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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Aims 
About a decade ago (when Gleitman, Gleitman, and Shipley published their 
study on "the emergence of the child as grarmarian"in 1972) developmental 
psycholinguists became interested in the acquisition of "linguistic awareness", 
i.e. in the child's ability to reflect and comment on language structures and 
functions. However, despite a growing body of empirical data on children's 
metalinguistic abilities (cf. especially the comprehensive overviews in 
Sinclair et al., 1978, and in Hakes, 1980) it is still an open question 
whether metalinguistic abilities play any role in children's acquisition of 
"primary" linguistic skills, such as language understanding (cf. Levelt, 
1974; Levelt et al., 1978; Clark, 1978a; Gleitman & Gleitman, 1979; List, 
1981; Karmiloff-Smith, 1981). 
The present research will try to answer this question. More particular-
ly, we are concerned with the investigation of development and interaction 
of language understanding and linguistic awareness. Three major problems are 
addressed in our study: 
a. How do language understanding and linguistic awareness change with age and 
experience? 
b. How do linguistic failures create awareness of these failures? 
c. How do linguistic awareness and language understanding interact in lan-
guage acquisition? 
Thus, a first aim of this work is the exploration of children's understanding 
(= performance) and awareness (different metalinguistic abilities) of some 
linguistic units (in our research: German possessive pronouns) in language 
acquisition. A second aim focuses on causes and functions of metalinguistic 
abilities in language development. Failure in communication might be a cause 
for linguistic awareness to arise, a possible function of linguistic aware-
ness could be prevention or repair of such failure, i.e. linguistic aware-
ness could serve as some kind of feedback mechanism or correction device 
(for this argument, cf. Claparède, 1917, 1918; Vygotsky, 1962; Marshall & 
Morton, 1978; Campbell, 1979). Our main hypothesis to be studied is that 
linguistic awareness at some stage (as apparent from different metalinguistic 
abilities such as error detection, the ability to provide better alternatives, 
and explanation) can lead to improvement of the child's spontaneous under-
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standing of correct forms. Rejection or confirmation of this hypothesis can 
shed some light on the enigmatic role of linguistic awareness in the acquisi-
tion of conmunicative abilities. 
1.2 Some Research Requirements 
In this section we will discuss some of the requirements that a system-
atic study of our questions must fulfill. The major ones are that our design 
allows for (1) an independent assessment of primary linguistic performance 
(here: understanding) and linguistic awareness; (2) a comparison of longi-
tudinal data on performance and awareness; and (3) a comparison of cross-
sectional data at different age levels. Furthermore the study should (4) use 
a "rich" linguistic domain; and include some form of (5) cross-validation. 
The first requirement for our research design is a clear distinction 
between language understanding (primary skill, performance) and linguistic 
awareness (reflections, metalinguistic abilities) and independent assessment 
of these two kinds of linguistic abilities. Our study will be restricted to 
only one part of linguistic "performance", i.e. to language understanding, 
although we can assume qualitative differences between language comprehension 
and production (Deutsch, 1982, p. 4: "the receptive abilities are usually 
somewhat ahead of their productive counterpart"; see also Maccoby & Bee, 
1965; Huttenlocher, 1974; Karmiloff-Smith, 1979b). Comprehension tests are 
preferable over production tests because language production shows in general 
only a small repertoire of language ability whereas comprehension tests can 
range wider in testing the child's competence. The comprehension (i.e. 
understanding) tests which we will call "performance tests" will be contrast-
ed with "awareness tests". For assessing the child's awareness we will ask 
for error detections, corrections, and explanations of linguistic mistakes 
which the experimenter will make. 
The second requirement is to observe whether the same child can perform 
better on a later test after he has demonstrated awareness in an earlier test. 
This within-child comparison makes a longitudinal set-up* of this study 
A longitudinal design requires that data are collected from an identical 
sample at two or more points of time in a defined time lag (cf. Helmreich, 
1977, p. 15, cf. also Baltes 4 Nessebroade, 1979, p. 3-7). In follow-up 
studies data are evaluated which are collected before the begin of a research 
study (cf. Helmreich, 1977, p. 12). We will, therefore, use the term 
"longitudinal". 
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necessary. It is noteworthy that our research is not a "learning experiment" 
(with awareness tests as independent variables) but rather an experimentally 
controlled correlation study. 
The third requirement is a cross-sectional comparison. Linguistic aware-
ness might facilitate future language understanding more at one life-time 
than at another. In order not to miss a critical age level for our longitudi-
nal study, different subsequent age levels have to be included in the study 
to start with. 
A fourth requirement is to use an important linguistic domain where 
children show substantial variability in competence up until a relatively 
advanced age level. The field of pronouns is such a linguistic domain. Pro-
nouns are among the latest acquired words. From both production and compre-
hension tests we know that German personal pronouns are not fully mastered 
before the age of 6;5 in children (Deutsch & Pechmann, 1978; Volbers, 1978). 
Since we have good reason to assume the same order of acquisition for per-
sonal and possessive pronouns (cf. Bohn, 1914; Goodenough, 1938) and since 
German possessive pronouns have not yet been systematically investigated, 
they will serve as our study material. This domain is, moreover, "rich" in 
view of morphophonological, syntactic, semantic, and deictic features (cf. 
Ingram. 1970) of pronouns. There are not only systematic intralinguistic 
relations between pronouns and other function words such as articles and 
demonstratives, but pronouns also relate systematically to extra-linguistic 
context because of semantic and deictic features. Syntactic features are 
relevant for distinctions of syntactic gender, semantic features for dis-
tinctions of natural gender, and deictic features for speaker/addressee 
shifts. This multiplicity of internal and external linguistic properties to-
gether with a slow pace of acquisition make pronouns a potentially faithful 
testing ground for the study of linguistic awareness. 
Our fifth requirement is the possibility to cross-validate our findings 
by testing our hypotheses by means of comparison between two areas of prob-
lems; the results of one study might confirm or falsify those of the other. 
Our first study, "shifting reference" (Study A), will not only test 
the role of linguistic awareness in the acquisition of possessive pronouns 
(variable terms) but also the more specific question of person deixis, 
both in the acquisition of language understanding and linguistic awareness. 
Deictic terras can only be understood in relation to the local-temporal 
position of the speaker (Bühler, 1934; Frei, 1944; Benveniste, 1965, 1966; 
Kuryjowicz, 1972; Clark, 1974; Clark & Sengul, 1978; Lyons, 1978; Tugendhat, 
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1976; Tanz, 1980; Charney, 1980). This implies that they do not only have a 
point of reference but that they also involve "shifting reference" (Jespersen, 
1922; Jakobson, 1963/1971; Harweg, 1978; Clark, 1978b; Deutsch & Pechmann, 
1978; Clark & Sengul, 1978, Tugendhat, 1979; Tanz, 1980; Habermas, 1971, 1975, 
1981; Bruner, 1982; Hickmann, in press). 
In a speech act we must distinguish between a speaker, an addressee, and 
a non-speaker/non-addressee (this can be either a listener who participates 
in a verbal comnum'cation situation or a non-present person). Personal or 
possessive pronouns,which comprise either speaker or addressee, change their 
form according to the point of reference. If a speaker says in self-reference 
"my present" the addressee must refer to the same present as "your present". 
Pronouns which involve both speaker and addressee or only third person par­
ticipants do not alter for speaker or addressee. Thus we must distinguish 
between pronouns which are affected by a speaker/addressee shift and those 
which are not. In this research we want to restrict the term "shifting 
reference" only to the speaker/addressee shift. 
In Study A it seems especially interesting to explore "shift awareness", 
i.e. the ability to detect, correct, and explain errors which are due to a 
shift from speaker to addressee. 
The second study, "natural and syntactic gender" (Study B ) , will also 
explore the role of linguistic awareness in pronoun acquisition. Study В 
focuses not so much on deictic features but on syntactic and semantic features 
of pronouns in performance and awareness tests. 
In the German pronoun system a multitude of information can be stacked 
in one single pronoun. There exist distinct forms for the so-called "semantic" 
characteristics of person, number, case, status, and gender (with respect to 
"semantic" characteristics, cf. Fillenbaum & Rapoport, 1971; Miller & 
Johnson-Laird, 1976; Klein, 1979). Personal and possessive pronouns refer 
in the first and second person to animates (inanimates are rarely "person­
alized"), in their third person they can relate to animates or to inanimates. 
Natural and syntactic gender only play a role in the third person singular 
but not in plural. Therefore, the third person singular is an epistemological-
ly interesting subject mattter. 
When reference is made to animates and there is no clash with syntactic 
gender (like in German: "das Mädchen, es ...") masculine and feminine gender 
indicate the sex of these animates. Here we speak of "natural gender" or 
"sexus". Both inanimates and animates are in German classified into three 
genders: masculine, feminine, and neuter "in order to account for two distinct 
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phenomena: (i) pronominal reference, and (ii) adjectival concord (or 'agree­
ment')" (Lyons, 1968, p. 283). Here we deal with "syntactic gender" or 
"genus". 
Our main interest is that natural gender has a semantic/cognitive base 
because of its extralinguisti с reference (persons can be looked at and judged 
for their sex) and that syntactic gender has a more morphophonological/ 
syntagmatic base because of its intralinguistic reference (Böhme & Levelt, 
1979). Hence, our second study on "natural and syntactic gender", which will 
have the same design as the first one on "shifting reference", studies the 
role of extralinguistic versus intralinguistic factors in the development of 
spontaneous language understanding and metalinguistic abilities. 
If we discover that metalinguistic abilities facilitate future perform-
ance in one study but not in the other we must be more cautious in our 
interpretation than in case of a convergence of both studies. 
Before we turn now to more specific discussions, let us give a short 
outline on how we will proceed in the following sections. In the next section 
2 different linguistic features for the classification of German possessive 
pronouns will be presented which - in section 3 - will be related to poten-
tial orders of skill acquisition. In section 4 we will distinguish different 
types of awareness which - in section 5 - will be associated with potential 
functions of awareness in language acquisition. In section 6 the results of 
Study A on "shifting reference" will be discussed and in section 7 the 
results of Study В on "natural and syntactic gender". The final section 8 
will contain conclusions of the main findings and some suggestions for 
further research. 
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2. LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF GERMAN POSSESSIVE PRONOUNS 
The notion of pronoun, as used in most descriptive grammars, was intro-
duced by the Alexandrian grammarians. Dyonisius Thrax (late second century 
B.C.) added to the four Stoic parts of speech ('noun', 'verb', 'conjunction', 
'article') four other ones, namely 'adverb', 'participle', 'preposition', 
and 'pronoun'. His definition is very concise: "The pronoun is a part of 
speech which is substitutable for a noun and which denotes certain persons. 
It has 6 characteristics: persons, gender, number, case, form, kind." (see 
Arens, 1974, p. 21-28). 
We cannot discuss here how this concept originally was conceived of and 
how it was elaborated and re-interpreted over the centuries when applied to 
other languages than Greek. Roughly speaking, there are four types of 
features which dominated the whole discussion of pronouns: 
- Morphophonological features: they concern the form of pronouns, their 
phonetic shape, inflection, stressability, etc.. 
- Syntactic features: they concern the role of pronouns within the whole 
sentence structure, for example whether they represent a noun, as tradi-
tionally assumed, or a noun phrase, as they obviously do in languages like 
German. 
- Semantic features: they concern the - mostly very general and abstract -
meaning of pronouns. 
- Deictic features: they concern the relation between pronouns and the speech 
situation, or rather specific elements of the speech situation; "I", for 
example, usually denotes the speaker, "you" usually denotes the addressee. 
This denotation underlies a constant change, depending on who is just 
speaking or listening. This phenomenon of "shifting reference" is one of 
the most salient features of pronouns (see, for example. Bühler, 1934, 
for a discussion of the deictic nature of pronouns). 
In the following we shall briefly consider these four feature types of 
pronouns, with special emphasis on semantic and deictic ones, since they are 
in the focus of our study. This discussion will neither be comprehensive 
nor very detailed. It should only prepare the ground for the presentation 
of our own investigation. Thus it will be basically limited to those pro-
nouns which function as independent variables in our own two studies. The 
first of these studies deals with "shifting reference", and the second 
with "gender". To begin with, let us briefly list the pronouns used in the 
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two studies. 
In the experiments on "shifting reference" (Study A), the following 
German possessive pronouns are used: 
mein, dein, sein, ihr, unser, euer. 
They are used to refer to the four "participants" of a speech situation: 
the experimenter, the subject, a male doll, and a female doll. It is import-
ant to note that some of the six pronouns are ambiguous: "ihr", for example, 
may refer to a singular female doll, or to two dolls (corresponding to 
English "her" and "their", respectively). In Table 1, these pronouns and 
some of their characteristics are listed. Whenever necessary we shall dis-
ambiguate ambiguous pronouns by subscripts; these subscript forms are given 
in the last columns. 
Table 1: German Possessive Pronouns of the Study on "Shifting Reference" 
person 
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
number 
singular 
plural 
singular 
plural 
singular 
plural 
referent(s) 
E(xperimenter) 
E & S(ubject) 
E & S & two dolls 
E & female doll 
S 
S & male doll 
male doll 
female doll 
two dolls 
pronouns 
mein 
unser 
unser 
unser 
dein 
euer 
sein 
ihr 
ihr 
pronominal 
abbreviations 
u n s e r i n c l . 
unser4 
u n s e r exc1. 
i h r sing. 
1 h r p l . 
In the two experiments on "natural and syntactic gender" (Study B), 
only two possessive pronouns are used: 
sein-e and ihr-e 
Morphologically, a German possessive pronoun consists of two parts (in 
the two examples above, they are separated by a hyphen). The first part 
(= free morpheme) is the lexical component; it is determined by semantic 
characteristics like person, number, gender and status of the possessor. The 
second part (= bound morpheme) is the inflectional component; it is determined 
by case, number and gender of the possession (cf. Helbig & Buscha, 1979). 
The possession is usually indicated by the following noun(s), and the pos-
sessor is given somewhere in the context. 
In our experiments, we are only interested in the gender of the possess-
or, that is, we are interested in the difference between, for example, 
"ihrre" vs. "sein-e", but not in differences such as the one between "ihr-e" 
vs. "ihr-er". In the first experiment on natural gender, the possessors are 
a male doll, a female doll, and a pig whose sex and hence whose natural 
gender is unspecified; it could even be referred to in the neuter gender 
("das Schweinchen"). The possession is a scarf ("die Schleife"). In the 
second experiment, on syntactic gender, the possessors are a dice ("der 
Würfel"), a watering-can ("die Gießkanne"), and a little boat ("das Boot/ 
Schiff/Bötchen"), and the "possession" - this word is somewhat inappropriate 
here - is the colour these objects had ("die Farbe"). This is summarized in 
Table 2. 
Table 2: German Possessive Pronouns of the Study on "Natural and Syntactic 
Gender" 
gender of the possessor 
natural gender 
task 
syntactic 
gender task 
masculine 
gender 
unspecified 
gender 
feminine 
gender 
masculine 
gender 
neuter 
gender 
feminine 
gender 
referent 
scarf (die Schleife) of the 
male doll (e.q. der Peter) 
scarf (die Schleife) of the 
pig (das Schweinchen) 
scarf (die Schleife) of the 
female doll (e.g. die Tina) 
colour (die Farbe) of the 
dice (der Würfel) 
colour (die Farbe) of the 
boat (das Boot/Schiff) 
colour (die Farbe) of the 
watering-can (die Gießkanne) 
pronoun 
"sein-e" 
"ihr-e" 
"sein-e" 
"ihr-e" 
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We will now turn to a discussion of the various features mentioned above. 
2.1 Some Morphophonological Features 
There is one aspect of the shape of pronouns which is particularly 
relevant in the present context; this is the collapsing of different functions 
in one morphophonological form. We might expect that children have special 
problems with this merging of functions in the acquisition of language under­
standing, so we will focus on the aspect of homonymity. 
Possessive pronouns, as personal pronouns in general, may be ambiguous; 
we already mentioned the example of "ihr". In the case of possessi ves,ambi­
guity may involve person, number, case, gender, and status. We shall consider 
them in turn: 
(1) Person: The free morpheme of the 3rd person singular and plural of the 
possessive pronoun "ihr" can be mixed up with: firstly, the 2nd 
person plural of the personal pronoun "ihr", and secondly, the 
politeness form (or 'V'-form, cf. Brown & Gilman, 1960) "Ihr", 
(2nd person singular and plural of the possessive pronoun) in 
spoken language. 
(2) Number: The free morpheme of the informal 3rd person of the possessive 
pronoun "ihr" can be either singular or plural (the same holds 
for the formal 2nd person possessive pronoun "Ihr"). 
(3) Case: a) The bound morpheme is identical for nominative and accusative 
of the masculine and neuter singular possessive pronoun "sein-tf" 
Ы denotes zero morpheme), b) The bound morpheme is not distinct­
ly marked for nominative and accusative of the feminine singu­
lar and plural pronoun "ihr-i(" (moreover, these can be confused 
with the dative inflection of the feminine 3rd person singular 
of the personal pronoun "ihr"), с) The bound morpheme is not 
distinctly marked for nominative and accusative of the feminine 
singular and all plural pronouns "sein-e" (this also holds for 
"ihr-e"). 
(4) Gender: a) The free morpheme of the masculine singular pronoun "sein" 
can be natural and syntactic gender (the same holds for the 
feminine singular and plural pronoun "ihr"), b) "sein" can be 
masculine or neuter, c) The bound morpheme of the feminine sin­
gular and all plural pronouns "sein-e" can be natural and 
syntactic gender (this also holds for "ihr-e"). 
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(5) Status: The free morpheme of the inforrcal 3rd person singular and plural 
"ihr" can be confused with the politeness form of the Znd person 
singular and plural of the possessive pronoun "Ihr" in spoken 
language (similarly for "ihr-e" and "Ihr-e"). 
There might be two additional sources of confusion: the pronoun "sein" 
and the infinitive of the auxiliary "sein" ('to be') might be confused, and 
it m'ght be difficult to differentiate the three meanings of "unser" (see 
Table 1). 
2.2 Some Syntactic Features 
Despite several controversial issues with respect to the syntactic 
classification of German pronouns (cf. e.g. Schmidt, 1965) we will briefly 
outline three of the most important and uncontroversial syntactic features 
of German possessive pronouns. 
Firstly, personal pronouns - including possessives - are noun phrases. 
In this respect, the tem "pro-noun" is very misleading: pronouns do not 
"replace" nouns but noun phrases (as to the "noun-conception", cf. the school 
granmars of Duden, 1966, or Schoebe, 1974, and the linguistic notions enter-
tained by Bloomfield, 1933; Pei & Gaynor, 1965; Lyons, 1968; Erben, 1977; as 
to the "noun phrase-conception", cf. Lyons, 197/a; Klein, 1979; Klein & 
Rieck, 1982). Possessive pronouns share three uses with noun phrases in 
general : 
1. Argument use: Here is my house. His is bigger. 
2. Predicative use: Here is the house. It is mine. 
3. Attributive use: This is his house. 
Secondly, coreferentiality of noun phrases and pronouns only holds for 
anaphoric uses but not for deictic uses. Anaphoric use is restricted to 3rd 
person pronouns and includes two subcases: 
- anaphoric use in the narrower sense (Bühler1s "Rückverweis", cf. Bühler, 
1934, p. 122): full noun phrase precedes corresponding pronoun, as in: 
"When Paul heard the message, he dropped dead". 
- cataphoric use (Bühler's "Vorverweis"): full noun phrase follows corres-
ponding pronoun, as in: "When he heard the message, Paul dropped dead". 
Thirdly, coreferentiality of noun phrases and pronouns is the basis for 
early linguistic descriptions which considered replacement (pronouns 'stand 
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for' noun phrases) to be "subject to very rigid graimati cal rules" (Lees & 
Klima, 1963). The derivational paradigm in which pronominalization is ex-
plained by means of formal transformations (cf. e.g. Jacobs & Rosenbaum, 
1968; Postal, 1969) has been given up by now (cf. Hankamer & Sag, 1976; 
Evans, 1980; Koster, 1979, 1981; Chomsky, 1981). In recent treatments in 
which semantic implications of pronouns are considered, a distinction is 
made between so-called "bound variable pronouns" and "free variable pronouns". 
The former have to be in the scope of a quantifier (like in "Everybody thinks 
that he is important"), or they must stand in a specific syntactic configur-
ation to the corresponding noun phrase (so-called "c-command"-relation, see 
Reinhart, 1976, and, for a longer discussion. Koster, 1979). The latter don't 
undergo syntactic restrictions at all. They are referring expressions, names, 
or definite descriptions, and whether they are coreferential to another noun 
phrase depends on general discourse context (for example "John hates his 
neighbour's dog. He shot him"). Thus it is assumed that only a very specific 
class of occurrences is governed by syntactic restrictions. 
Let us now turn to implications of syntactic functions and coreferen-
tial ity for the possessive pronouns which are used in our study. For both 
studies ("shifting reference" and "natural and syntactic gender"), we have 
to take into account at least four morphosyntactic aspects. 
Firstly, all possessive pronouns tested occur in attributive use (e.g. 
"mein Geschenk'Vmy present in shifting reference; "ihre Schleife'Vher scarf 
in the natural gender task; and "ihre Farbe'Vher colour in the syntactic 
gender task). Possessive pronouns in attributive use can be inflected. The 
suffix '-e' in the gender tasks requires a distinction between the coreferen-
tiality of free morpheme and possessor, on the one hand, and of bound mor-
pheme and possession, on the other. 
Secondly, all possessive pronouns (including the anaphoric 3rd person 
pronouns) get the feature (+def) since all referents will first be introduced 
by definite articles. 
Thirdly, the introduction of the referents by their definite articles 
allows for a one-to-one mapping between the gender and number of the noun 
phrase and the gender and number of the pronoun. The syntactic characteristic 
"case" can be neglected because the morphophonological forms do not differ 
the nominative and accusative in those pronouns which we will use (cf. 2.1). 
Fourthly, proper names of the dolls can carry definite articles in 
German. This may lead to referential confusion between natural and syntactic 
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gender: both dolls can be referred to as "die Puppe'Vthe doll. "Die" indicates 
feminine syntactic gender. The female doll can be called "das Madchen'Vthe 
girl. "Das" indicates neuter syntactic gender. To avoid this confusion the 
definite articles of the dolls' names will be stressed in both studies. 
2.3 Some Semantic Features 
Although thers are numerous interesting problems with respect to the 
ccnplexity of semantic features we tail! only discuss the markedness of 
German possessive pronouns which plays a major role in the hypotheses of our 
experiments. 
The concept of irarkedness was first introduced and systematically in­
vestigated by the phonologists of the Prague Circle, especially by 
Trubetzkoy and by Jakobson. In phonology, sounds are described in terms of 
phonological features. Thus, Geman [p] and [b] are only distinguished by 
one such feature [± voiced] , where b is voiced and ρ is not. It now often 
happens that only one element of such a pair is marked for such a feature, 
and the other element is simply unspecified or unmarked, that is, one is 
fixed, and the other one may be pronounced either way. This idea of an 
opposition between "neutral", unmarked elements and marked elements proved 
to be very fruitful, and various authors tried to apply it to semantic 
features, as well. Animals, for example, are specified for a feature [± malej 
- or [i female] - which separates men, bulls, boars fron women, cows, pigs. 
Now we may use a word like "der Hund'Vthe dog which (as opposed to "die 
Hundin'Vthe bitch) has [+ male] for reference to any dog if we don't want 
to specify its sex, that is, it can be used as an unmarked form, too, 
whereas "Hundin'Vbitch is always marked for sex. Another case in question is 
the asyrmetric use of pairs like "young-old" where "old" - the unmarked 
element - is used to refer to any age ("John is one year old", rathe1· than 
"one year young"). 
In all cases of this sort, the unmarked element is more neutral, more 
frequent, less informative, whereas its marked counterpart is more specific: 
it carries more senantic weight, with respect to the feature "male", "Hündin"/ 
bitch says more than "Hund'Vdog. Following this general idea. Greenberg 
(1970) has worked out a set of criteria for markedness. In her comprehensive 
study of German pronouns, Volbers (1978) has systematically applied these 
criteria and developed a most economical description of this system. 
Since her analysis of personal pronouns is easily transferable to 
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possessive pronouns we shall adapt it for our present concern. She only 
discusses the features "person", "number", and "gender", i.e. those we are 
interested in, too. The feature "person" is split into "reference to the 
speaker" (+ Ego) and "participation in the speech event" (+ Se). This sub­
division is based on earlier work by Huxley (1970) and Sharpless (1974). It 
allows the postulation of hierarchical relations of various sorts. Applied to 
possessive pronouns, her analysis yields the following description: 
"mein" 
"dein" 
"sein" 
"
i h r s i n g . " 
"unser" 
"euer" 
ЧЬГпі. " 
(+ Ego) 
(- Ego; 
(- Ego; 
(- Ego; 
(+ Ego; 
(- Ego; 
(- Ego; 
+ Se) 
- Se) 
- Se; + Fe(minine 
+ Pl(ural)) 
+ Se; + Pl(ural)) 
- Se; + Pl(ural)) 
On the basis of various criteria, mostly taken from Greenberg (1970), 
Volbers concludes that the following feature specifications characterize the 
marked element: 
(- Ego), i.e. (+ Ego) is unmarked 
(- Se) 
(+Fe) 
(+ P D . 
For a hierarchical ordering of pronoun complexity we will make three 
assumptions. Firstly, the more features a pronoun has, the more complex it 
is. Secondly, there is an intrinsic order of feature complexity. The feature 
(Ego) dominates (Se), (Se) dominates (Fe) and (pi.). (Ego) dominates (Se) 
for two reasons. Only the 2nd person and status are interrelated. We can also 
observe that "I and you" = "we", but not "you". (Ego) and (Se) dominate (Fe) 
because not all languages have gender pronouns but all have 1st and 2nd 
person (cf. Forchheimer, 1953). (Se) dominates the interrelationship between 
status and number (the V-forms are not distinguished with respect to number). 
Thirdly, markedness contributes to complexity. 
Table 3 shows us the markedness of German possessive pronouns for the 
Semantic Feature Hypothesis (SFH) which is relevant for our predictions for 
"shifting reference" (cf. 3.2, Diagram 1). In this table different relations 
are displayed: a "-" means that the row element is unmarked with respect to 
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the column element; a "+" indicates that the row element is marked with respect 
to the column element. Not all items are comparable in this sense; this is 
designated by "0". 
Table 3: Markedness of German Possessive Pronouns 
mein 
dein 
sein 
ihrsing. 
" " ^ i n c l / 
unser4 
u n s e rexcl. 
euer 
i h rpl. 
mein 
+Ego 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
dein 
-Ego 
+Se 
-
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
sein 
-Ego 
-Se 
-
-
+ 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
""•slag. 
+Fe 
-
-
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
unser.* 
+Ego 
+Se 
+P1 
-
0 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
u n s e rexcl. 
+Ego 
-Se 
+PI 
-
0 
0 
0 
-
+ 
+ 
euer 
-Ego 
+Se 
+P1 
-
-
0 
0 
-
-
+ 
ihr
Pl. 
-Ego 
-Se 
+P1 
-
-
-
0 
-
-
-
In addition we may assume that neuter pronouns are marked with respect 
to masculine and feminine pronouns and that natural gender is unmarked with 
respect to syntactic gender (cf. Greenberg, 1970). 
Though markedness theory can make rather precise statements about lin-
guistic complexity by contrasting semantic features, more recent approaches 
stress the importance of deictic features for the complexity of pronouns. 
Tanz (1980, p. 1) expresses this point saying: "Personal pronouns are para-
digmatic deictic terms.". 
Note that both "unser. , " and "unser." are plural pronouns which include incl. 4 r 
speaker and addressee. 
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2.4 Some Deictic Features 
Deixis is a way of referring which is essentially based on the point of 
view of the speaker (the "I, here, and now") vis à vis the addressee in the 
situation of speech (as to specifications with respect to the linguistic 
concept of "deixis", cf. e.g. Biihler, 1934; Hirt, 1934; Fillnore, 1971; 
Ehlich, 1978; Jarvella & Klein, 1982). It is not only expressed by linguistic 
means but also by nonverbal concommitants (eye-movements, gestures, head and 
body turns). Deictic terms depend on extralinguistic context (as to the 
infant's step from 'behavioral' to 'linguistic' deixis, cf. Bruner, 1974/ 
1975). Therefore, their meaning must be derived by linguistic and perceptual/ 
cognitive strategies. 
What distinguishes deictic terms such as pronouns from other referring 
expressions (proper names and definite descriptions)? There are at least 
two substantial characteristics which make the status of pronouns so unique 
although these characteristics also hold for local and temporal deixis (we 
will limit this analysis to person deixis and not go into the problems of 
temporal or local deixis, e.g. the problem of "shifting boundaries" in local 
deixis, cf. Clark, 1978b). 
The first characteristic concerns the variability of reference. "I" can 
refer to any speaker but in general a definite description like "the blond 
author" or a proper name like "Peter" refers to a specified person in all 
comunicative situations. Since the characteristic "variable reference" is 
only a matter of degree (definite descriptions are also variable in reference, 
cf. Nunberg, 1978) it cannot be considered to be the critical characteristic. 
The second characteristic concerns the shifting between speaker and 
addressee. The "shifting reference" feature is much more critical since it 
implies reciprocity between speaker and addressee. When a speaker says: "This 
is щ^ present" the addressee could answer: "Yes, this is your present", thus 
changing the reference marker. This does not hold for most proper names and 
definite descriptions (e.g. "This is Peter's present" or "This is the present 
of the blond author"). Thus, the overt forms of sentences with proper names 
and definite descriptions do not change between speaker and addressee, but 
ч 
Although Clark & Sengul (1978) attribute "shifting reference" to 3rd person 
pronouns we will restrict this term to the speaker/addressee shift. 
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they do change for pronouns, which either involve speaker or addressee (but 
not both of them). A specification of "shifting reference" involves a dis­
tinction of two pronoun meanings for those pronouns which involve speaker or 
addressee: utterance meaning and word meaning (cf. Bar-Hillel, 1967; Lyons, 
1973, 1977b). Although the same form "I" (or "my") can rotate from speaker 
to speaker in actual comnunication situations (utterance meaning), it has at 
the same time the invariant meaning "speaker" (word meaning). This is the 
case when an addressee embodies the utterance of a speaker directly, i.e. in 
some sort of speech quotation. In the following example, the addressee must 
take two perspectives simultaneously in one sentence, his own and the one of 
the speaker. 
(i) speaker В to A: "Your last sentence was 'this is m^ present."' 
(both "your" and "my" refer in this sentence to the same person A). 
In (i) "your" reflects B's perspective towards A and "my" B's embodiment of 
A's perspective. Thus, on the one hand, "your" is used in its utterance 
function, because В addresses A. On the other hand, "my" is not used in its 
utterance function but in its word function because "my" indicates A, but A 
is not the speaker at the very moment of the utterance. Therefore, in this 
one sentence (i) two different pronouns are implied which refer to the same 
person, utterance meaning "your" and word meaning "my". In some contexts 
(e.g. A to B: "This is щ^ present. What was m^ last sentence?") "your last 
sentence was" can be deleted by В so that we get the utterance: "This is my 
present" from В where В is the speaker but not the owner of the present. 
Note that this does not hold in case of proper names and definite descriptions. 
Examples: 
(ii) speaker A to B: "This is Peter's present." 
(iii) speaker В to A: "Yes, this is Peter's present." 
(iv) speaker В to A: "Your last sentence was 'this is Peter's present'". 
The distinction between word or sentence meaning and utterance meaning 
is relevant in speech act theory where there is a basic difference between 
what is said and what is implied (cf. Grice, 1975). In (i) it is said: "Your 
last sentence was 'this is m^ present"', but implied is: "Your last sentence 
was this is your present". 
The first deictic characteristic "variable reference" is more important 
for 3rd person pronouns than for those which involve speaker and/or addressee 
since they have a larger range of potential references (e.g. inanimates). 
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Thus, one could conclude that the former are linguistically more complex than 
the latter. Moreover, speaker and addressee are usually present in the com­
municative situation and can be identified whereas 3rd person pronouns may be 
used for human beings, animals, and things which are absent. Therefore, we 
might assume that "mein", "dein", " и п 5 е г,-
п с
1 "· " u n s e rexcl "' an(' "euer" a r e 
less complex than "sein", "ihr . ", and "ihr. ". Pronouns which involve 
the second deictic characteristic "shifting reference" are called "shift 
pronouns". These comprise either speaker or addressee but not both of them. 
We only find shift pronouns in the "shifting reference" study but not in the 
"natural and syntactic gender" study. These pronouns have either the semantic 
feature (+ Ego) or (+ Se), but not both of them: 
"mein" (+ Ego), 
"dein" (- Ego; + Se), 
"unser ι " (+ Ego; - Se; + plural), and 
"euer" (- Ego; + Se; + plural). 
The second deictic characteristic "shifting reference" does not apply 
to: 
"sein" (- Ego; - Se), 
"
i h r
sing." (- Ego, - Se;
 +
 Fe), 
"unser- ι " (+ Ego; + Se; + plural), and 
"ihr , " (- Ego; - Se; + plural). 
Whereas the "variable reference" characteristic depends exclusively on the 
intentions of the speaker, the "shifting reference" characteristic takes 
both speaker and addressee into account. Thus, we come to a different con­
clusion for the second deictic characteristic than for the first one with 
respect to deictic complexity: the shift pronouns ("mein", "dein", "unse,"
exc
-i 
and "euer") are more complex than non-shift pronouns ("sein", "ihr . ", 
"unser i n c l;. a n d " i h r p l / ) . 
A third deictic characteristic stresses also the importance of speaker 
or addressee but now of both: speaker and addressee are focused. Deutsch & 
Pechmann (1978) who used a similar experimental set-up as the one in the 
"shifting reference" study consider the "proximal-nonproximal contrast" 
(Lyons, 1975) as a decisive factor apart from the two principles "speaker-
nonspeaker contrast" and "singular-nonsingular" contrast". They claim that 
"this principle establishes a boundary between two areas in the positional 
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structure" (p. 157) with speaker and addressee on one side and others on the 
opposite side. Physical proximity and eye-contact are more likely for speaker 
and addressee than between speaker (or addressee) and another participant. 
Therefore, speaker and/or addressee pronouns which include basic reference 
points should be less complex than speaker (or addressee) and other partici-
pant pronouns. Pronouns which refer exclusively to one or more participants 
are even more complex "since the content being conveyed is not congruent with 
the people innediately engaged in the exchange of information". The "proximal-
nonproximal contrast" ranks possessive pronouns in the following order: the 
least complex are "mein", "dein", and "unser-¡nci "· raore complex are 
"unser , ", and "euer", and the most complex are "sein", "ihr . " and 
"ihr , ". In order to get a clearer picture of deictic complexity, different 
pronoun rankings will be shown in dependence of deictic characteristics 
(Table 4). 
Table 4: Deictic Complexity of German Possessive Pronouns 
order of 
complexity 
high 
complexity 
medium 
complexity 
low 
complexity 
first deictic 
characteristic 
variable reference 
(and "presence") 
sein 
ihrsing. 
i h rpl. 
mein 
dein 
unserincl. 
unserexc7 
euer e x '· 
second deictic 
characteristic 
shifting 
reference 
mein 
dein 
unserexcl. euer " ^ 1 · 
sein 
% 1 . 
third deictic 
characteristic 
proximal-nonpro-
ximal contrast 
sein 
1hrs1ng. 
ihrpl. 
unserexcl. 
euer 
mein 
dein 
unserincl. 
From Table 4 we can see that only one possessive pronoun is uncontro-
versial with respect to deictic complexity: "unser. , " is not very complex. 
The first and third deictic characteristic ("variable reference" and pro-
ximal-nonproximal contrast") allow similar pronoun rankings, with a further 
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specification for the "proximal-nonproximal contrast" which exhibits an in-
between position for "uriserexci " an(l "euer". However, the second deictic 
characteristic, on the one hand, and the first and third deictic character-
istics, on the other hand, rank pronoun complexity in inverse order, with the 
exception of "unser. , ". r
 m c I. 
What can we expect on the basis of linguistic complexity, morphophono-
logical, syntactic, semantic, and deictic characteristics, for the order of 
acquisition? 
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3. GENERAL PREDICTIONS ON THE ORDER OF ACQUISITION FOR UNDERSTANDING 
Because linguistic forms are for a child a means to express his cogni-
tions of the environment (Slobin, 1973), we must distinguish between lin-
guistic forms and conceptual implications of these forms. We should distin-
guish at least three conceptual implications for the predictions of skill 
acquisition which will be analyzed separately for the study on "shifting 
reference" and for the study on "natural and syntactic gender". 
Firstly, potential difficulties in the acquisition of German possessive 
pronouns may be due to different degrees of complexity in morphophonological 
and syntactic features. We will base our predictions on the assumption that 
homonyms (such as "ihr,- "/"ihr , ") are more complex and therefore more sing. pi. 
difficult than non-homonyms (such as "mein'V'dein") (cf. 2.1). In our progno-
sis we will take into account to what pronouns refer (cf. 2.2) because syn-
tactic agreement between article and pronoun can be problematic for the 
child's understanding of 3rd person pronouns. 
Secondly, semantic features could be decisive for the order of acquisi-
tion. In 2.3 we analyzed German possessive pronouns in terms of markedness. 
The Semantic Feature Hypothesis (SFH) claims that unmarked words should be 
acquired earlier than marked ones and that children might substitute unmarked 
words for marked ones but not reversely. Thus, the first claim predicts the 
order of correct usage and the second one the type of errors during acquisi-
tion. 
Thirdly, deictic characteristics could be of importance for correct pro-
noun acquisition. In 2.4 three characteristics were investigated which showed 
different degrees of deictic complexity. On the assumption that deictically 
more complex pronouns will be acquired later than less complex ones we will 
come to different predictions for acquisitional ranking. 
Differential difficulties of morphophonological, syntactic, semantic, 
and deictic characteristics may lead to conflicting predictions for pronomi-
nal acquisition. An overview of converging and diverging expectations will 
be given in 3.4. 
3.1 Predictions Based on Morphophonological and Syntactic Characteristics 
When children acquire language they must perceive and discriminate sound 
differences. Which of the phonemically different pronominal forms and which 
of the phonemically identical pronominal forms could cause difficulties in 
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the referent identification of the two studies, "shifting reference" and 
"natural and syntactic gender"? 
In the performance task of the "shifting reference" study the experi-
menter will ask for correct identification, one out of nine presents, after 
possessor relationships have been introduced. Nine possessive pronouns refer 
to nine different presents, but only six can be phonemically discriminated 
in adult language. These six possessive pronouns are: "mein", "dein", "sein", 
"ihr", "unser", and "euer" (cf. Table 1). However, the pronominal form 
"unser" can refer to three different presents, and the pronominal form "ihr" 
to two different presents. These two pronouns, "unser" and "ihr", are poten-
tially confusing because one and the same form can denote more than one 
referent. 
"Mein", "dein", "sein", and "euer" are phonemically different forms in 
adult language. Can we assume that "mein", "dein", and "sein" in which only 
the initial consonant is phonemically different will be a source of trouble 
for the child? It has been observed that "cluster reduction", the deletion 
of initial consonants (e.g. "ein" for "mein"), is a problem of expressive 
phonology but not of receptive phonology for children (De Villiers & De 
Villiers, 1978). De Villiers & De Villiers also report substitutions, such 
as stops for fricatives and vice versa (e.g. /d/ for /z/) in early utter-
ances. However, Gamica (1973) who studied phonemic speech perception in 
children between the age of 1;5 and 1;10 found that nine out of twelve 
children could discriminate between stops (e.g. /d/) and fricatives (e.g. 
/z/). Phonological assimilation, the maintenance of the same place of 
articulation for phonemes can further be a problem of production in children. 
These findings suggest that children discriminate among nasals (e.g. /m/), 
stops (e.g. /d/), and fricatives (e.g. /z/) in phonemic perception at a very 
early age. The fact that small children sometimes substitute "mein" for 
"dein" and vice versa is therefore most likely due to cognitive/psychological 
factors and not to sound similarity. It has been observed that "ich" and "du" 
of the 1st and 2nd person personal pronoun are also mixed up in the same 
child when "mein" and "dein" are confused (cf. Baronin von Taube's child, 
cited in Gheorgov, 1905). Thus, we should not stress phonemic factors in 
case of a confusion between "mein", "dein", and "sein". 
Which other morphophonological difficulties can be expected for the 
identification of "mein", "dein", "sein", and "euer"? Case and gender jumbles 
(cf. 2.1) for "sein" are irrelevant for "shifting reference" because we will 
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only administer this pronoun in accusative case in the performance tasks and 
because we will only deal with natural gender. Due to the syntactic form of 
the experimenter's question confusion with the infinitive of the auxiliary 
verb "sein" is highly unlikely. Therefore, we will not expect any effects on 
the use of "mein", "dein", "sein", and "euer" due to sound confusion, or 
homonymity. 
However, "unser" and "ihr" could be problematic because of their pluri-
functionality. The German possessive pronoun "unser" is not overtly marked 
for the inclusion or exclusion of the addressee (as to an overt inclusion-
exclusion distinction for the 1st person plural in other languages, cf. 
Ingram, 1970). Since the experimenter will ask three times for "unser" 
present the child has to find out which referent could be meant. Intra!in-
guistic information is not available for him. The three "unser" pronouns 
cannot be distinguished with respect to person, number, case, gender, and 
status. All three are 1st person pronouns, plural, and accusative. Gender and 
status are not marked for these possessive pronouns. This lack of information 
makes "unser" complex and difficult. 
The pronoun "ihr" which has two referents in the "shifting reference" 
study is also plurifunctional. If we neglect case and gender confusions, 
person, number, and status conflicts are likely. A mix-up with the personal 
pronoun "ihr" (cf. 2.1) is not expected because of the syntactic form of the 
experimenter question. In the jumble between person and status in spoken 
language (T-form "ihr'W-fonn "Ihr") status itself is considered as the main 
characteristic for pronominal ambiguity. This means that the so-called seman-
tic characteristic "person" does not provide major complications in the 
identification of "ihr". Number confusions are very probable ("ihr" can be 
singular or plural). Status could be a source of trouble although it is 
difficult to imagine that dolls will be addressed by V-forms and although 
Bates (1976) reports that formal address items are not very successfully 
discriminated by most children before the age of 5;6 in Italian. But the fact 
that formal addresses are used at the age of 3;6 and that it is possible to 
attribute status to the experimenter could give rise to intralinguistic 
conflicts. 
Since it is difficult to decide beforehand which of the two pronominal 
forras, "unser" or "ihr", are referentially more ambiguous we will solely rely 
on intralinguistic conflicts. We expect that "unser" is less difficult than 
"ihr" because "unser" is not only distinctively marked for an inclusion or 
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exclusion of the addressee but "ihr" is the same phonemic form for the 
singular "ihr", the plural "ihr", and the status "Ihr". 
As to syntactic coreferentiality in the "shifting reference" study 3rd 
person pronouns could be easier than 1st and 2nd person pronouns. Usually, 
only 3rd person pronouns function anaphorically. Number agreement holds for 
the 3rd person singular pronouns "sein" and "ihr", and for the 3rd person 
plural pronoun "ihr". Gender agreement is only notable for the two singular 
pronouns "sein" and "ihr". Proper names of the male and the female doll will 
be preceded by definite articles (e.g. der Hänsel/die Gretel). Since "sein" 
and "ihr . " are coreferential with respect to number and gender but 
sing. r 
"ihr ι " only with respect to number we will predict that "ihr·. " will be 
acquired earlier. Thus our predictions for morphophonological and syntactic 
characteristics in the acquisition of German possessive pronouns of the 
"shifting reference" study will be as follows: 
Table 5: Predictions Based on Morphophonological and Syntactic Characteristics 
for "Shifting Reference" 
Early 
Acquisition 
Later 
Acquisition 
Late 
Acquisition 
Morphophonological 
Characteristics 
euer 
mein 
dein 
sein 
u n s e rincl. 
u n s e r
excl. 
unser4 
^•"sing. 
i h rpl. 
Syntactic 
Characteristics 
sein 
1 h r
sing. 
i h rpl. 
mein 
dein 
u n s e rincl. 
и п 5 е г
ехс1. 
unser. 
euer 
Table 5 shows us that morphophonological and syntactic characteristics 
do not lead to the same conclusions about the order of acquisition for the 
pronouns of the "shifting reference" study. There is only one exception: 
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"sein" should be acquired early. Let us now see which predictions are possible 
on the basis of morphophonological and syntactic characteristics for the 
study on "natural and syntactic gender". 
Which entanglements do morphophonological characteristics provide in 
the "gender" study? Is there any chance that the child confounds the free 
morpheme which refers to the possessor with the bound morpheme which refers 
to the possession? The separation of two overt morphemes (sein-e; ihr-e) 
could be difficult but since this holds for both pronouns we will not con-
sider this problem in the gender task itself. We could, however, predict 
that "sein" and "ihr" of the "shifting reference" study are less complicated 
and will thus be acquired earlier than "seine" and "ihre" of the study 
"natural and syntactic gender". Will the child notice that one and the same 
word has different referential functions? Person and case are irrelevant for 
the gender tasks because we only deal with 3rd person pronouns in nominative 
case. Number will also not play a role because singular and plural cannot 
be confused. In case of plural reference we would have to ask: "Ihre 
Schleifen/Farben sind?" (Their scarfs/colours are?). Trouble could arise for 
status and gender. We already mentioned that "ihr" or "ihre" are phonemical-
ly the same as the V-forms "Ihr" or "Ihre". We should not exclude that 
"ihre" could give rise to intralinguistic conflicts although it is not very 
likely that dolls will be addressed that way in the "natural gender" task. 
This is even more true for the objects of the "syntactic gender" task from 
an adult point of view but a little child who does not yet know that 3rd 
person pronouns can also refer to inanimates might relate them only to persons 
(and would thus make a random choice in the syntactic gender task). Thus, 
"ihre" might be more difficult in the syntactic gender tasks than in the 
natural gender tasks. This holds also for "seine". "Seine" is probably more 
ambiguous than "ihre" because it can be either masculine or neuter. In the 
natural gender task the male doll has masculine gender (e.g. der Hansel) and 
the pig has no specific sex but will be introduced by the neuter definite 
article "das" (Schweinchen Dick*). This unspecifity of "seine" which is even 
more important in the natural gender task than in the syntactic gender task 
where "seine" can only refer to the dice which is masculine (der Würfel) or 
* 
Note that "Dick" is not a nick-name for "Richard" as it is in English. This 
name suggests in German that it is a fat pig (dick = fat). 
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the boat which is neuter (das Boot/das Schiff) might pose more problems than 
"ihre". 
There is a clash for the predictions of "seine" with respect to its pre-
cedence in the syntactic gender task, because this pronoun is referentially 
more specified in the syntactic gender task than in the natural gender task, 
and with respect to its precedence in the natural gender task because the 
child might only be able to refer "seine" to animates. The unspecifity of 
"seine" in the natural gender task is probably more problematic for the child 
than the exclusion of "seine" for objects since he will be told to refer the 
experimenter's questions to the puppets or the objects in front of him. 
As to the syntactic coreferentiality we will expect that "seine" will 
be acquired later than "ihre" in both tasks since "seine" can refer to more 
than one definite noun phrase but "ihre" only to one. Both "seine" and "ihre" 
could be excluded for objects by the child which would allow for their pre-
cedence in the natural gender task but we will only predict this precedence 
for "ihre" since the unspecifity for "seine" in the natural gender task allows 
for a stronger precedence in the syntactic gender task. What can we predict 
for morphophonological and syntactic characteristics in the acquisition of 
German possessive pronouns for the study on "natural and syntactic gender"? 
Table 6: Predictions Based on Morphophonological and Syntactic Characteristics 
for "Natural and Syntactic Gender" 
Early 
Acquisition 
Later 
Acquisition 
Late 
Acquisition 
Morphophonological 
Characteristics 
ihre (natural gender) 
ihre (syntactic gender) 
seine (syntactic gender) 
seine (natural gender) 
Syntactic 
Characteristics 
ihre (natural gender) 
ihre (syntactic gender) 
seine(syntactic gender) 
seine (natural gender) 
If the child can only refer 3rd person pronouns to persons, he has to guess 
which possessive pronouns refer to which objects in the syntactic gender task. 
It is also likely that he will not give any answer. 
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From Table 6 we can see that predictions which are based on morphopho-
nological characteristics are the same for "natural and syntactic gender" as 
the ones which are derived from syntactic characteristics. How do these 
predictions compare to what can be expected on the basis of semantic features? 
3.2 The Semantic Feature Hypothesis (SFH) and Its Relation to Performance 
The Semantic Feature Hypothesis (SFH) (cf. H. Clark, 1969; H. Clark, 
1973; E. Clark, 1973) which provides the most elaborated and precise pre-
dictions for the order of acquisition is based on the assumption that formal 
semantic complexity and cognitive complexity are interrelated. In numerous 
studies it has been found that cognitive complexity and acquisitional diffi-
culty go hand in hand (for some overviews, see especially Inhelder, Sinclair, 
and Bovet, 1974; Flavell, 1977; Gelman, 1978). If there is a close relation-
ship between linguistic and cognitive complexity and if cognitively more 
complex structures and functions are acquired later, then one could expect 
that linguistically more complex structures and functions come later in 
children's language than less complex ones. These predictions can be related 
to markedness. The SFH claims that unmarked words, the linguistically less 
complex terms, should be observed before marked ones which are linguistically 
more complex. The basic ontogenetic principles of the SFH can be circumscribed 
as follows: 
- the top-to-bottom hypothesis (more general/unmarked features should be 
acquired before specific/marked ones), and 
- the top overgeneralization hypothesis (terms with more general/unmarked 
features can be substituted for the ones with specific/marked ones but not 
vice versa). 
The first principle concerns the order of acquisition of a correct semantic 
term which consists "of adding more features of meaning to the lexical entry 
of the word until the child's combination of features in the entry for that 
word corresponds to the adult's." (E. Clark, 1973, p. 72). The second prin-
ciple yields a possible explanation for incorrect overextensions in early 
language (e.g. "daddy" for all male persons). These two principles concern 
only semantic complexity of words (for a research overview, cf. Richards, 
1979). 
On the basis of our markedness analysis in German possessive pronouns 
(cf. 2.3, especially Table 3) we can now formulate our expectations for 
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semantic feature acquisition. According to the first ontogenetic principle 
of the SFH we come to the following prognoses for "shifting reference" (which 
can be derived from Table 3 in 2.3): Possessive pronouns should be acquired 
in the order depicted in Diagram 1. 
Diagram 1: Partial Order Predictions of the SFH for "Shifting Reference" 
Early 
Acquisition 
mein (+ Ego) 
dein (-Ego; +Se) unser» 
(+Ego; +Se;+Pl) 
sein (-Ego; -Se) 
ihrsing. (-E3o;-Se;+Fe) 
Late 
Acquisition 
u n s e rincl. 
(+Ego;+Se;+Pl) 
u n s e rexcl. 
(+Ego;-Se;+Pl) 
euer (-Ego;+Se; 
+P1) 
ihr , (-Ego; -Se; 
p l
· +P1) 
In order to understand what Diagram 1 implies, let us give two examples: 
the first one concerns the acquisition of "dein", and the second one the 
acquisition of "euer". The possessive pronoun "dein" should be acquired 
before "sein", "ihr . _ ", and "ihr , " but after "mein". We cannot make any 
sing. pi. 
predictions for "dein" with respect to " u n s e ri n ci " and "unserexcl "* T'le 
possessive pronoun "euer" should be acquired before "ihr·. " but after 
"unser . ", " u n s e rì n ci "ι "mein", and "dein". We cannot make any predictions 
for "euer" with respect to "sein" and " i h r
s
i
n
n "· 
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No predictions can be made for differential acquisition of the two in-
clusive "unser" (i.e. "unser.¡nci " а ^ "unser-") since they are not differ­
ently marked. 
The SFH does not only concern the order of acquisition but also the 
referential overextensions (second ontogenetic principle which makes 
assumptions about the probability of certain mistakes). When mistakes occur 
the unmarked term should be used for the marked one but not vice versa. It is 
more likely that children substitute terms by a slightly less marked one than 
by a slightly more marked one. Fremgen & Fay (1980) report from their experi­
ment that "children ALWAYS know the correct referents of the words they 
overextend", thus demonstrating that errors are due to linguistic difficulties 
and not to a lack of conceptual discrimination. This finding agrees with the 
markedness hypotheses of the SFH. 
For the "shifting reference" experiment we can say that if children err 
on possessive pronouns they are likely to substitute: "mein" for "dein", 
"dein" for "sein", "sein" for "ihr,.. ", "mein" for "unserin(:1 ", "unser^^" 
(and possibly "mein" since German does not provide a phonemic difference 
between the two "unser") for " u n s e r
e x c
i "· "dein" (and possibly "unser
 1 " 
if (Se) is not yet fully mastered) for "euer", and "sein" (and possibly 
"dein" and "euer" if (Se) is still a source of trouble) for "ihr , ". These 
substitutions conform to direct back trackings of the arrows in Diagram 1. 
For the study on "natural and syntactic gender" we will make four 
predictions. Firstly, since "sein-e" and "ihr-e" are more marked than "sein" 
and "ihr" (cf. 2.3) "sein-e" and "ihr-e" of the gender study should be 
acquired later than "sein" and "ihr" of the "shifting reference" study (cf. 
also the morphophonological prognosis for the gender study in 3.1). Secondly, 
the masculine "seine" should come before the neuter "seine" since masculine 
is unmarked with respect to neuter (cf. 2.3). Thirdly, the masculine "seine" 
should precede the feminine "ihre" because masculine is unmarked with 
respect to feminine (cf. 2.3). Fourthly, natural gender pronouns should occur 
before syntactic gender pronouns because natural gender is less marked 
(cf. 2.3). Table 7 summarizes the predictions derived from SFH for the order 
of acquisition of "seine" and "ihre" in the study on "natural and syntactic 
gender". 
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Table 7: SFH-Predictions for "Natural and Syntactic Gender" 
Early 
Acquisition 
Later 
Acquisition 
Late 
Acquisition 
Masculine 
seine (natural 
gender) 
seine (syntactic 
gender) 
Feminine 
ihre (natural 
gender) 
ihre (syntactic 
gender) 
Neuter 
seine 
(natural 
gender) 
seine 
(natural 
gender) 
Table 7 shows that "natural gender" precedes "syntactic gender", 
"masculine" precedes "feminine", and "feminine" precedes "neuter". As to the 
second ontogenetic principle of the SFH we can only expect that children are 
likely to substitute the masculine "seine" (and not the neuter "seine") if 
they err on the feminine "ihre". Natural gender pronouns cannot replace syn-
tactic gender pronouns because the "natural gender" task will be given 
separately from the "syntactic gender" task. 
We can also make the prediction that "sein" and "ihr" of the 'shifting 
reference" study will be acquired earlier than "sein-e" and "ihr-e" of the 
gender study because the children will be in the same age range in both 
studies but since the two studies will be kept apart (different children for 
both studies) substitutions are not possible. 
Before we discuss conflicts with the predictions on the basis of morpho-
phonological and syntactic characteristics we will first see what we can 
expect for the order of acquisition for German possessive pronouns on the 
basis of deictic characteristics. 
3.3 Predictions Based on Deictic Characteristics 
In the study of "shifting reference" (performance) we will rely on the 
analysis of deictic complexity with respect to three characteristics, 
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"variable reference", "shifting reference", and the "proximal-nonproximal 
contrast" (cf. Table 4). Wherever it seems appropriate we will consider 
additional psychological factors which will specify our predictions. One 
factor is the child's egocentric viewpoint which is different in comprehen-
sion than in production tasks. The inclusion of this factor is necessary 
since deictic characteristics are not solely linguistic but have strong 
psychological and social implications. Moreover, in order to avoid gaze-
directional clues the experimenter will look at the child during the perform-
ance task thus centering his attention on her. 
In paralleling deictic complexity with acquisitional difficulty we will, 
on the basis of the first deictic characteristic ("variable reference"), 
predict that "mein", "dein", "unser.¡nci "» " u n s e r ex Ci "• and "euer" are 
earlier mastered than "sein", "ihr . ", and "ihr , ". If we take into 
account that young children are egocentric and that visual clues will be 
eschewed for referential identification, we might predict the following 
acquisitional ranking for the 'easy' pronouns: firstly "dein" since in the 
experiment this pronoun refers to the child, secondly, "unser-jnci " because 
this pronoun implies the child (and the speaker), thirdly, "euer" which 
denotes the child and a variable other person, fourthly, "mein" which indi-
cates the speaker, and fifthly, "unse,,'exci " which comprises the speaker and 
a variable other person. As to the 'difficult' pronouns we cannot specify 
our predictions except for a precedence of the sex-identical pronoun, i.e. of 
that pronoun with which the child is more familiar (and which has been less 
variable for him or her in everyday conversations) by his or her sex. 
The second deictic characteristic, "shifting reference", suggests dif-
ferent predictions. The pronouns "sein", "'ihrsi-nn "» "unserincl "· an<' 
"ihr, " are less complex than "mein", "dein", " u n s e r e x ci "> and "euer" 
(cf. Table 4) because the latter are shift-affected. A further subcategori-
zation can be made with respect to "unser. „, " which should come earlier 
r
 inci. 
than the other three 'easy' pronouns because of the involvement of the 
child. Concerning the relative difficulty of "sein", "ihr . " and "ihr , " 
t 
Since we deal with possessive pronouns "mining" can be an important factor. 
I owe this term ("mining") to John Gumperz (personal communication) who uses 
it for children's egocentric possessiveness. 
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we might expect precedence of the sex-identical pronoun. As to the 'diffi­
cult' pronouns (in the analysis of the "shifting reference" characteristic) 
we can draw parallels to the 'easy' "variable reference" pronouns, i.e. 
"dein" first, "euer" second, "mein" third, and "unser
e x c l " last. 
The fourth deictic characteristic, the "proximal-nonproximal contrast", 
proposes that "mein", "dein", and "unser. , " should come before "unser •. 
1 ПС I · Слі· I * 
and "euer", which are followed by "sein", "ihr . " and "ihr . ". In 
supplying psycho-social factors we might predict the acquisitional order as 
follows: "dein", "unserirlcl ", "mein", "euer", and "unsere)(c1 ". With respect 
to the 'highly complex' pronouns (cf. Table 4) we can only predict priority 
of the sex-identical pronoun. Let us now contrast these three different pre­
dictions (Table 8). 
Table 8: Predictions for "Shifting Reference" on the Basis of Deictic 
Complexity 
Order of 
Acquisition 
Early 
' 
Late 
Variable 
Reference 
1. dein 
2
·
 u n s e rincl. 
3. euer 
4. mein 
5
·
 u n s e r
excl. 
(sein 
* ihr
c
,·„„ 
sing. 
1 h rpl. 
Shifting 
Reference 
>-
ihr
sing. 
% 1 . 
5. dein 
6. euer 
7. mein 
8
·
 u n s e r
excl. 
Proximal-Nonproximal 
Contrast 
1. dein 
2
·
 u n s e rincl. 
3. mein 
4. euer 
5
·
 u n s e r
excl. 
sein 
*
 Íhl
"c-¡nn v
 sing. 
i h rpl. 
From Table 8 it becomes clear that predictions on the basis of deictic 
characteristics are dissimilar for the three deictic characteristics. 
What can we expect for the study on "natural and syntactic gender" on 
the basis of deictic characteristics? We will make only two claims. The first 
one states that sex-identical pronouns (i.e. "seine" for boys, "ihre" for 
ч 
= sex-identical pronoun f i r s t . 
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girls) should be acquired before sex-differential ones. The second one main-
tains that extralinguistic reference (natural gender) precedes intralinguis-
tic reference (syntactic gender). In the natural gender task the child will 
have also a visual clue, the looks of the puppets, apart from the linguistic 
one (coreferentiality of the pronoun with the definite article) which he 
also has in the syntactic gender task. Proper names of the male and the 
female doll could also help to determine natural gender items earlier than 
syntactic gender items. Diachronically, there is much dispute over the origin 
of gender. The so-called "sexus-theory" stresses extralinguistic factors as 
a historical base for the development of gender (this view is advocated by 
e.g. Brinkmann, 1954; Wienold, 1967; and Jarnatowskaja, 1968), the "genus 
theory" intralinguistic factors (cf. e.g. Lohmann, 1932; Fodor, 1959; 
Ibrahim, 1973). Ontogenetically the 'linguistic input hypothesis' (e.g. 
Braine, 1971) favours precedence of syntactic gender, the 'cognition hypoth-
esis' (e.g. Cromer, 1974) predicts precedence of natural gender. Schlesinger 
(1977) who pleads for/an interaction of linguistic input and cognitive 
development in the determination of linguistic growth proposes a complex 
relationship. We assume that perceptual/cognitive factors are decisive in 
gender identification. Different from, for instance, French (cf. e.g. 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1976) noun suffix clues are less likely to be discriminated 
in German since syntactic coreferentiality clues are the same in the syntactic 
and the natural gender task. Thus, predictions on the basis of deictic char-
acteristics will be as follows (cf. Table 9). 
Table 9: Predictions for "Natural and Syntactic Gender" on the Basis of 
Deictic Characteristics 
Early Acquisition 
Late Acquisition 
Natural Gender: seine * 
ihre > 
Syntactic Gender: seine * 
ihre > 
Tf 
= sex-identical pronoun first. 
Table 5, Diagram 1, and Table 8 list different predictions for the 
acquisition of those German possessive pronouns which play a role in the per­
formance test of the "shifting reference" study. Table 6, Table 7, and Table 
9 show what we might expect with respect to pronominal precedence in the 
study on "natural and syntactic gender". Since the predictions for the two 
studies, "shifting reference" and "natural and syntactic gender" are not 
unanimous, we will compare them in 3.4. 
3.4 Comparison of the Predictions on the Basis of Morphophonological, 
Syntactic, Semantic, and Deictic Characteristics 
Let us first see which predictions can be made for the acquisition of 
German possessive pronouns in the "shifting reference" study (Table 10). 
T«blt 10: PrwMcttoni for •Sklftlnf Rtftroice" (Nrformnct) 
Onfcr of 
»cqulsitlon 
E«rl, 
1 
Lt U 
Prtdlctlons Bastd on 
Morphophonological 
Characteristics 
euer 
•ein 
dein 
sein 
" " • • i n c l . 
u
"
, e r
» c l . 
unstr^ 
, h r s 1 n 9 . 
% 1 . 
Syntactic 
Character­
istics 
sein 
" - s i n , . 
%,. 
•ein 
dein 
" »
r 1 n c l . 
" " » ' . K l . 
uns.r4 
euer 
Semantic 
Character­
istics 
nein 
dein 
" " • ' i n c l . 
sein 
" " » ' . . c l . 
^ t l n , . 
euer 
%,. 
Deictic 
Characteristics 
Variable 
Reference 
dein 
" " " ' i n c l 
euer 
a l n 
" " ' e i c l . 
fseln 
*
l , h
' « 1 n , . 
% 1 . 
Shifting 
Reference 
u n M r 1 n c l . 
*(seln 
W s 1 n , . 
" " p l . 
dein 
euer 
M i n 
" » ' « . c l . 
Proiieel-
Нопргомішіі 
Contrast 
dein 
u n 5 e r l n c l . 
euer 
"""Wi. 
.(»In 
• sci-ldentlul pnmoun f i n t 
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Table 10 shows us that some predictions are alike and that others differ 
strongly. Relatively similar predictions are the ones which are based on 
semantic, "variable reference", and "proximal-nonproximal characteristics". 
There exist slight variations among these three hypotheses, so, for instance, 
for "euer" which should be acquired comparatively late according to the SFH 
but has an intermediate position in the order of acquisition if we rely on 
the two deictic characteristics "variable reference" and the "proximal-non-
proximal contrast". The pronoun "sein" is later for these two deictic pre-
dictions than for the SFH. On the other hand, "mein" precedes all other 
pronouns in the SFH-prediction but "dein" should be the earliest according to 
"variable reference" and the "proximal-nonproximal contrast". 
The predictions which are based on morphophonological, syntactic, and 
"shift" characteristics are relatively disparate. If we rely on syntactic and 
"shift" characteristics "mein" and "dein" should be comparatively late but 
3rd person pronouns should be among the first ones. Conflicting predictions 
hold especially for "mein", "dein", "ihr . " (late acquisition because of 
morphophonological, "variable reference", and "proximity" characteristics 
but early because of syntactic and "shift" characteristics), and "sein" 
(similar predictions as for "i h r si n a " except of the morphophonological 
prognosis). 
Is it possible that conflicting predictions are in some way mirrored in 
the course of possessive pronoun development? Or could it be that linguistic 
conflicts (our hypotheses are based on linguistic characteristics) are 
reflected in problems of linguistic judgments in the first place (to be 
observed in the tests on "linguistic awareness")? 
Which predictions are possible for the study on "natural and syntactic 
gender"? Which pronouns are acquired sooner, "natural gender" pronouns or 
"syntactic gender" pronouns? In order to illustrate different hypotheses we 
should contrast predictions which are based on morphophonological, syntactic, 
semantic, and deictic* characteristics (cf. Table 11) 
TE 
Note that there are no further specifications with respect to deictic char-
acteristics (we will only study 3rd person pronouns in the gender study). 
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Table 11 : Predictions for "Natural and Syntactic Gender" (Perfornance) 
Predictions Based on 
Order of 
Acquisition 
Morphophonologica1 
Characteristics 
Syntactic 
Characteristics 
Semantic 
Characteristics 
Deictic 
Characteristics 
Early 
Late 
ihre 
(natural gender) 
ihre 
(natural gender) 
seine (mase.) 
(natural gender) 
ihre 
(syntactic gender) 
ihre 
(syntactic 
gender) 
seine 
(syntactic gender) (syntactic 
gender) 
seine 
(natural gender) (natural 
gender) 
seme ^  
(natural 
gender) 
seine (nasc.) 
(syntactic 
gender) 
ihre (fen.) 
(natural 
gender) 
ihre 
(natural 
gender) 
,*sex-
identical 
pronoun 
first 
ihre (fem.) 
(syntactic 
gender) 
seine (neuter) 
(natural gender) 
(syntactic 
gender) 
ihre 
(syntac-
t ic gender) 
sex-
Identical 
pronoun 
f i r s t 
seme (neuter) 
(syntactic 
gender) 
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From Table 11 we can see that our four predictions are only partly 
comparable. Since - in the expectations based on deictic characteristics - a 
masculine/neuter differentiation of "seine" could be in conflict with the 
expected precedence of the sex-identical pronoun we did not specify masculine 
and neuter for the two "seine". Predictions based on semantic and deictic 
characteristics differ fron those which were derived from morphophonological 
and syntactic characteristics. The former two claim that the natural gender 
"seine" (masculine) should come before the syntactic gender "seine" (mascu-
line), the latter two predict the inverse order. The specified expectation on 
the basis of semantic characteristics for "seine" favours masculine before 
neuter. As to "ihre", only the "morphophonological and syntactic" predictions 
assume that "ihre" is in general sooner than "seine". In the SFH-prognosis 
the feminine form "ihre" comes after the masculine form "seine" but before 
the neuter form "seine" (this holds for natural and syntactic gender). For 
the deictic prediction we have to leave this question open. It will be 
interesting to look at other studies on the acquisition of possessive pro-
nouns, both longitudinal and cross-sectional ones, in order to check our 
predictions for possessive pronouns. 
3.5 Studies on the Acquisition of Possessive Pronouns as Related to 
Predictions 
A research overview of the development of possessive pronouns could help 
us to determine which of our theoretical assumptions for the order of acqui-
sition (cf. 3.4) hold the most valid predictions. Although Chipman (1980, 
p. 79) claims that "From the point of view of developmental psycholinguistics, 
it appears that nothing has been done with possessive pronouns.", a number 
of longitudinal and cross-sectional studies on (first) correct usage and 
mistakes are quite informative (they have been even tested experimentally, 
cf. e.g. Baron & Kaiser, 1975). 
Most of the data selection which we will present are based on longitudi-
nal observations. If we want to relate our predictions to empirical investi-
gations we should be aware that the reported analyses of longitudinal data 
on the acquisition of possessive pronouns provide at least four complications 
(apart from the small number of subjects). Firstly, most observations yield 
only information about the singular pronouns, especially 1st and 2nd person 
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pronouns . This is due to an interest of some early researchers in the devel­
opment of the "self" and in the beginnings of the differentiation between 
"Ego and Alter". Secondly, intra- and extralinguistic information is scarce. 
Even if we know at which age a child masters a possessive pronoun we often 
do not know under which circumstances and in which situations the first 
correct usage occurs and whether unsuccessful attempts preceded. Thirdly, 
most studies are on production rather than on comprehension. Fourthly, most 
observations concern English-speaking children. The homonym "your" can be 
singular or plural but is sometimes not distinguished with respect to the 
two functions (the possession suffix of German possessive pronouns). Case and 
gender of possessions and status of possessor are not relevant for English 
possessive pronouns. Still, it seems that some of the available longitudinal 
data provide a rich and useful data base which allows to draw some conclusions 
with respect to correct usage and mistakes. Let us first look at the findings 
of some early diary studies. 
3.5.1 Longitudinal Studies on the Acquisition of Possessive Pronouns 
The singular 1st and 2nd person possessive pronouns are acquired earlier 
and have been more extensively studied than other pronouns. In Table 12 we 
will compare sone diary studies in order to see which of these two possessive 
pronouns have been uttered first, in which syntactic function (predicative 
or attributive use), and which mistakes have been made. 
к 
Actually, only the singular 1st and 2nd person possessive pronouns are 
necessary in communicative situations. 3rd person pronouns can be substituted 
by proper names or definite descriptions. Plural pronouns can be given in 
"decomposed" forms (e.g. "my and Peter's" instead of "our"). Apart from 
comprehension problems there is no need for the child lïTproduce other pro-
nouns besides "my" or "mine" and "your" or "yours", especially in view of 
the fact that 3rd person pronouns are often more ambiguous than proper names 
or definite descriptions. 
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Table 12: Longitudinal Data of the Acquisition of Singular 1st and 2nd Person 
Possessive Pronouns 
Author(s) 
Deville,* 
1891 
Lindner, 
1898 
Gheorgov, 
1905 
Gheorgov, 
1905 
Cooley, 
1908 
Bohn, 
1914 
Stern & 
Stern, 
1928 
Bain, 
1936 
Trantham & 
Pedersen, 
1976 
language 
French 
German 
Bulgarian 
Bulgarian 
English 
English 
German 
English 
English 
sex of 
child 
female 
male 
male 
(1st) 
male 
(2nd) 
female 
female 
female 
female 
6 Ss 
month of first occurrence for 
"my" 
23 
(mon/ 
ma) 
22 
(25?) 
32 
20 
23 
(echo?) 
20 
20 
20 
18-29 
"mine" 
? 
? 
32 
22 
27 
27 
3rd 
year 
22 
28-34 
"your" 
24 
(ton) 
23 
? 
25 
not 
until 
27 
22 
3rd 
year 
(wrong) 
21 
23-33 
"yours" 
? 
? 
32 
28 
28 
? 
4th/6th 
year 
? 
7 
substitutions/ 
mistakes 
? 
"my" for "your" 
"your" for "my" 
"you" (dative 
for "your") 
"you" (dative 
for "your") 
"my" for "your" 
"me" (dative) 
for "my" (also 
"ine's") 
? 
"your" for "my" 
"Hilde's" for "my" 
"I'7"my" con-
fusion, "ny" for 
"your", "mine" 
for "my" 
"my's" for 
"mine" 
* 
cited in Gheorgov, 1905. 
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Table 12 indicates that 1st person possessive pronouns are earlier pro­
duced than those of the second person, and the attributive use comes before 
the predicative use. The precedence of 1st person pronouns can be explained 
by the SFH. This finding is, moreover, in correspondence with predictions 
which are based on morphophonological characteristics and with deictic ones 
which are based on "variable reference" and the "proximal-nonproximal contrast". 
However, "syntactic characteristics" and "shifting reference" predictions 
cannot be confirmed. 
The precedence of attributive use before predicative (sonetimes in­
correct) use agrees with Karmiloff-Smith's hypothesis (1979) that initially 
words function as descripters and only later as determiners (The descriptor 
function is defined as: "... a word is used by the speaker to give additional 
information about a referent already implicitly or explicitly under focus of 
attention by speaker and addressee.". The determinor function is described 
as: "... a word is used by the speaker to enable the addressee to pick out 
a referent amongst other potential candidates.", cf. p. 46). 
Two other kinds of mistakes can be observed: person confusion ("my" for 
"your" is more often reported than "your" for "my"), and a substitution of 
personal pronouns (both nominative and dative) and proper names for possess­
ive pronouns. Person confusion is probably due to a failure to "shift" 
pronouns (initial or subsequent correct usage implies that children go beyond 
imitation ). Such pronoun reversals have been observed in "normal" children 
(cf. Tracy, 1893; Moore, 1896; Hogan, 1898; Lindner, 1898; Gheorgov, 1905; 
Cooley, 1908; Bohn, 1914; Jespersen, 1922; Bain, 1936; van der Geest, 1977; 
Halliday, 1979; Chiat, 1982). They also seem to be typical for autistic 
children (cf. Rutter, 1978; Fay, 1979; Tanz, 1980). The fact that "my" for 
ч 
The steps which must be taken in the acquisition of person deixis could be 
as follows. In a first step pronouns may initially be used like proper names 
(cf. McNeill, 1963). In a second step (which necessitates a clear-cut dis­
junction between the concept of person and its linguistic realization) the 
child discovers that one single pronominal form can denote more than one 
person (mastery of "variable reference"). In a third step he masters the 
speaker/addressee shift (data hint at a slightly earlier precedence of 
"variable reference" before "speaker/addressee shift", cf. the protocols of 
Bain, 1936). In a final step the child is able to consider simultaneously 
variable utterance meaning and invariable pronoun meaning. This last step 
presupposes the ability to decenter and should therefore be acquired at the 
end of the preoperatory level (cf. e.g. Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). 
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"your" has been nore often found than "your" for 'my" can be explained by 
the second ontogenetic principle of the SFH ("ny" is unmarked with respect 
to "your") and the "inning" assumption which suggests that children refer mon 
likely to their own possession than to that of others. 
Personal pionoun and proper nare substitutions have been freauently found. 
Early researchers of child language could not agree on the precedence of 
either personal or possessive pronouns. Deville (1891), Gheorgov (1905), 
Cooley (1908), Bohn (1914), Bdin (1936), and Trantham & Pedersen (1976) 
observed a siniultaneous or slightly earlier occurrence of personal pronouns, 
on the one hand, but Lindner (1898), fleumann (19D3), Stern & Stern (1928), 
Anes (1952), and Huxley (19/0/"Katriona') found precedence of ^ ossessive pro-
nouns, on the other hand. This issue was hotly debated (Stern 6 Stern, 1928, 
p. 277). "Wieder hat hier der Intellektualismus irre geleitet.") because of 
its relation to volition and will. A siirilar dispute can be reported for the 
precedence of either (possessive) pronouns or oroper names. Pronoun doubling 
has also been found (cf. Oltuszewsky, 1897). What can we say about the de-
velopment of other possessive pronouns? 
As to "his", "her", "our", and "their" (the plural "your" has either 
not been observed or cannot be distinguished with respect to number) we found 
the following order (Table 13). 
Table 13 Longitudinal Data of the Acquisition of ' h i s ' , "her", "our", and 
"their" 
Author(s) 
Gheorgov, 
1905 
Bohn, 
1914 
Stern t 
Stern, 
1928 
Bain. 
1936 
Tranthan t 
Pedersen, 
1976 
language 
Bulgarian 
English 
German 
English 
English 
sex of 
child 
naie 
(1st) 
female 
fonale 
female 
6 Ss 
month of f i rst occurrence for 
"his" 
3« 
22 
4th/6th 
year 
(sein/ 
seins) 
25,26 
20-31 
(correct 
by 25-
34) 
"her" 
r 
22 
? 
25,21 
24-34 
(not 
correct 
by 36) 
"our" 
35 
Onci.) 
22 
end of 
6th year 
Onci.) 
26,27 
30-36 
"their" 
33' 
25 
? 
? 
33-36 
Substitutions/ 
mistakes 
male name for 
"his" 
7 
"his" for "her" 
spontaneous 
correction ( f i rst 
"ny", then "her") 
him" or "he's" 
for "his" 
i:3-24 mths). 
"hers" or "she" 
for "her" 
(24-34 mths) 
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The possessive pronouns "his", "her", "our", and "their" are later 
acquired than "my" and "your" (cf. Table 12 and Table 13). It is likely that 
the pronoun "his" occurs either simultaneously or earlier than "her" or "our" 
(although the Bulgarian child produces the inclusive "our" before "his"). 
The differences in order of acquisition are not very big but if we rely on 
Trantham & Pedersen's findings which comprise six children we get the 
following order: "his", "her", "our", "their" (the early "their" in Gheorgov's 
research could also be a reflexive pronoun). 
We can assume that substitutions in case of "speech need" of the male 
name instead of "his" or the female name instead of "her" are highly frequent. 
The same holds probably for the combination of proper names and possessive 
pronouns but it can be that the pronoun is not correct. Still, Stern & Stern 
(1928) report that Hilde produced even the correct gender in self-reference 
("Hilde ihr Stuhlchen"/Hilde her stool). The mistake "his" for "her" has also 
been observed by Jespersen (1922): "A boy said at the age of 3;3: "An ill 
lady, his legs were bad.".". This failure and the spontaneous correction of the 
incorrect "my" can be explained by the second ontogenetic principle of the 
SFH. Replacements of personal pronouns and/or possessive pronouns in the 
predicative function instead of the attributive function have also been found 
for the singular 1st and 2nd person possessive pronouns. Two remarks by 
Trantham & Pedersen (1976) are noteworthy. Firstly, they discovered that 
their children started using "his" and "her" correctly, produced then in-
correct forms, and re-established later the correct usage. Such overgenera-
lizations have been also observed in other parts of grammar (e.g. "went" 
before and after "goed", cf. Clark & Clark, 1977). Secondly, in "language 
impaired" children which they also investigated, "his", "her", "our", and 
"their" did not emerge before the age of 36 nonths (Trantham & Pedersen did 
not proceeed their analysis beyond this age). 
Sharpless (1974) did a longitudinal study on production and comprehension 
of singular possessive pronouns ("my", "your", "his", and "her"). She came 
to the conclusion that children understand these pronouns in dependence of 
the speech situation: "my" was better than "your", and "your" better than 
"his" or "her". But if the child did not participate in the speech event 
"his" and "her" were better than "your". 
The discussion of the longitudinal data suggest that the SFH and the 
predictions based on raorphophonological, "variable reference", and the "pro-
ximity-nonproximity contrast" characteristics are, so far, more valid than 
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those of syntactic and "shifting reference" characteristics (cf. Table 10). 
Since these longitudinal data should not be overinterpreted for the reasons 
mentioned, we will have a closer look on the cross-sectional studies. 
3.5.2 Cross-Sectional Studies on the Acquisition of Possessive Pronouns 
The cross-sectional studies on possessive pronoun acquisition are either 
frequency counts or experiments. 
In general, the frequency data (cf. Goodenough, 1938; Young, 1942; 
Wiederhold, 1971; the Cross-study, cited in Wales, 1979) seem to support the 
predictions of the SFH and the predictions based on the proximal-nonproximal 
contrast (the speaker/addressee pronouns precede 3rd person pronouns). 
Field or laboratory experiments on possessive pronouns are reported by 
Baron & Kaiser (1975), Rondai (1977), Wales (1979), Chipman (1980), and 
Charney (1980). Since Rondal's and Chipman's experiments do not focus on 
specific pronouns (the gender distinction in Chipman's study was not con­
ceived as a trouble source even in the youngest three-year-old subjects) and 
since they rely on syntactic characteristics we cannot draw any conclusions 
with respect to our predictions. 
The Wales-study poses some very interesting problems with respect to 
the speaker/addressee shift, although it is not very conclusive with respect 
to our predictions. Wales studied the understanding of English possessive 
pronouns in two groups of children with mean ages 4;6 and 6;0 years. The 
children had to act out for two male and two female dolls sentences like: 
'Mary says to John, "Give me your hat"'. Despite the better perfomance of 
the older group there was no statistically significant improvement. The fact 
that 1st and 2nd person pronouns were better handled than those of the 3rd 
person, although gender itself did not seem to be a problem is interpreted 
by Wales in terms of the precedence of the "pointing function". Since this 
study is not fully described it is impossible for us to draw any conclusions. 
We even do not know whether Wales' interpretation relates to the personal 
pronoun (the dative "me") or to the possessive pronoun ("your"). How did the 
child manage person identity and person differences of personal and possess­
ive pronouns (person identity: "Give me щу..."; person difference: "Give me 
your...")? Did the child really understand the speaker/addressee pronouns 
or did he just relate to the dolls because they were introduced by their 
proper names ("Mary says to John")? In fact, this task looks very complicated 
for such young children. There are three potential perspectives involved: 
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the child's perspective (he had to act out the utterance), the doll's per-
spective (children had to act out 'for the dolls'), and the experimenter's 
perspective (he or she made the utterance first). It would certainly be more 
informative if the original data could be inspected. 
Charney's study with twenty-one girls (age: 1 ;6 - 2;6) yields results 
which agree with the predictions of the SFH: first comes correct self-refer-
ence, then addressee-reference; thereafter the non-deictic use of the 3rd 
person, and finally the deictic use of the 3rd person. It is noteworthy that 
"my" and "your" were at first correctly used when they referred to the child's 
own speech role, i.e. "my" was produced by the child as speaker (although 
not correctly interpreted when used by other persons) and "your" was correct-
ly understood when the child was addressed (although not correctly produced 
by the chi Id). [Note that the SFH-predictions do not make different assumptions 
for production and comprehension]. This observation suggests that children's 
egocentric point of reference is a starting point in the development of 
possessive pronouns (cf. also Sharpless, 1974, for support of the "egocentric 
role hypothesis"). 
Baron & Kaiser's experiment gives us some clues about the incorrect 
usage of (possessive) pronouns in 3, 4, and 5 year old children. Only two 
findings confirm the expectations which we made on the basis of the second 
ontogenetic principle of the SFH. There are somewhat more male substitutions 
for the female referent than female substitutions for the male referent. The 
3rd person plural was most often replaced by the masculine 3rd person sin-
gular and not by the feminine 3rd person singular. 2nd person plural sub-
stitutions which are also possible according to our predictions cannot be 
checked because of the lack of number differentiation ("you" and "your" 
substitutions were very low anyway: 2,4%). All the other replacements are 
not in agreement with our predictions but we can observe something inter-
esting: the frequent mistake of the female 3rd person singular which is 
highest for the 1st person singular ("her" for "my"). Although this finding 
does not necessarily support our predictions based on deictic characteristics 
(sex-identical pronoun first) the number of male and female subjects was 
about the same and the results were not split up with respect to the sex of 
the subjects, we should be aware that sex of speaker and/or addressee should 
not be ignored. 
Longitudinal and cross-sectional studies on possessive pronouns have 
not found to be very useful for confirmations or falsifications of our 
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hypotheses. They do not yield enough information for our predictions. In 
general, however, it looks as if two predictions are not very likely. The 
data do not seem to support the prognoses which are based on "syntactic" and 
"shifting reference" characteristics. Maybe one or the other characteristic 
could be important for the awareness of possessive pronouns. Before we go 
into some tentative predictions on the acquisition of linguistic awareness 
for German possessive pronouns we will give a short outline of both theor-
etical assumptions and empirical research on linguistic awareness. 
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4. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS ON LINGUISTIC AWARENESS 
Research on "normal linguistic awareness in adults" is usually limited 
to questions of grammatical ity, relatedness of sentences in form and meaning, 
or ambiguity (cf. e.g. Gleitman & Gleitman, 1970, or Geer et al., 1972). 
Adult's judgments about language became of fundamental relevance in trans­
formational linguistics because "metalinguistic data" or "linguistic intu­
itions" were regarded as indications for the underlying linguistic competence 
(cf. Chomsky, 1965). However, their accuracy and completeness can be ques­
tioned since psycholinguistic research revealed that judgments on the gramna-
ticality of sentences are a kind of linguistic performance, and equally 
vulnerable to "performance factors" as any kind of linguistic activity (cf. 
MacLay & Sleator, I960*; Hill, 1961; Levelt, 1972, 1974; Cazden, 1976; Levelt 
et al., 1977; Carroll, Bever, and Pollack, 1981). Thus, psychological factors 
- though still largely unexplored - should be considered in validating lin­
guistic intuitions. The metalinguistic ability to judge sentence granmati-
cality should not a priori relate to tacit knowledge. We might even assume 
that production and comprehension ("primary" performance) are closer associ­
ated with competence than linguistic judgments ("secondary" performance) 
(Levelt et al., 1978). 
Notwithstanding, the study of explicit intuitions can be fruitful for 
psycholinguistic research because of at least three reasons: firstly, inter­
pretations of "primary" performance can be compared with metalinguistic data, 
secondly, linguistic intuitions can yield information which might be hard to 
obtain by simple observing "primary" performance, and thirdly, explicit in­
tuitions may play a role in the child's language development (cf. Read, 1978). 
The present research focuses on this last question. From all we know 
it seems that linguistic awareness serves no special function in adults' 
"primary" performance, i.e. that "One need have no disposition to think 
about language in order to use it appropriately" (Gleitman & Gleitman, 1979, 
p. 121). This could be different for language acquisition when linguistic 
skills are still notably changing. It is possible that linguistic awareness 
is not a mere epi phenomenon but can facilitate future language skills al-
ч 
As to critiques with respect to methodological shortcomings of the MacLay 
& Sleator study, cf. e.g. Miller & Isard, 1963, or Vetter, Volovecky, and 
Howell, 1979. 
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though "The studies we have cited would argue not, for the language functions 
seem developmentally to precede the metalanguage functions, with only some 
rare exceptions" (Gleitman & Gleitman, 1979, p. 122). A somewhat different 
point of view is taken by Karmiloff-Smith (forthcoming, cf. Hicknann & 
Weissenborn, 1982, p. 39) who also argues against the assumption that meta-
linguistic can play a role in language development: "... whilst explicit 
metalinguistic awareness has no specific function in language acquisition, 
it may have a function in general cognitive development in that when various 
aspects of human behavior are encoded in the same way, e.g., by language, 
then generalities may become salient for the child which were not obvious 
when the representations were in different codes, e.g. spatial, verbal and 
perceptual.". Although the assumptions of Gleitman & Gleitman and Karmiloff-
Smith are based on empirical observations, the question whether linguistic 
awareness can facilitate further performance remains unresolved as long as 
we cannot compare early linguistic performance and awareness with later lin-
guistic performance in the same child over time. The present research will 
try to give an answer to this question in fulfilling this requirement. 
This chapter on linguistic awareness will be split into three parts. 
Some assumptions on the structure of linguistic awareness will be outlined 
first (4.1). Next come assumptions on functions of linguistic awareness (4.2), 
and finally assumptions on relevant metalinguistic abilities from emoirical 
studies (4.3). Relevant for our research are studies on error detections, 
corrections, and explanations given by children. Although assumptions on 
structure and functions of linguistic awareness are made with respect to 
children's metalinguistic abilities, they can also be related to those of 
adults. 
4.1 Assumptions on the Structure of Linguistic Awareness 
The question of "awareness" or "consciousness" as a state of mind is an 
old problem in the study of human behavior which has been mainly tackled by 
philosophers, physiologists, and psychologists. The beginning of academe 
psychology was featured by a theoretical interest in the "stream of conscious-
ness" (James, 1890) and in the investigation of the so-called "Bewußtseins-
lagen" (usually translated as "imageless thought") by means of systematic 
introspection or retrospection (the German "Wurzburger Schule" and their 
representatives Kulpe, Ach, Buhler, and Marbe). 
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The further development of these notions in psychology has been described 
in detail by Underwood & Stevens (1979) and by Ericsson & Simon (1980). We 
do not go into these issues particularly. Our main interest concerns just 
the following structural aspects of meta-behavior: notions of meta-behavior, 
classifications of metalinguistic abilities, and the relationship between 
language and cognition, especially specifity and generality of linguistic 
skills and of reflective abilities. 
4.1.1 Notions of Meta-Behavior 
Despite the growing interest in the acquisition of "linguistic aware-
ness" in the past decade there is still much confusion and even disagreement 
about its definition and demarcation from similar constructs (cf. e.g. 
Gleitman, 1979; Gleitman & Gleitman, 1979; Gearhart, 1980). 
The most comprehensive term "meta-abilities" refers to all kinds of 
implicit and explicit knowledge about a variety of motor, cognitive, and 
verbal skills. 
Piaget who uses the term "conscience" ("consciousness") for explicit 
verbalizations and "cognizance" for "the act of becoming conscious" (cf. 
Piaget, 1976, p. 332) was mainly interested in the development of knowledge 
about motor skills (cf. Piaget, 1974, 1976; Sinclair, 1978). 
Researchers who explored knowledge about cognitive skills (memory, 
comprehension, communication, and attention) use such different notions as 
"knowing about x", "understanding of x", "monitoring x", "meta-x", "awareness 
of x", and "insight of x", generally without conceptual demarcations (cf. 
Krentzer, Leonard, and Flavell, 1975: Flavell & Wellman, 1977; Markman, 1977, 
1978; Flavell, 1978; Brown, 1978; Miller & Bigi, 1979; Yussen & Bird, 1979). 
Definitions on knowledge about verbal skills are usually also rather 
vague. However, two issues became salient in the demarcation of "linguistic 
awareness" which caused inconsistencies among psycholinguistic researchers: 
the question of "consciousness" and the degree of "explicitness". C. Chomsky 
(1979) and Marshall & Morton (1978) stress that consciousness is crucial to 
linguistic awareness whereas Slobin (1978, p. 45) differentiates "levels of 
metalinguistic capacity, from the dimly conscious or preconscious speech 
monitoring which underlies self-correction, to the concentrated, analytic 
work of the linguist". As to the closely related issue of "explicitness" 
Levelt et al. (1978) maintain that linguistic knowledge can be implicit or 
explicit and that "Between the two extremes one can find various degrees or 
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levels of explicitness" (p. 2). Thus, one might distinguish among at least 
three kinds of knowledge about language. Firstly, the child might use lan-
guage in such a way that an observer can make inferences about his intu-
itions. This "implicit" linguistic knowledge becomes transparent in morpho-
phonological generalizations of unknown words (cf. Brown, 1957; Berko, 1958) 
or in self-corrections (cf. Clark, 1978; Clark & Andersen, 1979). Secondly, 
the child might comment on parts of his own or other people's speech, either 
spontaneously or by promptings. Thirdly, he might formulate rules about the 
language system and explain language structures and functions. The latter 
two kinds are clear expressions of "explicit" linguistic knowledge. Delimi-
tations of "linguistic awareness" in which explicitness is considered as 
being critical are given by Bloom, 1975; Read, 1978; Valtin, 1979; or 
Forrest & Waller, 1979. Definitions which imply implicit as well as explicit 
knowledge or in which a distinction between these two types of knowledge is 
somewhat blurred are those by Cazden, 1976; Foss & Hakes, 1978; Hakes, Evans, 
and Tunmer, 1978; Berthoud-Papandropoulou, 1978; or Hakes, 1980. 
Our general definition of "linguistic awareness" as "the ability to 
reflect and comment on language structures and functions" (cf. 1.1) is re-
stricted to more explicit conments and excludes -provisionally - abilities 
such as spontaneous repairs which are rather implicit (and which probably 
need only a simple comparator or monitoring device, cf. Marshall & Morton, 
1978). Explicitness is stressed because comments are rather unequivocal. 
In the present research we confine "linguistic awareness" to the metalinguis-
tic abilities of explicit conments on errors, corrections, and explanations 
thereof. These operationalizations are, except for the explanations, compar-
able to the ones used in the early paradigms by Gleitman et al. (1972) and 
DeVilliers & DeViUiers (1972). 
4.1.2 Classifications of Metalinguistic Abilities 
In the following section four attempts to categorize the studies on 
linguistic awareness will be presented: those by Clark, 1978a, by Sinclair 
& Levelt (1977). by Hakes et al. (1978) (cf. also Hakes, 1980), and 
DeVilliers & DeVilliers (1978). 
A very detailed - and thus useful - classification system is offered by 
Clark (1978a) who takes the notion of awareness in its broadest sense there-
by also considering more implicit kinds of knowledge like spontaneous repairs. 
The types of "awareness" which she distinguishes rely - in part - on Brown 
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and DeLoache's classification of a variety of metacognitive skills. Clark's 
uncovering of different types of linguistic "awareness" under particular meta-
cognitive skills reveals the assunption that linguistic awareness is just 
one of the indications of netacognition (others could be - according to 
Flavell, 1976 - metamemory, metal earning, or meta-attention). On the basis 
of a preliminary taxonomy of "awareness" in the acquisition of primary lin-
guistic skills, she added to Brown & DeLoache's five metacognitive skills 
(with respect to "linguistic" awareness these are: firstly, "monitoring one's 
ongoing utterances", secondly, "checking the result of an utterance", third-
ly, "testing for reality", fourthly, "deliberately trying to learn", and 
fifthly, "predicting the consequences of using inflections, words, phrases 
or sentences") an additional sixth one: "reflecting on the product of an 
utterances (cf. p. 33/34, especially Table 1 in Clark's article). Clark 
maintains that these six types of awareness "have been listed roughly in 
their order of emergence, from most to least basic" (p. 33). Although there 
exist some minor overlaps with respect to subclassifications of the six 
awareness types (e.g. what is the exact difference between the subclassifi-
cation "correcting the utterances of others" and the more specific sub-
classification "correcting word order and wording in sentences earlier judged 
"silly""?), Clark's comprehensive typology can capture different metalinguis-
tic phenomena. 
Sinclair & Levelt (1977) classify in their review of the literature on 
implicit and explicit linguistic knowledge five domains which are relevant 
in children's language (we believe that they also hold for adults): firstly, 
gramnaticality or acceptability judgments, secondly, segmentation, thirdly, 
transformation and manipulation (most of these studies - cf. e.g. Kaper, 
1959; Weir, 1962; Smith, 1973; Limber, 1973; Cazden, 1976 - have been obser-
vational and focus rather on implicit knowledge), fourthly, comprehension/ 
appreciation/production of riddles, jokes, humor, and metaphors (which all 
require abstraction of one meaning, attention to form, or detection of am-
biguity), and fifthly, conceptualization of language (dissociations of word 
and referent). We believe that the general metalinguistic abilities of error 
detection, correction, and explanation can be applied to these five domains. 
Hakes et al. (1978) list in their review on children's metalinguistic 
abilities a number of awareness types which can be brought into a similar 
classification system as the one which is suggested by Sinclair & Levelt. 
The additionally listed experiments on the ability to judge synonymy (cf. 
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Beilin & Spontak, 1969; Sack & Beilin, 1971, Beilin, 1975) could be subsumed 
under the fourth category since such judgments require meaning abstraction. 
Another possibility of classification is the grouping on the basis of 
linguistic structures and functions. DeVilliers & DeVilliers (1978) choose 
the following distinctions. (1) awareness of component sounds, (2) awareness 
of word-meaning correspondence, (3) awareness of rules of granmar and seman-
tics, and (4) awareness of ambiguity. Me could complete these four classes 
by a fifth one: (5) awareness of appropriateness of communicative descrip-
tions and speech acts (as to this type of awareness, cf. Bates, 1976; 
Robinson & Robinson, 1977, 1978). Among DeVilliers & DeVilliers' distinctions 
are some overlaps. Although most research on the awareness of component 
sounds (1) concerns segmentation experinents (but note that there are also 
segmentation experiments on words and syllables, cf. e.g. Shankweiler et al., 
1974; Berthoud-Papandropoulou, 1976), there is also the interesting question 
of children's detection of sound ambiguity (4) (cf. e.g. Shultz & Pilon, 
1973, Hirsh-Pasek et al., 1978; Peters & Zaidel, 1980). And, of course, 
equivocality plays often a role in the awareness of rules of grarmar and 
semantics (3) (cf. e.g. Billow, 1975; Hirsh-Pasek et al., 1978). 
All these different types of awareness have been studied in English-
speaking preschoolers (although Adam's classic answer "Pop goes the weasel1" 
to Bellugi's attempt to elicit a gramnaticality judgnent (Brown & Bellugi, 
1964, p. 135) did not promise much success for studies on linguistic aware-
ness with small children). It seems that different countries concentrated 
in the past on different types of awareness. For instance, early Russian 
research was mainly on segmentation (cf. Bogayavlenskiy, 1957/1963, Karpova, 
1955/1966, 1977, Zhurova, 1963/1973). The isolation of linguistic units 
was also investigated with French-speaking children (from Switzerland) (cf. 
Berthoud-Papandropoulou, 1976, 1978, DeBellefroid & Ferreiro, 1979). 
Rumanian and German researchers noticed transformation and nampulation 
(for Rumanian, cf. Slama-Cazacu, 1957, 1979; for German, cf. Stern & Stern, 
1928, Leopold, 1949; Augst, Bauer, and Stein, 1977; Oksaar, 1977). Scan-
dinavian psycholinguists who are interested in the impact of awareness in 
learning to read focused often on sound awareness (cf. Lundberg & Tornéus, 
1978; Lundberg, 1979; Lundberg, Wall, and Olofsson, 1980, Luukkonen, 1979). 
Ongoing research on different types of awareness in European countries is 
reported in Levelt, Mills, and Karmiloff-Smith, 1981. 
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4.1.3 On the Relationship between Language and Cognition 
Before we enter the discussion of whether there exists a language-
specific awareness or whether there is a general awareness for all kinds of 
skills (motoric, cognitive, and linguistic) some points are worth mentioning 
with respect to the relationship between language and cognition. 
Language acquisition can be regarded either as being independent from 
the development of intelligence or as being inseparately linked to it. In 
the Piagetian tradition, the development of cognitive structures is not only 
conceived as being relevant for the explanation of language acquisition but 
also as a necessary precursor. Sinclair (1973, p. 11) asserts that "..., it 
seems easier, and much more hopeful, to suppose that the child brings to the 
task of acquiring his mother tongue a set of universal cognitive structures 
which have been built up during the first year of life and which provide 
enough assumptions about the nature of human language to enable the child 
to begin to join the talking coimunity at about the age of 1 1/2.". This 
position has been severely attacked by Chomsky who denies the explanative 
power of constructions of sensorimotor intelligence for the acquisition of 
language: "The expectation that constructions of sensorimotor intelligence 
determine the character of a mental organ such as language seems to me hardly 
more plausible than a proposal that the fundamental properties of the eye 
or the visual cortex or the heart develop on this basis" (Chomsky, 1980a, 
p. 37). His emphasis on specific formal language universels is in sharp 
contrast to Piaget's general universals of cognition. 
Despite much discussion and research, especially on problems which 
focused on the sensory-motor period, the nature of relationships between the 
acquisition of cognitive and linguistic skills is still an issue which is 
very much undecided. Most researchers seem to agree that during this period 
some special cognitive achievements are prerequisites for some related lin-
guistic developments (cf. Hakes, 1980; Szagun, 1980). Despite theoretical 
refinements (cf. Piatelli-Palmarini, 1980) and numerous proofs and counter-
proofs "the question of the role of intelligence in language acquisition 
remains'* (Mehler, 1980, p. 347). 
Still, the specifity of language must be kept in mind in making assump-
tions about different skills and awareness thereof. 
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4.1.3.1 Specificity and Generality of Linguistic Skills 
A major topic in psycho!inguisties is the question of language specifi-
city. What distinguishes human language from other human skills, and can the 
human capacity for language be reduced to general principles of cognitive 
functioning? 
In Lecture 1 of his "Lectures on language performance" (1980), Osgood 
gives a detailed overview of defining characteristics for "a language", and 
for "a human language", as he sees these. 
For something to be a language, Osgood requires it to display nonrandom 
recurrency of physical forms (sounds, gestures), reciprocal ity of producing 
and receiving these forms by the organism, pragmatics, i.e. relations between 
the use of these forms and other behaviors of the organism, semantics, i.e. 
the forms should allow for the representation of the "not-here", and "not-
now", syntax, i.e. nonrandom combinations of elementary forms, as well as 
potentially infinite combinatorial productivity of forms. 
For something to be a human language Osgood adds the following struc-
tural requirements: the channel should be vocal-auditory, it should display 
nondirectional transmission (several hearers can receive the same message at 
the same time), but directional reception (a listener can attend to one of 
several simultaneous messages), evanescence in time of the signals, integra-
tion over time on a "left-to-right"-basis by the receiver, prompt feedback 
in the sense that the speaker is his own listener. 
Many (psycho) linguists would reject these criteria. The natural sign 
languages of the deaf would, for instance, be excluded as a human language, 
in spite of strong evidence to the contrary: not only do they share all 
important syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic characteristics of spoken lan-
guages, they also show the same developmental phasing in young children, 
and they presumably use the same neurological substrates in the left hemi-
sphere. Moreover, contrary to early suggestions in the literature, natural 
sign languages cannot be acquired by even the highest non-human mammals. By 
intensive training chimpanzees can acquire a limited set of signs with which 
they are able to refer, even to the "non-here", or "non-now", but there is 
a complete lack of human syntax (see below) in the use of these signs (cf. 
for these issues Klima & Bellugi, 1979, and Terrace et al., 1979; Terrace 
et al., 1980). 
Osgood adds five defining functional characteristics for a human lan-
guage: Arbitrariness of semantics, i.e. referring is done in typically non-
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iconic fashion, discreteness of signals, hierarchical organization, compo-
nential organization, i.e. higher level units are decomposable in lower level 
units, and transferral via learning by which he means that experience rather 
than "germ plasm" is responsible for the dissimination of language within 
the species. 
Especially the latter requirement reveals Osgood to be a generalist. 
Language is a property of the cultural environment: general principles of 
learning are sufficient to explain the child's acquisition. There is no 
species-specific genetic constraint on what makes a human language. 
These views are presently highly controversial. Though there can be no 
doubt that languages are in several respects resultants of "arbitrary" socio-
cultural history, there is at the same time a growing body of knowledge on 
language universals (cf. Greenberg, 1957, 1966, 1970; Hawkins, 1980) which 
suggests the existence of at least some universals which cannot be explained 
by such general principles as "advantageous for conmunication", "allows for 
easy production/perception", or "can be easily acquired". Chomsky (1980b) 
argues that these arbitrary but universal properties of human language express 
the genetic basis of granmar. Among these properties of "universal graimar" 
are (1) the recursiveness of syntax, and (2) the universal properties of 
"binding", i.e. of relating syntactic elements to other elements in the 
sentence; these binding relations are universally restricted by quite arbit-
rary "locality" and "government" principles. These features arise in the 
child's language at a rather fixed age level, for spoken language as well as 
for sign language (none of these properties appear in Osgood's list). 
Linguistic and developmental (cf. especially Gleitman & Wanner, 1982) 
research of the last decade has made it highly likely that human languages 
are, in part, based on species-specific genetic endowment. To this extent the 
learning of a language essentially depends on maturation of these language-
specific mechanisms rather than on general "shaping" through experience. 
Still, the assumption of language-specific developmental mechanisms does 
not preclude the existence of similarities between language skills and other 
skills. One candidate for a rather general commonality between different 
skills is their automaticity, especially with regard to his lower level 
process (cf. Levelt, 1978). Motor skills, for instance, can be executed 
without much reflection. There may be reflection about goals or subgoals, 
but lower-level components of a skill tend to be automated. While walking, 
one might think about where to go but not about how to move one's weight 
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fron one foot to the other. 
Linguistic skills are used for communicative purposes. One will, surely, 
reflect on what to say but otherwise language production and comprehension 
can be considered as fast, low-level, and automatic processing (in the present 
research we refer to these skills as "performance"). In case of frequent 
practice, automation becomes nore likely (cf. Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). 
These speedy processes and their intermediate products are not available to 
working memory and are therefore inaccessible for explicit reflections (cf. 
Hakes, 1980). 
In contrast, language reflections and judgments arise only through slower, 
higher-level, and controlled processes. They involve some kind of "execution" 
although one may doubt Hakes' assumption that awareness implies "an element 
of choice in whether or not the operations are performed" (Hakes, 1980). Is 
there any reason for assuming qualitative differences in reflectiveness for 
language and for other skills? 
4.1.3.2 Specifity and Generality of Reflective Abilities 
Despite differences in performance we do not assume that reflection on 
performance is different for different behavioral phenomena, i.e. the ability 
to reflect is general and not skill-specific (for an early mention of this 
assumption, cf. GTeitman, Gleitman, and Shipley, 1972). There are sone 
indications from recent research that this assumption is correct and that 
middle childhood between the ages of four and eight years is a decisive 
developmental period for the development of general reflectiveness. 
In the experiments of Hakes, Evans, and Tunmer (1978) (cf. also Hakes, 
1980) 100 children between the ages of four and eight years had to perform 
a conservation and three metalinguistic tasks (synonymy judgments of 
sentence pairs, grammatical ity judgments, and segmentation of phonemes in 
spoken syllables). Correlational analyses and a scalogram analysis (a limited 
non-parametric equivalent to a factor analysis) revealed a clear relation 
between the results of the conservation task and the three metalinguistic 
tasks. Hakes, Evans, and Tunmer offer as an explanation for their finding 
that cognitive and metalinguistic developments in the transition from pre-
operational to concrete operational cognitive abilities are parts of the 
same general developmental change, the emergence of the ability to decenter 
(attention). "This development, it is suggested, is the emergence of an 
ability to engage in controlled information processing, which allows the 
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child to "stand back mentally" from language and other inputs and to deliber-
ately reflect upon them" (cf. Hakes, 1980, the cover of his book). 
Positive correlations between the results of cognitive and linguistic 
reflection tasks (cf. also Lundberg, 1978; Watson, 1979; Holdridge-Crane, 
1980) or among the results of different cognitive reflection tasks (cf. 
Yussen 4 Bird, 1979) present some evidence for two assumptions: firstly, 
reflective competence is dependent on developmental factors, and secondly, 
there might be a universal underlying meta-ability. Thus, we might sunmarize 
more generally that although different skills are distinguishable we do not 
(yet?) have any evidence for proposing skill-specific reflective competence. 
We rather hypothesize that a general reflective ability underlies different 
kinds of cognitive, linguistic, and motoric meta-behavior. This point is also 
stressed by more theoretically oriented language philosophers and psycholo-
gists. 
Seuren (1978, p. 203) distinguishes between CC Central control -
Ericsson & Simon (1980, p. 224) use the term "central jjrocessor": "The CP, 
which controls and regulates the nonautomatic processes, ...") and RP's 
(routine ¿rocedures). CC can get information from different RP's, it can 
receive outputs from and transmit conuiands to other RP's. CC "is (largely) 
open to introspection" and its "operations can be brought to awareness". 
RP's, on the other hand, are not open to introspection and may be quite spe-
cific in character. Seuren writes: "... behavior caused by CC-intervention 
is not limited to any precisely definable behavioral category or class of 
categories ...", (cf. p. 218). He also claims that procedures which have 
been acquired under the direct supervision of CC can become degraded to 
routine procedures. This, for instance,can be the case in studying a second 
language or in learning motoric behavior like skiing or dancing. With 
respect to such activities consciousness (or CC, or CP, respectively our 
"general reflective ability") is necessary in the early stages but with 
frequent practice the deliberately acquired activities become automatic 
skills. Ericsson & Simon (1980, p. 235) maintain also: "With increase in ex-
perience with a task, the same process may move from cognitively controlled 
to automatic status, so that what is available for verbalization to the 
novice may be unavailable to the expert". 
Piaget (1974/1976, p. 341), however, who attests degrees of conscious-
ness due to different degrees of integration (e.g. consciousness can only be 
temporary) pertains to the view that "it is doubtful that an action that is 
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successful after automatic regulations can become completely unconscious, 
even if success is extremely precocious". 
Developmental psycholinguists have wondered whether first language acqui-
sition follows - at least in part - a similar line as those activities which 
become automatic after having been conscious or whether language skills can 
proceed without any reflection (cf. e.g. Hakes, 1980, p. 23: "Comprehension 
processes, ... may be inherently automatic processes"). 
In fact, there are some definite parallels with respect to consciousness 
between first and second language acquisition (e.g. direct questions about 
language). As to Anthony Weir's linguistic variations in his soliloquies 
Jakobson (I960) notes: "Many of the recorded passages bear a striking resem-
blance to the grammatical and lexical exercises in textbooks for self-
instruction in foreign languages." (Though we should note that Anthony Weir's 
monologues show forms of implicit rather than explicit knowledge!). Even if 
L1-acquisition shows a comparable progression as the learning of L2 (from 
conscious reflection to automaticity) the controversial question (see the 
arguments by Seuren and Ericsson & Simon, on the one hand, and by Piaget, 
on the other hand) remains: is it possible that skills which have been con-
scious become completely unconscious? 
According to Seuren, the mechanisms involved in routine procedures can-
not be directly reflected upon ("Quite clearly, it is a matter of good 
functional economy that RP's,which are nothing but ancillary routines, are 
screened from access so that they cannot be interfered with by some CC-
command, retrieved or reported upon", cf. p. 214). Piaget (1974/1976, p. 334) 
argues in the same way: "These two aspects [goal and results, K.B.] of the 
immediate action are conscious in every deliberate activity, while the fact 
that the scheme that assigns a goal to the action immediately triggers off 
the means of effecting it (regardless of how appropriate these may be) may 
remain unconscious, ...". Thus, internal mechanism within a behavioral 
"system" (be it cognitive, linguistic, or motoric performance) cannot be 
brought to consciousness. The same holds for structures which guide reflec-
tions. 
Nisbett & Decamp Wilson (1977) argue similarly: subjects have hardly 
any direct introspective access to their mental processes. And if people 
give verbal reports on higher order cognitive processes they do so on "a 
priori, implicit causal theories" and often on motivational grounds. These 
arguments are severely criticized by Ericsson & Simon (1980) and Guerin & 
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Innés (1981). Ericsson & Simon propose a model which treats verbal reports 
to be more than post-hoc idiosyncratic rationalizations. In contrast they 
claim "that verbal reports, elicited with care and interpreted with full 
understanding of the circumstances under which they were obtained, are a 
valuable and thoroughly reliable source of information about cognitive pro-
cesses" (p. 247). Thus, in concurrent verbalizations (i.e. if information is 
verbalized at the time the subject attends to it) heeded information in 
short-term memory is available (at least as long as particular processes are 
not fully automated). 
Consciousness is triggered by routine procedures. Seuren even hypoth-
esizes that a model could be conceived which specifies the kind of CC-
activity in dependence of complex inferences of routine procedures. By what 
can CC be influenced? Which effects does CC have? These questions lead us 
to the discussion of causes and functions of the "general reflective ability" 
with respect to language performance. 
4.2 Assumptions on the Functions of Linguistic Awareness 
In her studies on children's gradual construction of systems of pluri-
functional markers, Kami lof f-Smith (1979b, p. 239/240) attempts to expli-
cate the grounds for "epilinguistic awareness" (which corresponds to our 
"linguistic awareness"): "It will be recalled that for the gender problem, 
for instance, epilinguistic awareness was primarily based on syntactic and 
semantic clues and, surprisingly, not on the predominant phonological ones. 
It is suggested that this can be explained by the fact that basic procedures 
and basic functions, because they stem from positive examples, become highly 
compiled and thus 'automatic', whereas 'sentries' and standby procedures may 
be more easily retrieved from memory because they are used in special cir-
cumstances. They may also be more easily retrievable because they stem from 
conflict rather than from the highly compiled system based on recognizing 
positive examples". 
This quotation implies two possible explanations for the rise of "epi-
linguistic awareness": special circumstances (which often implies infrequency 
of occurrence) and conflict. Both of these reasons seem also plausible from 
common experiences: in case of unusual situations and in case of contradic-
tion reflections are more likely than in case of habitual and frictionless 
regularity. One could subsume both "special circumstances" and "conflict" 
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under the broader category of "differences". The emergence of "epilinguistic 
awareness" stentning from special circumstances is basically due to a differ-
ence between familiar and unfamiliar (or between expected and unexpected) 
information. Conflicts involve - by definition - differences. In case of 
differences between actual and target information such as an unexpected out-
come (special circumstance) and suchasa source of trouble (conflict) resulting 
reflections could fulfill two basic functions: supplementation and rearrange-
ment. 
Before we make an endeavor to specify possible causes and functions for 
explicit reflections on language (= linguistic awareness) with respect to 
their role in language acquisition, we want to suggest a general hypothesis 
concerning emergence of linguistic awareness. This hypothesis relates to 
different behavioral phenomena and is based on early observations of percep-
tual phenomena: "... la théorie classique des psychologues anglais (Bain, 
Spencer), selon laquelle « le premier fait fondamental, celui qui constitute 
la conscience, c'est la perception d'une différence » (Claparëde, 1918, 
p. 67, quoting Ribot: "Psychologie anglaise contemporaine"). Results from 
Claparède's investigation with five to eight year old children show: "La 
conscience de la différence surgit plus aisément, plut tôt que celle de la 
ressemblance" (cf. p. 71). We propose very generally that "differences" such 
as conflicts within a behavioral system or between two "systems" of behavior, 
are more likely causes for the rise of (explicit) reflective ability than 
"similarities" such as regularities within a behavioral "system", or between 
two (respectively among more) "systems of behavior". 
One might think of at least four pairs of cause and function from which 
the first one has already been introduced in 1.1 because of its fundamental 
importance for the present research. Firstly, failure in comnunication (the 
"errors" can occur in production and comprehension) might be a cause for 
linguistic awareness to arise (a difference between inappropriate and appro-
priate information). A possible function could be the repair (correction) or 
the prevention of such failure. Thus, linguistic awareness would serve as 
some kind of feedback mechanism or correction device.* This first pair of 
Repair strategies with respect to "implicit knowledge" have been observed in 
a number of investigations (Levelt, 1979, mentions the early study by Bohn, 
1914; more recent studies are, for instance, those by Käsermann and Foppa, 
cf. Käsermann, 1978, 1979, 1980; Foppa, 1978; Foppa & Käsermann, 1979, 1981; 
Käsermann & Foppa, 1981). 
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cause and function becomes transparent from Claparêde's early works: aware-
ness results from a failure to adapt (Claparëde, 1917, p. 362; "Et l'on 
est en droit de penser que l'intérêt ne s'est porté sur ces «catégories» 
[des diverses catégories de questions, K.B.], que lorsque l'action s'est 
trouvée désadaptée S l'égard de l'une d'elles. C'est le besoin qui crée la 
conscience;.."). In 1918 (p. 73), Claparëde does not only generalize his 
supposition ("La prise de conscience marque toujours une dêsadaptation.") 
but specifies two necessary conditions for the rise of awareness: ".... 
lorsque le réajustement automatique a raté, et lorsque le développement 
mental s'est trouvé à un stade assez avancé pour découvrir la comparaison 
consciente; ..." (p. 76). In order to become aware, automatic readjustment 
must fail and the subject must be able to discover the conscious comparison. 
The function of awareness is adaptation (Claparëde, 1917, p. 362: "La 
conscience du problème est donc la conscience d'un manque particulier, de ce 
qui manque au sujet pour qu'il ajuste son action au but désiré."; Claparëde, 
1918, p. 76: "... les circonstances qui nécessitent un réajustement conscient"). 
As soon as "normal" functioning is reestablished, awareness is no longer 
needed (cf. Vygotsky, 1962; Piaget, 1974/1976; Campbell, 1979)-
Communicative failure is of major importance according to Marshall & 
Morton (1978, p. 237) who make the following claim with respect to the 
emergence of linguistic awareness: "We believe, then, that "awareness" arises 
from the operation of error-detecting mechanisms...". With respect to the 
function(s) of the "fault-finders and fault-describers" they say: "...mechan-
isms which are required to change errors into correct responses." (p. 238). 
An example would be a child's explicit correction (function) of a formerly 
wrong morphophonological form after misunderstandings such as an incorrect 
object identification (which was due to the wrong morphophonological form) 
of another person in the course of conversation (cause). 
Secondly, closely related to the maladaptation in communication, but 
still to be distinguished as possible cause for linguistic awareness is 
what could be called "speech need" ("Sprachnot", Stern & Stern, 1928): 
lacking the verbal means to express a particular idea. Thus, the cause is 
more some kind of nonadaptation (unavailable information). More generally 
speaking, when the child is confronted with unknown words or "working at" a 
specific part of his gramnar, he may become aware of his inabilities to 
produce utterances which are appropriate in this respect. The function of 
this awareness might then be to provide himself with the appropriate lexical 
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or graimatical means. In such a case, linguistic awareness could operate as 
some kind of completion or filling device. Examples are yielded by children 
who have contact with a number of foreign languages (cf. e.g. Slobin, 1978). 
Not knowing a foreign or unusual word X (cause) could give rise to questions 
of the type: "Hhat does X mean?" in order to learn the meaning of that word 
X (function). 
Thirdly, a conceivable cause could be "intralinguistic incoherence". 
Kami 1 off-Smith (1979a, p. 2) characterizes it more specifically as "the 
need to get a tangible grip implicit on distinctions by marking them external-
ly, the reorganization of isolated morphemic units into systems whose elements 
have plurifunctional status". A corresponding function of this type of aware-
ness is intralinguistic coordination and integration such as the consolidation 
of "two separate meanings normally expressed by a single surface element" 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1979b, p. 239). 
Here, the child is supposed to have an intrinsic interest in managing 
linguistic structures and functions and as working on language as a "problem 
space per se" although lack of understanding in communication cannot account 
for this. In this case, linguistic awareness is useful as some kind of co-
ordination and integration device (but cf. section 4 for a different point 
of view held by Karmiloff-Smith). An example could be an English child who 
has trouble in distinguishing the suffix 's' of the plural from the suffix 
's' in the genitive (cause) and who, after having become aware, can handle 
the two possible 's'-endings despite the fact that there has been no 
comnunicative pressure (function). 
Fourthly, and finally, unexpected outcomes or novelty in the course of 
language acquisition could be a cause for linguistic awareness. If some 
linguistic forms or functions are rarely used or completely new for the 
child, he might be (pleasantly) surprised. In this instance the process is 
more one of accomodation than of assimilation. A possible function of this 
awareness could be a more creative use of the language potential. Here, lin-
guistic awareness would serve as some kind of superaddition device. It can 
be assumed that "surprise" during linguistic progress is the motor for play-
ful language activities, such as rhymes, riddles, metaphors, and jokes, 
which school-children love to make and which can be, in a rudimentary form, 
already observed in an infant's verbal play (Weir, 1962). Linguistic "func-
tion pleasure" ("Funktionslust", Bühler, 1918, p. 332) of the child would 
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then operate for his own and other people's entertainment or amusement. An 
instance for the emergence of this type of awareness could be the child's 
discovery that word order can be manipulated and that subtle manipulations 
involve changes in meaning (cause). Once having noticed that word order ma-
nipulation can imply funny outcomes the child alters word order systematical-
ly in order to amuse himself or others (function). Let us now oppose the 
four types of awareness (cf. Table 14). 
Table 14: Causes and Functions of Linguistic Awareness 
mechanism/device 
1 
feedback mechanism 
or 
correction device 
2 
completion or 
filling device 
3 
coordination and 
integration device 
4 
superaddition 
device 
cause of 
linguistic awareness 
failure in communica-
tion ("errors") 
"speech need" 
intralinguistic 
incoherence 
unexpected outcomes 
or novelty 
function of 
linguistic awareness 
repair (correction) 
and/or 
prevention of such 
failure 
provision with 
new verbal means 
coordination and 
integration of 
procedures 
more creative use 
of language 
potential 
4.3 Empirical Studies of Metalinguistic Abilities 
In this section we will concentrate on those metalinguistic abilities 
which are relevant for our research. These are error detections, corrections, 
and explanations. 
4.3.1 Studies of Children's Detections and Corrections of Linguistic Errors 
In the early experiments by Gleitman et al. (1972) and DeVilliers & 
DeVilliers (1972, 1974), children were asked to judge and correct linguistic 
errors. As to the detection of errors, these early studies indicate that 
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linguistically less developed children base their judgnents rather on seman-
tic than on syntactic criteria whereas verbally advanced children judge both 
semantic anomaly and reversed word order accurately. As to the corrections of 
errors, the developmental sequence goes as follows: no corrections at early 
stage IV (MLU 3.0 - 3.5), corrections of semantic anomaly at late stage IV 
(MLU 3.5 - 4.0), semantic corrections for syntactically wrong sentences at 
early stage V (MLU 4.0 - 4.5), and direct word order corrections in later 
development (cf. Table 2 in DeVilliers & DeVilliers, 1974). In general, there 
seems to be a slight precedence of judgments, corresponding corrections fol-
low one stage later (although we should be aware that error detections are 
more sensitive to chance factors than error corrections: in binary judgments 
about 50 per cent of the answers could be correct by chance alone). Most 
other studies on children's judging acceptability of sentences (e.g. Howe & 
Hillman, 1973; James & Miller, 1973; Moore, 1975; Scholl & Ryan, 1975; 
Bohannon, 1976; Hakes, Evans & Tunmer, 1978 - cf. also Hakes, 1980; Carr, 
1979; Scholl & Ryan, 1980) are not directly comparable with each other. 
Age of the studied children varies greatly: e.g. in Carr's longitudinal 
study her subjects were between 2;0 and 5;0 years; Scholl & Ryan's children 
in the 1980 study were in kindergarten, second, and fourth grade; Moore 
collected data from twelve-year-olds. 
Materials differed greatly: e.g. Scholl & Ryan presented in their 1975 
experiment 52 sentences varying in gramatical complexity, i.e. different 
forms of questions and negations; Moore asked for judgments of sentences 
which contained such violations as subject-verb disagreements, noun-adjective 
disagreements, or lexical category violations; Hakes, Evans, and Tunmer 
included in their acceptability task the following sentence types: word-order 
changes, subcategorization violations, selectional restriction violations, 
some-any violations, violations of inalienable possession, and meaningful 
false sentences. 
With respect to the tasks, error detections and corrections were not 
required in all of the above mentioned studies (e.g. Scholl & Ryan asked in 
both of their experiments - 1975 and 1980 - only for attributions of sentences 
to an adult speaker or a child speaker). 
There has been some dispute with respect to the formulation of the 
acceptance and rejection of the nondeviant and deviant sentences (e.g. 
"good" vs. "right" or "ok"; "silly" vs. "wrong", "stupid", or "doesn't make 
sense"). The controversy about particular wordings (which was raised by 
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Scholl & Ryan (1975)) seems to be superfluous because Hakes, Evans, and Tunmer 
did not find a response bias in their data toward saying "right" or "good", 
respectively "wrong" or "silly". 
The amount of pretraining and instructions also varied. The assumption 
that children may be influenced in their task performance by instructional 
variation was confirmed by an experiment of Markman (1979, study 3). From this 
study it can be concluded that indications to hidden problems within a task 
might facilitate the search process in the detection of errors and inconsist­
encies. 
Despite variations regarding age, materials, tasks, formulation of the 
judgments, pretraining, and instructions in studies on children's acceptabi­
lity of sentences one finding seems to be сошоп to most studies (especially 
to those of Gleitman et al., 1972; DeVilliers & DeVilliers, 1972; Howe & 
Hillman, 1973; James & Miller, 1973; Hakes, Evans, and Tunmer, 1978 - cf. 
Hakes, 1980; Carr, 1979): small children rely in their judgments and correc­
tions more on content and meaning than on formal properties whereas older 
children are more often able to master both meaning and form. This change in 
reflective ability takes place during middle childhood, i.e. during the 
transition from preoperational to concrete operational cognitive abilities 
(cf. Hakes, Evans, and Tunmer, 1978). As to the small children's metalinguis­
tic abilities. Hakes & Foss (1978) make a very interesting suggestion for the 
early concentration on meaning: "... it appears that young children's earliest 
metalinguistic judgments are tied very closely to their comprehension strat­
egies: if their strategies allow them to understand an utterance, they will 
accept it; if not, they will reject it.". Since three-year-olds (and some 
four-year-olds) are not yet troubled by syntactic changes such as word order 
modifications, they can accept ungraimatical sentences such as reversed order 
imperatives. Older children which have become sensitive to syntactic anomaly 
are in this respect similar to adults: they can reject syntactically in­
correct but semantically comprehensible sentences. Even if an utterance is 
hard to understand, linguistically more advanced children can nevertheless 
spot purely syntactic deviance, repair, and correct it. In general, there 
seems to be a slight developmental precedence of appropriate error detections 
before appropriate corrections. 
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However, error detections and corrections are often not very informative 
with respect to the bases on which judgments and modifications are given. 
Better insights may be obtained in giving the child a chance to verbalize his 
reasons for his decisions (error detection and correction). 
4.3.2 Studies of Children's Linguistic Explanations 
There have been relatively few studies in which children were asked to 
explain their linguistic judgments and/or language structures and functions. 
They are also often problematic with respect to their interpretation since 
children's verbalizations cannot be so unequivocally classified as error 
detections and corrections (usually binary classifications as "yes/no", 
"good/silly", or "correct/incorrect"). Even if children are invited to give 
explanations, neither the exact wording of their answers is given nor - at 
least in some studies - explicit scoring criteria so that some research re-
sults have mere face validity. In most research the bases for conments on 
general linguistic relations, processes, or rules have been single sentences 
which the children had first to judge and sometimes also to correct. 
To ask little children about their linguistic intuitions requires great 
care from the researcher who must consider at least two possible pitfalls: 
firstly, the experimenter should choose his words so that the child can 
understand him, and secondly, the experimenter should be familiar with 
children and their language in order to grasp the intention of the child's 
utterance and to find the adequate interpretation (more verbal fluency -
which some of the small children might not yet have - is required for explana-
tions than for judgments and corrections). 
Questions for explanations range from paraphrasing and explicating (e.g. 
"Can you say X differently?" or "Can you explain X?") and contextual infor-
mation gathering (e.g. "Would you ever say X?" or "When, where, under which 
circumstances would you say X?") to more rule-directed prompts (e.g. "Why 
can one (not) say X?"). Paraphrases and explications were, for instance, 
studied by Shultz & Pilon (1973) in six to fifteen-year-olds and by Hirsh-
Pasek, Gleitman, and Gleitman (1978) in children from grade 1 to grade 6. 
The results of the Hirsh-Pasek et al. study (in which exact scoring 
criteria for paraphrases and explications were given) are partially in 
contradiction to the ones obtained by Shultz & Pilon (who did not give exact 
scoring criteria); in their study phonological ambiguity is easiest whereas 
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it is much harder in the Hirsh-Pasek et al. experiment. This conflict stems 
from a different classification of ambiguities and also from a different 
stimulus presentation (e.g. different renditions in the punch-line of the 
jokes) in both studies. 
Researchers with an interest in the gathering of contextual information 
are, for instance, Gleitman et al. (1972) and Forrest & Waller (1979). In an 
often-cited example seven-year-old Claire Gleitman was asked by her mother 
Lila Gleitman: "Would you ever say Claire loves Claire?". It becomes evident 
by Claire's answer that this seven-year-old can already explain under which 
circumstances that sentence can be said: "Well, if there's sonebody Claire 
knows named Claire. I know somebody named Claire and maybe I'm named Claire.". 
Another example of contextual information-gathering is given in a study Uj 
Forrest & Waller (1979). In this study which can be criticized for confounding 
linguistic skills and metalinguistic abilities it was found that younger 
children (and poor readers, the children ranged from grade 3 to grade 6) can 
only recognize incorrect sentences but cannot offer explanations whereas only 
the older children and better readers can explain how something should be 
said and why a given sentence was wrong. 
Apart from the why-questions in the Forrest & Waller study, more rule-
directed prompts and requests which concern linguistic behavior were, for 
instance, also important in studies by Robinson & Robinson (1977, 1978), by 
Sinclair (1981), and by Hakes (1980). 
No precise scoring examples for children's explanations are given in the 
studies by Robinson & Robinson and by Sinclair. The studies by Robinson & 
Robinson were aimed to explore children's pragmatic understanding and their 
knowledge about the communicational requirements for speaker and addressee. 
In the 1977 experiment with children aged between 5;9 and 8;0 it was found 
that younger subjects nearly never allocated communicational failures to 
the speaker, slightly older ones were dependent on the outcome of the mess-
ages, and only the oldest children could evaluate good messages as adequate 
and bad messages as inadequate (irrespective of outcome). 
In the first experiment of 1978 with 65 children between the ages of 
4;11 and 6;11 the main result is that younger children have difficulties 
both in comparing referents with nonreferents and in differentiating between 
speaker's and listener's perspectives. Both of these weaknesses may be 
dependent causes of iimature understanding about coimunication. In the second 
study 1978 Robinson & Robinson conclude (on p. 139) "that an awareness of 
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a need to take the listener's requirement into account precedes the develop-
ment of an ability to make the necessary comparisons to achieve effective 
comminication" (although they are cautious with respect to prelature general-
izations because of previous findings). 
Pragmatic knowledge of young children was also investigated by Sinclair 
(1981). She asked three to eight-year-old Dutch kindergartners what they know 
about language production (e.g. "How do people talk?"), language function 
(e.g. "Why do people talk?"), characteristics of language ("Can animals talk?"), 
language acquisition ("Can babies talk?"), and incomprehension ("Do you always 
understand everyone and everything?"). Children's answers showed "that it is 
only gradually that children dissociate language or language behavior from 
other kinds of activities. Gradually, with age, certain ideas and conceptions 
develop and are coordinated, and the role played by the interlocutor, the 
cotmiunicative function of language, the fact that it has to be learnt, and 
its structure" (cf. p. 19). 
Hakes (1980; cf. also Hakes, Evans, and Tunmer, 1978) gives a detailed 
description of metalinguistic explanations in which examples and scoring 
criteria are listed. The percentages of different kinds of reasons given in 
the acceptability task for judgments of unacceptability at each age level 
(cf. Fig. 4.4 in Hakes, 1980, p. 80) show clearly that partially correct 
answers increase with age, especially in the preschool years. Hakes notes 
that this trend does not only reflect children's increasing metering of 
gramnatical rules but also the articulateness with which this knowledge is 
comnunicated (cf. also the corresponding decrease in the categories "no 
reason" and "nonsense"). Interestingly, there is a strong decline in "content 
oriented" answers ("content oriented" answers comprise "denial of truth", 
"possible negative consequences", and "against societal rules") which wer« 
relatively often given by four-year-olds. This decline is especially strong 
after four years of age (cf. p. 92). The finding for the sharp decline of 
"content oriented" reasons in the preschool children goes hand in hand with 
error detection and correction data: "It appears, then, that 4-year-olds, 
and to some extent 5-year-olds, are strongly disposed toward finding sen-
tences unacceptable because of what they assert rather than because of the 
linguistic manner in which they convey that assertion", (cf. p. 84). Only 
older children are able to consider sentences per se, independently of 
meaning and content, and to pay attention to grammatical constraints. After 
clear arguments and disclaims that the nature of the task and the mode of 
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instruction might have created an artifact. Hakes sumnarizes the findings of 
error detections, corrections, and explanations of the acceptability task: 
the development of these metalinguistic abilities suggest that children focus 
first on a single criterion and only later on multiple criteria. However, 
"The change is not a substitution of one criterion for another but, rather, 
an increase in a number of criteria" (cf. p. 87). Initially, children rely 
only on their comprehension when confronted with metalinguistic tasks, by the 
age of 4 years they use also a content criterion, and only later - by the age 
of 7 or 8 years - the linguistic criterion becomes an additional, third al-
ternative. We can observe a parallel to Hakes' suggestion (i.e. a shift from 
one to several possible criteria) in other metalinguistic studies (for a 
similar finding in Hakes' research, cf. also the synonymy judgments). 
For instance, in segmentation tasks four-year-old children concentrate 
only on "the tangible elements of reality", i.e. on comprehensible events 
(cf. Berthoud-Papandropoulou, 1978, example of a child aged 4;1: "Six enfants 
jouent: ('Six children are playing') "How many words?" "Six" "What are those 
six words?" "Moi, mon petit frère, et Christiane, Anne, Jean, etc." ('Me, my 
little brother, and Christiane, Anne, Jean, etc.')". Older preschool children 
ennumerate often only content words (Berthoud-Papandropoulou: "privileged 
constituents"): "Le garçon lave le camion - "How many words?" "Trois" ('Three') 
"What are they?" "Le garçon, lave, et le camion" ('The boy, washes, and the 
truck')." whereas at a still later age they can take also function words into 
account (in addition to the content words) (cf. also Karpova, 1966; Holden & 
McGinitie, 1972). 
It is remarkable that in a number of examples (cf. Piaget, 1929; Vygotsky, 
1962; Markman, 1976; Papandropoulou & Sinclair, 1974; Berthoud-Papandropoulou, 
1976, 1978; Hirsh-Pasek et al., 1978; Hakes, 1980) we can notice an expansion 
of criteria in children's explanations rather than a substitution. Thus, it 
seems that the development of metalinguistic abilities is not so much marked 
by a quantitative intensification (improvement with respect to one criterion 
- which would be the case if with increasing age a criterion can be applied 
in more tasks) but rather by additional, qualitative differentiation (as to 
the "attention shift" from meaning to form, cf. Lundberg, 1978). 
From an 'extrapolation' of error detection, correction, and explanation 
data which have been discussed (cf. Shultz & Pilon, 1973; Hirsh-Pasek, 
Gleitman, and Gleitman, 1978; Forrest & Waller, 1979; Robinson & Robinson, 
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1977; Robinson & Robinson, 1978; Hakes, 198ϋ) there seems to be no critical 
difference between error detection and correction, on the one hand, and 
explanation, on the other hand: younger children focus more on transparent 
reality-bound meaning and content than on opaque linguistic forms (for 
instance, in the 1977 experiment by Robinson & Robinson younger children 
consider more the effect of communication than the actual message). 
The fact that in general explanations seem to follow (i.e. come later 
in the developmental sequence) error detections and corrections can have at 
least three different reasons. Firstly, it could be that this finding is due 
to different scorings (binary coding for error detections and corrections and 
several coding possibilities for different kinds of explanations could re­
sult in diverging probabilities and create a scoring artifact). Secondly, due 
to a lack of articulateness in small children some of their arguments might 
be classified as irrelevant or nonsensical (as to the verbalization handicao 
in young subjects, see Levelt et al., 1978; Hakes, 1980). And thirdly, it 
might be easier to say "yes" or "no" when asked for judgment than to give a 
complex explanation (as to the psychological barrier, cf. also Hakes, 1980). 
In every research, it is highly likely that all of these reasons hold. 
A still open question is the relationship of error detections and corrections, 
on the one hand, and explanations, on the other hand, for different granrna-
tical violations. It is conceivable that different metalinguistic abilities 
follow a different developmental sequence for different linguistic viol­
ations. It will be interesting to see if different profiles for error detec­
tions, corrections and explanations can be found for different violations in 
the present research. 
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5. GENERAL PREDICTIONS ON THE ROLE OF LINGUISTIC AWARENESS WITH RESPECT TO 
THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
In the present research two different studies ("shifting reference" and 
"natural and syntactic gender") will explore the role of linguistic awareness 
in language acquisition. The awareness tests which comprise error detections, 
corrections, and explanations of errors will be given to children from three 
age groups either before or after the performance tests which shall inves-
tigate children's automatic comprehension skills. The awareness tests of both 
studies (as well as the performance tests) will be administered twice; the 
second testing will be the same as the first one, only five months later. Our 
general hypothesis on linguistic awareness and its relation to performance 
will refer to both studies if no further specification is made. 
Linguistic awareness will be stimulated in both studies by some sources 
of trouble which the experimenter will provide (among the incorrect items are 
some "filler tasks", i.e. correct items and "ambiguous" items, will function 
as "distractors" in order to discover response sets of the children). We 
proposed in 4.2 (Assumptions on the Functions of Linguistic Awareness) a 
general hypothesis concerning emergence of linguistic awareness which has 
been derived by Claparêde's observation that young children are more aware 
of differences than of similarities ("at an age when they are prone to ex-
cesssive generalizations", cf. Piaget, 1974/1976, p. 333). 
We expect that "differences" (such as conflicts) within a system of 
behavior, or between two (respectively among more) systems of behavior stimu-
late metalinguistic abilities more than "similarities" (such as regularities) 
within a behavioral system, or between two (respectively among more) systems 
of behavior. 
This "difference hypothesis" means for the present research, first of 
all, that a mismatch between sentence content ("sentence meaning", cf. 2.4) 
and communicative intent ("utterance meaning", cf. 2.4) within a given 
utterance is more likely a cause for metalinguistic abilities than a cor-
respondence between these two within an utterance. 
Thus, error detections, corrections, and explanations of errors should 
more likely arise if in the two studies a pronoun is "said" which is not 
"meant" (as it will be the case in most awareness tasks of both studie^; e.g. 
in the awareness task of "shifting reference" the experimenter might say 
"his present" but mean "her present") than if wording and intention are in 
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unison (as it might be the case in the performance task of 'shifting reference" 
where the experimenter might say "his present" and also mean "his present"). 
Secondly, this general "difference hypothesis" implies also that a dis-
crepancy between utterance and nonverbal reference, such as pointing or gaze 
in a special direction, is more likely to give rise to metalinguistic 
abilities than a correspondence between these two behavioral systems. This 
means for the study on "shifting reference" (where a difference between ut-
terance and pointing is frequent) that spontaneous reflections of the child 
should more likely arise when a pronoun utterance and the simultaneous ges-
tural reference of the experimenter do not match than when they do match. 
In the awareness tests of both studies inconsistencies of these two 
behavioral systems (verbal and nonverbal mismatch in "deviant" sentences) 
should be easier detected, corrected, and explained than agreements between 
verbal and nonverbal reference in "nondeviant" sentences, i.e. in correct 
distractor sentences. 
Thirdly, awareness should be more easily stimulated if differences 
between two behavioral systems (such as between the linguistic "system" and 
the cognitive "system") exist than if there is no such difference within a 
behavioral system. The implication for the present research is that in the 
study on "natural and syntactic gender" we propose that metalinguistic 
abilities can be observed earlier (respectively more often) for natural 
gender where cognitive and linguistic factors coincide than for syntactic 
gender where only linguistic factors play a role. 
With respect to predictions on the role of linguistic awareness in lan-
guage acquisition, five additional major issues are of interest for the 
present research. The first two issues concern only metalinguistic abilities 
and the following three the relationship of these abilities and language per-
formance. Hypotheses will be formulated for, firstly, the relationship among 
error detections, corrections, and explanations at one point of time, second-
ly.for the differential development of these metalinguistic abilities with 
age, thirdly,for the coherence of these metalinguistic abilities with per-
formance at one point of time, and fourthly,for the possible influence of 
error detections, error corrections and explanations on later performance. 
The fifth and last hypothesis concerns the possible influence of early lin-
guistic performance (which should be stronger than the possible influence 
of early metalinguistic abilities) for later linguistic performance. 
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5.1 On the Relationships among Error Detections, Corrections, and Explanations 
Within a Test 
As to the relationship among different metalinguistic abilities within 
a test we assume that a general reflective ability underlies error detections, 
corrections, and explanations (cf. 4.1.3.2: Specificity and Generality of 
Reflective Abilities). We therefore expect a close relationship among these 
metalinguistic abilities. 
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that a child who can detect an error in 
a task is neither able to correct nor to explain this error, and also that a 
child who can both detect and correct an error cannot explain it. Despite the 
fact that one general reflective ability underlies the emergence of super-
ficially different metalinguistic abilities it is possible that the strain 
on this general reflective ability is different for error detections, cor-
rections, and explanations. 
For an appropriate error judgment some shallow monitoring could be suf^ 
ficient. For this it is only required that the correctness or incorrectness 
of an utterance is checked in a rather superficial way. For an appropriate 
correction of an error the exact location of the source of trouble has to be 
detected first and then corrected (since often more than one correction is 
possible the subject has also to grasp the demand characteristics of a task). 
Appropriate explanations demand probably most of the general reflective 
ability. Usually, they do not only require additional knowledge and reflec-
tions about granmatical relationships, generalizations, or rules, but also 
more verbal skills than error detections and corrections. 
Different strains on reflective ability and different requirements with 
respect to verbal fluency should be reflected in a differentiated categori-
zation of the child's responses. Both error detections and corrections are 
often only coded binarily, i.e. "correct/incorrect". Explanations should be 
mulitply coded (e.g. "no reason", "partially correct reason", and "correct 
reason"). It will sometimes be hard to keep apart different strains on 
n 
Different degrees of consciousness could be due to different degrees of in-
tegration (cf. Piaget, 1974/1976; cf. also Hirsh-Pasek, Gleitnan and Gleit-
man's example of a child where awareness "flits in and out of his head", 
1978, p. 126). 
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reflective ability, different requirements with respect to verbal fluency, 
and different codes for error detections, corrections, and explanations, since 
they can be mutually dependent, for instance, when we have the case where a 
child can detect an error but can neither correct nor explain the error or if 
a child can detect and correct an error but cannot explain it. It will be 
interesting, however, to see if children can explain an error but do not show 
error detection and/or error correction (a Piagetian type of interview will 
be necessary so that the child can correct former decisions and so that the 
experimenter can follow his reasonings). Thus, the three metalinguistic abil-
ities of the present research have to be analyzed with respect to each other. 
Because of the assumption of one general reflective ability we assume that 
within a test they are rather more interdependent than contrasting. 
5.2 On the Differential Development of Error Detections, Corrections, and 
Explanations with Age 
As to the differential development of error detections, corrections, and 
explanations with age, these will be seen in a clearer light if we inspect 
cross-sectional and longitudinal developments. Since we do not know of any 
systematic longitudinal studies on error detections, corrections, and ex-
planations we will make the same predictions for intraindividual (longitudinal) 
metalinguistic developments as for interindividual (cross-sectional) develop-
ments. 
Our general hypothesis will be that the development of different meta-
linguistic abilities should be ordered according to "strain" in reflective 
ability, i.e. that error detections precede developmentally corrections of 
errors, and that corrections of errors precede explanations of such errors. 
The sequence of acquisition for these abilities should be: first error 
detections, then corrections of errors, and finally explanations of errors. 
These assumptions have been confirmed by empirical observations (cf. 
section 4.3). Hirsh-Pasek et al. (1978, p. 125) say with respect to their 
investigation on the detection and explanation of ambiguities in jokes: 
"Along with other investigators, we have found that the ability to explain 
ambiguity emerges much later in developmental time than the ability to detect 
potential alternative interpretations of a single speech signal.". Likewise, 
Hakes (1980, p. 93) assumes for his findings: "... that being able to give 
an appropriate reason for a correct judgment represented a higher level of 
competence than merely giving a correct judgment.". Whereas it is possible 
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that error detections and corrections are already mastered beyond two and a 
half years (cf. Gleitman, Gleitman, and Shipley, 1972; deVilliers & DeViliers, 
1972 - whereby error detections precede corrections, cf. DeVilliers & 
DeVilliers, 1974, Table 2, and also DeVilliers & DeVilliers, 1978, p. 169) 
the onset of the ability to explain a given judgment appropriately is prob­
ably not before the age of four (there is - to our knowledge - no comparable 
research available but for some evidence cf. Hakes' Fig. 4.4 in Hakes, 1980, 
p.80). 
There is an interesting parallel with respect to the relatively late 
onset of explanations in a study by Dimitrovsky & Almy (1972) on children's 
knowledge of conservation in which over a three-year period 432 children from 
kindergarten, first and second grade, had both to judge and to explain two 
Piagetian tasks involving conservation of number and one which involved con­
servation of liquid. Their results indicate that consistently correct judg­
ments on tests of conservation are not always followed by verbalizations of 
the reasoning underlying these judgments and that "children who respond cor­
rectly to conservation questions early in kindergarten are significantly less 
likely to be able to accompany these responses with acceptable explanations 
than are children who begin to respond correctly to such questions in first 
or second grade." (p. 24). Dimitrovsky & Almy's conclusion for this finding 
is that one group of children might indeed have achieved spontaneously con­
servation concepts but could not yet use their language consciously and that 
the other group of children might have used language as a tool for the achiev-
ment of these concepts. However, we think that it is also conceivable that 
the relatively late onset of explanatory ability for both groups of children 
is much more reflective of the ability to decenter, than to give an alter­
native answer to the question: "... more, less, or the same?". Moreover, in 
the latter case the children have a chance of one third to be correct whereas 
τ 
Hakes (1980) administered in addition to the metalinguistic tasks also the 
Goldschmid-Bentler Concept Assessment Kit-Conservation, Form A. The scalogram 
analysis in which only the judgment data were considered did not differ sig­
nificantly from the one in which both the judgment and explanation data were 
included. Beyond this no direct correlations between judgments and explana­
tions of Hakes' conservation tasks were evaluated in the publications (cf. 
Hakes, Evans, and Tunmer, 1978; and Hakes, 1980). 
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this is not so for reflective explanations. 
In conclusion the literature suggests that the development of meta-
linguistic abilities with age should be in that sequence; first error detec-
tions, then corrections, and finally explanations. 
5.3 On the Coherence of Metalinguistic Abilities with Performace Within Tests 
Our third general set of hypotheses concerns the coherence of error 
detections, corrections, and explanations with performance within tests. 
Three assumptions can be made. 
Firstly, since research data (cf. e.g. DeVilliers & DeVilliers, 1972 and 
1974) showed that primary linguistic skills can be observed independently 
from controlled reflections on language we assume that performance (automatic 
language understanding) can proceed without accompanying metalinguistic 
abilities (cf. also Karmiloff-Smith, forthcoming, cited in Hickmann & Weissen-
born, 1981). 
Secondly, we exoect that performance precedes error detections, cor-
rections, and explanations (cf. e.g. DeVilliers & DeViliers, 1974, Table 2, 
or Hirsh-Pasek, Gleitman, and Gleitman, 1978, p. 98: "For a variety of lan-
guage issues, judgmental performance does lag behind speech and comprehension 
in developmental appearance."). It is thus possible that a child uses his 
language skillfully, but is not yet aware of it. 
Thirdly, we also expect in Study A ("shifting reference") that there is 
an inverse relationship between the order of acquisition of performance and 
the order of acquisition of metalinguistic abilities. This means for the 
present research that it is easier for the child to become aware of lately 
acquired pronouns than of early acquired pronouns and vice versa (i.e. it 
will be hard to become aware of early acquired pronouns. This assumption is 
based on Claparêde's law of awareness in 1918, p. 71/72 ("une loi très 
générale du développement mental" = "Loi de la prise de conscience"): 
"L'enfant (ou en général l'individu) prend conscience d'une relation d'autant 
plus tard que sa conduite a impliqué plus tôt et plus longtemps l'usage 
automatique (instinctif, inconscient) de cette relation.". 
5.4 On the Potential Role of Metalinguistic Abilities in the Development 
of Linguistic Skills 
As far as the literature goes, the development of linguistic skills 
before age seven would not be any different if the child would not show any 
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metalinguistic abilities (cf. e.g. DeVilliers & DeVilliers, 1972 and 1974, 
as to pronoun acquisition, cf. e.g. Deutsch & Pechmann, 1978; Volbers, 1978). 
It is, however, a legitimate question to ask whether linguistic awareness 
can serve as a feedback mechanism or correction device (cf. 1.1 and 4.2). 
The two necessary conditions for the rise of linguistic awareness, which 
were formulated by Claparède in 1918, ara a failure to adapt automatically in 
case of a source of trouble or disturbance and the ability to make conscious 
comparisons. Although Claparède does not discuss this issue in detail we can 
assume that the child must have reached a level of cognitive development 
which allows him to attend to at least two aspects of a phenomenon for making 
a conscious comparison (cf. also Hakes' suggestion (1980, p. 38) about the 
"ability to decenter, to mentally stand back from a situation in order to 
think about the relationships it involves" which emerges between four and 
eight years of age). Marshall & Morton (1978) clam for linguistic awareness 
more explicitly that the "fault-finders and fault-describers" can change lin-
guistic errors and communicative failures into correct (appropriate) responses. 
We thus expect for the two studies on "shifting reference" and "natural 
and syntactic gender" that children who show metalinguistic abilities (error 
detections, corrections, and explanations) in the first test but whose auto-
matic performance is not yet appropriate will iirprove their performance in 
the second test more than those children who are neither aware (i.e. who do 
not show error detections, corrections, or explanations) nor perform cor-
rectly in the first test. That is, the abilities to detect, correct, and 
explain errors could "facilitate" future performance (for Karmiloff-Smith's 
counter-claim, cf. 4.). 
5.5 On the Potential Role of Early Linguistic Skills and Early Metalinguis-
tic Abilities in the Development of Later Linguistic Skills 
We do not yet have any empirical evidence that early reflective abilities 
are "facilitative" for later linguistic skills. However, if our data show 
that our main hypothesis (i.e. linguistic awareness can function as a feed-
back mechanism or correction device) cannot be rejected, we can still suppose 
that early linguistic skills are even more "facilitative" for later linguis-
tic skills than early reflective abilities. This assumption seens reasonable 
in view of the fact that primary linguistic skills can be observed to develop 
independently from metalinguistic abilities (cf. 5.2). We thus propose that 
early language performance is stronger correlated with later language perform-
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ance than is early reflective ability. 
5.6 Synopsis of the Predictions which Relate to the Role of Linguistic 
Awareness in Language Acquisition 
In 5. we proposed on the basis of Claparede's observation that small 
children are more aware of differences than of similarities the following 
general hypothesis (cf. 5.): 
H.I* : "Differences" (such as conflicts) within a system of behavior, or 
between two or more systems of behavior stimulate metalinguistic 
abilities more than "similarities" (such as regularities) within a 
behavioral system, or between two or more systems of behavior. 
From this general hypothesis we derived three sub-hypotheses which are 
more specific for the present research (cf. 5.): 
H, la: Metalinguistic abilities (error detections, corrections, and explana­
tions) arise more likely in case of a mismatch between sentence con­
tent and conmunicative intent within a given utterance than in case 
of a correspondence between these two within an utterance. H. la 
applies for both studies, Study A ("shifting reference") and Study В 
("natural and syntactic gender"). 
H. lb: Metalinguistic abilities (error detections, corrections, and explana­
tions) arise more likely in case of a mismatch between verbal utter­
ance and nonverbal reference in a task than in case of a correspondence 
between these two. H. 1b applies only for Study A ("shifting refer­
ence") in which the pointing direction is crucial. 
H. 1c: Metalinguistic abilities (error detections, corrections, and explana­
tions) can be observed earlier (respectively more often) for natural 
gender where cognitive and linguistic factors coincide than for syn­
tactic gender where only linguistic factors play a role. Clearly, 
this hypothesis (H. 1c) relates only to Study В ("natural and syn­
tactic gender"). 
ι 
"Нд" refers to hypotheses which relate to awareness and its role in language 
acquisition. 
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As to the relationships among different metalinguistic abilities within 
a test, we propose the following hypothesis (cf. 5.1): 
H.2 : Metalinguistic abilities (error detections, corrections, and explana­
tions) are all contingent on one underlying factor, "reflective ability", 
and should therefore covary in development. This hypothesis relates to 
both Study A and Study B. 
With respect to the differential development of different metalinguistic 
abilities with age, we came to the following prediction (cf. 5.2): 
НдЗ : The development of metalinguistic abilities (error detections, correc­
tions, and explanations) with age is ordered according to "strain" in 
reflective ability: first are error detections, then corrections, and 
finally explanations. This hypothesis relates to both studies, and 
should be apparent in both cross-sectional and longitudinal comparisons. 
With respect to the coherence of metalinguistic abilities with perform­
ance within tests, we made three assumptions (cf. 5.3): 
Нд4 : Primary linguistic skills (= performance) can exist independently from 
the ability to reflect on language (i.e. independently from error 
detections, corrections, and explanations). This hypothesis relates to 
both Study A and Study B. 
H.5 : Performance precedes error detections, corrections and explanations. 
This hypothesis relates to both studies. 
Ндб : There is an inverse relationship between the order of acquisition of 
performance and the order of acquisition of metalinguistic abilities 
(error detections, corrections, and explanations), i.e. it is easier 
to become aware of lately acquired pronouns than of early acquired 
pronouns (and vice versa). This hypothesis Ндб can only be tested in 
Study A ("shifting reference") (the pronoun "seine" in the awareness 
tests of Study В can be either masculine or neuter, as to this problem, 
cf. 3.2). 
With respect to the potential role of reflective abilities in the de­
velopment of linguistic skills (cf. 5.4) our main hypothesis is: 
Нд7 : Children who show metalinguistic abilities (error detections, correc­
tions, and explanations) in the first test but whose automatic perform­
ance is not yet appropriate will improve their automatic performance 
in the second test more than those children who are neither aware (i.e. 
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who do not show error detections, corrections, or explanations) nor 
perform correctly in the first test. Clearly, our main hypothesis must 
relate to both studies. 
As to the potential role of early linguistic skills as opposed to early 
reflective abilities in the development of later linguistic skills (cf. 5.5), 
we propose: 
H.8 : Early language performance is stronger correlated with later language 
performance than early reflective abilities (i.e. error detections, 
corrections, and explanations). Hypothesis H.S applies to both Study A 
and Study B. 
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6. STUDY A: "SHIFTING REFERENCE" 
6.1 Method of Study A 
The motives for choosing German possessive pronouns as independent 
variables for the study of metalinguistic abilities and their relation to 
performance were already discussed in the introduction. We know from re-
search on German personal pronouns (Deutsch & Pechmann, 1978; Volbers, 
1978) that they are not fully acquired before the age of 6;5. Under the 
assumption that the development of possessive pronouns is similar to that 
of personal pronouns it will be interesting to see whether some possessive 
pronouns are not yet mastered by preschool children although these children 
might be able to express their ideas about these pronouns. Thus, German 
possessive pronouns might be a fruitful linguistic domain for the explora-
tion of the relationship between language understanding and linguistic 
awareness. Another motivation for their selection is the multiplicity of 
their linguistic features. Deictic features are especially relevant for 
speaker/addressee shifts. The study of "shifting reference" focuses mainly 
on three questions: firstly, the child's understanding of different pos-
sessive pronouns (understanding = performance), secondly, his detection, 
correction, and explanation of errors with respect to shift pronouns and 
non-shift pronouns (cf. 2.4) (metalinguistic abilities), and thirdly, the 
relationship between performance skills and metalinguistic abilities, es-
pecially the impact of linguistic awareness on later performance (longi-
tudinal relation between awareness and performance). 
In the present study ("shifting reference") each child receives both 
performance tasks and metalinguistic tasks. In three age groups the 
performance tasks are given first but in one additional group (group 4) 
which functions as a control group the metalinguistic tasks are adminis-
tered before the performance task. The study on "shifting reference" 
examines the three age groups and the additional fourth group twice: in 
May and June 1978 the children were tested for the first time (we will 
refer to this first test as "PRE"); in October and November 1978 the same 
test procedure was repeated with the same children (we will refer to this 
second test as "POST"). Thus, the time lag in this longitudinal study was 
* 
Note that order of presentation is not the main aim of our research. 
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exactly five months. 
6.1.1 Subjects in Study A 
In the first study (PRE) a total of 62 children were tested, 35 girls 
and 27 boys. For a proper analysis the data of three from the 62 children 
of the first test (PRE) were discarded because two children were sick at 
the time of the second test (POST). The data of one other child were not 
evaluated because of his response bias (acquiescence) in the metalinguistic 
tasks of PRE. Thus, there were 59 children partitioned over four groups: 
In group 1 were the 14 youngest children, nine girls and five boys, from 
3;9 to 4;5 years of age (mean age: 4;2). In group 2, 16 children were 
tested, nine girls and seven boys, from 4;6 to 5;2 years of age (mean age: 
4;10). Group 3 contained 14 children, seven boys and seven girls, ranging 
from 5;3 to 5;10 (mean age: 5;6). 
The mean age differences between group 1 and 2, on the one hand, and 
between group 2 and group 3, on the other hand, were eight months. In 
group 4, the control group (these children got the awareness test first), 
were 15 children, eight girls and seven boys, ranging from 5;1 to 5;11. 
Their mean age was the same as the one of the children in group 3, namely 
5;¿. When these four groups were tested for the second time they were 
exactly 5 months older: group 1 (4;7), group 2 (5;3), group 3 (5;11), and 
group 4 (5;11). These age groups were chosen because we expected that not 
all of the possessive pronouns are fully mastered at this level and that 
there are still developmental changes to be observed in metalinguistic 
abilities. 
All children were native speakers of German. They came from five 
different kindergartens and, according to the kindergarten-teachers, from 
different socio-economic classes (lower class families, middle class 
families, and upper-middle class families). All children lived 1n Kleve in 
North-West Germany. Parental and kindergarten permission was obtained prior 
to the testing of any child. All tested children knew the experimenter 
(the present author) for at least half a year. Due to the relaxed atmos-
phere from earlier visits no warming-up sessions were needed. Only those 
children who volunteered were tested. 
6.1.2 Research Design of Study A 
In order to give a clearer picture of how the research was planned, 
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Table 15 and Table 16 present the design of the study on "shifting 
reference": 
Table 15: Research Design for the First Test of "Shifting Reference" in^ 
May and June 1978 (PRE) 
group 
1 
experi­
mental 
2 
experi­
mental 
3 
experi­
mental 
4 
control 
order of presentation 
performance 
before 
awareness 
awareness 
before 
performance 
number of subjects 
14 (16)* 
16 (16) 
14 (15) 
15 (15) 
mean age 
χ = 4;2 
χ = 4;10 
χ = 5;6 
χ = 5;6 
In parentheses are the original numbers of subjects. 
The same procedure was repeated with the same subjects in a second test in 
October and November 1978 (POST). 
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Table 16: Research Design for the Second Test of "Shifting Reference" in 
October and November 1978 (POST) 
group 
1 
experi­
mental 
2 
experi­
mental 
3 
experi­
mental 
4 
control 
order of presentation 
performance 
before 
awareness 
awareness 
before 
performance 
number of subjects 
14 
16 
14 
15 
mean age 
χ = 4;7 
χ = 5;3 
χ = 5;11 
χ = 5;11 
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The time lag of five months between PRE and POST was chosen because of some 
calculations (comparisons of children in group 1 and 2 with those of group 2 
and 3) after the first test. An improvement in performance could be expected 
after five months for at least one pronoun. The reason why we did not choose 
a time lag of eight months (which corresponds to inter-group intervals with 
respect to the mean age of the three groups) but of five months was that in 
two kindergartens the oldest children should begin a "reading training" after 
Christmas. Since the reading training could have had an effect on metalin­
guistic abilities it was necessary to do the second testing earlier. 
6.1.3 Experimental Set-up of Study Д 
In the experiment on "shifting reference" the following German possess­
ive pronouns were tested: "mein", "dein", "sein", "ihr", "unser", and "euer" 
which referred to four participants in the experiment: the female experi­
menter, a subject (either sex), a male doll, and a female doll (cf. 2., 
especially Table 1). Nine presents in different colours (small raisin 
packages) were on a table of a kindergarten room. 
Table 17: Experimental Set-up of "Shifting Reference" 
doll 
1 I f · · · ! · ! doll (male) 
laBBlstantl 
V (femaleW 
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The arrangement was the following: the experimenter, the subject, and 
the two dolls sit at a table. Behind the experimenter and the child is a 
female research assistant with a cassette recorder. The research assistant 
who takes notes is seated at an angle where she can observe the situation 
but is not seen herself. On the table are nine presents (p): p. belongs to 
the female experimenter (E = speaker), p- belongs to the subject (S = 
addressee), p, to the female doll (non-addressee; participant in the game), 
p. to the male doll (non-addressee; participant in the game), p¡- belongs 
to the experimenter and the subject, p, to the experimenter and the female 
doll, ρ, to the female doll and the male doll, ρ 8 to the child and the 
male doll, and ρ- to all four participants together, i.e. to the experi­
menter, the subject, and the two dolls (for a similar experimental set-up, 
cf. Deutsch & Pechmann, 1978, or Volbers, 1978). 
Since the experimenter is the speaker, the child the addressee, and 
the two dolls only participants (who cannot talk or hear) these nine 
presents should be labelled with the following German possessive pronouns 
(cf. also 2., Table 1): 
p. = "mein" present (experimenter = speaker) 
p 2 •= "dein" present (subject = addressee) I , p O S S e s s o r 
p, = "ihr" (= ihr . ) present (female doll) 
p. = "sein" present (male doll) 
P 5 = "unser" (=
 u n s e r 4
n c
i ) present (E & S) 
p 6 = "unser" (= unser e x c 1 ) present (E & female doll) i 2 p o s s e s s o r s 
Py = "ihr" (= ihr, ) present (female doll & male doll) 
p Q = "euer" present (S & male doll) 
Ì 
Pg = "unser" (= unser4) present (E & S & 2 dolls) >4 possessors 
The female research assistant who took notes did not participate in 
the experiment (the child was told this) except for the beginning when she 
distributed the presents. This was done in order to make sure that the 
child should not think that all the presents belonged to the experimenter 
anyway. 
6.1.4 Performance Tasks of Study A 
The performance tasks were items which tested the child's understand-
ing of possessive pronouns. The child's task was the identification of the 
six possessive pronouns: "mein", "dein", "sein", "ihr", "unser", and 
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"euer". The experimenter asked the child to point out a present: 
1. "Can you show me "mein" (my) present?" 
2. "Can you show me "dein" (y°ulrs-¡na ) present?" 
3. "Can you show me "ihr" (her or their) present?" 
4. "Can you show me "sein" (his) present?" 
5. "Can you show me "unser" (our) present?" 
6. "Can you show me "euer" (your ·, ) present?" 
Since "ihr" can refer to two presents (p, = sing, female 3 person 
rd 
and p, = plural 3 person), a further question was asked after question 3. 
and the identification of a present: 
** 
3a. "Is there another present which is "ihr" (her or their) present?" 
The pronoun "unser" can refer to three presents (p5 = "unserincl "' 
Pg = "unser ι ", and p„ = "unser·"), thus two further questions had to 
be asked after question 5. and the identification of a present: 
5a. "Is there another present which is "unser" (our) present?", and 
*** 
5b. "Is there still another present which is "unser" (our) present?" 
There were all together nine questions (1., 2., 3., 3a., 4., 5., 5a., 5b., 
and 6.) but three with different wording (3a., 5a., and 5b.). It was felt 
that the wording "Is there another present ...?" and "Is there still 
another present ...?" was more natural as a second, respectively third 
question than the wording "Can you show me another (still another) ... 
present?". The questions 3a., 5a,. and 5b. were also asked if the child 
pointed out a wrong present. In some cases the children denied the presence 
of another "unser" present. In these instances 5b. was not questioned and 
the child was not further prompted. 
Before the experiment started the six questions (3a., 5a., and 5b. 
followed always the kernel question, 3. or 5. respectively) were randomized 
for each child (but note that the child got the same order in POST as in 
PRE). 
it 
The German question was: "Kannst du mir mal ... Geschenk zeigen?" 
** 
The German question was: "Gibt es noch ein Geschenk, das ... Geschenk 
ist?" 
*** 
The German question was: "Gibt es noch ein anderes Geschenk, das ... 
Geschenk ist?" 
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The V-form "Ihr" was not tested since in German it can only be used 
for grown-ups and the addressee was a child. The motivation for testing 
three different referential possibilities for "unser" ("unser-¡nci "» 
"unser . ", and "unser.") was the examination of the child's comprehen-
sion of addressee-inclusion and addressee-exclusion. The two inclusive 
"unser" pronouns ("unser-¡nci " and "unser.") were selected because we 
wanted to see whether the implication of the two dolls facilitated correct 
identification of "unser". 
6.1.5 Awareness Tasks of Study A 
Each awareness task (= error detection task) consisted of an error 
detection which was followed by a correction and an explanation. We 
decided to use standardized questions for error detections but took the 
Genevan "clinical interview" approach for error corrections and explana-
tions (for a beautiful discussion on the problem of experiments and 
"clinical interviews", cf. Karmiloff-Smith, 1979b). Only in cases where 
the child had been aware that the given pronoun was mistaken or where his 
answers were hesitant or contradictory (e.g. nodding and a "no"-answer) 
he was further prompted for corrections and explanations. The error 
detection tasks were the following: 
Ι. E pointed at the present of the female doll (p,) and asked: 
"Can 2 say this is "sein" (his) present?" (Kann ^ ch sagen, dies ist 
sein Geschenk?). The correct pronoun would be "ihr" (ihr . /her). 
The utterance is "sein" and the reference "ihr,,. _ " (in the following 
sing. a 
we will refer to this task as "task I" ("sei""/ihr
si )"). This item 
should test the child's awareness of natural gender (-Ego-Se versus 
-Ego-Se+Fe). 
II. E pointed at the present of the subject ^ ) and asked: "Can ^  say 
this is "mein" (щу) present?" (Kann Ich sagen, dies ist mein Geschenk?). 
The correct pronoun would be "dein" (y o u r s-¡ n a )· The utterance is 
"mein" and the reference "dein" (henceforth: Task II ("mein'Vdein)). 
In this task the singular speaker/addressee shift was investigated 
(+Ego versus -Ego, + Se). 
III. E pointed at the present of the subject and the male doll (pe) and 
asked: "Can ^  say this is "unser" (our) present?" (Kann ich sagen, 
dies ist unser Geschenk?). The correct pronoun would be "euer" 
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(your , ). The utterance is "unser" and the reference "euer" (henceforth: 
Task III ("unser"/euer)). The problem involved in task III is a plural 
speaker/addressee shift where E utters a pronoun which implies the 
speaker but refers to a present which involves the addressee (+Ego, 
±Se, +Plural versus -Ego, +Se, +Plural). 
IV. E pointed at the present of the male doll (p.) and asked: "Can i_ say 
this is "dein" (your,. „ ) present?" (Kann ich sagen, dies ist dein sing. r 
Geschenk?). The correct pronoun would be "sein" (his). The utterance 
is "dein" and the reference "sein" (henceforth: task IV ("dein'Vsein)). 
This task should test the child's ability to discriminate between 
addressee and another participant (-Ego, +Se versus -Ego, -Se). 
V. E pointed at the present of E and the female doll (ρ6) and asked: "Can 
i_ say this is "euer" (your , ) present?" (Kann jch sagen, dies ist 
euer Geschenk?). The correct pronoun would be " u n s e r
e x c
i " ' o u r
e
vcl '· 
The utterance is "euer" and the reference " u n s e r
e x c
i " (henceforth: 
task V ("euer'Vunser ι )). Like in task III, task V concerns a plural 
speaker/addressee shift, but here E utters a pronoun which implies the 
addressee but refers to a present wnich involves the speaker (-Ego, 
+Se, +Plural versus +Ego, -Se, +Plural). 
VI. E pointed at the present of the two dolls (p,) and asked: "Can l_ say 
this is "euer" (your , ) present?" (Kann ich sagen, dies ist euer 
Geschenk?). The correct pronoun would be "ihr , " (their). The utter­
ance is "euer" and the reference "ihr , " (henceforth: task VI ("euer"/ 
ihr . )). In this task we were interested whether the child notices 
that a plural addressee involvement is not appropriate when the 
reference is only made with respect to other participants (-Ego, +Se, 
+Plural versus -Ego, -Se, +Plural). 
The four remaining awareness tasks were "filler tasks", two "correct" 
tasks and two "ambiguous" tasks. Moreover, these four tasks functioned as 
"distractors" for the detection of response sets, i.e. of either acquies­
cence or negation. The "correct" awareness tasks are: 
* 
The two "correct" tasks functioned not only as "fillers" but also to have 
an opportunity to test Claparêde's suggestion that awareness for "incorrect" 
precedes awareness for "correct" (cf. H.la and H.lb in 5.6). The two 
"ambiguous" tasks were not only "fillers" but also a possibility for testing 
the Gricean maxims of "quantity" and "quality" (the specification of this 
assumption follows after presentation of the "ambiguous" tasks IX and X). 
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VII. E pointed at the present of the subject (p-) and aslcd: "Can 1_ say 
this is "dein" (your . ) present?" (Kann ich sagen, dies ist dein 
Geschenk?). The correct pronoun is "dein" (y o u r s-¡ n a )· Thus, the 
pronoun utterance is in conformity with the reference (we will refer 
to this task as "task VII ("dein'Vdein)"). 
Vili. E pointed at the present of E and the female doll (pg) and asked: 
"Can 2 say this is "unser" (our) present?" (Kann ich sagen, dies ist 
unser Geschenk?). The correct pronoun is "unser , " (our , ). 
Thus, the pronoun utterance is in conformity with the reference (we 
will refer to this task as "task VIII ("unserVunser^^ )"). Since 
the "unser"-utterance is an exclusive "unser"-reference difficulties 
can be expected. It will be necessary to contrast task VIII with the 
error detection task V where E also points at the present of E and the 
female doll (pg) and asks: "Can j_ say this is "euer" (your , ) 
present?" (Kann jch sagen, dies ist euer Geschenk?). Both of the 
pronouns ("unser" and "euer") are plural but the former includes the 
speaker and the latter the addressee. 
In the two "ambiguous" tasks (the statements questioned in tasks IX 
and X are not completely incorrect and are thus "ambiguous" tasks) E's 
question could be affirmed but another pronoun would be more appropriate: 
IX. E pointed at the present of E and S (p5) and asked: "Can 1_ say this 
is "mein" (my) present?" (Kann jçh sagen, dies ist mein Geschenk?). 
The pronoun "mein" (my) is correct but "unser. , " (ou·"^ ,.·! ) would 
be more appropriate (we will refer to this task as "task IX ("mein"/ 
unser. - )"). The contrast between utterance ("mein") and reference 
("unser-, ") is: +Ego versus +Ego, +Se, +Plural. Especially 
interesting will be those cases where the child affirms the question 
("yes") but changes the given pronoun into "unser. , ". 
Χ. E pointed at the present of all four participants (pg), i.e. of E, S, 
the female doll, and the male doll, and asked: "Can l_ say this is 
"euer" (your , ) present?" (Kann jch sagen, dies ist euer Geschenk?). 
The pronoun "euer" (your , ) is correct but it is more appropriate to 
include the speaker: "unser." (our^) (we will refer to this task as 
"task X ("euer"/unser4)"). The contrast between utterance ("euer") 
and refe-enee ("unse-/') is: -Ego, ;-Se, 'Plura'! versus +Cg&, +Se, 
•Plural (note that tb° *·>·/ο in-liisiv« 'ijn.-cr' - 'u'ser. , " ari 
ine ι. 
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"unsery - are not distinguished with respect to their features). Again, 
those cases will be interesting where the child affims the question 
("yes") but changes the given pronoun into "unser.". 
Both of the ambiguous tasks (task IX ("mein'Vunser , ) and 
task X ("euer'Vunser^) are a good testing ground for the two Gricean 
maxims of quantity and quality (Grice, 1975). If the child follows the 
maxim "Make your contribution only as informative as required" he might 
only affirm the two "ambiguous' questions although he knows that another 
pronoun would be more appropriate when prompted. If the child follows 
the maxim: "Make your contribution one that is true" he should deny 
questions IX and correct "mein" into " и п 5 е г 1 п с і "» respectively include 
the speaker in task X, i.e. he should deny the experimenter's question 
and give a correction which includes the speaker. 
The ten awareness tasks were presented in random order for each child 
(in POST, however, the children got the same order as in PRE). Let us now 
give an overview of these tasks. 
Table 18. Overview of the Awareness Tasks of Study A 
t»sk-type 
error 
detection 
tasks 
"correct" 
tasks 
'ambiguous" 
tasks 
task 
1 
I I 
I I I 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 
V I I I 
IX 
X 
utterance 
•sein" 
"mein" 
"unser" 
"dein" 
"euer" 
"euer" 
"dein" 
"unser" 
"nein" 
"euer" 
reference 
Ь '
 , h r s1ng. 
p2 - dein 
pe - euer 
p. =* sein 
"б
 = ,
"
, s e r excl 
"7 = 1 h r p l . 
p, « dein 
^ • • " " • " . K l . 
P 5 - u n s e , r 1 n c l . 
p9 · unser4 
contrast 
-Ego, -Se vs. -Ego, 
-Se, »Fe 
•Ego vs. -Ego, +Se 
-Ego, iSe, +P1ural vs. 
-Ego, +Se, +Plural 
-Ego, +Se vs. -Ego, -Se 
-Ego, +Se, »Plural vs. 
+Ego, -Se, +Plural 
-Ego, *Se, •Plural vs. 
-Ego, -Se, +Plural 
no contrast 
-Ego. «Se 
no contrast »Ego.-Se, 
»Plural 
»Ego vs »Ego, »Se, 
»Plural 
-Ego, »Se, »Plural vs. 
»Ego, »Se, »Plural 
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We mentioned before that for further exploration the "(Genevan) 
clinical interview" method was used. This means that we approached each 
child individually after the introductory awareness questions. We also in-
tended to elaborate the first awareness question if a child would respond 
that X could be said (meaning: even if the utterance is incorrect it could 
be said) thus taking the question: "Can l_ say this is X present " 
literally. However, the intended change ("Is it correct if 1 say this is 
X present?") was not necessary in the actual experiment. 
Whenever the child denied in an awareness task E's pronoun suggestion 
like when he said to the experimenter: "No, you can't say that", and also 
if his reaction was hesitant or contradictory he was prompted for correction 
and explanation. 
The correction part of the awareness tasks. Questions for corrections 
were: "How do I_ have to say for this present?" (Wie muß jçh bei diesem 
Geschenk sagen?) or "What do ì_ have to say for this present?" (Was muß ich 
bei diesem Geschenk sagen?) (for different elicitations of verbalizations 
in experiments with young children, cf. Blank, 1975). 
The explanation part of the awareness tasks. Questions for explanations 
were worded as follows: "Why is it impossible to say X?" (Warum - also: 
'wieso' or 'weshalb' - ist es unmöglich.X zu sagen?) or: "Why do ^ have to 
say Y?" (Warum - also: 'wieso' or 'weshalb' - muß ich Y sagen?), or the 
like. In cases where the child spontaneously said that the experimenter 
could not say X but had to say Y the question was usually elliptic: "Why 
(not)?" (Warum (nicht)?). In questions with speaker/addressee shift for 
pronoun correction the speaker's utterance "I" like in "How do l_ have to 
say for this present?" was especially emphasized. The speaker/addressee 
shift becomes fundamentally important in task II, task III, and task V, 
i.e. the speaker utters here pronouns which are correct from the addressee's 
point of view. In the other error detection tasks and the two "ambiguous" 
tasks (1,1V,VI,IX, and X) the child can keep his own point of view for a 
correction. 
6.1.6 Experimental Procedures and Instructions of Study A 
In this experiment on "shifting reference" each child was tested in-
dividually In one session (for one test) which lasted approximately 15 to 
25 minutes. The sessions took place in a quiet room of the child's kinder-
garten. The children were escorted to the experimental room by the experi-
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menter and assistant and were seated next to the experimenter (cf. 6.1.3). 
Some children wanted the company of a boy-friend or girl-friend. This was 
possible but the little friend was told to be quiet and was seated at an 
angle where the tested child was not diverted by any nonverbal cues of 
the companion. After the female research assistant Veronika had been 
introduced to the children, instructions were given. The instructions 
for the first performance tests (PRE) in the three experimental groups 
were as follows: 
"You see these little packages here, right? These are presents from 
Veronika. The little packages belong now to you, to me, and to the two 
dolls. Do you want to give a name to this doll? (E points to the female 
doll) (All children gave the female doll a female name thus showing that 
they knew the sex of the female doll). And also to that one? (E points to 
the male doll) (All children gave the male doll a male name, thus showing 
that they made a distinction between the sexes of the two dolls). I now 
want to play a game with you in which you have to answer a few questions. 
Veronika does not play with us but Inge (respectively the child's choice of 
the name for the female doll) and Hans (respectively the child's choice of 
the name for the male doll) will play with us. Inge and Hans cannot talk or 
hear. 
How, listen carefully which presents belong to whom. Well, I got this 
present (E points to p.), you this one (E points to Ρ2), Inge this one 
(E points to p,), and Hans this one (E points to p.). Some presents belong 
to two together ("zweien zusaimen") . You and I together ("du und ich zu-
sammen") got this present (E points to Pg), Inge and I together this present 
(E point to Pg), Inge and Hans together this present (E points to p 7 ) , and 
Hans and you together this present (E points to ρ 8 ) . (At this point there 
was often an interruption after the attributions of the eight presents when 
the child pointed to Pg and asked: "And this one?".) Now, this present in 
the middle is for all four together. Hans, Inge, you, and I got this present 
it 
Pilot studies had indicated that the children had difficulties if E said: 
"This present (...) belongs to A and B". Under this instruction a number of 
children pointed out two presents (one of A and the other one of B) when 
asked in the recall test: "Which present belongs to A and B?", thus ignoring 
the singular form of "present ". Therefore we decided to instruct the 
children differently: "A and ÏÏ together got this present.". With this 
instruction there were no problems as indicated by the recall-test. 
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together. Now, this was a lot to remember. Do you still know which present 
Inge and Hans together got?" (eight further recall questions in random 
order). Thereafter, the attribution explanations (who had which present) 
were repeated. Finally, a recognition test was administered where E pointed 
out all nine presents and asked: "Who got this present?". 
After these memory checks the nine randomly ordered performance 
questions followed. The cassette-recorder was not used for the performance 
tests but E had for each child the random order of questions in front of 
her. During the actual test-session the experimenter tried to avoid non-
verbal hints. She always looked at the child when asking the questions. The 
research assistant took notes on specially prepared answer sheets, also of 
* 
some nonverbal reactions, when the child pointed out a present. As an 
additional check for the research assistant the experimenter repeated the 
color of the little packages which the child pointed out and said 'neutral-
ly': "The pink one" or "Number eight" (respectively, one of the other eight 
colors or numbers). The research assistant knew by some pretraining that 
a special color or number indicated a special present. 
Directly after the performance task the instruction for the first 
awareness items (PRE) was given to the child: "You did very well. We now 
do something else. I want to see if you notice when I make a mistake. Can 
I say this is Inge's present? (E points at p. = present of the male doll)". 
All children said "no" and when asked how E had to say they replied: "The 
present of Hans". When asked why 'Inge's present' was wrong most children 
said: "Because it is not Inge's; it belongs to Hans". The same procedure 
was done with p,, but this time with a correct question: "Can I say this 
is Inge's present?" (...). Then E said: "We now do more of thisgame. But 
watch out: I sometimes make a mistake but not always." (as to this instruc-
tion, cf. Markman, 1979, experiment 3). After this, the ten randomly 
ordered awareness questions followed. The child's name and age, his or her 
answers to the ten awareness questions (cf. 6.1.5), the whole interview 
sequence with children's error detections, corrections,and explanations was 
tape-recorded. Additionally, the research assistant took notes of the 
child's verbal and some nonverbal reactions (and also of unusual occurrences 
It would have been useful to observe children's nonverbal reactions system-
atically but such observations were beyond the scope of the present research. 
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such as telephone ringing or interruptions by the kindergarten-teacher's 
accidental dropping-in). On the awareness protocols were colunns for notes 
on error detections, corrections, explanations, and other comments or 
relevant nonverbal reactions of the children. At the end of the experiment 
the experimenter said: "Thank you! You did very well. Did you like this 
game?". Only a few children found it very difficult and said that they did 
not like it. In such cases the child was asked what he or she liked and 
the child's favorite game was played. All children got p, (present of the 
child). The children were not told that a retest was planned. 
The control group (group 4) had the awareness questions before the 
performance test. Here, the child was first given the instruction in 
which the "possessors" of the presents were identified. Immediately after 
the identification of possessive relationships the instructions for aware-
ness followed. The ten awareness questions were given in random order. 
Again, minutes were kept from the child and special occurrences. The whole 
interview sequence with children's error detections, corrections and expla-
nations was tape-recorded. 
After the awareness questions the child was introduced to the perform-
ance tasks: "Now, we do something else. Can you show me...?".The performance 
questions were administered in random order. The final sequence was the 
same for the children of the control group as for the children in the three 
experimental groups. For standardization performance and awareness questions 
of the first test were repeated in the second test for each child individual-
ly. In the instructions of the second test (POST) the children were asked 
which names they had given to the two dolls (about one third of the children 
knew still the names of both dolls, one third of one doll, and one third 
could not remember the dolls' names). Then E asked the children what they 
remembered (a few children still knew correctly the owners of the present; 
these attributions were nearly always dative constructions such as: "To me 
belongs this one". (Mir gehort das da.)).For most children the whole sequence 
(present attributions) had to be explained again. The second tests were 
the same as in the first tests. At the end of the experiment the child was 
thanked, told about his or her excellent performance, and got p, (present 
of the child). 
6.2 Results of Study A 
Before we turn to the results of the study on "shifting reference" 
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(Study A ) , let us explain the procedure of the analyses. 
Performance tests 
A first step in the analyses of the performance tests was a check of 
children's correct performances in the first test (PRE) and in the second 
test (POST). This was done for the three "experimental" groups which got 
the performance test prior to the awareness test (group 1, group 2, and 
group 3) and for the "control" group 4 which obtained the performance test 
after the awareness test. We analyzed both interindividual, cross-sectional 
correct performance of all three groups and intraindividual, longitudinal 
correct performance for each group. 
In order to find out which items (pronouns) were more difficult than 
others in the different age groups we used Bart & Krus' Item Tree Analysis 
(1973) for determining pronoun hierarchy structures. Bivalued items 
(correct pronouns are scored as 1, incorrect pronouns as 0) are compared 
pairwise and analyzed with respect to their relationship within the item 
matrix. By means of identifying item pairs, a hierarchy among items (a 
tree-diagram) can be set up which shows "logical" relationships within the 
item set. The rationale of this method is described in a detailed way by 
Deutsch & Pechmann (1978, p. 161): 
"... within a defined set of items the relations between all pairwise 
combinations of items are examined and tested for whether the relation 
can be assessed as prerequisite, equivalent, or independent. An item i is 
prerequisite to an item j if the number of subjects who did not solve 
item i but solved item j is less than or equal to a present tolerance level 
of error. The zero-one response pattern for an item i and an item j is 
viewed as a disconfirmation that item i is a prerequisite to item j. If the 
response pattern zero-one as well as the pattern one-zero occurs at a 
frequency less than or equal to that established by the tolerance level, 
the two items are said to be equivalent. They are independent if more 
subjects solve item j than would be accepted by the tolerance level and if 
the same holds for the number of subjects who solved item j but not item i. 
A tree-diagram can be used for the simultaneous representation of all the 
existing relations,showing the structure of the set as a whole". 
Since the item response matrix for the first test of the youngest 
children already revealed intransitivities ("unserinci B was preceded by 
"ihr^j.., " but "ihr„, _ " was "logically" independent at a tolerance level sing. sing. J * r 
of 10%), v. Leeuwes' program EDITA (Experimental Deterministic Item Tree 
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Analysis) (v. Leeuwe, 1974a, 1974b) was run in order to control transitivi-
ties and to yield reproducibility coefficients and correlational agreements. 
Because of numerous intransitivities at higher tolerance levels (cf. 
especially v. Leeuwe, 1974a) the radical tolerance level of 0% was chosen 
for the items although quite a number of branches and even independency 
of some items were obtained. These item trees will be presented to illus-
trate the results. 
Presentation order effects were examined by comparing the results from 
experimental group 3 and control group 4, item order effects by checking 
whether the position of one of the pronouns within the sequence of pronouns 
influenced the correct performance of this pronoun (although pronouns were 
presented in random order we wondered whether, for instance, the pronoun 
"sein" was better mastered in case of prior or posterior presentation with 
respect to the pronoun "ihr . " ) . The same procedure was applied for in-
correct performances ("mistakes"). 
We also analyzed children's preferences for "unser" and "ihr" (which 
of the three "unser" pronouns was chosen first, which of the two "ihr" 
pronouns?), their refusals ("there is no such present" and "I don't know"-
responses), and their spontaneous comments as well as some of their non-
verbal reactions during the experiment. 
Although all of these analyses were done comprehensively (except for 
the analysis of children's nonverbal reactions), we will only present those 
results which are of theoretical interest. 
Awareness tests 
All utterances and relevant nonverbal responses of the experimenter 
(E) and the child (S) in the awareness tests were transcribed and coded by 
means of a special computer program. 
The experimenter and the research assistant transcribed and coded in-
dependently all interview texts. In case of different codes for one and the 
same text, discussions between E and the research assistant either brought 
uniformity or a revision of the coding scheme. The coding scheme had to be 
changed several times. In the final coding scheme interrater agreement was 
94%. Children's error detections and corrections were not a source of 
trouble in the coding procedure. The printing of the text interviews was 
done under Unix operating system (Faculty of Mathematics and Physics 
Graphics group. University of Nijmegen). In order to analyze codes which 
concerned the context of the interview texts the RSX operating system of 
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the Max-Planck-Institut was used. Since Unix and RSX do not have a 
compatible file-structure the files had to be converted. In order to do so 
a third operating system was necessary (RT-11, Psychological Laboratory, 
University of Nijmegen). By means of a Fortran program we received print-
outs of code frequencies, frequencies of code combinations, and, if 
necessary, texts which enriched the abstract codes. This procedure was help-
ful because we dealt with nearly 400 pages of transcriptions (in general 
there were about three pages of transcription of each child per test 
session) and nearly 12.000 codes (about one hundred for each child per 
test session) for the awareness data of "shifting reference". Frequencies 
of codes and code combinations were analyzed statistically (sources of 
reference: Siegel, 1956; Adler & Roessler. 1972; Kriz, 1978). The essential 
parts of the awareness data concerned the children's error detections and 
their error corrections. 
Error detections 
When E made a mistake, saying, for instance: "Can ]_ say this is my 
present?" thereby pointing to the subject's present (task II "mein'Vdein), 
the subject had several possibilities to react. He could say "yes", thus 
showing that he had not been aware that the wrong pronoun was used, or he 
could say "no", thus demonstrating that he had detected the error. In a 
few cases, children changed their opinion during the interview, first 
agreeing, then denying, or vice versa. Here, the last reaction of the child 
was taken as answer. The children could, of course, also say that they did 
not know. If in such a case E's prompts and interventions did not result 
in a reaction of the child which showed his ability to detect an error, the 
"I don't know"-answer was interpreted as an inability to detect an error. 
These are all instances of error detections. 
Corrections (pronoun changes) 
Whenever the child said "no" or if a "yes" was hesitant, E asked: "How 
do l_ have to say to it?". Here, S had basically five reaction possibilities. 
He could say: "I don't know" (no pronoun correction), he could give a wrong 
pronoun (e.g. "euer" present in task II "mein'Vdein) or the pronoun which 
was appropriate for his own point of view as speaker ("mein" present in 
task II "mein'Vdein), he could ignore the speaker/addressee involvement 
(e.g. "Paul's" present when the child's name was Paul), and he could 
correctly take the point of view of the experimenter ("dein" present in 
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task II "mein'Vdein). These are - except for "I don't know" answers - all 
examples for error corrections (or so-called "pronoun changes"). 
Thus, pronoun changes are not only incorrect pronouns, names (when 
the child used his or her name for self-reference or E's name for addressee-
reference, we speak of "name substitutions") and correct pronouns (which 
result from the perspective-taking in tasks II, III, and V), but also 
pronouns which are appropriate from the child's point of view. If, for 
instance, a child says "mein" present to E's correction question in task II 
("mein'Vdein) he denotes another "mein" than E's "mein". In such a case 
(denial of E's "mein" and the subject's emphasis of "mein") the same pronoun 
is regarded as a pronoun change since the morphophonological form is the 
same but not the utterance function. Non-changes are given if a child 
accepts E's utterance ("Yes, you can say that") and either repeats the 
given pronoun or does not cotment on it. 
Error detections and corrections did not cause coding problems. This, 
however, was different for "changes of reference" and "explanations". 
Despite several trials to find unambiguous codes for these two classes of 
reactions on which both E and the research assistant could agree we could 
not come to acceptable reaction classifications for both "changes of 
reference" and "explanations". 
How does one code a child's reasoning like: "You said that it belongs 
to me and therefore it is not yours" or "You cannot say "mein" present 
because I sit here and it is"mein present" in task II ("mein'Vdein)? Is 
the first example "a change of reference" (the child seems to "know" which 
present belongs to E) or is it an explanation (but what kind of an explana-
tion is this then?)? Does in the second example the child "know" the 
difference between speaker and addressee? Since he does not explicitly 
explain this difference (like "You have to say "dein" present but I can say 
"mein" present") explanations and their classifications are difficult to 
evaluate (cf. also Levelt et al., 1978) and to sunmarize. Because of such 
problems and because "changes of reference" and "explanations" were rela-
tively infrequent we will only present the children's error detections and 
corrections. 
This means that we just consider a very small amount of the actual 
data. However, the few data which are selected on the basis of theoretical 
questions cannot reflect the arduous process of transcribing 40 hours of 
interviews, of comparing E's 400 pages of transcription with those of the 
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research assistant, and of checking and re-checking nearly 12.000 codes in 
one study (the original data and statistical computations which cannot be 
presented here are available on request since they might comprise useful 
information for other researchers). 
The relationship between performance and awareness 
The main focus of this research is the investigation of the relation-
ships (cross-sectional and longitudinal) between performance (i.e. language 
understanding) and linguistic awareness. Language performance has been 
checked by a comprehension test ("Can you show me X present?" whereby 'X' 
stands for different German possessive pronouns). Linguistic awareness, 
on the other hand, was stimulated by a mismatch of E's utterance and E's 
reference. In the awareness test of Study A we will consider only two 
different metalinguistic abilities: children's error detections and their 
corrections. The comparison between performance and metalinguistic abil-
ities reveals some possible pitfalls. At least three kinds of complications 
are to be faced. Firstly, there are unequal chances with respect to correct 
answers in the two tests. Whereas in all performance tasks there were eight 
incorrect alternatives to the one correct alternative (except for the 
pronoun "unser" with a guessing probability of .33 and the pronoun "ihr" 
with a guessing probability of .22) there were only two incorrect response 
alternatives ("yes" and "I don't know") in the error detection tasks 
(correct are only the "no"-answers). A second difficulty concerns the task 
comparisons. In the performance tasks E's utterance could match the perform-
ance of the subject (e.g. E: "Can you show me "mein" present? - S shows 
E's present); in the awareness tasks we deal a priori with two pronouns (an 
"utterance" pronoun and a "reference" pronoun) which result from the mis-
match between E's utterance and E's reference (e.g. E: "Can ^ say this is 
"mein" present?" thereby referring to the present of the subject for which 
"dein" would be the correct pronoun). The third difficulty is closely re-
lated to the second one. The awareness tasks did not cover the whole range 
of possible linguistic contrasts (we did, for instance, not administer an 
item which tests the singular/plural contrasts with respect to the ad-
dressee such as "Can l_ say this is "euer" present?" whereby E refers to the 
present of the subject - which would in retrospect have been quite inter-
esting). In fact, there are quite a number of interesting linguistic 
contrasts which could be tested and analyzed, but the necessity to hold 
the child's attention limited the number of awareness tasks. 
100 
The within-test relations between performance and awareness 
Despite of these reasons the procedure for analyzing the relationship 
between language performance and linguistic awareness was in the within-
test relations between performance and awareness based on a comparison of 
identical pronouns in both performance and awareness tasks. Since we dealt 
with "qualitatively" different pronoun changes in the corrections (e.g. 
"egocentric" pronouns or name substitutions) we will only present data on 
the within-test relations between performance and error detections. Thus, 
we asked, for instance, whether correct performance of "mein" corresponded 
to error detections in the awareness task II ("mein'Vdein). 
Longitudinal relations between awareness and performance 
In the analysis of the longitudinal relations between awareness and 
performance (i.e. between awareness in PRE and performance in POST) we 
decided to use a different procedure in order to check whether early 
awareness might be "instrumental" or "facilitative" for later performance. 
Here, the intraindividual comparison was based on each child's general 
performance and on his general abilities to detect and correct errors. 
The general analysis was done as follows. We first dichotomized the 
performance scores in the first test (PRE) for each child, i.e. we looked 
whether a child's performance in PRE was above or below the average perform-
ance of his age group. For instance, the average performance of a group 
might have been six correct pronouns (out of nine pronouns which were 
tested). A child of this group who had only four pronouns correct showed 
"low performance". However, a child with seven correct pronouns showed 
"high performance". We then similarly dichotomized the error detection 
scores and the correction scores in PRE (the dichotomized scores were based 
on error detections and corrections of the six error detection tasks, I, 
II, III, IV, V, and VI). After having analyzed the child's relative perform-
ance and his relative metalinguistic abilities in the first test we 
determined his performance scores in the second test (POST). 
In a final step we performed two tests (error detection and correction) 
for each group (and after this, for all four groups together). The first 
one is an analysis of difference in means of performance in POST for two 
groups of children: those with "high error detection" in PRE but "low 
performance" in PRE and those with "low error detection" in PRE and "low 
performance" in PRE. Before we applied the t-test we checked for equal 
variances of the two types of independent observations. The second test is 
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an analysis of difference in means of performance in POST from children 
with "high correction" in PRE but "low performance" in PRE and children 
with "low correction" in PRE and "low performance" in PRE. These two tests 
which are applied to each of the four groups, and to the four groups taken 
together, shall show whether early error detections and/or corrections can 
be predictive of later performance (and, if this is the case, at which age 
early awareness is most predictive). So far for the procedures of analysis 
to be applied to the data. 
6.2.1 Performance Tests 
6.2.1.1 General Results of the Performance Tests 
Before we go into a detailed discussion of the results of the study 
on "shifting reference" we want to look at the general picture of all 
correct performance scores (mean values of PRE and POST for the three 
experimental groups and the control group), cf. Fig. 1: 
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Three major findings are apparent from this figure: 
1. Possessive pronouns for speaker and addressee are mastered first. The 
pronoun "dein" which refers to the present of the subject (S) is with 
94% even more often correct than "mein" with 89% which refers to the 
present of the experimenter (E). 
2. Possessive pronouns which concern just one other participant and pronouns 
which concern the first person plural where speaker and addressee are 
included (inclusive "unser") are acquired next: "sein" {69%), "ihr . " 
(72%), "unser i n c l " (74%), and "unser4" (71%). 
3. The least number of correct responses were obtained for pronouns which 
relate to speaker or addressee plus a third person, and pronouns which 
include only third person participants: "unser· ι " (42%), "euer" (41%), 
and "ihr j " (25%). 
Figure 1 shows generally a dominance for correct usage of singular 
items over plural ones, with the exception of plural items which include 
both speaker and addressee. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the correct performance results of the three 
experimental groups taken together, for PRE and POST respectively. 
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Fig. 2: Average correct performance of children at the three age levels 
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F i g . 3 : Average c o r r e c t per formance o f c h i l d r e n a t t h e t h r e e age l e v e l s 
i n POST 
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Fig. 4: Average correct performance of the youngest age group 
in PRE and POST 
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Fig. 5: Average correct performance of the middle age group 
in PRE and POST 
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F i g . 6: Average c o r r e c t performance of t h e o l d e s t age group 
i n PRE and POST 
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Fig. 7: Average correct performance of the control group 
i n PRE a n d POST 
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Bart & Krus's item tree analyses for correct performance 
The itera tree analyses for the four groups in PRE and POST give an 
impression of the order in the acquisition of possessive pronouns. Item 
trees 1 through 8 present pronoun hierarchies at a tolerance level of 0%. 
The notation "-." means that pronouns which are above that sign are preceded 
by all pronouns below that sign. "Independent pronouns" (like "unsere)(Ci " 
in item tree 2) are neither preceded nor related to other pronouns in the 
item tree. 
ITEM TREES OF CORRECT PERFORMANCE 
1 (group 1/PRE) 
3 (group2/PRE) 
7 (group 4/PRE) 
2 (group 1/POST) 
β (groups/POST) 
β (group4/POST) 
Presentation order effects 
In order to check whether correct performance was influenced by the 
order of presentation we present Figure 8, which shows the correct per-
formances in PRE for the oldest experimental group 3 (performance before 
awareness), and for the control group 4 (awareness before performance) 
which had the same age as the children in group 3. 
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Fig. 8: Average correct performance of the oldest age group and the 
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In PRE, presentation order effects with respect to performance are not 
apparent because none of the differences (tested by X for two independent 
samples) turned out to be significant. 
Figure 9 shows the comparison of correct performances for group 3 and 
group 4 in POST. 
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F i g . 9: Average c o r r e c t performance of t h e o l d e s t age group and t h e 
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Although Figure 9 suggests a better performance of group 3 for singu­
lar pronouns and a worse performance for plural pronouns (except for 
"ihr . ") none of these differences are significant. In sum, we may conclude 
that the orders of presentation (performance before awareness versus 
awareness before performance) has no major impact on the number and type of 
correct responses in the performance task of "shifting reference" (and the 
same holds for incorrect responses). 
Item order effects 
The succession of possessive pronouns was randomly varied in all first 
tests (PRE) and in the second tests (POST) five months later, with the 
restriction that all SS got the same item order in POST as in PRE. Item 
order variation was checked for several critical items in all groups, so, 
for instance, for "sein" before "ihr . ", "ih r SJ n a " before "sein". In 
the present experiment, we came to the conclusion that correct usage of 
possessive pronouns is not noticeably dependent on item order. 
With respect to incorrect responses, we did not obtain any significant 
results for item order effects, with one exception; SS who have to master 
"euer" before "mein" or "dein" make significantly more mistakes for "euer" 
in substituting "dein" (α = .05) than SS who get "mein" or "dein" before 
"euer". 
6.2.1.2 Correct Performance Scores as Related to Predictions 
Section 2. (Linguistic analysis of German possessive pronouns) and 
section 3. (General predictions on the order of acquisition for understanding) 
were devoted to deriving expectations with respect to the order of acqui­
sition of possessive pronouns. This was done from different linguistic 
points of view: morphophonological, syntactic, semantic, and various 
deictic characteristics. These different points of view, however, did not 
converge on a single developmental pattern, but rather conflicted in various 
respects. Table 10 in section 3.4 sunmarized the various predictions. 
Here, we will successively discuss the predictions for each of these points 
Tt 
In fact, only frequently incorrect items could turn out to be significant. 
When the smallest expected frequency was smaller than five, Fisher's 
Exact Probability Test was applied. 
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of view in order to establish which one(s), if any, of these developmental 
patterns in fact arise in the data. 
Morphophonological characteristics 
According to Table 10, one would expect "euer", "mein", "dein", and 
"sein" to preceed all the other five pronouns. Also, one would expect the 
two forms of "ihr" to come last. 
There are at least three exceptions in the data. Firstly, "euer" comes 
far later than predicted (see Fig. 1). In fact, in almost all tests it does 
not preceed but rather follows "и,15ег-!
ПС
-| "» "unser.", and "ihr . ". It 
is also less developed than " u n s e r
e x c
i " f° r the youngest age group (cf. 
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3). But "euer" seems to "take over" again with respect to 
"unser ι " in the older age groups, which is apparent in the PRE to POST 
changes for groups 2, 3 and 4 (cf. Fig. 5, Fig. 6,and Fig. 7). 
Secondly, "ihr . " is generally earlier than predicted on morpho­
phonological grounds. The most evident difference is that its acquisition 
does not generally coincide with the acquisition of "ihr , " which is mor­
phophonological ly identical. Performance on "ihr . " is always better 
than on "unser . ", "euer", and "ihr , " (cf. also the item trees). 
Thirdly, the order of acquisition of "sein" and " u n s e r i
n c
i " is по* 
generally as predicted. In group 1 (PRE and POST, cf. Fig. 4), in group 2 
(POST, cf. Fig. 5), and in group 4 (POST, cf. Fig. 7) children performed 
better on "unser. , " than on "sein" (cf. also item trees 1, 2, 4 and 8). 
In summary, the only pronouns clearly reflecting an order of acquisi­
tion in correspondence with the predictions are "mein" and "dein", which 
are early, and "ihr, " which is generally late. Hov/ever, the relatively 
early acquisition of "ihr . " argues against a morphophonological expla­
nation of the latter, and the early occurrence of "mein" and "dein" is 
predicted as well from other points of view (semantic, variable reference, 
and the proximal-nonproximal contrast). A morphophonological prediction is, 
therefore, definitely insufficient. 
Syntactic characteristics 
The predictions based on syntactic characteristics (cf. Table 10) 
suggest that the possessive pronouns "sein", "ihr . ", and "ihr, " 
should be acquired before the ones which involve speaker and/or addressee 
("nein", "dein", "unser i n c l ", "unser^., ", "unse^", and "euer"). At least 
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in four cases these expectations are not met by our observations. Firstly, 
Table 10 shows late acquisition for "mein" and "dein". This prediction is 
wrong since "mein" and "dein" are hardly ever acquired later than any of 
the other pronouns (cf. all figures and item trees). In almost all tests, 
the 3rd person pronouns "sein", "ihr . ", and "ihr . " follow "mein" and 
"dein". 
Secondly, the prediction suggests a precedence of "sein" and "ihr . " 
before "unser-¡ncT "· This is not always the case (cf. Fig. 1). In some 
tests, "ljnserinci " is even acquired before "^ein" and "ih>*sinq "· so» for 
instance, in group 1 (PRE and POST, cf. Fig. 4), in group 2 (POST, cf. Fig. 
3) , and in group 4 (POST, cf. Fig. 7). 
Thirdly, the expectation that "sein" and "ihr . " are always acquired 
before "unser." cannot be confirmed (cf. Fig. 1). In group 1 (PRE and POST, 
cf, Fig. 4) and in group 4 (cf. Fig. 7) "unser." even precedes "sein" and 
"
ihrsinq " 1 π 9 Γ ο υ ρ 2 ( ρ 0 5 Τ' c f · F'i9· 3^ a n d i n 9 r o u p 3 ( p R E' c f · F i 9 · 2^ 
"unser4" is better than "sein" (although not better than "ihr. " ) . 
Fourthly, the relatively early acquisition of "ihr, ", as predicted 
on syntactic grounds, has to be rejected with respect to our data. Although 
it does, in fact, follow "sein" and "ihr . " it does generally not follow 
sing. 
the other six pronouns, with two exceptions: in group 1 (PRE, cf. Fig. 4) 
"euer" is worse, and in group 3 (PRE, cf. Fig. 6) "euer" and "unser , " 
are worse than the plural 3rd person pronoun "ihr , ". 
In sunmary, except for the late acquisition of "unser , " and "euer" 
and the precedence of the singular 3rd person pronouns "sein" and "ihr . " 
before the plural 3rd person pronoun "ihr , ", none of the predictions 
based on syntactic characteristics can be fully confirmed. The confirmed 
predictions can, moreover, be due to other than syntactic factors (cf. the 
semantic, and the proximal-nonproximal contrast predictions). In short, 
a syntactic explanation is not attractive, since incorrect predictions are 
often made and correct predictions can also be explained by other prognoses. 
Semantic characteristics 
Table 10 shows us that on semantic grouns "mein", "dein" and 
"unser. , " are to be expected early, and "ihr . ", "euer", and "ihr, " 
comparatively late. The predictions of the SFH (Semantic Feature Hypothesis) 
are rather specific and precise which allows for a finer check-up with 
respect to our observations. 
Although at first glance predictions based on semantic characteristics 
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seem to be generally valid, one major and three minor exceptions can be 
observed. The clearest exception concerns the prediction that " u n s e r
e x c
i " 
should be acquired before "ihr,.. ", "euer", and "ihr . ". "Ihr... " is 
in all older groups earlier than " и п 5 е г р
Ж С
і " (cf. group 2 in Fig. 5, 
group 3 in Fig. 6, and group 4 in Fig. 7). The pronoun "euer" is in some 
tests ahead of " u n s e r
e x c
i " (cf. group 2/POST in Fig. 5, group 3/PRE in 
Fig. 6, and group 4/POST in Fig. 7). "Ihr , " is in one test better than 
"unser
e x c l " (group 3/PRE cf. Fig. 2). 
Three other exceptions are less salient. Firstly, according to the 
SFH "mein" should precede all other pronouns. There is only one clear 
exception to this prediction: "dein" is better than "nein" in younger 
subjects and the control group (cf. group 1 in Fig. 4, cf. group 2/PRE in 
Fig. 5, and group 4/POST in Fig. 7). Secondly, "dein" and "unser.¡nci " are 
expected to come before "sein" and "ihr . ". However, group 2 (PRE, cf. 
Fig. 5), group 3 (PRE and POST, cf. Fig. 6), and group 4 (PRE, cf. Fig. 7) 
show that the singular 3rd person pronouns are earlier than "unser-¡nci "· 
Thirdly, the order of acquisition of "sein" and "ihr . " is not generally 
as predicted. In group 2 (POST, cf. Fig. 5) and in group 3 (PRE, cf. Fig. 6) 
"sein" is later acquired than "ihr . " (cf. also item trees 4 and 5). 
In suiranary, the predictions which are based on semantic characteristics 
are generally in correspondence with our data. The pronouns "mein", "dein", 
and "unserinci " are, in fact, early acquired, 3rd person singular pronouns 
follow, and "euer" and "ihr, " are late. There is only one major restric-
tion: "euer" is generally later than predicted on semantic grounds. A 
semantic prediction (as provided by our version of the SFH) has, therefore, 
considerable predictive power, although it is not completely sufficient. 
Deictic characteristics (variable reference) 
In Table 10, the expectations based on deictic characteristics (vari-
able reference) indicate that "dein" should be first and the singular and 
plural 3rd person pronouns "sein", "ihr • " and "ihr , " last. The 
pronoun "dein" should be followed by "unser-¡nci "» "unserinri " by " e u e r"· 
"euer" by "mein", "mein" by "unser . ", and "unser , " by the three 
3rd person pronouns. 
There are at least four exceptions to this in the data. Firstly, "dein" 
is not always as predicted prior to all other pronouns. In group 3 (PRE, 
cf. Fig. 6) "mein" seems to "take over" "dein". Secondly, "unser-¡nc-i " 
120 
should, according to Table 10, precede all other pronouns, except for "dein". 
This is in general not the case for "mein", "sein", and "ihr . ": 
"unser, -ι " is worse than "mein" in group 1 (POST, cf. Fig. 4), in group 2 
(PRE, cf. Fig. 5), in group 3 (cf. Fig. 6), and in group 4 (PRE, cf. Fig. 7). 
"Unser. -J " is also later acquired that "sein" in group 2 (PRE, cf. Fig. 
5), in group 3 (cf. Fig. 6), and in group 4 (cf. Fig. 7), and than "ih""^ " 
in group 2 (PRE, cf. Fig. 5), group 3 (PRE, cf. Fig. 6), and in group 4 
(PRE, cf. Fig. 7). Thirdly, as to the "variable reference" predictions, 
"euer" should come before all other pronouns, except for "dein" and 
"unser- , ". This expectation is apparently false. In all tests, "mein", 
"sein", and "unser." precede "euer" (cf. all figures and item trees). In 
general, "ihr,. _ " is earlier than "euer" - with the exception of one test J
 sing. 
where these two pronouns are equally well mastered (cf. Fig. 4, Fig. 5, 
Fig. 6, and Fig. 7). Also, in group 2 (PRE, cf. Fig. 5) and in group 3 
(PRE, cf. Fig. 6) " u ns e rp X Ci " precedes "euer". Fourthly, the predictions 
suggest that "unser „„, " comes before "sein" and "ihr . ". The data 
" excl. sing. 
show the opposite relationship for group 2 (cf. Fig. 5), for group 3 (cf. 
Fig. 6), and for group 4 (cf. Fig. 7). The hypothesis that the sex-identical 
pronoun (i.e. "ihr . " by girls, "sein" by boys) should be acquired first, 
cannot be decided on the basis of our data but does not seem to be fully 
valid since we have a balanced subject pool in group 3 (cf. 6.1.1) which 
exhibited a better performance for "ihr . " in PRE but for "sein" in 
sing. 
POST (cf. Fig. 6). 
In summary, although "dein" and " u n s e r i
n c
i " are early acquired and 
"ihr , " late we had a number of objections with respect to the acceptance 
of the predictions based on variable reference. The correct predictions 
are also held by explanations from other points of view (semantic and the 
proximal-nonproximal contrast). A "variable reference" prediction is, 
therefore, not very convincing for the acquisition of possessive pronouns; 
the "good parts" are, moreover, equally well explained by other theoretical 
factors. 
Deictic characteristics (shifting reference) 
According to Table 10, the expectation is that "unser. , " precedes 
all other pronouns, and that "unser , " follows all other items. Inbetween 
one would expect to find first the 3rd person pronouns ("sein", "ihr . ", 
and "ihr . " ) , thereafter "dein", then "euer", and finally "mein". 
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Our data argue against these assumptions in at least five cases. First-
ly, " u n s e ri n ci " which should be ahead of all other pronouns is generally 
preceded by "mein" and "dein" (cf. Fig. 1; group 1, cf. Fig. 4; group 2/PRE, 
cf. Fig. 5; group 3, cf. Fig. 6; group 4/PRE, cf. Fig. 7). Secondly, one 
would expect that the 3rd person pronouns "sein", "ihr . " and "ihr, " 
are prior to "dein" and "mein". This is, however, never the case (cf. 
group 1 in Fig. 4; cf. group 2 in Fig. 5; cf. group 3 in Fig. 6; cf. group 
4 in Fig. 7). Thirdly, "euer" is expected to come before "mein" and 
" u n s e r • ". The pronoun "mein" is apparently clearly earlier acquired than 
"euer" (cf. all figures and item trees). "Unser , " does in our data not 
always follow "euer" (cf. group 1, group 2, and group 3 in Fig. 2; and 
group 1/POST in Fig. 4, also group 4/PRE in Fig. 7). Fourthly, "ihr . " 
is never, as predicted,earlier than "mein" and "dein". It is also not 
always prior to "euer" and " u n s e r e x ci "· i·6· "euer" is better than "ihr. " 
in group 2/PRE (cf. Fig. 5), in group 4/PRE (cf. Fig. 7), and in all POST-
tests (cf. Fig. 3, and Fig. 7), and " u n s e r e Xri " is generally better than 
"ihr, " (except for group 3/PRE, cf. Fig. 6). Fifthly, Table 10 suggests 
that the understanding of "dein" should be better than the understanding 
of "mein". This prediction does not hold for older children (group 2/POST, 
cf. Fig. 5; group 3, cf. Fig. 6, and group 4/PRE, cf. Fig. 7). 
In summary, none of the pronouns in our tests reflects clearly the 
orders of acquisition in correspondence with the predictions derived by the 
"shifting reference" factor. It is, thus, reasonable to conclude that 
"shifting reference" characteristics are definitely "out" as an explanation 
for the automatic acquisition of possessive pronouns. 
Deictic characteristics (proximal-nonproximal contrast) 
The last prediction for the order of acquisition is based on the 
proximal-nonproximal contrast (cf. Table 10). Here, it is assumed that 
"dein" comes first, then "unserinc·) "· "mein", "euer", "unsere)(c-i "> and 
finally the 3rd person pronouns "sein", "ihr . ", and "ihr , „. 
Although the early acquisition of "dein", "unser., •  ", and "mein" 
and the late acquisition of "ihr, " seem to conform to the predictions, 
we found four exceptions. Firstly, a minor exception is that "dein" is not 
always - as predicted - prior to all other pronouns (cf. group 3/PRE in 
Fig. 6 where "mein" precedes "dein"). Secondly, another minor exception is 
that "unser.jnci " is " in contrast to the expectation - hardly ever earlier 
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acquired than "mein" (only in group 4/POST, cf. Fig. 7). Thirdly, and 
somewhat more severely, "euer" does not - as expected - always come before 
"unser , " (cf. group 1, group 2, and group 3 in Fig. 2; and group 1/POST 
in Fig. 4, as well as group 4/PRE in Fig. 7). Fourthly, and most severely, 
the prediction for the singular 3rd person pronouns "sein" and "ihr . " 
is in most cases wrong. Although "sein" and "ihr . " do, in fact, precede 
"ihr , " and follow "dein" and "mein", they never follow "euer" (cf. all 
figures). The pronouns "sein" and "lllrsl-na " do also not always follow 
"unser.¡ι " (cf. group 2/PRE in Fig. 5; cf. group 3 in Fig. 6; and cf. 
group 4/PRE in Fig. 7) and "unser . " (cf. all figures). 
In suimary, despite some correct predictions for the early pronouns 
"dein", " u ns e ri
n c
i "» and "mein" and for the late pronoun "ihr , " we had 
some disconfirmations in our data, of which the late acquisition for "sein" 
and "ihr . " is most prominent. The correct predictions are, in part, 
also given by the SFH. But, predictions based on the proximal-nonproximal 
contrast contain - despite of their insufficiencies - some explanative 
potential with respect to the immediate speaker/addressee dyad and more 
distant persons. 
6.2.1.3 Incorrect Performance as Related to the Semantic Feature Hypothesis 
(SFH) 
Out of the six predictions for correct pronoun performance (cf. Table 
10), only the Semantic Feature Hypothesis makes specific hypotheses on 
children's mistakes (cf. the second ontogenetic principle in 3.2). But 
before we consider the SFH-predictions let us first look at the data. 
A list of the most frequent mistakes out of all incorrect responses 
("typical mistakes") over all age groups in both tests is given in Table 19. 
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Since the children had more possibilities to make mistakes when asked 
for "unser" and "ihr" (three questions for "unser", two questions for "ihr") 
we received higher absolute frequencies of all mistakes for these two pro­
nouns. The fact that "ihr" was more often incorrectly identified than 
"unser" can be explained by the chance for a wrong "ihr"-answer: ρ = .78 
(the chance for a wrong "unser"-answer is ρ = .67). 
Binomial tests revealed four significant mistakes which are relevant 
to the second ontogenetic principle of the SFH: 
1. Group 1 in the first test frequently interpreted "unser" as mein. This 
occurred significantly more often than any other mistaken interpretation 
for "unser" (ρ = .013). 
2. Group 1 interpreted in PRE and group 2 in POST the pronoun "sein" as 
dein. The chance for dein is 1/8, and in both groups it was picked out 
five times out of eight mistakes. When this mistake is compared with all 
other mistakes which were made we get a significant difference (p = .0012). 
3. In the first test of group 3 "sein" was not only interpreted as dein but 
also as euer. In comparison with all other mistakes this latter mistake 
(euer for "sein") occurred significantly more frequent (p = .015). 
4. The most frequent incorrect interpretation of "euer" was dein. Signifi­
cant differences for this mistake in comparison to all other mistakes 
were found in group 1/POST (p = .016), in group 2/PRE (p = 1/7 χ 10 ), 
in group 2/POST (p = .016), and in group 3/PRE (p = .005). 
Some further relevant findings are: 
5. In one case there is a significant cross-sectional decrease (i.e. over 
the age groups) in PRE in number of mistakes, namely for "euer". 
Initially it is often interpreted as dein, but this misinterpretation 
is less in older children (X" = 6.44, df = 2, ρ < .05). 
6. If, as one would expect on the basis of the SFH, the child makes 
"typical mistakes" rather than "random" ones, one would expect children 
who make mistakes on the same pronoun in both PRE and POST to have a 
tendency of making the same mistake in both cases. There is, however, 
no indication whatsoever in the data to support this. 
7. Another finding concerns the two singular gender items "ihr . " and 
"sein". It could be expected that children who cannot yet differentiate 
between the two sexes would either point out any other present (for 
instance, euer) or would mix up the two pronouns for the two dolls (for 
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instance, "sein" for the female doll and "ihr" for the male doll). The 
error analysis meets this expectation only partially. It is true that 
the most frequent mistake for "ihr" is sein (cf. Table 19) but the 
opposite has not been observed (only one ihr-substitution for "sein"). 
8. Finally, there is a relevant finding in the mistakes for "sein" and 
"ihr . ". It appears from the pattern of results that mistakes of the 
interpretation of these pronouns is not due to the absence of the "gender" 
feature. It hardly ever happens that children who make mistakes for 
these pronouns, but who interpret them as referring to either themselves 
or the experimenter, refer to the interlocutor of the wrong sex (36 
cases of "correct sex" mistakes versus 3 of "wrong sex" mistakes). 
When we compare these results with the predictions derived from the 
second ontogenetic principle (cf. Diagram 1) we can see that the mein-
interpretation for "unser" (1), the dein-interpretation for "sein" (2), 
and the euer-interpretation for "dein" (4) are correctly hypothesized. As 
to the euer-interpretation for "sein" (3) we observed that "euer" has been 
taken for dein, and that this is an indirect confirmation of the SFH. The 
fact that "ihr" is frequently misinterpreted as sein, but "sein" not as ihr 
(7) is a further support for the semantic predictions. It is also interest-
ing to see that the "gender" feature of "sein" and "ih,"cina " is apparently 
correctly "transferred" to the preceeding pronouns "mein" and "dein" (8). 
This is another indirect confirmation for the SFH. 
The less frequent misinterpretation dein for "euer" in older children 
is due to the fact that older subjects make generally less errors with 
"euer" (5). The observation that there is no tendency to make the same 
mistake in PRE and POST for a given pronoun (6) has not been predicted by 
SFH but can be explained by a possible acquisition of feature parts during 
the time between the two tests. If, for instance, a child mistook unser. , 
for "euer" in PRE he might have noticed after the first test that unser 
implies the speaker. He, therefore, could have chosen sein for "euer" in 
the second test. Thus, our data do not imply a direct disconfirmation of 
the second ontogenetic principle of the SFH. 
6.2.1.4 Conclusions with Respect to Performance Tests as Related to 
Predictions 
In 6.2.1.2 we discussed various predictions with respect to our data. 
We saw that none of the six different points of view (morphophonological 
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characteristics, syntactic characteristics, semantic characteristics, 
"variable reference" characteristics, "shifting reference" characteristics, 
and "proximal-nonproximal contrast" characteristics) suffice for a full 
explanation of the results in "shifting reference". Some of the predictions 
are probably not very powerful. These are those which are based on morpho-
phonological characteristics, syntactic characteristics, "variable reference" 
characteristics, and "shifting reference" characteristics. Two predictions 
are, however, most likely relevant: the SFH-predictions and the predictions 
which are based on the "proximal-nonproximal contrast" (see also section 3.5). 
We should note here that these confirmations are related to our version of 
the SFH (including the complexity ordering, i.e. on the basis of our marked-
ness analysis of German possessive pronouns) and to our version of the 
"proximal-nonproximal contrast". Thus, a combination of semantic and deictic 
(proximal) features might come close with respect to a powerful prediction 
for pronoun acquisition. However, some unexplained issues (such as the 
relative stability for "unserexci "· t he conflict between "unser-¡nci " and 
singular 3rd person pronouns, and the gender attribution to the interlocutors) 
remain which require a careful further analysis, since apparently other 
factors are involved as well in children's pronoun acquisition. 
6.2.1.5 Other Influential Factors in the Performance Tests 
At this point, we felt the necessity to thoroughly inspect all data 
again, in order to find out what potential further factors might have been 
at work in children's performances, and whether any alternative interpre-
tations would suggest themselves. It turned out that there are at least 
four factors which are not or insufficiently accounted for by the different 
predictions, but which appear to be relevant for a full understanding of 
the children's behavior in these tasks. 
The first factor is the concentration on the dyad of the interlocutors. 
This can be supported by two observations (one on correct performance and 
one on mistakes). Firstly, the singular pronouns of the speaker/addressee 
dyad ("dein" and "mein") occur early (cf. Fig. 4) and are generally better 
mastered by all children than other pronouns (cf. Fig. 1). Moreover, the 
plural pronoun "unser. , " which comprises both speaker and addressee 
occurs also relatively early (cf. Fig. 4). The possessive pronoun "dein" 
is more frequently correct than "mein" in our tests, with the exception of 
the oldest children of group 3 in PRE (cf. Fig. 2) and the ones in group 2 
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and group 3 in POST (cf. Fig. 3) who understand "mein" either better than 
"dein" or equally well. The results of the younger children on these two 
pronouns can be explained by the nature of the tasks: we investigated the 
child's comprehension, not his production. The early precedence of "dein" 
over "mein" (cf. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5) which is neither supported by the SFH 
(predictions of the SFH are the same for production and comprehension) 
nor by the predictions based on the proximal-nonproximal contrast (there 
the pronoun "dein" should precede all other pronouns in all age groups, not 
only in the youngest age groups) agrees with findings of a recently pub­
lished study with English-speaking children from 1;6 to 2;6 by Charney 
(1980) (cf. also Sharpless, 1974). The results of Charney's study on the 
acquisition of personal pronouns indicated that children were "initially 
aware of speech roles, but only when they themselves occupied those roles" 
(Charney, 1980, p. 509). The frequently correct responses of "dein" and 
"mein" and the relatively good performance of " u n s e r i
n c
i " c a n be interpre­
ted as a confirmation of an "economy principle": performance is best for 
those pronouns which must be learned in dialogue and which cannot be easily 
substituted by names or other referring expressions (e.g. the plural 
'speaker pronoun' " u n s e r
e x c
i " c a n Ь е replaced by the decomposed form "mein 
and X"). Secondly, the analysis of mistakes reveals that many mistakes 
refer to members of the speaker/addressee dyad (cf. Table 19 in 6.2.1.3). 
The frequency of interlocutor substitutions can be only partially explained 
by the second ontogenetic principle of the SFH (cf. Diagram 1 in 3.2). For 
instance, according to this principle, the pronoun "ihr" should be inter­
preted either as sein (this holds for an incorrect interpretation of either 
"ihr.,. " or "ihr , ") or as euer (for "ihr.,·. " ) . However, we observed a 
sing. p i . p i . 
nearly equal number of dein-substitutions (15% of " typical mistakes") as 
of sein-substitutions (16% of "typical mistakes", c f . Table 19) f o r " i h r " . 
The concentration on the dyad of the inter locutors in the mistakes for 
"sein" and "ihr,,. " has been also observed by other researchers ( c f . 
sing. 
Baron & Kaiser, 1975; Volbers, 1978). 
The second factor is the preservation of the "gender" feature in the 
mistakes for 3rd person pronouns (cf. 6.2.1.3, relevant finding 8.). This 
preservation of the "gender" feature in the incorrect interpretation of 
"sein" and "ihr" as dein or mein is not predicted by the second ontogenetic 
principle of the SFH (cf. 3.2). Although children showed uncertainty with 
respect to the pronoun identifications for the two dolls during E's prompts 
for "sein" and "ihr" (children looked alternatingly at the dolls and near-
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ly one third asked: "which one do you mean?"), natural gender is not the 
most prevalent problem in 3rd person pronouns. (The preservation of the 
"gender" feature in the mistakes of 3rd person dative pronouns is also 
discussed in Volbers, 1978, p. 129; and the comparably early mastery of 
the gender distinction in 3rd person pronouns also in Scholes, 1981). 
Moreover, we also observed in the pre-experimental phase that natural 
gender attributions for the dolls were not a source of trouble because names 
of the male and the female doll were correct (cf. 6.1.6). We thus assume 
that the natural gender problem in (possessive) pronouns is a linguistic 
one (and not a cognitive one). 
The third factor is the "developmental focussing". Between four and 
five years there seems to arise a conflict in the acquisition between pro­
nouns which relate to a 3rd person participant and plural pronouns; for the 
five year olds it is resolved in favour of the better performance for 
pronouns which relate to a 3rd person (cf. Figs. 2 and 3). This can be seen 
in the development of the pronoun "sein" which is not marked by a steady 
amelioration. In the first cross-sectional comparison (PRE) group 3 (X = 5;6 
years) performs worse than group 2 (X = 4;10) (cf. Fig. 2). In the second 
cross-sectional comparison (POST) there is a clear Improvement for group 3 
with respect to group 2 (cf. Fig. 3). The deterioration of group 2 from PRE 
to POST for "sein" (cf. Fig. 5) coincides with an intraindividual improve­
ment for " u n s e ri
n c
-i " in this age group. We also found that the youngest 
children in PRE perform much (though not yet significantly) better on 
"unser, ι " than the oldest children (cf. Fig. 2), i.e. the developmental 
order in the first test is reversed. Correct performance of "unser.¡nci " 
of the youngest children in PRE is a precursor of understanding "sein" 
correctly (cf. item tree 1 in Bart & Krus's 'item tree analyses'). However, 
for the oldest children in POST correct performance of "sein" is a precur-
sor of understanding "unser. , " correctly (cf. item tree 6) . It might be 
that these two items are prototypical for a conflict between 3rd person 
and plural pronouns in four- and five year olds. Although one could argue 
from an inspection of Figures 2 and 3 that "ihr . ", which is also a 3rd 
person pronoun, is not in such a conflict with " 1 | п 5 е г<
п с
і "
 a s
 "sein" in 
the cross-sectional comparison, the longitudinal, intraindividual analyses 
revealed mixed types of development (deteriorations and improvements) from 
PRE to POST, despite general improvements for the groups. This holds es­
pecially for group 2. Thus, it is likely that children between four and 
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five years "work" simultaneously on pronouns for a 3rd person and on 
plural pronouns. 
The fourth factor is the inclusion of nonverbal communication in pro-
noun acquisition. The comparatively poor overall performance for 
"unser , " (cf. Fig. 1, Fig. 2, and Fig. 3) can be interpreted as an 
experimental artifact (cf. also the independency of this item in the item 
trees 2 and 3). In a "natural" communication situation the speaker would 
look at the person who is included in the "unser , " pronoun and would 
thus give an additional nonverbal clue. In the experiment E only looked at 
S (cf. 6.1.6). This explanation could also hold for some of the incorrect 
interlocutor-identifications for singular 3rd person pronouns. The experi-
menter's eye-contact with the child night be the reason for the develop-
mental precedence of the two inclusive "unser" pronouns before the ex-
clusive "unser" pronoun (in the analysis of children's preferences for 
"unser", i.e. of the first accurate "unser" identification with respect to 
the three "unser" possibilities, the order is as follows: "unser-jnci "> 
"unser.".and " u n s e r e x ci ")· 
6.2.1.6 Summary of the Results of the Performance Tests 
Children's acquisition of possessive pronouns is most likely influenced 
by a combination of semantic and deictic (proximal) features. The predic-
tions of the Semantic Feature Hypothesis (SFH) and those which are based on 
the "proximal-nonproximal contrast" are clearly more powerful than those 
based on morphophonological, syntactic, "variable reference", and "shifting 
reference" characteristics. Still, at least four other factors are involved 
in pronoun acquisition: the child's concentration on the dyad of the inter-
locutors, his preservation of the "gender" feature, his "developmental 
focussing", and his inclusion of nonverbal clues. The child's dyadic 
concentration can be explained by the need for unambiguous reference and 
is probably rooted in our culture in early mother-child dialogues where 
In a control study with 15 adults (one third psycholinguists) the same 
experimental set-up and procedure as with the children was used. To our 
surprise we found only 40% correct answers (with fast repairs or short 
hesitations with less than one minute) when E asked which other present E 
could call "unser", thus intending "unsere)(c-i "· 
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speech roles are learned first. His preservation of the "gender" feature is 
probably due to an early distinction of male and female persons. The 
"developmental focussing" shows children's conflict in the acquisition of 
pronouns which relate to a 3rd person participant and plural pronouns where 
a 3rd person is involved. It might be that they "work" on this problem 
because of the necessity to go beyond the dyadic communication situation. 
Children's dependency on nonverbal communication in pronoun acquisition 
stresses the importance of nonverbal factors in language development. 
6.2.2 Awareness Tests 
6.2.2.1 General Results of the Awareness Tests 
Error detections 
Before we relate our awareness results to our theoretical questions 
let us first present the general picture of all correct error detection 
scores (mean values of PRE and POST for the three experimental groups and 
the control group), cf. Fig. 10: 
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Fig. 10 : Average correct error detections of all children at all age levels 
in PRE and POST 
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Three major findings are apparent from this figure: 
1. Awareness tasks in which the addressee is involved (but not together 
with another person) are mastered best. The "mein'Vdein error detection 
(task II) was excellent (92%). Nearly equally good is the "dein'Vsein 
error detection (task IV) with 90%. 
2. Awareness tasks in which the addressee and another person are involved 
are mastered next: task V ("euer'Vunser . ) with 77%, task III ("unser"/ 
euer) with 71%, and task VI ("euer'Vihr . fwith 68%. 
3. The least number of error detections (59%) are observed for task I 
("sein'Vihr . „ ) in which the child had to distinguish natural gender 
sing. 
in singular 3rd person pronouns. 
Figure 10 shows generally a dominance of awareness tasks in which only 
the addressee is involved (task II and task IV). As to the other four error 
detection tasks, we can see that errors in plural pronoun contrasts in which 
the addressee is involved (task V, task III, and task VI) are better detec-
ted than singular pronoun contrasts in which another person is involved 
(task I). 
We now want to look at correct error detections in PRE and POST of 
the four groups separately (comments on the following figures will follow 
in later sections). 
Figures 11 and 12 show the error detection results for the three expe-
rimental groups taken together, and for PRE and POST respectively. 
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F i g . 1 1 : Average c o r r e c t e r r o r d e t e c t i o n s of c h i l d r e n a t t h e t h r e e age l e v e l s 
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Fig. 13: Average correct error detections of the youngest age group 
in PRE and POST 
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F i g . 1 4 : A v e r a g e c o r r e c t e r r o r d e t e c t i o n s o f t h e m i d d l e a g e g r o u p 
i n PRE a n d POST 
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Fig. 16: Average correct error detections of the control group 
in PRE and POST 
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Error corrections 
If we disregard different kinds of error correction (e.g. "names", sub-
stitutions, cf. 6.2) we observe nearly as many corrections (= pronoun changes) 
as error detections. In general, we found that Ss who can detect an error do 
also give some kind of possessive pronoun correction (mutatis mutandis: Ss 
who cannot detect an error do not change the given possessive pronoun). Thus, 
presentation of figures seems to be redundant. This result is not surprising 
in view of task requirements. There are, however, slightly more subjects who 
can detect an error and who do not give a possessive pronoun correction than 
Ss who do correct but cannot detect. 
In order to illustrate qualitatively different pronoun changes at dif-
* 
ferent ages to the same question three excerpts of the transcriptions will 
be given. All three are examples of PRE which show pronoun changes in task 
III ("unser'Veuer). 
Task III ("unser'Veuer) 
S7 in group 1/PRE; 4 ;4 ; female 
V I : "Kann ich sagen, das i s t unser 
Geschëïïlc?" ^ 
(Verweis auf ρ 8 ) 
Vp: "Das ist meiner." 
VI: "Das ist...ist...ist 
mein.***Hmhm. Wieso ist denn 
das dein Geschenk?" 
Vp: "Weil ich das wollte." 
VI: "Weil du das wolltest. Und dann 
kann ich jetzt nicht sagen, 
das ist unser Geschenk?" 
E: "Can ì_ say, this is our 
present?" 
(Reference to ρ 8) 
S: "This is mine"." (the child 
uses here a wrong morpho-
phonological form for the 
possessive indicating that 
the present is mase. The 
present (das Geschenk) is 
in German of neuter gender) 
E: "This is...is...is mine. 
(E corrects S). Hum. Why is 
this your present?" 
S: "Because I wanted this." 
E: "Because you wanted this. 
And it is now not possible 
for me to say, this is our 
present?" 
The English translations are often not quite to the point since some 
utterances cannot be translated literally. 
** 
Protocols of nonverbal conmients were taken by the research assistant 
whenever they were relevant. They have been added in the transcriptions. 
*** 
Actually, E's conment here is somewhat confusing but seemed "natural" 
the interview situation. However, such confusing answers were infrequent. 
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Vp: "M'm" (Kopfschütte!η der Vp) 
(...) 
S: "No." (S shakes her head) 
(continuation of 
dialogue) 
Task III ("unser'Veuer) 
S 33 in group 2/PRE; 5;0; female 
VI: "Kann ich sagen, das ist unser 
Geschenk?" 
(Verweis auf ρ 8) 
Vp: "Nein" 
VI: "Nein?" 
Vp zeigt auf männliche Puppe und 
auf sich. 
VI: "Kann ich da nicht sagen, das 
ist unser Geschenk?" 
Vp: "Nein, das ist von uns beiden. 
Peter und ich". 
VI: "Peter und ..." 
Vp unterbricht VI: "Peter und 
Regine. Ich sag das nämlich, 
weil mein Bruder so heißt." 
VI: "Du Regine, ehm - wie muß 
ich denn zu dem Geschenk 
sagen, das ist ...?" 
E: "Can 1_ say, this is our 
present?" 
(Reference to ρ 8) 
S: "No" 
E: "No?" 
S points at the male doll 
and herself. 
E: "2 cannot say, this is 
our present?" 
S: "No, it is from the two 
of us. Peter and I." 
E: "Peter and ..." 
S interrupts E: "Peter and 
Regine. I say that 
because my brother is 
so called." 
E: "Listen Regine, hum -
how do l_ have to say 
for this present, this 
is ...?" 
Vp: 
VI: 
Vp: 
VI: 
"Unsres." 
"Unsres?" 
"Peter und Regine." 
"Peters und Regines muß ich 
sagen. Hmhm .. Kann ich auch 
sagen, das ist euer Geschenk?" 
S 
E 
S 
E 
"Ours." 
"Ours?" 
"Peter and Regine." 
"2 have to say Peter's 
and Regine's. Humhum . 
Can 1_ also say, this i 
your (pi.) present?" 
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Vp: "Ja." 
VI: "Das kann ich auch sagen." 
(...) 
S: "Yes." 
E: "I can say this, too. 
(...) 
Task III ("unser'Veuer) 
S 43 in group 3/PRE; 5;8; female 
VI: "Kann jch sagen, das ist unser 
Geschenk, das rosa?" 
(Verweis auf ρ 8) 
Vp zeigt auf ρ 9 (= unser.) 
VI: "Und das hier?" 
(Verweis auf ρ 8) 
Vp: "Ist von ... hmm ..." 
(zeigt auf sich und männliche 
Puppe) 
VI: "Also, das ist von ... ?" 
Vp: "Von Frank und ...?" 
VI: "Dir das Geschenk. Wie kann 
ich noch zu dem Geschenk 
sagen, das ist ...?" 
- Sehr lange Pause -
VI : "Wie würdest du zu dem Geschenk 
sagen, das ist ...?" 
Vp: "Von uns zwei das Geschenk." 
VI: "Ja, das hab ich aber gesagt: 
das ist von uns das Geschenk. 
Das ist unser Geschenk, hab ich 
gesagt. Kann ich das sagen?" 
E: "Can I say, this is our 
present, the pink one?" 
(Reference to ρ 8) 
S points at ρ 9 (= our.) 
E: "And this here?" 
(Reference to ρ 8) 
S: "Is from ... hm ..." 
(points at herself and 
male doll) 
E: "So, this is from ...?" 
S: "From Frank and . . . ? " 
E: "From you the present. 
How else can ^  say for 
this present, this is 
... ?" 
- Long Silence -
E: "How would you say for 
this present, this is 
...?" 
S: "From us two the pres­
ent." 
E: "Yes, that's what I just 
said: This is the present 
from us. This is our 
present, I said. Can ^ 
say this?" 
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Vp: "Das ist ja nicht von uns beiden 
(Verweis auf Vp and VI), sondern 
von uns beiden." (Verweis auf Vp 
und männliche Puppe) 
VI: "Ach so, wie muß ich da sagen, 
bei dem rosa Geschenk?" 
Vp: "Das ist euer Geschenk." 
VI: "Prima, ganz, ganz prima." 
(...) 
S: "Well, this is not from 
us two (reference to S 
and Ε), but from us two." 
(Reference to S and male 
doll) 
E: "Oh! I see. How do I 
have to say, for this 
pink present?" 
S: "This is your (pi.) 
present." 
E: "Good, very, very good." 
(...) 
These three examples show us three different kinds of reactions to 
the same question. The youngest child in group 1 yields the incorrect 
pronoun "meiner" (mine) which shows an exclusion of another person (the 
male doll). The girl in group 2 "substitutes" names (Peter and Regine) for 
the pronoun "unsres" which is inappropriate from her point of view. The 
oldest child in group 3 is the only one of the three girls who takes the 
perspective of the experimenter. Interestingly, we discovered age-dependent 
strategies in children's pronoun corrections which we will discuss with 
respect to theoretical considerations in 6.2.2.3. 
Our texts revealed not only "name substitutions" (cf. 6.2) but also 
other kinds of substitutions. Table 20 lists six categories of substitu­
tions. These are: 
1. Name substitutions: Here, only proper names were counted (e.g. "Karin 
und Regine"), also in genitive cases (e.g. "ReginesVRegine's) or as 
possessive attributes (e.g. "von Regine"; für Regine/of; for Regine). 
2. Dative possesive pronoun relationships: Here, only possessive pronoun 
relationships (e.g. "von uns'Vof us) which substituted the possessive 
pronouns (for "unser'Vour) were counted. 
3. "Decomposed" pronouns: "Decomposed" forms imply only pronouns, such as 
"my and your" instead of "our". 
4. GrarnnaticaHy "dubious" pronouns: An extra category was found because 
some grammatically "dubious" forms, such as "Thomas sein Geschenk" 
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(Thomas his present) occurred frequently (although the combination of a 
proper name plus a pronoun can be often heard in dialects or in collo-
quial conversations. Standard High German allows only for the pronoun 
or for the proper name). 
5. Word innovations: Only recurring cases of innovation were counted in 
order to distinguish them from mere speech errors. 
6. Rest category: Here we list substitutions such as colours (of the 
present), numbers (of the present), "negations" (like: "not his"), and 
substitutions which did not imply possessive pronouns, but which are 
reference markers (e.g. demonstratives). 
(Note that Table 20 does not comprise: changes to the correct pronoun, 
such as "dein" in task II, incorrect pronoun changes, such as "dein" instead 
of "ihr", which are either due to "linguistic errors" or memory problems, 
and "egocentric" pronouns which are only correct from the child's perspec-
tive but not from E's perspective, such as "mein" in task II.) 
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Tab 20 Subiti tut Ioni In a l l ' iMft l i tg refervncc" Mârwttsi іш\кі (Ν In РЯЕ · 55 • N in POST - 49) 
t m s 
ι 
utterance "seto' 
reference ihr 
[ I 
utt i ránce "ие!«" 
reference dein 
M l 
utterance "unser" 
reference euer 
IV 
utterance M e m -
reference sein 
V 
utterance "euer" 
reference unser 
еясі 
VI 
utterance "euer" 
reference ihr 
Pi 
V I I 
utterance "dein" 
reference dein 
utterance ' u n t e r ' 
reference unser 
e i c l 
IK 
ulcerane« 'min* 
reference u w г 
.nel 
Χ 
utterance "euer" 
reference unser α 
substitutions 
IWKS 
27 
7 
6 
47 
3 
46 
ι 
I 
(wssesjlKe 
pronoun 
relationships 
"won i h r " ( 2 i ) 
"won л і г " ( 1 1 д ) 
fdr « I c h - t l M ) 
vor 4ΙΓ"(1Κ) 
"von uns b e l d e n - f U ) 
von u n s - ( l ï ) 
'von uns Ius4nnen''(]x) 
-von i t a ( 7 , ) 
"von euch beiden (3x) 
"von euch"(lM) 
'von euch г и е і " ( 1 я ) 
".on a i r - d i ) 
"von uns ое*оеп'(17ж) 
"von uns і и е і " П ' ) 
'von uns a l l e be>(te"(U) 
"fur uns b e i ( l e " ( l i ) 
' f u r uns i * e i " ( l i ) 
"von uns a l l e n ' ( 1 4 i ) 
"von uns a l l e n і е г е п " ( 1 2 і ) 
'von uns a l l e n v l e r ( e n ) " ( S x ) 
"fur uns zusanmen-fl*) 
•deco^wsrt" 
pronouns 
"ven d i r und і Ы Г ( І і ) 
"ihr und dem ( І л ) 
"sein und ihr it*) 
"von ihn und von ihr (Lx) 
"von dir und i h r * i l « ) 
'van d i r und тІг-(Гкі 
"•ein und d e m " (4») 
g r a m a t i c a l ly 
Muhious" 
pronouns 
• i h r « С " ( B i ) "sie G " ( U ) 
-< seTn 6 - ( 2 » ) - d t e sein G "(1«) 
-von sie das G " ( l i ) 
' s i e sein G '{it) 
-ste dein G " ( Ι « ) 
•ihres G "(г«) 
"meiner Б " ( 1 к ) 
"du G • ( ] * ) 
seins und и і г s e l n s ' f l n ) 
vor Junge üñ3 * l e h " ( l i ) 
von « und iPlch"(l«) 
-uns « e i das G " ( l i ) 
"я sein G "( ІЭж) 
•ihm G " ( І д ) 
-von i t e G ' ( l x ) 
"von d n seins G "(1н) 
"ihres G - ( l i ) 
•meins jnd • 4 e i n s " ( U ) 
"von к und d i c h " ! l i ) 
'euers G "(1я) 
"r. sein und ι sein G * ( } • ) 
- ihres G - ( l e » 
-er und s ie G * ( ! • ) 
"von sie und d l r ' ( I i ) 
" ihr seins und к s " ( l i ) 
•uns beides G "<2я) 
unsers beldes G 4 2 » ) 
"«ir v ier G ( U ) 
"unseres G " ( U ) 
"unsere v i e r G " ( U ) 
unsers v i e r dai G " ( U ) 
uns vier G " ( l e ) 
irord 
innovations 
• ш Ь е п а г І с Ь - ( и ) 
•iwinde"(lK) 
d l e n ' t l x ) 
"eueres ( U ) 
-se - j e - ( l x ) 
e u g * r e s " ( U ) 
"sie - »1*(10 
rest 
category 
•die Frau G ' ( 2 i ) 
c o l o u r ( l i ) 
"nicht s e i n s ' ( U ) 
•von d i e - ( l x ) 
"die G - ( l i ) 
пияЫ!г(2і) 
•nicht n * 1 n s ' ( b ) 
•nicht dein G ' ( I » ) 
n u i b e r ( U ) 
"von d i e Z M 1 * ( U ) 
•von dee"(Su) 
"den Jungen G "(Зж) 
nicht іяеіпг"(2к) 
der G " ( Z i ) 
•von в"(1д) 
colour(3x) 
'von den fraun-(2i i ) 
nunber(lx) 
"von den/die Ье1(Іеп-[ і ) 
'von de* und von der'fZft) 
•von d i e und von d i e " ( 2 i ) 
"von den ι e i Puppen"(2i) 
- d i . t e . d e n G - i l « ) r „ t ( 5 0 * 
n i a b e r ( l K ) 
-von bei den " ( U ) 
-deins und d l f l - ( l i ) 
•von d i e und von d l r - ( l i ) 
n » b t r ( l i ) 
- e m e H í W t e - ( U ) 
• a l l e b e i d e - t U ) 
-von * l l e n - ( S i ) 
'von a l len v1eren' (2a) 
"unser v1er»r G " { l « ) 
'von a l l en l u i a w n ' i l x ) 
"fur die ganien v i e r " ! ! ! ) 
Table 20 indicates that most "name substitutions" were found when 
reference was made to the dolls. The fact that task I embodies comparative­
ly less names (27) than task IV (47) can be explained by the difference 
of task requirements: in task I pronouns for the two dolls had to be 
distinguished, in task IV the child had to delimit himself from the male 
doll. 
We also discovered some name substitutions in the three error 
detection tasks II, III, and V which required a speaker/addressee shift. 
As for dative possessive pronoun relationships, most of these were observed 
for the two "ambiguous" tasks IX and X. All of these possessive attributions 
are specifications which particularize the number of participants. In task 
II ("mein'Vdein) eleven Ss evade the difficult speaker/addressee shift 
("dein" would be appropriate) and substitute instead of "mein" (which is 
only correct from the child's perspective) the attribution "von mir" (of me). 
Most "decomposed" pronouns occur for task IV ("mein'Vunser. , ). Out 
of the six tasks where "decomposed" pronouns were possible (III, V, VI, 
VII, IX and X), this is the only task where "decomposed" pronouns are more 
appropriate than names plus pronouns or names only (speakers and addressees 
do not refer to themselves by names). 
The most frequent use of a gramnatically "dubious" pronoun was "X' 
sein Geschenk" (Χ' his present) in task IV ("dein'Vsein). Thirteen children 
used the combination of a proper name plus the correct gender pronoun 
"sein". Five Ss did not say "ihr Geschenk" (her present) in task I but 
"ihres Geschenk" (he« present) thus showing that they did not discriminate 
between possessive pronouns in an attributive function and pronouns in a 
predicative function (which have an additional morpheme). A few children 
did not master the difference between possessive and personal pronouns 
(e.g. "sie Geschenk" (she present) or "du Geschenk" (you present)), others 
produced dative pronouns (e.g. "ihm Geschenk" (him present)), and one 
child gave a plural possessive pronoun ("unsere vier Geschenke") which 
has to go hand in hand with a plural noun. 
Except for the strange word innovation "ummenazich" of a three-year 
old girl, all given word innovations show morphophonological similarities 
a 
A translation is impossible because the plural possessive pronouns are 
not marked in English (Engl.: "our'V'our", German: "unser'V'unsere"). 
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to the supposedly intended pronouns. "Meinde" could be a contamination of 
"mein" and "dein". Children's struggle in finding the correct pronoun is 
theoretically interesting and will be discussed in 6.2.2.3 where we will 
also present transcripts of such word struggle. 
As to the rest category, we must differentiate between colour nomina-
tions (e.g. "the orange present"), number nominations (e.g. "number three"), 
x-by-default strategies ("not x"), changes of the definite article (e.g. 
"der Geschenk" for the present of the male doll; note that in German 
"Geschenk" is of neuter gender ("das Geschenk"), "der Geschenk" is an in-
correct male gender attribution). So far for a general overview of qualita-
tive pronoun changes in our data (theoretically interesting observations 
will be taken up in 6.2.2.3). 
Bart & Krus's item tree analyses for correct error detections 
The item tree analyses of correct error detections for the four 
groups in PRE and POST reflect orderings in children's mastery of the six 
error detection tasks. Item trees 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 show 
hierarchies of error detection tasks at a tolerance level of 0%. Here 
again, error detection tasks which are above the notation "-»" are preceded 
by all other error detection tasks below that sign. The "independent" error 
detection task (i.e. task V "euer'/unser . in item tree 12) is neither 
preceded nor related to other error detection tasks in that item tree. 
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ITEM TREES OF CORRECT ERROR DETECTIONS 
9 (group 1/PRE) 10 (eroupl/POST) 
12 (group 2/POST) 
& 
14 (group 3/POST) 
16 (areup 4/POST) 
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Bart & Krus's item tree analyses for pronoun changes will not be 
presented here since error detections and pronoun corrections go usually 
hand in hand. As to "qualitatively" different pronoun changes (e.g. name 
substitutions, pronouns which indicate the child's ability to take E's 
perspective, etc.), item tree analyses are not attractive because of 
different task requirements (e.g. awareness tasks which require perspective-
taking vs. tasks without such a demand). 
Presentation order effects 
In order to see whether error detections were influenced by the order 
of presentation we present Fig. 17 which displays correct error detections 
in PRE for the oldest experimental group 3 (performance before awareness) 
and the control group 4 (awareness before performance) which had the same 
age as the children in group 3. 
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F i g . 1 7 : A v e r a g e c o r r e c t e r r o r d e t e c t i o n s o f t h e o l d e s t a g e g r o u p a n d t h e 
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This comparison shows again an excess of group 3 over group 4, except 
for task IV ("dein'Vsein) where both groups detected the error equally well. 
As to pronoun changes, we found in the three error detection tasks 
which require perspective-taking (tasks II, III and V) differences between 
PRE and POST in group 3 and group 4 in the ability to shift perspective. 
In PRE, the "control" children yield slightly more pronouns which indicate 
the awareness of such a shift in all three tasks than the "experimental" 
children. The fact that the reverse is true for POST (Ss who got performance 
before awareness can considerably more often take E's point of view) calls 
for an interpretation (which will be given in 6.2.2.3). 
Item order effects 
Although all metalinguistic tasks were presented in random order we 
wanted to check for item order effects in PRE and POST. If, for instance, 
task V ("euer'Vunser ι ) was presented before task III ("unser'Veuer) we 
had to compare task III before task V with respect to differences for these 
two tasks in error detection and change of possessive pronoun, and vice 
versa (task V before task III). These time-consuming analyses yielded all 
the same results: no significant findings for the item order effects, i.e. 
the position of a metalinguistic task in the series of tasks does not 
influence results on error detection and (correct) pronoun change. 
6.2.2.2 Awareness Results as Related to Hypotheses 
Section 4 (general assumptions on linguistic awareness) was devoted to 
deriving hypotheses on the role of linguistic awareness in language acqui­
sition. In 5. (general predictions on the role of linguistic awareness with 
respect to the present research) we specified our predictions which were 
summarized in 5.6 (synopsis of the predictions which relate to the role of 
linguistic awareness in language acquisition). 
In H. la we proposed on the basis of Claparêde's observations that: 
H. la: Metalinguistic abilities (error detections, corrections, and expla-
nations) arise more likely in case of a mismatch between sentence 
content and communicative intent within a given utterance than in 
case of a correspondence between these two within an utterance. 
Since the subsequently following hypothesis H. 1b is also derived 
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from Claparëde's observation and can be also tested for the same awareness 
tasks in study A, we will repeat it here as well: 
H. lb: Metalinguistic abilities (error detections, corrections, and 
explanations) arise more likely in case of a mismatch between verbal 
utterance and nonverbal reference in a task that in case of a 
correspondence between these two. 
Task VII ("deinVdein) and task VIII (Bunser"/unserexcl ), the two 
"correct" tasks, functioned as testing-ground for Claparëde's suggestion 
that awareness for "incorrect" precedes awareness for "correct" (cf. 6.1.5). 
In task VII all children accepted E's utterance and did not coment on it, 
i.e. they gave neither corrections nor explanations. This result indicates 
that awareness for "correct" singular tasks is far behind awareness for 
"incorrect" singular tasks (cf. 6.2.2.1: children detected and corrected 
errors in the singular "incorrect" tasks II, IV, and I) and that the 
Claparéde predictions can be confirmed. 
In task VIII we observed many children in all three experimental 
groups and the control group who "detected an error" in this "correct" 
task. We observed non-acceptance ("no, you cannot say 'unser' present" when 
E pointed at the present of E and the female doll) most frequently in 
group 2, in PRE and POST. One third of the subjects in this group do not 
only say "no" but change also the "correct" pronoun into an "egocentric" 
one ("euer") in the first test. In POST even half of the children want to 
change "unser" into "euer". When we take all four groups together in PRE 
and POST, we can see that one fifth (21Ж) "detect and correct an error" in 
the "correct" task VIII. Thus, children show "egocentric" awareness in the 
"correct" plural task VIII ("unser'Vunser - ). Although children display 
more often awareness in the "incorrect" plural awareness tasks V, III, VI 
(i.e. more than half of the children detect and correct errors in these 
tasks, cf. Figure 10 and 6.2.2.1) than in the "correct" plural awareness 
task VIII we can only partially confirm H. la and H. lb. Apparently there 
is an additional factor involved. It seems to be important for the child 
whether something is the same or different from the child's egocentric 
point of view. We will return to this in 6.2.2.3. 
Our next hypotheses H,2 and H.3 relate to the question if we can 
assume one general metalinguistic ability. We will first repeat the 
hypothesis which concerns the relationships among different metalinguistic 
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abilities within a test. 
H.2: Metalinguistic abilities (error detections, corrections, and 
explanations) are at one point of time rather more interdependent 
than contrasting. 
Since we did not evaluate children's explanations in Study A because 
of coding difficulties (cf. 6.2), we will relate this hypothesis only to 
error detections and corrections of the six awareness tasks. 
Although quantitative pronoun changes agree with this hypothesis 
(error detections and pronoun corrections go hand in hand if we disregard 
the kind of pronoun correction) this does not hold for "qualitative" pro­
noun changes: error detections do not go hand in hand with appropriate 
corrections. The child knows that something has to be corrected when an 
error is detected but often does not have the means for appropriate 
corrections. We also observed that older children even know that they do 
not know what has to be corrected ("I know this is wrong but I don't know 
what I should say"). We will come back to the child's struggle in finding 
the correct pronoun (cf. 6.2.2.3). 
Hypothesis H.3 concerns the differential development of different 
metalinguistic abilities with age: 
НдЗ: The cross-sectional and longitudinal development of metalinguistic 
abilities (error detections, corrections, and explanations) with age 
is ordered according to "strain" in reflective ability: first are 
error detections, then corrections, and finally explanations. 
. This hypothesis has to be rejected for error detections and quantita­
tive pronoun changes in the six error detection tasks: error detection 
and any kind of pronoun change go generally hand in hand. However, if we 
look at qualitative aspects of pronoun changes, this hypothesis can be 
accepted, for both cross-sectional and longitudinal data. Error detections 
precede inter- and intraindividually appropriate corrections (an appropri­
ate correction for the three "shift" affected tasks II, III, and V is a 
pronoun which indicates perspective-taking, for task I "ihr", for task IV 
"sein", and for task VI "ihr"). 
The conclusion with respect to our hypotheses H. la, H. lb, 4,2 and 
Н.З is: none of these predictions can be fully confirmed although Нд 1a 
and Нд lb can be - at least partially - accepted. Thus, we feel the need 
to look very carefully into our data for other underlying factors. 
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6.2.2.3 Other Influential Factors in the Child's Metalinguistic Abilities 
There are at least five factors which are not accounted for by our pre-
dictions but which may shed some light on children's metalinguistic abilities. 
These factors are: the enhancement of awareness through metalinguistic 
experience, the saliency of dyadic interaction, the change of egocentricity 
in younger children to perspective-taking in older children, children's 
striving for internal coherence, and the developmental change in the ad-
herence to conversational maxims. 
The first factor is the enhancenent of awareness through metalinguistic 
experience. The enhancement of error detections in POST through error de-
tections in PRE (especially with respect to the plural awareness tasks: 
task V "euer"/unserexcl , task III "unser'Veuer, and task VI "euer'Vihr } ) 
can be seen in the three experimental groups (cf. 6.2.2.1, Fig. 13, Fig. 14, 
and Fig. 15) but not in the control group 4 which got awareness before per-
formance (cf. Fig. 16). This enhancement becomes also evident from Fig. 17 
and Fig. 18 in which presentation order effects are apparent the "experi-
mental" children of group 3 detect in POST errors generally better than the 
"control" children of group 4 (cf. presentation order effects in 6.2.2.1). 
Enhancement of "qualitative" pronoun changes in POST through "quali-
tative" pronoun changes in PRE can also be observed in Table 21 which shows 
"correct" pronoun changes (which require perspective-taking from the child) 
in task II ("mein'Vdein), task V ("euerVunser^^ ), and task III ("unser"/ 
euer). In task II the "correct" answer of the child is dein, in task V 
unser, and in task III euer. 
The effect of awareness experience is even stronger in case of perform-
ance experience. Table 21 indicates that the control group 4 yields slight-
ly more pronouns in PRE which are the result of the child's ability to 
take E's perspective than the experimental group 3. In POST, we can see 
that children who got perfomance before awareness (= experimental group 3) 
can take E's point of view considerably more often than children who got 
awareness before performance (= control group 4) (cf. also presentation 
order effects in 6.2.2.1). 
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Table 21 : Children's Ability to Take E's Point of View in Task II, Task V, 
and Task III (PRE and POST) 
group 1 
(N=14) 
group 2 
(N=16) 
group 3 
(N=14) 
group 4 
(N=15) 
Task II 
("mein'Vdein) 
PRE 
14% 
13% 
14% 
33% 
POST 
21% 
50% 
79% 
60% 
Task V 
("euer"/unser
excl ) 
PRE 
7% 
13% 
29% 
27% 
POST 
0% 
31% 
79% 
40% 
Task III 
("unser'Veuer) 
PRE 
0% 
a% 
7% 
7% 
POST 
7% 
25% 
79% 
40% 
It is obvious that there are training effects for awareness in all age 
groups. This is quite different from what we found for performance (cf. 6.2.1). 
Apparently, the child quickly "grasps" the notion of detecting and correcting 
linguistic errors, and once "grasped" it tends to be a rather permanent 
addition to his cognitive abilities. If this is generally true for metalin­
guistic abilities of children in the age range studied, there is less reason 
to expect a fixed developmental progression for different metalinguistic 
abilities. It would largely depend on the child's early or late involvement 
with "awareness-raising" situations for the different metalinguistic abili­
ties which ones will be developed early, and which ones will be relatively 
late. It could be that a situation in which performance and awareness are 
required gives more rise to later awareness than a situation in which only 
awareness is necessary (cf. the differences of error detections and correc­
tions between experimental group 3 and control group 4). 
These considerations would also argue against postulating one metalin­
guistic capacity as was discussed in 6.2.2.2. 
This assumption might not only hold for error detections and correc­
tions in "incorrect" tasks but also for linguistic awareness in "correct" 
tasks which are "incorrect" from the child's egocentric point of view, 
such as task VIII "unser'Vunser , (cf. the Claparede-expectations 
Нд 1a and H. lb in 6.2.2.2). We observed in PRE one third of the children 
in group 2 rejecting E's "unser" in task VIII and change it into an "ego­
centric" pronoun ("euer" or "dein and X"), and in POST one half of the 
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children. It seems that metalinguistic abilities rely on an "awareness-
raising" situation: it is just a natter of having been involved with it, 
or exposed to it at some early stage. 
The second factor is the saliency of dyadic interactive features. 
Error detections for task II ("mein'Vdein) in which the child had to 
distinguish between speaker and addressee are early and generally better 
than for all other awareness tasks (cf. Fig. 10, Fig. 11, Fig. 12, and 
Fig. 16). Relatively good is also the task in which the addressee (i.e. 
the child) is involved (task IV "dein'Vsein) and the speaker and addressee 
related plural tasks (task III "unser'Veuer and task V "euer'Vunser , ) 
(cf. Fig. 10). The least number of error detections were found for the two 
awareness tasks in which an incorrect pronoun had to be corrected into 
a 3rd person pronoun (task VI "euer"/ihr. and task I "sein'Vihr . ) 
(cf. the general results in 6.2.2.1). 
We also found that singular pronoun corrections precede plural ones. 
Most correct pronoun changes (in the two tests of the four groups: 36%) 
were given in task II ("mein'Vdein) in which the child had to discriminate 
the perspectives of speaker and addressee, the least (only 2% in the two 
tests of the four groups) in task VI ("euer'Vihr . ). In this task VI the 
correct pronoun is "ihr , " which is not only a plural pronoun but also a 
pronoun in which neither speaker nor addressee are involved. 
Clearly, the saliency of dyadic factors in error detections and cor-
rections relates to our findings in the performance tasks where we observed 
a concentration on the dyad of the interlocutors (cf. section 6.2.1.5, the 
first influential factor in the acquisition of pronouns). 
The third factor is the change from egocentricity in younger children 
to perspective-taking in older children. Qualitative pronoun changes in 
task II ("mein'Vdein), task V ("euer"/unserexcl ), and task III ("unser"/ 
euer) shed a light on developmental processes in children's self-reflec-
tions and social cognitions. 
Selman and his co-workers (Selman & Byrne, 1974; Selman & Jacquette, 
1978; Selman, 1981; Selman, Lavin & Brion-Meisels, 1982; Selman, 1982) 
elaborated a "logical" analysis of developmental levels of perspective-
taking and reflective interpersonal understanding which we will adopt for 
the classification of our data. 
Three developmental levels and stages of Selman's analysis are relevant 
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for our findings, i.e. for qualitative pronoun changes in task II, V, and 
III. All three levels of perspective-taking relate to a differentiation 
between Ego and Alter in middle childhood and relate more to meta-behavior 
than to automatic skills. 
Level 0 (egocentric or undifferentiated perspectives) 
The child does not yet clearly (in our research: linguistically) 
distinguish between his own perspective and that of another person although 
he might notice differences between his own experiences (in our research: 
between his own utterances) and those of another person. According to 
Selman, we can observe Level 0 between four and six years (Selman, 1982; 
Selman, 1981: "roughly ages 3 to 7"). 
An example from our data would be a child's answer "Yes, because this 
is from me" to E's recurrent question: "Can l_ say this is my present?" in 
task II whereby E points at the present of the child. With respect to the 
question how E has to say to S's present the child says: "my present". 
In task V ("euer'Vunser ι ) a child at Level 0 says to E's question: 
"Can \_ say this is "euer" (your, ) present?" (whereby E points at the present 
of E and the female doll): "Yes, because this is "euer" (your . ) present". 
E's question: "How do l_ have to say?" is answered with: "Euer" (your, ) 
present". 
In task III ("unser'Veuer) E asks: "Can I say this is our present?" 
whereby E points at the present of the cild and the male doll. A child at 
Level 0 answers: "Yes, because this is our present". E's question: "How do 
1_ have to say?" is answered with "Our present". 
Level 1 (subjective or differentiated perspectives) 
At this level the child begins to understand that the same "objective" 
extrinsically perceivable event can be seen subjectively by another person 
in the same way (as the child sees it) or differently (discrepancy between 
the perspective of the child and another person). Selman (1981, p. 250) 
writes: "Of particular importance, the child at Level 1 is newly concerned 
with the uniqueness of the covert, psychological life of each person.". 
According to him, the "social-informational role taking" at Level 1 can be 
observed between six and eight years (Selman, 1982; Selman, 1981: "roughly 
ages 4 to 9"). 
Different from Selman et al.'s classification we feel the need for a 
further subclassification of Level 1 because of a qualitative difference 
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in our data. Selman et al.'s level comprise our Level la and Level lb. 
Level 1a (subjective or differentiated perspective without person 
identification) 
Unlike at Level lb, the child at Level la does not (yet) identify 
himself as an individual with specific attributes (in our research: the 
child's name). 
An example from our data would be the child's answer "No, it is my 
present!" to task II ("mein'Vdein). At Level la we observed that after E's 
repetition of "my present" (E: "That's what I just said: It is my present. 
How do \_ have to say?") the children became highly upset and screamed: "No, 
you cannot say 'my present'. It is my, my, my, my present. It is "von mir" 
(of me, cf. Table 20).".This triumphant exclamation ("of me" was apparent-
ly a way out of a difficult and problematic situation) was also repeated 
by E: "O.k. .then I say, it is of me" whereupon children were pretty 
puzzled and said that they did not know how E had to say to S's present 
("I don't know how you have to say to my present"). 
In task V ("euer'Vunser , ) a child at Level la would say with 
respect to E's question: "Can l_ say this is "euer" (your, ) present?" 
"No, it is "euer" (your , ) present". When E asked: "How do \_ have to say?" 
the child would either repeat: "Euer" (your , ) present", or use a 
subjective ("egocentric") decomposed form such as "Dein (y o u r si n Q ) and 
Susi's (name of the female doll) present". 
In task III ("unser'Veuer) a child at Level la would answer: "No, it 
is unser (our) present". When E asked: "How do l_ have to say?" the child 
would say: "Unser (our) present" or yield a subjective ("egocentric") 
decomposed form such as "Mein (my) and Peter's (name of the male doll) 
present". 
Level 1b (subjective or differentiated perspectives with person identifi-
cation) 
Level lb differs from Level la only insofar that the child identifies 
himself as an individual with a specific attribute: his name* Identifi-
Note that names function normally as orientation markers (Habermas, 1981, 
II: "Wegweiser") in unfamiliar situations (e.g. at the begin of a telephone 
conversation). 
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cation took place after a first trial of S: "No, my present" in task II 
("mein'Vdein) and E's repetition of "my present". As to E's question how E 
had to say the child suggested, for instance: "Annette's present" (the 
child's name is Annette). This name identification is interesting because 
E could not claim S's present (E's name is Karin). In using his name the 
child avoided variable reference (which are a characteristic of pronouns) 
but offered one of the invariable characteristics of his own identity (it 
would be interesting to see what would happen if E and S had the same first 
name - would these children offer other invariable distinctive marks?). 
Children's name substitutions suggest that they have - at least rudimenta-
rily - a conception of their own individuality although they might not yet 
have a conception of their variable speech role in a communication 
situation. 
For a classification at Level lb in task V ("euer"/unser , ) the 
child had to give E's name and either the name or a "demonstrative article" 
(e.g. "von Karin und der das Geschenk" - of Karin and of this one* the 
present). 
In task III ("unser'Veuer) the child substituted his name and the male 
doll's name or a demonstrative article at Level lb. 
Level 2 (self-reflective or reciprocal perspectives) 
At this level the child is able to "decenter" (in the Piagetian sense) 
and to take the perspective of another person which enables him to take 
his self as both subject and object of (inner) experience. Here ".... 
children are able to take a second-person perspective, which leads to an 
awareness of a new form of reciprocity, a reciprocity of thought and 
feelings rather than a reciprocity of action" (Selman, 1981, p. 250/251). 
According to Selroan, Level 2 can be observed between eight and ten years 
(Selman, 1982; Selman, 1981: "roughly ages 6 to 12"). 
An example of Level 2 is the child's answer ""dein"(your . ) 
present" for the child's own present to E's question: "How do I have to 
say for this present?" in task II ("mein'Vdein) where E points at S's 
present. 
This translation is not quite correct because English does not have 
"demonstrative articles" like in "of the the present". Note also that 
children gave only three times two names (cf. Table 20). 
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Another example for a classification at Level 2 where the child had 
to "decenter" and take E's perspective is in task V ("euer'Vunser , ) 
the child's answer: "unser (our) present" for the present of E and the 
female doll. The child could also give a decomposed form, such as "mein 
(my) and Susi's present". 
In task III ("unser"/euer) the child at Level 2 yields either "euer 
(yourι ) present" for the present of the child and the male doll ("euer" 
is E's perspective) or a decomposed form, such as "dein (your - ) and 
Peter's present". Let us now look at these four partially overlapping but 
discernible levels of perspective-taking (levels 0, la, lb, and 2) in 
task II ("mein'Vdein), task V ("euerVunser^^ ) and task III ("unser"/ 
euer) (cf. Figures 19, 20, 21). 
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Fig. 19: Developmental levels of perspective taking in task II ("mein'Vdein) 
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öj Fig. 20: Developmental levels of perspective taking in task V ("euer'Vunser excl.) 
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Fig. 21: Developmental levels of perspective taking in task III ("unser'Veuer) 
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Discussion of Figure 19: Except for one child in group 2 (in PRE and 
POST) who could not decide clearly whether "mein" would be also appropriate 
for E (but knew that it was not E's present), we observed the undifferenti-
ated perspective (Level 0) only in two very young children: a boy of 3;9 
and a girl of 4;3 (this girl is the only bilingual child in all experiments: 
the kindergarten teacher told us that the girl and her family speak usual-
ly German at home although her mother would sometimes address her in Dutch). 
However, these two children detected and corrected errors when incorrect 
names were used. From these data, we may assume that Level 0-performance 
in this task holds in general for children before the age of four years. 
The subjective or differentiated perspective without person identifi-
cation (Level la) occurs frequently between four and six years. The decrease 
of egocentric "mein"-answers (Level la) in all POST-tests goes hand in 
hand with children's ability to take E's perspective (Level 2). Intra-
individual, longitudinal comparisons reveal that 44% of the children in 
the three experimental groups who yielded the egocentric pronoun "mein" in 
PRE could take E's perspective ("dein") in POST: one child in group 1, 
five children in group 2,and six children in group 3 (note that two 
children who were on Level la in PRE switched to Level lb in POST). Clear-
ly Level la decreases in task II before school age. The decrease of the 
egocentric pronoun "mein" in POST can be explained by the enhancement of 
awareness through metalinguistic experience (cf. our first factor in 
6.2.2.3). 
Name substitutions (Level lb) occur most often in group 2, i.e. 
between four-and-a-half and five-and-a-half years. In this age span 
children can conceive invariable attributes of their own identity. However, 
the curvilinear occurrency of name substitutions at around age five has 
to be seen in the light of the task requirement (prompts for pronouns, i.e. 
for variable speech roles). Name substitutions probably functioned in 
this experiment as a way out of a difficult situation: the egocentric 
"mein" seemed already inappropriate and the child could not yet take E's 
perspective ("dein"). There is an interesting parallel in the spontaneous 
language use of very young children: they sometimes use names for self-
reference (e.g. Matthew for "I") or reference of another person (e.g. 
Bain - the last name of a father - for "you") when they still reverse 
pronouns (e.g. "I" for "you", "you" for "I", cf. 3.5) (cf. the protocols 
of Bohn, 1914; Stern & Stern, 1928; Bain, 1936; Chiat, 1982). Apparently, 
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name substitutions are a means to disambiguate unclear reference in both 
awareness and performance situations. 
The self-reflective or reciprocal perspective (Level 2) increases over 
age in task II. Perspective-taking can already be observed in the youngest 
age group: one child in group 1 (PRE) is 3;9 and another one 4;3. We 
already pointed out that awareness in POST might have been enhanced by 
metalinguistic experience in PRE (cf. our first factor in 6.2.2.3): half 
of the children in group 2 and 79% of the children of group 3 can take 
E's perspective in POST. Since this Level 2 may be relevant for a theory of 
awareness we will discuss it after the inspection of task V ("euer"/ 
unser ι ) and task III ("unser'Veuer). 
Discussion of Figure 20: Figure 20 indicates that Level 0 is most 
frequent in the youngest age group and relatively seldom in the older two 
groups (cf. also children's error detections in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12). It 
is remarkable that children who are at Level 0 in task V ("euer'Vunser , ) 
are on Level la in task II ("mein'Vdein) - except for two children who are 
at Level 0 in both of these tasks (cf. the discussion of Fig. 19). 
Thus, we might conclude that children who are already at Level la 
with singular pronouns (in task II where E refers to the child's own 
present) are still at Level 0 with plural pronouns (in task V where E 
refers to part of E's own present). At the age of four years children are 
still at Level 0 with respect to plural pronouns in tasks which require 
a speaker/addressee shift. 
In task V, Level la shows a curvilinear course of development. Most 
of the children who are at Level la in task V are also at Level 1a in 
task II. This suggests that for both singular and plural pronoun tasks the 
subjective or differentiated perspective (without person identification) 
is between four-and-a-half years of age and six years. Name substitutions 
(Level 1b) around the age of five years are also frequent for plural 
pronouns which require a speaker/addressee shift. 
Level 2 (self-reflective or reciprocal perspective) increases also 
for plural pronouns over age. The longitudinal, intraindividual data of 
group 2 and group 3 indicate that most changes from PRE to POST are those 
from Level 1a to Level 2. The comparison of task II ("mein'Vdein) with 
task V ("euer'Vunser , ) reveals that taking E's perspective in task II 
goes hand in hand with taking E's perspective in task V. There are more 
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children who can take E's perspective in the singular speaker/addressee 
shift (task II) but cannot do this in the plural task V (9 children) than 
children who changed the pronoun correctly in task V but not in task II 
(3 children). 
This leads us to the conclusion that the speaker/addressee shift 
in singular contrasts is somewhat easier than in plural contrasts. It is 
around school age or shortly before when speaker addressee/shifts develop 
most clearly. Do these findings hold also for task III ("unser'Veuer)? 
Discussion of Figure 21: Task V and the homologuous task III show a 
similar developmental decrease of Level 0. Most of the older children who 
are still at Level 0 in task III ("unser'Veuer) are at Levels la or lb in 
task V ("euer"/unserexcl ) and task II ("mein'Vdein). 
This finding suggests that we should not only discriminate between 
singular and plural speaker/addressee shifts with respect to a develop-
mental decrease of Level 0 but also between plural speaker/addressee shifts 
in which an incorrect reference to the speaker (and another person) is 
made (task V "euer"/unser , ) and plural speaker/addressee shifts in 
which an incorrect reference to the addressee (and another person) is made 
(task III "unser'Veuer). The former (task V) shows a slightly but not 
significantly earlier developmental decrease of Level 0 than the latter 
(task III). 
Since at Level 0 the most apparent developmental differences are 
between plural speaker/addressee shifts with an incorrect reference to the 
speaker and those with incorrect reference to the addressee, we might also 
expect at Level 0 developmental differences between singular speaker/ 
addressee shifts with an incorrect reference to speaker and singular 
speaker/addressee shifts with an incorrect reference to the addressee. 
In case of a parallel between singular and plural speaker/addressee shifts 
with respect to an incorrect point of reference, we should find a slightly 
earlier decrease of Level 0 for a task in which E points to E's present 
and asks S: "Can 1 say this is your present?" (we did not use such a task 
in our experiment) than for task II ("mein'Vdein). If we would get such 
a result (i.e. "no"-answers should be earlier in a "dein'Vmein contrast 
than in a "mein'Vdein contrast) from young children (they should be 
younger than the ones in our experiment) we could strengthen the outcome 
of the plural speaker/addressee shifts: it is harder to become aware of 
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speaker/addressee shifts (i.e. to differentiate between speaker and address-
ee) in which an incorrect reference is made to the addressee than in those 
with an incorrect reference to the speaker. This means for language compre-
hension (but not for language production) that it is easier to become aware 
of one's own perspective than of that of another person. 
Level la and Level lb in task III show similar curvilinear develop-
ments as in task V. Level la is more frequent than Level lb, i.e. we 
observe more "egocentric" pronouns than name substitutions. 
Level 2 increases also in task III over age. When we compare task III 
with task V we can see that most children who master the speaker/addressee 
shift in one task master it also in other tasks. 
In fact, most of the oldest children can take E's perspective in the 
second awareness test. Our three tasks which involve a speaker/addressee 
shift show clearly that - despite slight differences in the time of onset 
- the age between five-and-a-half and six years is a turning point for the 
ability to take the perspective of another person. Although differences 
between singular and plural tasks seem to exist, "egocentric" pronouns 
decrease (slightly) over age in the second awareness test. Substitutions 
(Level lb) are an intermediate stage in the transition from Level 0 and 
Level la to Level 2. 
What does this mean for a theory of development of awareness? Cogni-
tive/communicative egocentrism and perspective-taking in child develop-
ment (for recent reviews, cf. Ford, 1979; Edelstein & Keller, 1982; Geulen, 
1982) are based on the differentiation between Ego and Alter. Theories 
on private or egocentric speech are formulated by Piaget (1926), Mead 
(1934), Vygotsky (1962), and Flavell (Flavell, 1966; Flavell et al., 1968). 
These four theories make similar and different assumptions with respect to 
the developmental course and the functions of this phenomenon (for an 
overview, cf. Kohlberg et al., 1968). For instance, Piaget proposes a 
straight age decline of egocentric speech which is replaced by social 
The differentiation between Ego and Alter goes back to the German 
philosopher G.F.W. Hegel whose ideas have influenced theoretical notions 
on perspective-taking, so, for instance, also those of Mead (cf. Joas, 
1980; Geulen, 1982). 
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speech whereas Vygotsky and Mead propose a curvilinear development. Vygotsky 
(1962, p. 132) argues that egocentric speech goes underground as thought: 
"... egocentric speech disappears at school age, when inner speech begins 
to develop ...". Although a thorough discussion of these controversial 
issues is beyond the scope of the present research we will base our ideas 
on two of these theories: Vygotsky's developmental theory and Mead's 
communication theory since they help to understand the start of self-reflec-
tive awareness at Level 2. 
Mead adopted the dialectic notions "I" and "Me" as technical terms 
in social psychology. He stresses that the subjective self ("I") can take 
itself as an object ("Me"). This self-representation ("Me") holds for all 
kinds of activities (speaking, remembering, etc.). Linguistic skills ("I" 
language) or memory skills ("I" memory) can be taken as objects for 
reflection (metalinguistic skills, i.e. "Me"-language, or meta-memory 
skills, i.e. "Me"-memory). 
There is no basic difference between "Me" activities of oneself or of 
another person. This point is clearly expressed by Vygotsky: "We are aware 
of ourselves in that we are aware of others; and in an analogous manner. 
we are aware of others because in our relationship to ourselves we are the 
same as others in their relationship to us. I an aware of myself only to 
the extent that I am as another for myself, i.e. only to the extent that 
I can perceive anew my own responses as new stimuli." (Vygotsky, 1924/1979, 
p. 29/30; cf. also Vygotsky, 1978). In our view, perspective-taking and 
self-reflective awareness (which are inseparably and intrinsically linked) 
require a mental step-back from subjective self ("I") and the ability to 
conceive an objective other of self ("Me"). Egocentric speech as a 
"phenomenon of the transition from interpsychic to intrapsychic functioning" 
(Vygotsky, 1962, p. 133) could be conceived as a harbinger of internal 
comnunication and self-reflective awareness. 
We believe that the movement from egocentric speech to perspective-
taking and self-reflective awareness is reflected in the shift from subjec-
tive self (when the word "I" or "me" equals genuine self-experience) to 
the differentiation and integration of subjective self and objective self. 
The main developmental force for this differentiation and integration of 
"I" and "Me" is social interaction. Language has a double function: on the 
one hand, the word for an object is not the object but could be replaced 
by any other word (i.e. the object would be still there even if another 
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word was used), and on the other hand, the word for an object is "part of 
the object" by social conventions of language use. 
This double function of language becomes evident in personal pronouns. 
The subjective self ("I") cannot be shared with another person because of 
its holistic property whereas the objective self ("Me") can be shared 
(everybody can say "I"). Personal pronouns are a clue to the understanding 
of self-representation.* Our data show that the development of self-
reflective awareness is a gradual process where one level of self-represen­
tation (or perspective-taking) replaces another. 
The "Me"-language is the material for the acquisition of other types 
of self-representation (e.g. representation of "my body", "my memory", 
"my emotions"). 
Although egocentricity and perspective-taking are crucial factors in 
the development of linguistic awareness, two further influential factors 
seem to be important: children's striving for internal coherence and the 
developmental change in their adherence to conversational maxims. 
The first one of these, our fourth factor, which is involved in 
children's metalinguistic abilities is their striving for internal coher­
ence of linguistic units. Intralinguistic coordination and integration is 
one possible function of linguistic awareness (cf. our discussion in sec­
tion 4.2). Our data show that children "work on linguistic 'objects'" 
and that "language is a problem-space per se for small children" (Karmiloff-
Smith, 1979b, p. 236). This can be seen in children's "word innovations" 
and their use of "gramnatically dubious pronouns" (cf. Table 20). 
Let us present two examples from the transcripts which show children's 
struggle for the correct pronoun. 
ι 
Habermas (1981, p. 531) writes: "So bietet die Analyse der Bedeutung, 
nicht zwar des referentiellen, aber des performativen Gebrauchs des Aus­
drucks "Ich", innerhalb des Systems der Personalpronomina, einen aussichts­
reichen Schlüssel zur Problematik des Selbstbewußtseins", cf. also Habermas, 
1971, p. 193 and 194. 
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Task IV ("dein'Vsein) 
S2 in group 4 (control group)/PRE; 5;6; female 
VI: "Kann ich sagen, das ist dein 
Geschenk?" 
(Verweis auf P4 = sein) 
Vp: "Nein." 
VI: "Sondern?" 
Vp: "Weil's Michael ... vor 
Michael liegt." 
VI: "Und dann muß ich sagen, das 
ist ...?" 
Vp: "Se ... or je? - Hm...hm?" 
VI lacht: "Wie heißt das? Se, or 
je?" 
Vp: "Nein." 
VI: "Das ist ...?•• 
- Pause -
Vp überlegt: "Um... hach ..." 
VI: "Wie heißt das Wort noch mal?" 
Vp denkt lange nach: "Wie?" 
VI: "Wie heißt denn das Wort noch mal, 
das ...?" 
Vp: "Je ...se...je ...?" 
VI lacht: "Wie? Wie heißt das 
Wort?" 
Vp stöhnt. 
VI: "Sag's mal ganz laut!" 
Vp: "Erst mal überlegen, wie's 
heißt." 
E: "Can I say, this is your 
(sing.) present?" 
(Reference to P4 = his) 
S: "No." 
E: "But?" 
S: "Because it Michael ... 
before Michael is." 
E: "And then I have to say, 
this is ...?" 
S: "Se ...or je? - Hm...hm?" 
E laughs: "How is it called? 
Se, or je?" 
S: "No." 
E: "This is ...?d 
- Silence -
S reflects: "Hm... gee ..." 
E: "How is this word called?" 
S thinks for a long time: 
"How?" 
E: "How is the word called, 
this ...?" 
S: "Je ...se...je ...?" 
E laughs: "How? How is the 
word called?" 
S sighs. 
E: "Say it really loud!" 
S: "I have first to think 
about how it is called." 
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VI: "Gut, dann überleg mal!" 
Vp: "Hm, Michael, der ist nämlich 
schon neun und in der Schule." 
(Protokollantin diskutiert leise mit 
VI, ob Vp die Höflichkeitsform "Ihr" 
meint.) 
VI: "Das ist ...?" (Verweis auf p 4 ) . 
Vp: "Se ...hen, nee. Nee (lustig 
verzweifelt.) На? ... Wie?" 
(VI zu Protokollantin: "Schreib mal 
auf: Sejehn.") 
Vp: "Nein, jetzt sagst du's falsch!" 
VI: "Soll ich dir mal sagen, wie 
es richtig heißt?" 
Vp: "Ja." 
VI: "Kann ich sagen, das ist sein 
Geschenk?" 
Vp (befreit): "Jaaa." 
- allgemeines Lachen -
E: "Ok. think about it!" 
S: "Hm, Michael, he is namely 
already nine years old and 
goes to school." 
(Research assistant discusses 
with E in a low voice whether 
S wants to use the V-form 
"Ihr".) 
E: "This is ...?" (Reference 
to Р4). 
S: "Se ...hen, no. No 
(joyously desperate). He? 
...How?" 
(E to research assistant: 
"Write down: Sejehn.") 
S: "No, now you say it wrong!" 
E: "Shall I tell you, how it 
is correctly called?" 
S: "Yes." 
E: "Can I say, this is "sein" 
(his) present?" 
S (relieved): "Yeah." 
- All laugh -
Task II ("sein'Vihr... ) 
S7 in group 4 (control group)/PRE; 5;8; female 
VI: "Kann ich sagen, das ist sein 
Geschenk?" (Verweis auf p3 = 
^sing.) 
Vp: "Nein." 
VI: "Warum nicht?" 
E: "Can I say, this is his 
present? (Reference to 
РЗ = her) 
S: "No." 
E: "Why not?" 
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Vp: "Weil das ein Mädchen ist." S: "Because this is a girl." 
VI: "Richtig, und da muß ich sagen, E: "Precisely, and then I have 
das ist ...?" to say, this is ...?" 
Vp: "Ehm, sie ... dein Geschenk." S 
VI: "Hm?" E 
Vp: "Die ... sie dein Geschenk." S 
"Hum, she ... your present." 
"What?" 
"The (female demonstrative 
or definite article) ... 
she your present." 
(...) (...) 
In the first example (S2) the child starts out with "se .. or je" (for 
"sein"), corrects herself ("je ...se ...je"), and yields finally "se-hen" 
which comes closer to the correct pronoun "sein". In the second example 
(S7) the child has difficulties in finding the correct pronoun "ihr ., " 
(= her) and uses first "sie ... dein" (she ... your) and later "die ... 
sie dein" (the female demonstrative or definite article "the" and "... she 
your") although natural gender can already be correctly explained. These 
difficulties may be due to the clash between syntactic and natural gender of 
""ein "Mädchen'Va girl (as to this problem, cf. Lang, 1977, p. 43). Use 
of personal pronouns instead of possessive pronouns has been also observed 
in other children, so, for instance "sie sein" (she his) for 'her', "sie" 
(she) for 'her', "du" (yousi ) for 'your . ', "ihm" (him) for 'his', 
"er und sie" (he and she) for 'their', and "wir" (we) for 'our' (cf. 
Table 20). 
We already pointed out that most word innovations (except for the 
strange word "uimenazich") show morphophonological similarities to suppos-
edly intended pronouns ("meinde" as a contamination of "mein" and "dein") 
(cf. 6.2.2.1). The word innovation "dien" for "euer" (your, ) is prob-
ably derived from "dein" (уоиг,,-
па
 )» and "eueres" from "euer" (your, ). 
One little boy, who knew that "euer" (your, ) was inappropriate in 
task V ("euer'Vunser , ) and tried out different forms, such as "ihres" 
(hers or theirs, "ihr" is plurifunctional in German, cf. 2.1) for the 
female doll and the female speaker, came up with "eugeres". He seemed to 
be quite happy with this new word since it was different from "eures", 
so he stressed (correct is the pronoun "unser" which requires perspective-
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taking). The word innovation "sie-nal" has to be decomposed in "sie" (she) 
and "mal" ('times', like in 5 times 7) for an understanding of the child's 
substitution for "ihr-. " (their). 
These examples show that the struggle for intralinguistic organization 
is an important factor in children's metalinguistic processing. 
Our fifth, and last factor in the development of metalinguistic 
abilities is the adherence to conversational maxims. In 6.1.5 we stated 
that the two ambiguous tasks, task IX ("mein'Vunser. , ) and task X 
("euer'Vunser.) are a good testing ground for the two Gricean maxims of 
quantity and quality. If the child follows the Gricean maxim of quantity 
("Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current 
purposes of the exchange" and "Do not make your contribution more informa­
tive than is required", cf. Grice, 1975, p. 45) he should affirm E's 
question: "Can I say this is my present?" in task IX, where E points at the 
present of all four participants (S, E, and the two dolls) although he 
knows that another pronoun would be more appropriate when prompted. If the 
child follows Grice's quality maxim ("Try to make your contribution one 
that is true") he should deny both questions and correct "mein" (my) into 
"unser" (our) in task IX, respectively "euer" (your ·, ) into "unser" 
(our) in task X, i.e. he should deny E's questions and give corrections 
which include the speaker. 
Our data show that the youngest children in group 1 follow in task 
IX ("mein'Vunser. ι ) the maxim of quantity because they affirm E's 
question (group 1: 64% in PRE, 57% in POST, as opposed to 'yes"-answers 
in group 2: 31« in PRE, 19% in POST, and group 4: 20% in PRE, 13% in POST) 
although they know that both E and S own the present. Explanations which 
reflect awareness of "quality" and which follow "no"-answers in task IX 
are more often observed in older children (group 2, group 3, and group 4). 
Let us give two examples from the transcripts. 
Task IX ("mein'Vunser. , ) 
S40 in group 2/POST; 4;7; female 
E: "Can I say, this is my 
present?" (Reference to 
p5 = o u r i n c l > ) 
VI: Kann ich sagen, das ist mein 
Geschenk?" (Verweis auf p5 = 
""^incl.) 
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Vp: "Eine Hälfte." 
VI (lacht); "Gut, wie muß ich 
sagen?" 
Vp: "Da das (zeigt auf pi = V T s 
Geschenk) ist ein Ganzes von 
dir." 
(...) 
S: "One half." 
E (laughs): "Ok. How do I 
have to say?" 
S: "The one there (points to 
pi = E's present) is a 
whole one of you." 
(...) 
Task IX ("mein,7unserincl ) 
S6 in group 4 (control group)/P0ST; 5;8; female 
VI: "Dann möcht' ich jetzt noch von 
dir wissen: Kann ich sagen, das 
ist mein Geschenk?" (Verweis auf 
p5) 
Vp: 
VI: 
Vp: 
"M'm." 
"Wie muß ich sagen?" 
"Das ist von uns beiden das 
Geschenk." 
VI: "Ganz prima. Und warum kann ich 
nicht sagen: das ist mein Geschenk?" 
Vp: "Weil es uns beiden das gehört, 
und dann will einer das Stück 
haben und der andere das." 
(zeigt zuerst auf die linke 
Geschenkhälfte, dann auf die 
rechte) 
VI (lacht): "Welches Stück willst 
du denn haben?" 
Vp: "Gar keins." 
E: "Now, I also want to know 
from you: Can I say, this 
is my present?" (Reference 
to p5) 
S: "No." 
E: "How do I have to say?" 
S: "This is the present of us 
two." 
E: "Very well. And why can't 
I say: this is my present?" 
S: "Because it belongs to the 
two of us, and then one 
wants this piece and the 
other one this." (points 
first to the left half of 
the present then to the 
right half) 
E (laughs): "Which piece 
would you like?" 
S: "None at all." 
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VI: "Weil, ich nein ... du hast vorhin E: "Because, I mean ... you 
gezeigt, das Stück auf der rechten pointed before, this piece 
Seite gehört dir und das auf der on the right side belongs to yo 
linken gehört mir. Damit wir uns and that on the left side 
nicht zanken, sagen wir lieber: to me. Since we don't want 
das ist unser Geschenk, ne." to fight, we rather say: 
this is our present, ok." 
(...) (...) 
In task X ("euer'Vunser.) we found a similar trend: the youngest 
children in group 1 say more often "yes" to E's question (and offer "our" 
or "of all four" when asked for an alternative) than the older children 
in groups 2, 3, and 4. On the other hand, these older children deny E's 
question and say often spontaneously that the present of the four partici-
pants is "of all four", "of us four", or "our four". 
This reflects a growing awareness of the maxim of quality in older 
children. Still, there is in general unclarity about the developmental 
status of Gricean maxims, and metalinguistic questions are needed in order 
to study them. 
6.2.2.4 Simmary of the Results of the Awareness Tests 
None of our predictions on linguistic awareness could be fully 
confirmed. 
Claparêde's difference hypothesis (it is easier to become aware of 
differences than of similarities) seems to hold with certain reservations: 
it matters whether something is the same or different from the child's 
egocentric point of view (and not just from an adult's point of view). 
Different metalinguistic abilities do not develop in the same way. 
If the quality of pronoun corrections is considered, we can see that 
linguistic judgments (i.e. error detections) precede appropriate correc-
tions. 
Other influential factors seem to be at work in children's acquisi-
tion of metalinguistic abilities: the enhancement through metalinguistic 
experience, the saliency of dyadic interaction, the change of egocentricity 
in younger children to perspective-taking in older children, children's 
striving for internal coherence, and the developmental change in the 
adherence to conversational.maxims. 
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The enhancement of awareness through metalinguistic experience argues 
against postulating one metalinguistic capacity. Apparently, metalinguistic 
abilities rely on an "awareness-raising" situation at an early stage. 
The saliency of dyadic factors in error detections and corrections 
relates to our findings in children's performance where a concentration on 
the dyad of the interlocutors has been observed. This stresses the import-
ance of speaker and addressee in both awareness and performance. 
Our data show that in the developmental change from egocentricity to 
perspective-taking four partially overlapping but discernible levels can 
be distinguished which shed a light on children's self-reflections and 
social cognitions. Despite of slight differences among individual children 
and singular/plural tasks with respect to the time of onset, the age be-
tween five-and-a-half and six years seems to be a turning point for pers-
pective-taking and self-reflective awareness. 
Children's striving for intra!inguistic coherence can be seen in their 
struggle to find the correct pronoun. Karmiloff-Smith's point that "language 
is a problem space per se" is also apparent from our data. 
The conversational implicature "Try to make your contribution one 
that is true" (the Gricean maxim of quality) is better understood by older 
children than by younger children. This might reflect a growing awareness 
of the cooperative principle. 
Clearly, our assumptions and findings on the development of linguistic 
awareness need further theoretical and empirical evaluation. 
6.2.3 The Relationship between Performance and Awareness 
6.2.3.1 General Results of the Relationship between Performance and 
Awareness 
Performance and error detections 
We first want to give a short overview of the relationships between 
performance and error detections (the relationships between performance 
and corrections will not be presented because of the large variety in our 
data). Our comparisons for the four groups in PRE and POST distinguish 
among four possible relationships: correct performance and correct error 
detections (++), incorrect performance but correct error detections (-+), 
correct performance but incorrect error detections (+-), and incorrect 
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performance and incorrect error detections (--). 
These comparisons relate to intraindividual item relations, i.e. to 
performance and error detections of one child in one task. They are summed 
over the seven pronouns "mein", "dein", "sein", "ihr . ", " и п 5 е г
е х с
і "· 
"euer", and "ihr , " in the performance tests which match either "utterance" 
or "reference" pronouns in the awareness tests (e.g. in task II the 
"utterance" pronoun is "mein" and the "reference" pronoun "dein") and the 
six error detection tasks in the awareness tests (task II "mein'Vdein, 
task IV "dein'Vsein, task V "euer"/unser
excl , task III "unser"/ihrsi ). 
Figure 22 shows the four relationships for PRE and POST. 
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Fig. 22: General within-test relations between performance and error detections 
for PRE and POST 
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Figure 22 demonstrates that about half of all children are correct in 
both performance and in error detections. There are more children who cannot 
yet perform correctly but who can detect an error than children who can 
perform correctly but who cannot yet detect an error. In PRE incorrect per-
formance and incorrect detections are more frequent than in POST. 
Figure 23 exhibits the four relationships for the three experimental 
groups (age 1, age 2, and age 3) and the control group. 
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Fig. 23: Within-test relations between performance and error detections 
for the Four Groups (PRE and POST) 
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In the youngest group (age 1) 35% of the children can either not per-
form correctly or detect an error or both. In group 2, group 3, and group 4 
most subjects are correct in both performance and error detections. In all 
four groups there are more children who show incorrect performance but cor-
rect error detections than children with correct performance but incorrect 
error detections. These findings will be discussed in 6.2.3.2. 
Presentation order effects 
Figure 23 indicates that the experimental group 3 is generally slight-
ly better in error detections than the control group 4: children from group 
3 show more often incorrect performance but correct error detections than 
group 4 whereas the "control children" of group 4 show more often correct 
performance but incorrect error detections (compare also the performance 
results in Figure 8 and Figure 9 with the results on error detections in 
Figure 17 and Figure 18). The relatively better results in error detections 
of group 3 could be due to a momentary enhancement by imediately preceding 
performance. 
6.2.3.2 Within-Test Relations between Performance and Awareness as 
Related to Theoretical Expectations 
In 5.6 (synopsis of the predictions which relate to the role of 
linguistic awareness in language acquisition) we formulated three hypoth-
eses with respect to the within-test relations between performance and 
awareness. 
In the first one (H.4) we expected that awareness can be observed 
although children do not yet perform correctly. This assumption can be 
confirmed for error detections by looking at Figure 22 and Figure 23 
which show a relatively high percentage of children who can detect errors 
correctly but who cannot yet perform correctly. There are even children 
who change an incorrect pronoun correctly and can explain why the incorrect 
pronoun is inappropriate although their performance is insufficient. 
However, such children were rare (4 children) and we found them only in 
POST. It is noteworthy that their performance in PRE had been at least 
partially correct, i.e. either the "utterance" pronoun* or the "reference" 
E.g. in the awareness task I ("sein'Vihr . ) the "utterance" pronoun in 
the performance test is "sein" and the "reference" pronoun is "ihr . ". 
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pronoun had been mastered in the first test. 
For instance, subject 33, a girl who was 5:0 in PRE and 5;5 in POST 
mastered "ihr . " and "sein" in the first performance test (PRE), detected 
the error in task I ("sein'Vihr . )/PRE but could not yet correct appro-
priately (she substituted the name of the female doll). In POST, her 
performance deteriorated for "ihr . " and "sein" although she was able to 
sing. 
detect, correct, and explain the error in task I ("sein'Vihr . ). 
(...) 
S: "His present does not work." 
E: "His present does not work. 
And why doesn't his present 
work?" 
S: "Because this doesn't sound 
like a boy." 
E: "I see, ok. - And for girls 
I have to say?" 
S: "This is her present." 
(...) 
Vp: "Sein Geschenk geht nicht." 
VI: "Sein Geschenk geht nicht. Und 
wieso geht 'n sein Geschenk 
nicht?" 
Vp: "Wegen das sich nicht anhört 
wie 'n Junge." 
VI: "Aha. ja gut - Und bei Mädchen 
muß man sagen?" 
Vp: "Das ist ihr Geschenk." 
Another girl who only knew the utterance pronoun "sein" in the first 
performance test (but could neither detect nor correct the error in task 
I in PRE) did not master "sein" and "ihrsi " in POST. Although this 
child detected and corrected the mistake in task I ("no, it is her present") 
her explanation was contradictory. 
(...) 
VI: "Warum muß ich denn sagen: 
ihr Geschenk?" 
Vp: "Weil es sein Geschenk ist. 
(...) 
E: "Why do I have to say: 
her present?" 
S: "Because it is his present. 
Thus, we conclude that error detections are possible without correct 
performance but corrections and explanations are less likely without 
correct performance. If at a later stage corrections and explanations are 
given but the directly preceding performance is bad, there has been at 
least partially correct performance at an earlier stage. 
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In our second hypothesis relating to within-test relations between 
perfonnance and awareness (H.S) we assumed that performance precedes error 
detections and corrections. Our results show that this hypothesis holds only 
for singular pronouns in the comparison of performance and error detections. 
For instance, there are more children who are able to perform correctly 
in the 3rd person singular pronoun tasks ("sein" and "ihr - ") but cannot 
detect the error in task I ("sein'Vihr . ) than children who cannot per­
form correctly on "sein" and "ihr . " but can detect the gender error in 
task I (significant difference bewteen +- and -+: X = 38.24, df = 1, 
ρ < .001). 
However, for all comparisons of performance and error detections with 
plural pronouns (i.e. when pronouns of the plural awareness tasks III, V, 
and VI are analyzed) we have to reject H.5. The (-+) relationship is in PRE 
more frequent than the (++) relationship. This means that error detections 
of plural pronouns precede correct performance of plural pronouns. 
This result has to be seen with respect to (semantic) features. For 
correct performance one needs alj^ features to be mastered. For correct 
error detections one needs at least one uf the contrasting features invol­
ved. This difference between performance and awareness should therefore not 
hold for corrections. And, in fact, children who cannot correct a pronoun 
appropriately generally master the pronoun in the performance test (note 
that the four children who displayed correct error detections but not 
correct performance in POST mastered at least one pronoun correctly in the 
first performance test). 
In our third hypothesis with respect to within-test relations between 
performance and awareness (Н.б) we assumed that it is harder to become 
aware of early acquired pronouns than of later acquired pronouns. Our data 
show that this is only sometimes the case. 
For instance, "mein" (my) and "dein" (уоиг5-іпа ) are the earliest 
pronouns in all performance tests (cf. Fig. 1). The "mein'Vdein contrast 
(task I) reveals that error detections are also early (cf. Fig. 10). 
However, the speaker/addressee shift and perspective-taking are still dif­
ficult and only older children can yield the appropriate pronoun "dein" 
(cf. Fig. 19). 
Or, plural pronouns (such as "euer'Vyour , ) are late in the perform­
ance tests. Thus, awareness for plural tasks should be early. However, 
error detections for plural awareness tasks (such as task V "euer'Vunser , ) 
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are later than error detections for the "mein'Vdein contrast (which should 
be relatively late because "mein" and "dein" are acquired early) but 
earlier than error detections for the "sein'Vihr . contrast (which should 
sing. 
be later than error detections for plural awareness tasks because "sein" 
and "ihr . " are acquired earlier than plural pronouns, such as "euer") 
(cf. Fig. lo'and Fig. 19). 
It seems that these results are due to another cause, namely the one 
mentioned before: what matters for detection is whether there is at least 
one of the contrastive features mastered, and not whether the pronoun as 
a whole is (i.e. all features of the pronoun). 
For pronoun correction, it is important to distinguish between pro-
nouns which are affected by the speaker/addressee shift and those which 
are not (cf. 6.2.2.3, our third factor). The developmental growth of 
pronoun performance and pronoun corrections seems to be more concordant 
for pronouns which are not affected by the speaker/addressee shift than 
for pronouns which are affected. 
This completes the analysis of within-test relations as far as 
required by the theoretical analyses in section 5.1 to 5.6. Let us 
summarize the main findings: 
- error detections are possible without correct performance but this is 
less likely for corrections and explanations, 
- error detections can precede correct performance because only contrasting 
(and not all) features are required for correct error detections, 
- corrections do in general not precede correct performance because all 
features are required for appropriate corrections, and 
- the developmental growth of performance and corrections seems to be 
more concordant for pronouns which are not affected by the speaker/ 
addressee shift than for pronouns which are affected. 
6.2.3.3 Longitudinal Relations between Awareness and Performance 
Let us first repeat our main hypothesis (H.7) as stated in 5.6 
(cf. also section 1 and section 5). We said: 
Children who show metalinguistic abilities in the first test but 
whose automatic performance is not yet appropriate will improve their 
automatic performance in the second test to a larger degree than those 
children who are neither aware nor perform correctly in the first test. 
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It is only because of this hypothesis that a longitudinal correlative 
study had to be set up (early awareness may be instrumental or facilitative 
for later performance). 
In 6.2 we described the analyses of our data with respect to longitudi-
nal relations between awareness and performance in order to find an answer 
for our main hypothesis. Children's performance scores and awareness scores 
in PRE were dichotomized because we wanted to compare children with low 
performance and low awareness in PRE (00) with children who show low 
performance but high awareness in PRE (01) with respect to differences in 
absolute performance scores in POST of these two groups of children (PRE 
00 versus PRE 01). 
The dichotomization of a few performance and awareness scores in PRE 
caused problems because there were cases where children's score was exactly 
the median for their groups. Example: For a group where the median 
detection score was 3, two or less correct error detections had to be 
classified as "0" (worse than average), and four or more correct error 
detections as "1" (better than average), but without further criteria one 
cannot decide whether a child with three correct error detections should be 
classified as "0" or as "1". In such a case we checked the protocols for 
the classification of performance scores and the protocols and transcripts 
for the classification of the awareness scores: were there any clear indi-
cations which favoured either classification? In case of very hesitant and 
inconsistent answers we decided for a "0"-classification. Since this 
criterion (long hesitations and inconsistencies) was still insufficient for 
our scores, we assigned the child randomly to a "0" or "1" score. These 
decisions were made before the inspection of the performance scores in POST, 
i.e. without knowing whether performance in POST was better (or worse or 
the same) than in PRE. 
A post-hoc examination of our "blind" dichotomizations showed that a 
Type I error (HQ will be rejected falsely) can be excluded but that a 
Type II error (Hn is accepted when, in fact, it is false) is possible. 
HQ: There is no difference of absolute performance scores in POST of (00)-
children and (01)-children. 
H.: (Ol)-children have higher absolute performance scores in POST than 
1
 (OO)-children. 
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In 6.2 we described our final step of these analyses. Let us shortly 
surmiarize it again: Two tests (error detection and correction) for each 
group (and thereafter, for all four groups together) were carried out. The 
first test analyzes differences in means (= M) of performance in POST for 
"00 ." -children ("00 ." = children with "low performance" and "low error 
detections" in PRE) and "01
ed"-children ("01 d" = children with "low per­
formance" but "high error detections" in PRE). 
The second test analyzes differences in means (= M) of performance in 
POST for "00 ""-children ("00 " = children with "low performance and 
PP PP 
"low possessive pronoun corrections" in PRE) and "01 "-children with "low 
performance" but "high possessive pronoun corrections" in PRE). 
For both of these tests we applied t-tests (prior to the t-tests we 
checked for equal variances of the two types of independent observations). 
These two tests are performed because we are interested in the 
question whether early error detections and/or corrections can be predictive 
for later performance. 
We now want to look at our results with respect to our main hypothesis 
(Table 22): 
Tibie 22. Differences In PerforMnce/POST Scores betwten Non-avarc Children 
and Early bmn Chlldrm (Errer Detect lont end Corrections) 
Croup 1 
Group г 
Group 3 
Croup 4 
»11 four 
jroups 
tojetMr 
error detections 
significant differences between 
•OO ,^· and " 0 1 ^ - In performance/ 
POST 
•» '"on,,, • ' - " « o i ^ • 5 · ' 
»es (И,, - 4.8/1^, • β.) 
ed ed 
(ρ < .MS/4.5Í > | t ( 0 . W i S ) l -
2.0IS) 
no ( ^ - б.в/Н,,^ . 7.3) 
no ( « ^ . i - M ^ - 7.5) 
'" "4d " ''""»'.d " '•" 
<p<.025/2.17 > Κ,ο.κ.;,,,! • 
1.7031 
corrections 
significant differences between 
"rápp" άηΛ "0 ,pp" 1 n P*p f o n"· 
ance/TOST 
~> (»ίο " ' - ' " Ό ι " 4 · 5 ) 
PP PP 
yes (Иц, - S./Hj, - 7.7) 
(ρ < 0.25/2.7 > | t ( 0 „ i 6 ) | -
1.943) 
" · ("οο ' • '- '"οι • ' ·> 
PP PP 
not yet ( Ι ^ 0 • б./Ц, • β.) 
( 2
·
, 2 <
 Ι'(0.95.4)1 · 2 · , 3 2 ) 
yes (Над - 5 . 5 / ^ , - 7.) 
(ρ < . 0 1 / 2 . 6 > | t ( 0 „ 5 i Z 7 ) l • 
1.703) 
"ed" stands for "error detection". 
** 
"pp" stands for "possessive pronoun correction". 
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Table 22 shows us that in general those children who are aware but can-
not yet perform correctly in the first test show better performance in the 
second test than children who can neither perform correctly nor are aware 
in the first test. 
The youngest children of group 1 who have "high awareness" (with respect 
to error detections and corrections) but "low performance" in the first test 
show clearly (but not significantly) better performance in the second test 
than children of this group with "low awareness" and "low performance" in 
the first test. 
Children of group 2 who have "high awareness" (with resoect to error 
detections and corrections) but "low performance" in the first test show 
significantly better performance (p < .025) in the second test than children 
of this group with "low awareness" and "low performance" in the first test. 
The oldest children of group 3 who have "high error detections" but 
"low performance" in PRE show clearly better performance in POST than 
children of this group with "low error detections" and "low performance" in 
PRE. There is no difference between the oldest children with "low perform-
ance" and "low corrections" in PRE and the oldest children with "low per-
formance" but "high corrections" in PRE in the performance of the second 
test. "Control" children who have "high awareness" (with respect to error 
detections and corrections) but "low performance" in PRE display clearly 
(but not significantly) better performance in the second test than children 
of this group with "low awareness" and "low performance" in PRE. 
When all four groups are taken together the difference between "00"-
children and "01"-children is significant for error detections (p < .025) 
and for corrections (p < .01). However, when group 1, group 3, and group 4 
are taken together the difference between "00"-children and "OV'-children 
is not significant for error detections, but only for corrections (p < .05). 
These results indicate that early awareness (error detections and correc-
tions) may be instrumental or facultative for later performance. This holds 
more for children in group 2 (who are aware but cannot yet perform correct-
ly) than for children in group 1 (who are often not yet aware) and children 
in group 3 (who are often already quite good in performance). This means 
that we cannot reject our main hypothesis. It seems that linguistic aware-
ness can function as a feedback mechanism or correction device in the 
acquisition of possessive pronouns. The generally better perfornance in 
POST of children who show early awareness is not necessarily due to 
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these children's use of a "deliberate control". It could be that the effect 
of awareness rather lies "in a generalized differentiation of the cognitive 
structure which is then in a position to respond to various different 
demands by activating a variety of specific heuristic processes, instead of 
always applying the same one standard procedure to all situations, as it 
had tended to be before" (Dörner, 1979, p. 104).* Thus, it could be that a 
"system for awareness" "is applying its heuristic techniques to the 
record of its own heuristic processes. This means that it does not observe 
itself directly but only indirectly, in that it analyzes the records of its 
own activity." (Dörner, 1979, p. 106; cf. also Nisbett & DeCamp Wilson, 
1977). 
In our last hypothesis (H.8), which also relates to longitudinal rela-
tions between awareness and performance (in Study A) we assumed that early 
language performance is stronger correlated with later language performance 
than early reflective abilities. 
In order to test this hypothesis we used Kendall's partial rank corre-
lation coefficients for partial correlations between awareness in PRE and 
performance in POST (partialling out the effect of performance in PRE) and 
for partial correlations between performance in PRE and performance in POST 
(partialling out the effect of awareness in PRE). This was done in two tests 
(error detections and corrections). For each of the four groups and for 
the four groups together both tests were carried out. 
In a first step we determined three correlations: The first one is the 
correlation between performance in POST (= perf- = x; "x" is based on the 
number of correct pronouns in POST, i.e. from 0 to 9 ) and awareness in PRE 
(i.e. in our first test: error detections in PRE = ed. = У«; in the second 
-f 
In three experiments with adults Dörner (1979) could show that "self 
reflection leads to a substantial improvement in problem solving ability." 
(p. 102). However, it is noteworthy that the awareness tasks were qualita-
tively different from ours: Ss had to report their own thinking during the 
problem-solving process. 
** 
There were nine pronouns in the peformance test. We ranked our observa-
tions on the χ variable from 1 to N (N is the number of subjects in a 
group). Our computations had to be corrected for ties (cf. Siegel, 1956, 
p. 217) because some Ss had the same scores. 
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test: corrections in PRE = pp. = У2; "y" is based on the number of correct 
error detections or correct changes of possessive pronouns in the six error 
detection tasks, i.e. from 0 to 6). The second one is the correlation between 
performance in POST (= perf„ = x) and performance in PRE (- perf. = z; "2" 
is based on the number of correct pronouns in PRE, i.e. from 0 to 9). The 
third correlation computed is between awareness in PRE (i.e. in our first 
test = ed. = y. ; in our second test = pp. = y-) and performance in PRE 
(= perf1 = z). 
For each group we had three correlations in each test, for error 
detections Τ ^ Τ . , and Τ
χ ζ
, and for corrections Τ -, T y 2 z , and Τ χ ζ 
(note that the correlation between performance in POST and performance in 
PRE, i.e. Τ , is the same in both tests). 
In a second step, we determined for the first test (error detections) 
the correlation between performance in POST and error detections in PRE, 
partiall ing out performance in PRE (T « ), and the correlation between 
performance in POST and performance in PRE, partial ling out error detec­
tions in PRE (T . ) . Similarly, for our second test (pronoun corrections) 
the correlation between performance in POST and corrections in PRE, partial-
ling out performance in PRE (T - 7)» w a s determined as well as the corre­
lation between performance in POST and performance in PRE, partialling out 
corrections in PRE (T - ) . These four partial correlations (T . as 
compared to Τ . ; Τ _ as compared to Τ „) w ^ e analyzed for each 
of the four groups and for all four groups together. Let us now look at 
the results (Table 23): 
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Table ¿3: Partial Correlations between Early Awareness and Later Performance 
and between Early Performance and Later Performance 
Group 1 
(N=14) 
Grouo 2 
(N=16) 
Group 3 
(N=14) 
Group 4 
(N=15) 
All four 
groups 
together 
Awareness: Error 
τ * T
xy1.z 
partial correla­
tions between per­
formance in POST 
and error detec­
tions in PRE, par-
tialling out per­
formance in PRE 
.26 
.68 
.31 
.26 
.46 
Jeteetions 
T
xz.y1 
partial correla­
tions between 
performance in 
POST and perform­
ance in PRE, par-
tialling out 
error detections 
in PRE 
.25 
-.25 
.29 
.06 
.10 
Awareness: Corrections 
T
xy2.z 
partial cor­
relations 
between per­
formance in 
POST and cor­
rections in 
PRE, partial-
ling out 
performance 
in PRE 
.30 
.32 
-.01 
.42 
.34 
T
xz.y2 
partial cor­
relations 
between per­
formance in 
POST and per­
formance in PRE, 
partial ling 
out corrections 
in PRE 
.16 
-.17 
.29 
-.C6 
.14 
Note that tests of the significance for Τ and Τ are not possible 
because the observations are not independent. 
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Table 23 indicates generally that performance in POST is stronger cor­
related with awareness in PRE than with performance in PRE (with one ex­
ception: in group 3 corrections in PRE are not correlated with performance 
in POST but performance in PRE is correlated with performance in POST). 
This means that we have to reject our hypothesis that early language per­
formance is stronger correlated with later language performance than early 
reflective abilities for the tasks under concern. It seems that in general 
early awareness is more predictive for later perfornance than early per­
formance. This holds more for error detections than for corrections. A 
possible reason for the one exception, the stronger predictive power of 
performance in PRE for performance in POST than of corrections in PRE for 
group 3, could be the children's inability to master the speaker/addressee 
shift in the perspective-taking tasks II, V, and III in PRE (cf. Table 21, 
Fig. 19, Fig. 20 and Fig. 21).* Maybe, this inability to yield the appro­
priate pronoun "weakened" the correlation between performance in POST and 
corrections in PRE. 
The generally stronger correlations between awareness in PRE and per­
formance in POST than those between performance in PRE and performance in 
POST can be due to the fact that we used deictic terms as our study material. 
Pronouns are variable in their referential function. It may be that - to 
some degree - awareness is necessary for correct identification of pronouns 
within a communication situation. This might be more so for pronouns which 
are even less "fixed" than the self-referring "I" (or "my") or the other-
directed "you . " (or "your"), i.e. for 3rd person pronouns and plural 
pronouns which involve at least one 3rd person. This may be a reason for 
their relatively late acquisition. Could it be that this factor (variable 
terms require to some degree a metalinguistic step-back) holds also as an 
explanation for the relatively late acquisition of kinship terms (i.e. of 
relational nouns, cf. Piaget, 1928; Danziger, 1957; Haviland & Clark, 
1974; Deutsch, 1979), of deictic verbs (cf. Clark & Gamica, 1974) or of 
verbs (like "promise", "ask", and "tell") which relate to speaker and 
addressee (cf. С. Chomsky, 1969)? 
ι 
Note that the control group 4 mastered the speaker/addressee shift in 
the perspective-taking task II in the first test better than the experi­
mental group 3 (cf. Table 21). 
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From our data it appears that we should not underestimate lin­
guistic awareness as a possible facilitation in language acquisition although 
we should be cautious not to overgeneralize our findings. It might well be 
that the role of linguistic awareness in language development is only im­
portant for variable terms or that still other factors (e.g. nonverbal ones) 
are involved. 
After our analyses on the longitudinal relations between awareness and 
performance we want to consider a last question: Is linguistic performance 
in PRE predictive for linguistic awareness in POST? For this, the procedure 
of our analyses was very similar to the one for our nain hypothesis. We 
compared the absolute awareness scores (error detections and corrections) 
in POST of children with "high performance" but "low awareness" (low error 
detections and corrections) in PRE with absolute awareness scores in POST 
of children with "low performance" and "low awareness" in PRE. None of these 
comparisons proved to be significant (the original data can be inspected). 
This means that early performance is not predictive for later awareness. 
Let us sumnarize our findings before we turn to Study В on "natural 
and syntactic gender" which might either confirm or falsify our assumptions 
from Study A: 
- our data suggest that, in fact, early linguistic awareness may be 
"instrumental" or "facilitative" for later performance, 
- early awareness seems to be in general more predictive for later perform­
ance than early performance, and 
- early performance is not predictive for later awareness, i.e. the acqui­
sition of primary linguistic skills is not a sufficient condition for the 
development of linguistic awareness. Let us now turn to Study B. 
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7. STUDY В: "NATURAL AND SYNTACTIC GENDER" 
7.1 Method of Study В 
In the experiment on "natural and syntactic gender" (= Study B) we 
will compare natural gender which has clear extra!inguistic/semantic refer­
ence with syntactic gender which has a more morphophonological/syntagmatic 
base (Study A focussed more on deictic aspects.). This Study В has been set 
up in order to explore "the role of non-linguistic conceptual factors versus 
purely linguistic ones in the acquisition of metalinguistic abilities 
(Böhme & Levelt, 1979, p. 2). 
Both natural and syntactic gender become only relevant for the 3rd 
person singular in German possessive pronouns. Natural gender indicates the 
male or female sex of animates. Syntactic gender which refers also to in-
animates can be differentiated for masculine, feminine, and neuter gender. 
In Study В we will only investigate the gender of the possessor which is 
expressed by the free morpheme in German possessive pronouns (cf. section 2). 
Since the morphophonological form for the masculine possessor cannot be 
distinguished from the one for the neuter possessor, it will be interesting 
to see which possessor will be chosen first in the performance test and 
whether the child masters two functions of one and the same form. 
The general outline of the study of "natural and syntactic gender" is 
the same as the one of the study on "shifting reference". There are four 
groups which get performance and awareness tests at two points of time 
(PRE and POST). The main points of interest are: firstly, the child's 
understanding of natural and syntactic gender in possessive pronouns 
(performance), secondly, his detections, corrections, and explanations of 
errors with respect to natural and syntactic gender (metalinguistic 
abilities), and thirdly, the relationship between metalinguistic abilities 
and performance (especially the longitudinal, intraindividual relation 
between awareness in the first test and performance in the second test). 
Each child has to answer performance and awareness questions for two 
different tasks: one task which tests the child's understanding and aware­
ness of natural gender (= "sexus"), and another task which tests his 
understanding and awareness of syntactic gender (= "genus"). The children 
in Study В are not the same as the ones in Study A but there are just as 
in Study A three age groups which get performance before awareness and one 
additional group (the control group 4) in which the children are of the 
193 
same age as those in the oldest experimental group, and where awareness 
precedes performance. The experiment on "natural and syntactic gender" 
involves a PRE- and POST-comparison covering a time interval of five months 
between the two testings. 
7.1.1 Subjects and Research Design of Study В 
In the first test (PRE) a total of 64 children were involved, 38 girls 
and 26 boys, i.e. as in Study A the girls were somewhat overrepresented. 
Here again, the data of three children were discarded because two of them 
had moved away after PRE and one was sick in POST. Thus, there were 61 
children in four groups: In group 1 were the 16 youngest children, half of 
them boys and half of them girls, ranging from 3;3 years to 4;5 years of 
age (mean age: 3;11). Group 2 contained 13 children (two children were 
discarded in this group), five girls and eight boys, from 4;6 to 5;1 years 
of age (mean age: 4;9). In group 3, 18 children were tested, fourteen girls, 
but only four boys, ranging from 5;2 to 5;11 (mean age: 5;5). In group 4, 
the control group (awareness before performance) were 14 children, eight 
girls and six boys, ranging from 5;0 to 5,10 (average: 5;5). 
When these four groups were tested in POST, they were exactly five 
months older: group 1 (4;4), group 2 (5;2), group 3 (5;10), and group 4 
(5;10). Pilot studies had indicated that gender was still a major problem 
in these age groups (cf. also the results of the study on "shifting refer­
ence"). 
All children were native speakers of German and came from the same 
kindergartens as the children in Study A. Everything we reported for the 
children in Study A holds also for the children in Study B, except that 
there was a selection criterion for the children in Study B: they had to 
be familiar with the basic colours (red, green, blue, yellow, black, and 
white). The research design for the study on "natural and syntactic gender" 
was for both tests (PRE and POST) the same one as in "shifting reference" 
(cf. Table 15 and Table 16), except for the number of subjects and their 
mean age. PRE of Study В was also administered in May and June 1978, POST 
in October and November 1978 (exactly five months later). 
7.1.2 Experimental Set-up of Study В 
In Study В each child had to do one task on natural gender and one 
194 
task on syntactic gender. The order was chosen randomly: 29 children got 
natural gender (= "sexus") before syntactic gender (= "genus"), 32 children 
the inverse order (genus before sexus). In the sexus-task three animates 
were seated on a table of a kindergarten room: a male doll, a female doll, 
and a pig without specific sex. The left-to-right ordering of the three 
figures was varied from child to child. 
Before the sexus-task began names had to be given to the male doll 
(e.g. der Peter) and to the female doll (e.g. die Tina) (notice that proper 
names in colloquialism can carry articles in German). The pig was well-
known through German television (das Schweinchen Dick). "Der Peter" had a 
red scarf around his neck, "die Tina" had a green scarf, and "das Schweinchen 
Dick" a yellow scarf. 
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In the genus-task three objects were placed on the table. Here, too, 
the order of the objects varied. These objects were a black dice (der 
schwarze Würfel), a yellow watering-can (die gelbe Gießkanne), and a blue 
mini-boat (das blaue Boot/Bötchen, respectively das blaue Schiff/chen) 
(the diminuitive "-chen" goes in German together with the neuter article). 
The dice and the watering-can were relatively big so that the child would 
not use the suffix "-chen" (or "-lein") for these objects. 
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7.1.3 Performance Tasks of Study В 
The performance tasks in Study В were completion tasks which tested the 
children's comprehension of 3rd person singular possessive pronouns. The 
experimenter asked the child in the natural gender experiment: 
I. "Ihre Schleife ist ...?" (Her scarf is ...?),* and 
II. "Seine Schleife ist ...?" (His scarf is ...?). 
The questions were always in that order. Although the pronoun "ihre" 
can refer to either the female doll or the pig by conceiving it as a female 
animal we expected that in spontaneous understanding correct reference 
would be primarily made to the female doll (if the pig was also conceived as 
female this could be indicated by the children in a spontaneous second 
reference). The pronoun "seine" can refer to either the male doll or the pig 
(either by conceiving it as a male animal or by the neuter article: das 
Schweinchen Dick). Despite the possible multiple pronoun functions the 
child was not prompted for a second time because we wanted to know whether 
the child showed plurifunctional usage spontaneously. 
In the syntactic gender task E aske': 
1. "Ihre Farbe ist ...?" (Her colour is ...?),* and 
2. "Seine Farbe ist ...?" (His colour is ...?). 
There was also no change of questions. The possessive pronoun "ihre" 
can only refer to the feminine gender of the watering-can (die Gießkanne) 
whereas "seine" can refer to either the masculine gender of the dice (der 
Würfel) or the neuter gender of the boat (das Boot). The child was not 
prompted a second time when asked for "seine Farbe". 
Some children got the sexus task before the genus task, others genus 
before sexus. This holds for the experimental and the control children. 
There was, however, the same order for PRE and for POST. Our motivation for 
the inclusion of the pig in the sexus task was the child's gender attribu-
tion to this animate. Would the child react to it in the performance tasks? 
And if not, would the child comment on it in some way? 
Note that in the natural gender task the possessors are the male doll, the 
female doll, and the pig, and the possession is a scarf. In the syntactic 
gender task "the possessors" are the dice, the watering-can, and the boat, 
"the possession" is the colour of these objects. Although it seems somehow 
inappropriate to use the terms "possessors" and "possession" in genus there 
seems to be in general an inappropriacy with respect to "possessive relation-
ships" of objects. 
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7.1.4 Awareness Tasks of Study В 
Here again, standardized questions were used for error detections, but 
exploratory interview questions for corrections and explanations of errors 
(if the child's answers indicated denial or if they were hesitant or contra­
dictory). 
There were altogether ten awareness questions in Study B: four questions 
on "natural gender", four questions on "syntactic gender", and two "conflict" 
questions (these are questions in which there is a conflict between natural 
and syntactic gender). 
The four awareness questions on natural gender in which the possessive 
pronoun and the colour were emphasized are: 
Ι. E looked at the child and asked: "Can I say, "seine" (his) scarf is 
green?", thus mistaking the pronoun deliberately. For a correction the 
child had two choices in this task: the correction of the possessive 
pronoun (his) or of the predicative adjective (green). For a correct 
explanation the child had to show awareness of the relationship between 
the possessive pronoun(s) and sex of the doll(s). 
II. E looked at the child and asked: "Can I say, "ihre" (her) scarf is 
yellow?".The child's acceptance of this utterance would have been only 
coded as a correct answer if there was an indication that he or she 
thought that the pig could be only a female pig. But no such case could 
be found. Therefore, the acceptance of "ihre" in this task was coded 
as non-detection. Again, the possessive pronoun (her) or the predica­
tive adjective (yellow) could be corrected. However, if the child 
changed the predicative into "red" but did not change the possessive 
pronoun (her to his) the correction would be wrong. For an explanation 
to be correct the child should refer to the sex of the pig (if the 
child conceived the pig as male) or the neuter gender of the pig (das 
Schweinchen), or in case of a colour change (green), to the sex of 
the female doll. 
III. This awareness task consisted of two parts which implied both correct 
statements: 
a. E looked at the child and asked: "Can I say, "seine" (his) scarf is 
yellow? (this task will be also called "filler task Ilia"), and 
b. E looked at the child and asked: "Can I say, "seine" (his) scarf is 
red?" ("filler task Illb"). 
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(his) or the predicative adjective into "yellow" (the watering-can is of 
feminine gender). For a correct explanation the child had to indicate 
the syntagmatic collocation between possessive pronoun and syntactic 
gender (which becomes evident by the article and also in the personal 
pronoun). 
2. E looked at the child and asked: "Can I say, "seine" (his) colour is 
yellow?", thus mistaking the pronoun deliberately. The possessive pronoun 
"seine" could be corrected into "ihre" (her). There were two possibilities 
for a correction of the predicative adjective: "seine" can go together 
with the black dice (der schwarze Würfel) or the blue boat (das blaue 
Boot /Schiff). For a correct explanation, cf. task 1. 
3. Like in III. this awareness task consisted of two parts which implied 
correct statements: 
a. E looked at the child and asked: "Can I say, "seine" (his) colour is 
black?" ("filler task 3a"), and 
b. E looked at the child and asked: "Can I say, "seine" (his) colour is 
blue?" ("filler task 3b"). 
Here, too, either 3a or 3b could be discarded if relevant information 
had been given earlier. The children were often prompted for an explanation, 
both in case of acceptance and of rejection (we will see in the results 
that a number of children wanted to refer "seine" to one object only). 
4. E looked at the child and asked: "Can I say, "ihre" (her) colour is 
black?", thus mistaking the pronoun deliberately. Again, the child could 
change the possessive pronoun into "seine" or the predicative adjective 
into "yellow". For a correct explanation, cf. task 1. 
After these four questions (which were administered in the following 
order: 1, 2, 3a, 3b, and 4) the "syntactic gender conflict" question was 
given: 
5. E looked at the child and said: "The boat is now called Susanne (= a 
female German name). What do I have to say now: "ihre" (her) or "seine" 
(his) colour?". For half of the children "seine" was given before "ihre". 
The motivation for this conflict task was the investigation of the 
child's preference of either (female) natural gender ("ihre") or of 
(neuter) syntactic gender ("seine"). The child had to explain his or her 
choice. 
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Half of the children got I, II, Ilia, ІІІЬ, IV, and V (the "natural 
gender awareness tasks") before 1, 2, За, 3b, 4, and 5 (the "syntactic gender 
awareness tasks"), the other half the inverse order (syntactic gender 
awareness tasks before natural gender awareness tasks). 
7.1.5 Experimental Procedures and Instructions of Study В 
In the experiment on "natural and syntactic gender" each child was test­
ed individually in one session (one test) which lasted approximately 20 
minutes. The sessions took place in a quiet kindergarten room. The children 
were escorted by the experimenter and were seated next to her. "Companions" 
were allowed to the children (cf. 6.1.6). 
After the introduction of the female research assistant Veronika who 
took notes but did not participate in the "games", instructions were given. 
For the first performance tests (PRE) in the three experimental groups 
instructions (which include definite article and colour checkings) were as 
follows: 
"You see this boy, this girl-doll ("Mädchenpuppe"; note that "Mädchen" 
is despite the female sex of neuter gender - therefore, we had to use the 
feminine syntactic gender "die Puppe" for the female doll; this was not the 
case for the boy), and this pig, right? (Most children knew "Schweinchen 
Dick" by German television). This is "das Schweinchen Dick". You know that 
its name is "Dick" because it is so fat (this was done in order to exclude 
connotations with the - in Germany unusual - male name "Dick"). How do you 
want to call the boy? (Child says, for instance, "Peter"). Ok this is "der 
Peter". How do you want to call this girl-doll? (Child says, for instance, 
"Tina"). Ok, this is "die Tina". 
Now, who is this (E points at the pig)? (If the children did not say 
"das Schweinchen Dick" but only "Schweinchen Dick" they were prompted for 
the definite article: "Der, die, das?" - which nearly all children answered 
correctly. The few children who said: "Das ist der Dick" were told that 
this was not "der Dick" but "das Schweinchen Dick"). Ok, this is "das 
Schweinchen Dick". Who is this (E points at the male doll) (same procedure 
as above). Ok, this is "der Peter". Who is this (E points at the female 
doll)? (same procedure as above). Ok, this is "die Tina". Which colour has 
the scarf which "das Schweinchen Dick" has around the neck? (Children who 
had difficulties with colours were discarded). Yes, "das Schweinchen Dick" 
has a yellow scarf. Which colour has the scarf which "der Peter" has around 
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the neck? Yes, "der Peter" has a red scarf. Which colour has the scarf which 
"die Tina" has around the neck? Yes, "die Tina" has a green scarf. I want 
to know whether you can answer my questions. Just tell me which colour I 
mean. ..." (administration of the natural gender tasks of the performance 
test). 
The instructions for the syntactic gender tasks were the same as for 
natural gender: after the definite articles and colours of the three objects 
were checked the child was also told to tell E which colour she meant. 
Thereafter, the natural gender awareness and the syntactic gender aware-
ness questions (respectively the inverse order) followed. E said: "We now 
do something else. I want to see if you notice when I make a mistake. Can I 
say, the scarf of Peter is green?". All children said "no" and some mentioned 
that Tina had the green scarf (they also used the 'German demonstrative 
article': "Die hat doch die grüne Schleife!" (This one has the green scarf!)). 
Some children said that Peter had a red scarf, a few indicated both possi-
bilities ("Tina has the green scarf and Peter has the red scarf"). In this 
trial phase the children were not asked to give explanations because of a 
possible transfer of 'trial explanations' to 'task explanations'. Before 
the awareness tasks were introduced the child was told that E made only 
sometimes a mistake but not always. The "natural gender conflict task" 
(the pig is called Petra) followed the four, respectively five, "natural 
gender awareness tasks" (as to the instruction, cf. task V in 7.1.4). The 
"syntactic gender conflict task" (the boat is called Susanne) followed the 
four, respectively five, "syntactic gender awareness tasks" (as to the 
instruction, cf. task 5 in 7.1.4). 
The cassette-recorder was only used for the awareness questions and 
the dialogue between the experimenter and the child (the exploratory 
interview included E's promptings for corrections and explanations). Both 
performance and awareness answers of the child were recorded on specially 
prepared answer sheets by the research assistant. If a nonverbal reaction 
of the child was remarkable it was also noted. The experimenter gave no 
nonverbal hints to the child when asking questions. 
At the end of the experiment E said: "Thank you! You did very well.." 
(for the final sequence, cf. 6.1.6). All children were "rewarded" with 
"Smartie"-sweets and not told that a retest was planned. The control group 
4 had the same introduction to the tasks (names, definite articles, and 
colours of the animates for the "natural gender awareness tasks"; definite 
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articles and colours of the objects for the "syntactic gender awareness tasks") 
but got the awareness tasks before the performance tasks (cf. 6.1.6). 
The second test (POST) was the same as the first one (PRE) (as to the 
procedure of standardizing the questions, cf. 6.1.6). Again, at the end of 
the experiment the child was thanked, told about his or her excellent per­
formance, and got "Smarties". 
7.2 Results of Study В 
Before we give our results of the study on "natural and syntactic 
gender" (Study B), a few preliminary notes have to be made with respect 
to the procedure of analyses. 
Performance tests 
Like in Study A, we first checked children's correct performance in 
the first test (PRE) and in the second test (POST). We did this for the 
three "experimental" groups which got the performance test prior to the 
awareness test (group 1, group 2, and group 3) and for the "control" group 4 
which obtained the performance test after the awareness test. Both inter-
individual, cross-sectional correct performance of all three "experimental" 
groups and intraindividual, longitudinal correct performance for each group 
were analyzed. 
Children's correct performances in "natural gender" (= "sexus") are 
analyzed separately from their correct performances in "syntactic gender" 
(= "genus"). This means that there will be no uniform performance score of 
both natural and syntactic gender for each child. Children could be easily 
correct by chance in the performance tests since there were only three 
animates in the natural gender task and only three objects in the syntactic 
gender task. The chance for a correct "ihre"-answer is in both tasks 1/3, 
and for a correct "seine"-answer 2/3. 
Our expectation that children would always choose a different answer 
(i.e. another predicative adjective = another colour) for the second than 
for the first performance question was not met. Some subjects, especially 
the younger ones, referred to the same animate (or object) for both the 
"ihre"- and the "seine"-question. Because of the different chances for 
correct "ihre"- and "seine"-answers and because of the possibility of the 
same answer to two different questions we decided to evaluate both answers 
together. If just one completion was correct (e.g. to the "ihre"-question) 
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but the other one incorrect (e.g. to the "seine"-question) the child's total 
performance is classified as faulty, or incorrect. The same holds if both 
answers were incorrect. This means that each child had a "general performance 
score" in sexus and a "general performance score" in genus. In the following, 
therefore, correct performance in Study В refers always to correct perform­
ance with respect to both "ihre"- and "seine"-questions, except for the 
discussion where performance will be related to our predictions (cf. 7.2.1.2). 
Some of the older children (in group 2, group 3, and group 4) showed 
"plurifunctional usage", when asked for "seine". This means that they 
referred not only to the boy ("his" scarf is "red") but also to the pig 
("his" scarf is "yellow") in the natural gender task. In the syntactic gender 
task they referred not only to the dice ("his" colour is "black") but also 
to the boat ("his" colour is "blue"). 
If at least two correct answers (to the "ihre"-question and to the 
"seine"-question) were given, this correct performance will be called 
"standard performance". The "standard" performance includes also "pluri­
functional usage" (because children added the "plurifunctional usage" to 
their correct "standard performance"). 
For group 4 (awareness before performance) a further specification was 
necessary. Some children gave names to the animates in the natural gender 
task and also to the objects in the syntactic gender task. This was done 
spontaneously. If in "sexus" a child said "her scarf is yellow" to the 
"ihre"-question and argued that "the piggy is called Petra" the "yellow"-
answer was evaluated as a correct "ihre"-answer, i.e. there were no scoring 
problems in the natural gender task. However, scoring difficulties arose 
in the syntactic gender tasks of group 4: some subjects changed the syntac­
tic gender of the objects by giving names with definite articles to the 
objects. These children claimed in the performance task that the watering-
can (which is in German of feminine gender) is called "der Thomas" 
(masculine definite article and male name), that the boat (of neuter gender) 
is called "die Susanne" (feminine definite article and female name), and 
that the dice (of masculine gender) is called "die Michaela" (feminine 
definite article and female name). The correspondingly used genders (i.e. 
what we will call "anaphoric intrusions") are a separate performance class 
which are added to the "standard performance" scores because such "anaphoric 
intrusions" yield correct answers with respect to natural gender (i.e. to 
sex-specific names). 
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Presentation order effects were examined by comparing the results from 
experimental group 3 and control group 4, and task order effects by checking 
whether task presentation (sexus first or genus first) influenced correct 
performance (of genus second or sexus second) (cf. 7.1.3: 29 Ss had the 
sexus task first, 32 Ss the genus task first). We also analyzed children's 
preferences for the plurifunctional "seine" in sexus and genus (which of 
the two possibilities for "seine" was chosen first), their refusals (only 
one girl from group 4 replied in genus/PRE when asked for "ihre": "I don't 
know, this (= a possible reference for "ihre") doesn't exist". No other 
refusals were observed in Study B), children's mistakes in sexus and genus, 
and their comments in the performance tasks (there were hardly any comments 
in Study В except for children who showed plurifunctional usage - e.g. in 
sexus: "You forgot the pig. There you can also say "seine" scarf". - or 
in case of "intrusions of anaphoric reasons" - e.g. in genus: "The (female) 
watering-can should be called Thomas (male name)."). Children's nonverbal 
reactions were not systematically observed and analyzed. 
Although a host of further systematic analyses (on correct and in­
correct performance) were done, we will only present those results which 
are of theoretical interest. 
Awareness tests 
Like in Study A, we transcribed all utterances and nonverbal responses 
of E and S in the awareness tests and coded them by means of a special 
computer program. E and the research assistant transcribed and coded in­
dependently all interview texts. After several revisions of the coding 
scheme, the interrater agreement in the final coding scheme was 92%. Again, 
children's error detections and corrections (in Study В we dealt not only 
with "changes of the possessive pronoun" but also with "changes of the 
predicative adjective", cf. 7.1.4) were not a source of trouble in the 
coding procedure. Explanations, however, were as problematic in Study В as 
in Study A (cf. 6.2) though they were slightly more uniform than in Study A. 
In the final coding scheme we distinguished several kinds of explanations. 
The essential parts of the awareness data in Study В are: error detections, 
corrections (either "changes of the possessive pronoun" or "changes of the 
predicative adjective"), and explanations (examples for different kinds of 
explanations will be given below). 
Like in Study A, the printing of the text interviews was done under 
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Unix operating system and the codes which concerned the interview texts under 
RSX operating system. Because of the incompatibility of Unix and RSX file 
structures we used a third operating system (RT-11). 
By means of a Fortran program we got print-outs of code frequencies, 
frequencies of code combinations, and, if necessary, texts for further en-
richment of the abstract codes. This was necessary because we had nearly 
500 pages of transcriptions for the awareness data of "natural and syntactic 
gender" (about four pages of transcription of each child per test session) 
and nearly 12.000 codes (like in Study A about one hundred for each child 
per test session, i.e. eight codes for each of the five tasks in sexus and 
for each of the five tasks in genus plus additional codes for subject, task, 
and test identification). Frequencies of codes and code combinations were 
analyzed statistically (cf. Siegel, 1956; Adler & Roessler, 1972; Kriz, 1978). 
Error detections 
Like in Study A, there were several reactions of the child possible 
when E mistook the pronoun deliberately (in the sexus task I: "Can I say, his 
scarf is green?" where the female doll had the green scarf, or in genus task 
1: "Can I say, "her" colour is blue?" where the - in German neuter - boat 
was blue). A "yes"-answer to an incorrect question (in sexus these tasks are 
tasks I, II, and IV; in genus these are tasks 1, 2, and 4) showed that the 
child had not been aware that the wrong pronoun had been used. A "no"-answer 
in tasks I, II, and IV (sexus) and in tasks 1, 2, and 4 (genus) indicated 
correct error detection. If a child changed his opinion during the inter-
views (from "yes" to "no" or from "no" to "yes") his last reaction was 
taken as answer. If in case of a "I don't know"-answer E's prompts and 
interventions did not result in a reaction of the child which indicated his 
error detection ability, the "I don't know"-answer was interpreted as an 
inability to detect an error. These are all instances of error detections 
in Study B. 
For a correct error detection in either sexus or genus it was sufficient 
if a child had detected an error in only one of the three error detection 
tasks (I, II, or IV in sexus; 1, 2, or 4 in genus). No differences were made 
between children who showed correct error detection in one error detection 
task and children who showed correct error detections in two or three error 
detection tasks. Correct error detections are not given "by chance" (since 
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they are generally followed by corrections); even a single instance expresses 
a certain competence on the child's part. Each child had one "general" 
(correct or incorrect) error detection score in sexus and one "general" 
(correct or incorrect) error detection score in genus. The same holds for 
changes of the possessive pronoun, changes of the predicative adjective, 
and explanations, i.e. a single instance was sufficient for an awareness 
classification. 
Error corrections 
In Study В we have to distinguish between two types of error corrections: 
a) changes of the possessive pronoun, and b) changes of the predicative 
adjective. 
a) Changes of the possessive pronoun 
Whenever the child said "no" in an error detection task in either sexus 
(task I, II, and IV) or genus (tasks 1, 2, and 4) or if a "yes" was hesitant 
E asked: "How do I have to say it?". Here, the child had four reaction 
possibilities (if we exclude "changes of the predicative adjective", cf. b): 
firstly, he could say "I don't know" (no pronoun correction), secondly, he 
could yield an inappropriate pronoun (only one child corrected inappropriate­
ly in task I, saying "my scarf is green", he later gave the correct pronoun 
"her"), thirdly, he could choose a partly correct pronoun change (we will 
give examples below), or fourthly, he could yield a correct pronoun change. 
Correct changes of the incorrect possessive pronoun in sexus are only the 
following pronouns: "ihre" (her) in task I, "seine" (his) in task II (only 
five children conceived the pig as potentially female but they also argued 
that the pig could be of male gender and suggested "seine", i.e. the posses­
sive pronoun was correctly changed), and "seine" (his) in task IV (cf. 
7.1.4). Correct changes of the incorrect possessive pronoun in genus were 
only: "seine" (his) in task 1, "ihre" (her) in task 2, and "seine" (his) 
in task 4 (cf. 7.1.4). "I don't know"-answers, the inappropriate pronoun, 
and partly correct pronoun changes are not evaluated as correct pronoun 
changes. 
Partly correct pronoun changes of sexus and genus occurred in three 
types: those with a definite or demonstrative article, those with a per­
sonal pronoun, and those which indicated a struggle for the correct morpho-
phonological pronoun form (as to "word innovations", cf. 7.2.2.3). As to 
the first type (definite or demonstrative article), which was given by five 
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children in different groups, we want to present two examples from the 
transcripts. 
Task II (sexus) 
S15 in group 3/PRE; 5;7; male 
VI: "Kann ich sagen, ihre Schleife 
ist gelb?" 
Vp: "Nein, grün!" (schreit) 
VI: "Jesses [sic]. Wer hat denn 
die gelbe Schleife?" 
Vp: "Das Schweinchen Dick." 
VI: "Ja, und wie muß ich beim 
Schweinchen Dick sagen?" 
Vp: "Das ist ... das Schwein 
seine gelbe Schleife." 
VI: "Gut. (lacht) Nehmen wir mal 
an, ich müßte jetzt sagen, 
seine Schleife ist gelb. Das 
hast du ja eben gesagt. Ich 
kann nicht sagen, ihre Schleife 
ist gelb, beim Schweinchen Dick. 
Warum muß ich beim Schweinchen 
Dick sagen, seine Schleife ist 
gelb?" 
Vp: "Weil die Farbe (zeigt auf die 
Schleife der weiblichen Puppe) 
ja grün ist und die Farbe 
(zeigt auf die Schleife des 
Schweinchens) ja gelb ist. 
Kann doch nicht gleichzeitig 
sein." 
E: "Can I say, her scarf is 
yellow?" 
S: "No, green!" (screams) 
E: "Jesus. Now who has the 
yellow scarf?" 
S: "The piggy Dick." 
E: "Yes, and how do I have to 
say for piggy Dick?" 
S: "This is .. the pig his 
yellow scarf." 
E: "Good, (laughs) Let us now 
suppose I had to say, his 
scarf is yellow. That's 
what you just said. I cannot 
say, her scarf is yellow, 
for piggy Dick. Why do I 
have to say for piggy Dick, 
his scarf is yellow?" 
S: "Because this colour (refers 
to the scarf of the female 
doll) is green and this 
colour (refers to the scarf 
of piggy) is yellow. Cannot 
be at the same time." 
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VI: "Nee, aber ich könnte doch 
sagen beim Schweinchen Dick: 
ihre Schleife ist gelb, ja?" 
Vp: "rtnhm." 
VI: "Kann ich denn das sagen? Das 
ist das Schweinchen Dick, ihre 
Schleife ist gelb." 
Vp: "Nein. Weil das (weibliche Puppe) 
ja grün ist und das (Schweinchen) 
ja gelb. Und das ist 'ihr' 
(weibl. Puppe) und das ist der, 
eh, das Schwein." 
VI: "Ah ja. Jetzt will ich wissen: 
warum muß ich sagen, seine 
Schleife ist gelb, bei dem 
Schweinchen?" 
Vp: "Weil die Schleife ja ... ein 
Mann hat ja imer eine gelbe 
Schleife und eine rote und eine 
Frau hat ja eine grüne Schleife." 
VI: "Na, überleg doch mal. Ich könnte 
mir doch auch eine rote Schleife 
um den Hals binden. Das muß doch 
einen anderen Grund haben." 
(lacht) 
Vp: "Mmm..." 
VI : "Warum muß ich denn bei dem 
Schwein sagen, seine Schleife?" 
Vp: "Weil da ja das Schwein ist. 
Nicht seine Schleife, sondern 
das, das seine Schleife." 
E: "No, but I could nevertheless 
say for piggy Dick: her 
scarf is yellow, yeah?" 
S: "ttnhurn." 
E: "Can I say this now? This is 
piggy Dick, her scarf is 
yellow." 
S: "No. Because this one 
(female doll) is green and 
this one (piggy) is yellow. 
And this is 'her' (female 
doll) and this is the (mase.) 
article), eh, the (neuter 
article) pig." 
E: "Oh yeah. Now I want to know: 
why do I have to say, his 
scarf is yellow, for piggy?" 
S: "Because the scarf .. a man 
has always a yellow scarf 
and a red one and a woman 
has a green scarf." 
E: "Now, think about it. I 
could also tie a red scarf 
around the neck. There must 
be another reason." 
(laughs) 
S: "Mum..." 
E: "Why do I have to say for 
the pig, his scarf?" 
S: "Because there js^ the pig. 
Not his scarf, but the, 
the (neuter article) his 
scarf." 
208 
InterestingTy, this child (S15) corrected "ihre" in the same task in 
POST very similarly. E: "How do I have to say?" S: "Das, das Schweinchen 
Dick ist die Farbe gelb." ("The" (neuter article), the piggy Dick is the 
colour yellow. The child uses here an ungramnatical sentence). 
Task IV (sexus) 
S5 in control group 4/POST; 5;7; female 
VI: ..."Wie würdest du denn sagen 
bei dem Mädchen?" 
Vp: "Die." 
VI: "Die Schleife?" 
Vp: "Ja." 
VI: "Und beim Jungen?" 
Vp: "Der, der Schleife." 
(...) 
..."How would you say now 
for the girl?" 
"The." (feminine article) 
"The (feminine) scarf?" 
"Yes." 
"And for boys?" 
"The (mase), the (mase.) 
scarf." 
(The scarf is in German of 
feminine gender). 
(...) 
One child used the second type of partly correct pronoun changes (i.e. 
using a personal pronoun): this child of group 4 maintained in sexus that 
it was impossible to say "his scarf is green" (task I) and that one should 
say: "Sie ist grün" ("she" is green), thus avoiding the possessive relation-
ship. 
Transcripts of the third type (word innovations) will be presented in 
7.2.2.3. 
b) Changes of the predicative adjective 
Correct changes of the predicative adjective were those answers in 
which the colour of the scarf (in sexus) or of the object (in genus), i.e. 
the predicative adjective, is in correct correspondence to the given 
possessive pronoun (cf. 7.1.4). 
Correct changes of the predicative adjective in sexus are: "yellow" 
and "red" in task I, "green" in task II, and "green" in task IV (in task 
IV "yellow" would also be correct if the child argued that piggy Dick was 
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female). Correct changes of the predicative adjective in genus are: "yellow" 
in task 1, "blue" and "black" in task 2, and "yellow" in task 4. 
Incorrect changes of the predicative adjective would be: in sexus in 
task II "red", and in genus in task 1 "black" (the dice is m a s e ) , and in 
task 4 "blue" (the boat is neuter). 
In the following figures "changes of the predicative adjective" comprise 
only correct colour changes, i.e. non-changes (= no change of the predicative 
adjective) and incorrect changes are not included. 
It was possible that a child did not only give one correction (either 
a change of the possessive pronoun or a change of the predicative adjective) 
but both kinds of corrections, i.e. a change of the possessive pronoun and 
a change of the predicative adjective in one task. 
Explanations (sexus) 
Answers to "Why (not)?"-questions were generally full explanations. It 
was pretty difficult to code explanations in Study В and the coding scheme 
had to be revised several times. A main difficulty in the coding of the 
natural gender task were the explanations with respect to the pig. If a 
child said "no" to question II "Can I say, "ihre" (her) scarf is yellow?" 
and changed "ihre" (her) to "seine" (his) he was prompted for an explanation. 
In some cases children argued that "seine" was more appropriate because the 
pig 'looks like a boy', 'is like a father', etc. Here, a correct natural 
gender explanation was coded. It was, however, even harder to code un­
ambiguously an answer like: "Seine (his) because of the trousers" (E: "Who 
has trousers, boys or girls?", child: "Boys .. eh no .. girls have sometimes 
also trousers.") or "seine (his) because of the blue eyes" (E: "What has 
"seine" (his) to do with the blue eyes?", child despite some counterevidence: 
"All boys have blue eyes."). These "pars-pro-toto" arguments were classified 
as "partially correct explanations". 
Children's explanations in sexus varied from correct answers* (e.g. 
"Her (scarf), because this is a girl" or "His (scarf), because this is a 
ч 
A correct answer was also a natural gender attribution to the pig on the 
basis of extralinguistic clues. Nearly all children tried to determine the 
sex of the pig, turning it upside-down (e.g. "It doesn't have an udder, 
it must be a boy", "it looks like a father", "half boy. half girl", "it is 
not a girl, because he has to breasts"). 
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"der"")* to partially correct answers (e.g. "You cannot say "his" because 
it is Tina"), incorrect answers (e.g. "His (scarf) because this is a "she""), 
so-called "arbitrary" answers and "I don't know"-answers. 
Some of the "arbitrary" answers were quite interesting. The children 
often claimed that a correctly changed pronoun just sounded better. Some 
argued even that they could not pronounce another pronoun in this context, 
e.g.: "weil ich das sonst nicht kann" (because otherwise I cannot say it) 
or "sonst kann man das nocht so gut aussprechen" (otherwise one cannot 
pronounce it so well), or that others would use the corrected pronoun also, 
e.g. "weil ich das so gehört habe" (because I have heard it in this way), 
and "weil ... weil man normal so sagt" (because one normally says so). In 
the same direction but a bit more enhanced was the normative argument: 
"weil man nicht lucht [sic]" (because one does not lie). One child just said: 
"weil ich das so möchte" (because I want it in this way), and another: "weil 
ich es gerade gesagt habe" (because I said it right now). In the following 
(general analysis) we only discriminate between correct answers and all 
other modes of explanations to "why (not)"-questions (about ^0% of children's 
explanations in sexus, PRE and POST, were "arbitrary" explanations; partial-
ly correct or incorrect answers were remarkably rare in sexus: two subjects 
in PRE and also two in POST). 
Explanations (genus) 
More serious than in sexus was the coding problem in genus. How should 
one code natural gender explanations for syntactic gender? Like in the 
following example (task 4): "Can I say, "ihre" (her) colour is black?" (the 
black dice is of masculine gender), child: "Yes, only if this is a mother-
dice (Mutter-Würfel)." 
In general, explanations were relatively rare in syntactic gender. 
Most answers to the "why-not"-questions were "I don't know"-reactions 
(about 63% in PRE, and 46% in POST). "Arbitrary" explanations occurred also 
quite often (there is a slight increase over age; in PRE: 20% in POST: 34%). 
An interesting version of an "arbitrary" explanation which showed awareness 
is the distinction between a speaker's utterance and his (here:her) 
intention. E: "Why do I have to say "his" and not "her" colour?", S 
"Der" is in German the masculine definite article. 
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reflecting: "Weil ... man kann sich ja auch manchmal vertun" (Because ... 
one can sometimes also be mistaken). "I don't know"-reactions and "arbitrary" 
explanations are not coded as correct explanations in genus (cf. also the 
sexus-explanations). 
It was often difficult to differentiate between correct and incorrect 
explanations in genus. Altogether we found more correct explanations (ca. 
11% in PRE and ca. 14% in POST) than incorrect explanations. Children's 
explanations in genus have to be illustrated because quantitative analyses 
are a comparably poor means for an understanding of the child's train of 
thoughts. We decided to code sexus arguments in the genus tasks as incorrect 
if the possessive relationship was preserved but incorrectly used. Example: 
Task 2 (genus) 
S3 in group 3/PRE; 5;5; female 
VI: "So, jetzt will ich wissen, kann 
ich sagen, seine Farbe ist gelb?" 
Vp: "Ihre." 
VI: "Ihre. Wieso muß das denn ihre 
Farbe heissen?" 
Vp: "Weil das ihre Kanne ist." 
(Verweis auf weibliche Puppe, 
die auf dem Stuhl neben dem 
VI sitzt)* 
VI: "Wem gehört denn die Kanne?" 
Vp: "Dem Mädchen da." 
E: "So, how I want to know, 
can I say, "his" colour is 
yellow?" 
S: "Her." 
E: "Her. Why is it called 
"her" colour?" 
S: "Because this is her 
(watering-)can." (Reference 
to the female doll who sits 
on a chair next to E) 
E: "To whom belongs the can?" 
S: "To the girl there." 
We also classified an answer as "incorrect" if the child attributed 
the pronoun to the colour. Example: 
The two dolls and the pig of the sexus task were placed on a chair next 
to the experimenter but in such a way that the child could normally not see 
the three figures. The objects of the genus task were on the table. 
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Task 2 (genus) 
S12 in group 3/POST; 5;7·, female 
VI: "Dann / Ш ich von d i r wissen, 
kann ich sagen: seine Farbe i s t 
gelb?" 
Vp schüt te l t den Kopf 
VI 
Vp 
VI 
"Warum nicht?" 
"Weil das ja blau ist." 
"Aha. Ehm - wen mein ich da?" 
Vp: "Das Schiff." 
VI: "Und jetzt will ich wissen, warum 
sag ich da 'seine Farbe' beim 
Schiff?" 
Vp: "Weil das 'ne Jungen-Farbe ist." 
E: "Then 1 want to know from 
you, can I say: "his" colour 
is yellow?" 
S shakes her head 
E: "Why not?" 
S: "Because this is blue." 
E: "Aha. Eh- to whom am I 
referring to?" 
S: "The boat." 
E: "And now 1 want to know, why 
do I say '"his" colour' for 
the boat?" 
S: "Because this is a boy's 
colour." 
We should add that this girl maintained that "black is a boy's colour" 
and that "yellow is a girl's colour". We could later confirm our assumption 
for this child that all light colours were girl's colours to which one 
should refer to with "her" (independently of the indicated object) and that 
all dark colours were boy's colours to which one should refer to with "his". 
This becomes also evident in another child's argument: 
Task 4 (genus) 
S2 in control group 4/POST; 5;8·, female 
VI: "Kann ich sagen: ihre Farbe ist 
schwarz?" 
Vp: "Auch." 
VI: "Warum?" 
Vp: "Beides hört sich gut an, aber 
'seine' hört sich besser an." 
E: 
S: 
E: 
S: 
"Can I say: "her" colour is 
black?" 
"Also." 
"Why?" 
"Both sound o.k. but "his" 
sounds better." 
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VI: "Weisst'e auch warum?" 
Vp: "Nein." 
VI: "Ja. Muss ich bei dem Würfel 
'seine' oder 'ihre' Farbe 
sagen?" 
Vp: "Sagen wir mal 'seine'." 
VI: "Ja. Und warum?" 
Vp: "Weil ... Jungs meistens 
schwarz sind." 
E: "Do you know why?" 
S: "No." 
E: "Yeah. Do I have to say now 
"his" or "her" colour?" 
S: "Let us say "his"." 
E: "Yes. And why?" 
S: "Because ... boys are mostly 
black." 
Other incorrect explanations were: ""her" because this is a boy", 
"because this is so big", or ""her" because the watering-can waters flowers". 
Our last example for an incorrect explanation shows most clearly that a 
natural gender explanation in genus is not always a means for expressing the 
gender of an object but that it can be also an expression for a personifi-
cation. 
Task 4 (genus) 
S37 in group 2/POST; 5;1; female 
VI : "Kann ich sagen, ihre Farbe ist 
schwarz?" 
Vp: "Nee." 
VI: "Warum nicht?" 
Vp: "Kannste sagen. Aber dann muß 
man ... eh, eine Mutter haben, 
die Würfel is. 'Ne Würfel-Mutter 
und 'n Würfel-Vater ..." 
VI: "Ja und was ist ..." 
Vp: "Und 'n Würfel-Kind und 'n 
Würfel-Baby." (lacht herzhaft) 
"Hört sich witzig an, ne?" 
E: "Can I say, "her" colour is 
black?" 
S: "No." 
E: "Why not?" 
S: "You can say it. But then 
one must ..eh, have a 
mother who is dice. A dice-
mother and a dice-father.." 
E: "Yeah and what is ..." 
S: "And a dice-child and a 
dice-baby." (laughs heartily) 
"Sounds funny, doesn't it?" 
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VI. "Ja, eh.... jetzt wollt'ich noch 
wissen, kann ich sagen, seine 
Farbe ist schwarz' - Das ist 
der Würfel, seine Farbe ist 
schwarz7" 
Vp. "Ja, weil das doch 'n Würfel 
ist." 
VI: "Und kann ich auch sagen, ihre 
Farbe ist schwarz7" 
Vp: "Ja, nur wenn es ein Mutter-
Wurfe 1 ist." 
(...) 
"Yes, eh .. now I still wanted 
to know, can I say, "his" 
colour is black' - This is 
the dice, "his" colour is 
black'" 
"Yes, because this is a 
dice." 
"And can I also say, "her" 
colour is black7" 
"Yes, only if it is a 
mother-dice." 
(...) 
Partly correct (i.e. incorrect) are those explanations in which the 
child noticed the coreferentiality between the gender of the definite 
article and the gender of the possessive pronoun but where the gender of 
the definite article was incorrectly reproduced. Three children said that 
"you have to say "his" - because "das" boat is not a "die" but a "der"."* 
Correct explanations in genus are those in which the coreferentiality 
between the (correctly used) gender of the definite article and the gender 
of the possessive pronoun was explicated. 
Task 2 (genus) 
S15 in group 4/POST; 5,7; male 
(...) 
VI: "Bei der Gießkanne, wieso is 
denn bei der Gießkanne 'ihre 
Farbe' besser als 'seine Farbe'7" 
(...) 
E: "For the watering-can, why 
is now for the watering-can 
"her" colour better than 
"his" colour7" 
"Das" is the (correctly used) neuter article for the boat. "Die" is the 
feminine article which, in fact, does not go together with "seine" ("his"). 
"Der" (masculine article) goes together with "seine" but not with the boat. 
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Vp: "Weil das ja .. eine Gießkanne, 
die heißt ja wie 'n Mädchen, ne. 
Und das ist ja auch der gleichen 
Name, wegen das 'die'. 
Und das ist ja wie ein Würfel, 
ne." 
Protokollantin unterbricht: "Und das 
ist wie ein Jungenname?" 
Vp: "Ja, und das Schiff ist auch 
ein Jungenname." 
VI: "Genau. Ehm- aber jetzt 
interessiert mich das noch: 
warum denn gerade 'ihre' bei 
der Gießkanne?" 
Vp: "Weil die das ja, die gießt ja, 
ne. Und dann kommt danach noch 
die Kanne* und das ist dann 
ein Mädchen." 
Some subjects related the possessi 
ly . 
Task 2 (genus) 
S50 in group 1/POST; 4;5·, male 
(...) 
Note that the spontaneous segmentation 
In German, the last noun determines the 
E: "Because this yeah ... a 
watering-can, this (= female 
demonstrative article) is 
called like a girl, isn't it. 
And thisis also the same 
name, because of the "die" 
(fem. art.). And "das" ' 
(neuter art.) is like a dice, 
isn't it." 
Female research assistant inter-
rupts: "And "das" is like a 
boy's name?" 
S: "Yes, and the boat is also 
a boy's name." 
E: "Exactly. Eh- but now I am 
still curious: why is it 
just "her" for the watering-
can?" 
S: "Because "die" (fern.art.) 
"das" (neuter art.) yeah, 
"die" waters, right. And 
thereafter follows the can* 
and this is a girl." 
and the personal pronoun correct-
(...) 
of the German compound "Gieß-kanne". 
gender of the compound. 
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VI : "Und warum muß ich bei der 
Gießkanne sagen: 'ihre Farbe' 
und kann nicht sagen: 'seine 
Farbe1?" 
Vp: "Weil es ja nicht 'er' heißt, 
sondern 'sie'." 
"And why do I have to say 
for the watering-can: "her" 
colour and cannot say: "his" 
colour?" 
"Because it is not called 
"he" but "she"." 
Coding problems emerged for such answers in which children replied that 
an object was a boy (or a girl). In view of small children's difficulties 
to express themselves in abstract terms we coded such explanations as 
correct, especially since some children gave evidence that they did not 
really think that an object was a boy (or a girl). 
Task 1 (genus) 
S21 in group 2/POST; 5 ;1; female 
(...) 
VI : "Und warum 'seine Farbe1?" 
Vp: "Weil das ein Junge ist, nee 
- ein Segelschiff." 
VI: "Das Boot? Ja, und wieso sag ich 
aber 'seine' bei dem Segelboot?" 
Vp: "Weil das ein Segelschiff ist 
und kein Mädchen." 
VI: "Und da muß ich 'seine' sagen?" 
Vp nickt 
(...) 
E: "And why "his" colour?" 
S: "Because this is a boy, no 
- a sailing-ship." 
E: "The boat? Yeah, and why do 
I nevertheless say "his" 
for the sailing-boat?" 
S: "Because this is a sailing-
ship and no girl." 
E: "And then I have to say 
"his"?" 
E nods 
A last interesting correct explanation was given by a gir l in 
group 3. 
Task 2 (genus) 
S11 in group 3/PRE; 5;4; female 
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(...) (...) 
Vp: "Ihre." S 
VI: "Genau. Und warum?" E 
Vp: "îtn...weil...weil der Gießkanne S 
"Her." 
"Exactly. And why?" 
"Mm...because..because 
nicht gut anhört." "der" (mase.art.)watering-
can does not sound well." 
VI: "Genau. Prima." E: "Exactly. Very good." 
Unlike in Study A, we did not solely analyze error detections and one 
kind of corrections (pronoun changes) but also another kind of corrections 
(changes of the predicative adjective) and explanations. 
These four metalinguistic abilities (error detections, pronoun changes, 
changes of the predicative adjective, and explanations) were examined for 
both sexus and genus. Like in Study A, we will only present those data of 
Study В which are of theoretical interest. 
The relationship between performance and awareness 
Like in Study A, the main focus of our research in Study В is the in­
vestigation of the cross-sectional and longitudinal relationships between 
performance (i.e. language use) and linguistic awareness. In Study B, lan­
guage performance was checked by a completion test (in sexus: her/his scarf 
is ...?, and in genus: "her'V'his" colour is ...?). 
Linguistic awareness, on the other hand, was stimulated by a mismatch 
within E's utterance (the possessive pronoun and the predicative adjective, 
i.e. the colour, did not have the same referent). In the within-test and 
the longitudinal relations between performance and awareness of Study B, we 
will consider four different metalinguistic abilities: children's error 
detections, changes of the possessive pronouns, changes of the predicative 
adjective, and explanations. 
Within-test relations between performance and awareness 
Pitfalls of comparing performance with metalinguistic abilities were 
already mentioned in the analyses of Study A (cf. 6.2). They also hold in 
part for Study B. Despite of these we decided - for the within-test relations 
between performance and awareness - to rely on the "general" (correct or 
incorrect) performance scores (e.g. in case of a "general" correct perform-
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ance score both items, i.e. "seme" and "ihre", had to be correct). In the 
first withm-test-relation (PRE) each child had one "general" performance 
score in sexus (either at least two correct items in performance/PRE = perf^, 
or at least one incorrect item in perfomance/PRE = perf.-) and one "general" 
performance score in genus (either perf.t or perf.-). In the second withm-
test-relation (POST) each child had, similarly, one "general" performance 
score in sexus (either perf2+ or p e ^ - ) and one "general" performance score 
m genus (either perf2+ or perf--).* 
For the first withm-test-relation m PRE each "general" performance 
score in sexus/PRE was correlated with four "general" awareness scores m 
sexus/PRE. firstly, with a "general" error detection score (either at least 
one correct error detection in PRE = ed.t, or no correct error detection in 
PRE = ed.-), secondly, with a "general" score for pronoun changes (either 
at least one correct change of the possessive pronouns in PRE = ΡΡ.+, or no 
correct change of the possessive pronouns m PRE = pp.-), thirdly, with a 
"general" score for predicative adjectives (either at least one correct 
change of the predicative adjective in PRE = ref.+, or no correct change of 
the predicative adjective in PRE - ref.-\ and fourthly, with a "general" 
score for explanations (either at least une correct explanation in PRE = 
expl.+, or no correct explanation in PRE = expl.-). An analogous procedure 
was used for genus/PRE. each "general" genus score in performance was 
correlated with each of the four "general" awareness scores in genus. 
For the second withm-test-relation, namely m POST, we correlated 
each "general" performance score (either perf2+ or perf«-) in sexus/POST 
with each of the four "general" awareness scores m sexus/POST, i.e. with 
either ed2+ or ed--, with either pp2+ or PP2-, with either ref-* or ref--, 
and with either expl--·· or expl--· Again, an analogous procedure was used 
for genus/POST· each "general" genus score in performance was correlated 
with each of the four "general" awareness scores in genus. 
For the withm-test-relatmns in PRE and POST we used contingency 
coefficients for the associations of performance and metalinguistic abilities. 
This was done for the four groups taken together. 
τ 
We also analyzed performance for each item in sexus and in genus, and also 
awareness (all four abilities) for each task in sexus and genus. The data 
will not be presented here but are available on request. 
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Longitudinal relations between awareness and performance 
For the analyses of the longitudinal relations between awareness in PRE 
and performance in POST in order to check whether early awareness might be 
instrumental of facultative for later performance, we used a different 
procedure than the one for the within-test-relations. The analyses were 
done as follows (as to this procedure, cf. also 6.2). 
We first dichotomized the performance scores in the first test (PRE) 
for each child in sexus and genus, i.e. we looked whether a child's perform-
ance in PRE was above or below the median performance of his age group. For 
instance, median performance of a group in sexus might have been one correct 
pronoun (there were four possibilities for a child: no correct pronoun, one 
correct pronoun - either "ihre" or "seine", two correct pronouns, and three 
correct pronouns if the child showed plurifunctional usage). A child of this 
group who had no pronoun correct showed "low performance". However, a child 
with two correct pronouns showed "high performance". We then similarly 
dichotomized the four awareness scores for error detections, pronoun changes, 
changes of the predicative adjective, and explanations in PRE for both sexus 
and genus (the dichotomized scores were based on error detections, pronoun 
changes, changes of the predicative adjective, and explanations in the three 
error detection tasks I, II, and IV in sexus, and 1, 2, and 4 in genus; e.g. 
there were four possibilities for a child in sexus: awareness in no task, 
one task, two tasks, or three tasks). 
After having analyzed the child's relative performance and his relative 
metalinguistic abilities in the first test we determined his performance 
scores in the second test (POST). 
In a final step we performed four tests (error detections, changes of 
the possessive pronoun, changes of the predicative adjective, and explana-
tions) for each group (and after this, for all four groups together) in 
sexus. In genus we similarly performed four tests (see above) for each 
group (and after this, for all four groups together). 
The first test is an analysis of difference in means of performance in 
POST for two groups of children: those with "high error detection" in PRE 
but "low performance" in PRE and those with "low error detection" in PRE and 
"low performance" in PRE. Before the t-tests were applied we checked for 
equal variances of the two types of independent observations. The second test 
is an analysis of difference in means of performance in POST for children 
with "high pronoun change" in PRE but "low performance" in PRE and children 
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with "low pronoun change" in PRE and "low performance" in PRE. The third 
test is an analysis of difference in means of performance in POST from 
children with "high change of the predicative adjective" in PRE but "low 
performance" in PRE and children with "low change of the predicative adjec-
tive" in PRE and "low performance" in PRE. The fourth test is an analysis of 
difference in means of performance in POST from children with "high explana-
tion" in PRE but "low performance" in PRE and children with "low explanation" 
in PRE and "low performance" in PRE. 
These four tests were applied for sexus and genus. They were done for 
the four groups (and all four groups together) and shall show whether early 
error detections, pronoun changes, changes of the predicative adjective, or 
explanations can be predictive for later performance (and, if this is the 
case, at which age early awareness is most predictive). 
So far for the procedures of analyses to be applied to the data in 
Study B. 
7.2.1 Performance Tests 
7.2.2.1 General Results of the Performance Tests 
Before we go into a detailed discussion of the results of the study on 
"natural and syntactic gender" we want to look at the general picture of 
the "general" correct performance ("standard" performance) in sexus and 
genus of the first test (PRE) and of the second test (POST) for the three 
experimental groups, cf. Figure 24: 
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pj Fig. 24: Average correct performance of children at the three age levels in sexus and genus 
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From this figure one major finding becomes apparent: children in all 
three experimental groups perform better in genus/PRE (group 1: 56%; group 2: 
462; group 3: 72%) than in sexus/PRE (group 1: 3 H ; group 2: 31%; group 3: 
67%). The better performance in genus than in sexus in PRE does not hold 
anymore for POST. In POST, children perform better in sexus (group 1: 56%; 
group 2: 69%; group 3: 89%) than in genus (group 1: 50%; group 2: 54%; 
group 3: 78%). Clearly, children only improve from PRE to POST in sexus, but 
not in genus. 
Presentation order effects 
In order to see whether correct performance was influenced by the order 
of presentation let us look at Figure 25 which displays correct performance 
("standard" performance, "plurifunctional usage", and "anaphoric intrusions", 
cf. 7.2) in PRE from the oldest experimental children in group 3 (performance 
before awareness) and the coeval control group 4 (awareness before perform-
ance). 
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К Fig. 25: Average correct performance (standard, plurifunctional usage, and anaphoric intrusion) of the 
oldest age group and the control group in sexus and genus (PRE) 
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An Inspection of the correct performance in sexus/PRE (in Fig. 25) 
reveals a twofold difference between group 3 and group 4. 79% of the children 
from group 4 are correct, with respect to the "standard" performance, and 
67% from group 3. Thus, in the "standard" performance group 4 exceeds group 3. 
However, this difference is insignificant. The other difference between group 
3 and group 4 in sexus/PRE is the "plurifunctional usage" in group 4. 36% of 
the children in control group 4 yield a second referent with respect to the 
"seine"-question (here: the pig) whereas no child does this in experimental 
group 3. The difference between the two groups is significant (p = .031). 
In genus/PRE, we observed more correct ansv/ers with respect to the 
"standard" performance in group 3 (72%) than in group 4 (57%). The difference, 
however, just misses significance. Also, the difference with respect to 
plurifunctional usage between group 3 (no plurifunctional usage) and group 4 
(14% of the children) does not yet reach significance. If we add the "ana-
phoric intrusions"** to the correct "standard" performance in genus/PRE we 
can see that the performance of group 4 (71%) equals nearly that of group 3 
(72%). 
Thus, the most notable difference between group 3 and group 4 in sexus/ 
PRE is the plurifunctional usage in group 4. The major, but non-significant 
difference between group 3 and group 4 in genus/PRE is firstly, the "anaphoric 
intrusion", and secondly, the "plurifunctional usage" of group 4, which got 
awareness before performance. 
We now consider Figure 26 for differences between experimental group 3 
and control group 4 in the second test (POST): 
Here, we used the Binomial Test because of a small expected frequency. 
** 
These are gender changes of objects by definite articles and names. 
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oí Fig. 26: Average correct performance (standard, plurifunctional usage, and anaphoric intrusion) of the 
oldest age group and the control group in sexus and genus (POST) 
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In sexus/POST, the "standard" performance of group 3 (89Ï of the children 
were correct) is nearly equal to that of group 4 (93% of the children). 
Interestingly, group 3 shows now in sexus/POST also "plurifunctional usage" 
(17% of the children) but is still surpassed by group 4 (64%) in this 
respect. The difference in "olurifunctional usage" between group 3 and group 
4 in sexus/POST is significant (x2 = 12.1, df = 1, ρ < .01). In genus/POST, 
no significant differences between group 3 and group 4 »ere observed. In the 
"standard" performance 78% of group 3 and 79% of group 4 were correct. 
With the "anaphoric intrusions" group 4 (86%) exceeds slightly group 3 
(78%) in genus/POST. Again, group 3 shows also "plurifunctional usage" in 
genus/POST (28%) but is surpassed by group 4 (43%). 
Apparently, there are presentation effects in both PRE and POST. In 
sexus, group 4 (the group which had awareness before performance) showed in 
both PRE and POST significantly more often "plurifunctional usage' than 
group 3 (the group which had to do performance first). In genus, group 4 
showed also in PRE and POST more often "plurifunctional usage" than group 3. 
However, the differences are not significant. "Anaphoric intrusions" were 
only observed in control group 4. 
Task order effects 
Sexus and genus tasks were administered to all children in the four 
groups, in PRE as well as in POST. However, task order was not the same for 
all subjects: 29 Ss got the sexus task first, 32 Ss the genus task first 
(cf. 7.1.2). We were interested in whether task order had an effect on 
correct performance on either sexus or genus. 
When the two groups (sexus first and genus first) were compared with 
each other, in PRE and in POST, we found that in general task order did not 
have an effect on correct performance in either the genus or the sexus task, 
although there was a tendency for better genus oerfomiance in POST when the 
sexus task was given first (and the genus task subsequently)· X = 3.53, 
df - 1, ρ > .05. A slightly positive effect of "sexus first" on correct 
genus performance was observed in all analyses whereas task order had no 
influence on correct sexus performance. 
When we compared differences in correct performance in dependence on 
task order for each group separately we obtained one significant result the 
second age group performed better in PRE on genus with the sexus task first 
than with the genus task first (Fisher Exact Probability Test ρ = .05). No 
other significant effect could be found. 
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One possible reason for the one task order effect (though not a valid 
explanation) could be that intralinguistic reference in genus is more auto-
matic than extralinguistic reference in sexus (cf. the relatively good per-
formance of the children in the first test with respect to genus in Fig. 24). 
Having done one test already (sexus), children could have been more at ease 
in the next test (genus). This could also hold for the generally better per-
formance in genus/POST when sexus was given first. The reason why sexus is 
not better with genus first could be a lesser automaticity in sexus perform-
ance. We will come back to this point in 7.2.1.2. 
7.2.1.2 Correct Performance Scores as Related to Predictions 
Section 2 (linguistic analysis of German possessive pronouns) and 
section 3 (general predictions on the order of acquisition for understanding) 
were also devoted to deriving expectations with respect to the order of 
acquisition of possessive pronouns in Study B. Like in Study A, this was 
done from different linguistic points of view: morphophonological, syntactic, 
semantic, and deictic characteristics (only one prediction was made with 
respect to deictic characteristics). The morphophonological and the syntactic 
prediction were the same but semantic and deictic predictions were different. 
Table 11 in section 3.4 sunrnarized our four predictions. Here, we will - like 
in Study A - successively discuss the predictions for each of these points 
of view (whereby the predictions based on morphophonological characteristics 
and predictions based on syntactic characteristics will be discussed under 
one heading since they are the same) in order to establish which one(s), if 
any, of these developmental patterns in fact arise in the data. 
Before we discuss our different points of view one precaution has to 
be given. In our figures we presented only "general" correct performance 
scores (cf. 7.2) because the chances for a correct "seine"-answer were 
higher (2/3) than for a correct "ihre"-answer (1/3) since "seine" can refer 
to the male doll or the neuter pig in the sexus task and to the dice (mascu-
line object) or to the boat (neuter object) in the genus task. With respect 
to our predictions based on morphophonological and syntactic characteristics 
we will thus only look at children's correct "seine"-answers in genus as 
compared to their correct "ihre"-answers in genus and at children's correct 
"seine"-answers in sexus as compared to their correct "ihre"-answers in sexus. 
With respect to our predictions based on semantic characteristics we 
will compare correct masculine "seine"-answers, correct feminine "ihre"-
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answers, and correct neuter "seine"-answers in sexus and genus since the 
semantic predictions allow for a differentiation between the masculine "seine" 
and the neuter "seine". The differentiation between the masculine "seine" 
and the neuter "seme" can be observed in both "standard" performance and 
"plurifunctional usage". 
With respect to our predictions based on deictic characteristics we will 
look, firstly, if "sex-identical" pronouns are acquired first (i.e. "seine" 
by boys, "ihre" by girls), and, secondly, if natural gender precedes, as 
predicted, syntactic gender. 
Let us now analyze which of our predictions, if any, can be observed in 
our data. 
Morphophonological and syntactic characteristics 
According to Table 11, one would expect the pronoun "ihre" in sexus 
(= natural gender) to come first, and "seine" in sexus to come last. The two 
genus (= syntactic gender) pronouns "ihre" and "seme" should be in-between 
"ihre" in sexus and "seme" in sexus. 
Children's actual performance, i.e. the percentages of their correct 
answers to the "ihre"- and the "seme"-questions in sexus and genus, is 
presented in Table 26. 
Table 26 Correct ' I h re * - and "Seine'-tastters In Sexus and Genus 
group 1 (N=16) 
group 2 (N-13) 
group 3 (N-18) 
group 1 (N=16) 
group 2 (N=13) 
group 3 (N=18) 
SEXUS/PRE 
"Ihre" 
381 
til 
72* 
"seine"* 
691 
541 
891 
SEXUS/POST 
"Ihre" 
561 
691 
891 
"seine"* 
87Ï 
841 
1001 
GENUS/PRE 
"ihre" 
62X 
541 
72Ï 
"seine"* 
751 
621 
891 
GENUS/POST 
"Ihre" 
561 
541 
781 
"seine" 
811 
921 
941 
* 
Since the predictions based on morphophonological and syntactic characteristics 
do not allow for a distinction between the masculine and the neuter "seine" we 
do not differentiate between these two types of "seine" In Table 26. 
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Table 26 shows us that correct "seine"-answers are always more frequent 
than correct "ihre"-answers. However, we should be aware that the chances 
for a correct "seine"-answer (2/3) and for a correct "ihre"-answer (1/3) were 
different. Thus, we will not concentrate on the precedence of either "seine" 
or "ihre" with respect to our predictions based on morphophonological and 
syntactic characteristics, but rather check whether "ihre" is, as predicted, 
earlier acquired in the sexus than in the genus task, and whether "seine" 
is, as predicted, earlier acquired in genus than in sexus. 
There are at least four exceptions in our data (cf. Table 26). Firstly, 
for the youngest children "ihre"-scores are earlier in genus/PRE than in 
sexus/PRE. Secondly, age group 2 performed better on "ihre" in the first 
genus test than in the first sexus test. Thirdly, "seine" is by the youngest 
children earlier apparent in sexus/POST than in genus/POST, and fourthly, 
the oldest children in group 3 showed in POST a better "seine" performance 
in sexus than in genus. Moreover, the oldest children master "ihre" in 
sexus/PRE and genus/PRE equally well. They also perform equally well on 
"seine" in sexus/PRE and genus/PRE. The youngest children master "ihre" in 
sexus/PRE and genus/POST equally well. 
In suimary, the only pronouns clearly reflecting an order of acquisition 
in correspondence with the morphophonological and syntactic predictions with 
respect to "ihre" in sexus and genus are "ihre" in group 2/POST and in 
group 3/POST and "seine" in group 1/PRE, in group 2/PRE, and in group 2/POST 
(cf. Table 26). However, the relatively early acquisition of the syntactic 
gender pronouns "ihre" and "seine" in the first test of group 1 and group 2 
argues against our morphophonological and syntactic explanations (according 
to our predictions the natural gender pronoun "ihre" should come first). 
These morphophonological and syntactic predictions are, therefore, definite-
ly insufficient for the early acquisition of natural and syntactic gender. 
Semantic characteristics 
The predictions based on semantic characteristics (cf. Table 11) suggest 
that the masculine natural gender pronoun "seine" should come first and the 
neuter syntactic gender pronoun "seine" last. In-between these two pronouns 
the masculine syntactic gender pronoun "seine" and the feminine natural 
gender pronoun "ihre" should precede the feminine syntactic gender pronoun 
"ihre" and the neuter natural gender pronoun "seine". Thus, two developmental 
trends are expected: firstly, with respect to "specific" pronouns (i.e. 
masculine, feminine, neuter pronouns), natural gender should be acquired 
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before syntactic gender, and secondly, within natural and syntactic gender 
we should observe the following order: first, the masculine pronoun "seine", 
then the feminine pronoun "ihre", and finally the neuter pronoun "seine". 
Table 27 displays children's actual performance with respect to both mascu­
line and the neuter "seine" and "ihre" in sexus and genus, i.e. percentages 
of their correct identifications. 
Table 27 Correct Masculine, Feminine, and Neuter Identifications in Sexus and Genus 
group 1 
(N-16) 
group 2 
(N--13) 
group Э 
(N-18) 
group 1 
(N=16) 
group 2 
(N=13) 
a3 
SEXUS/PRE 
"mase."seine" 
(boy) 
62% 
23Ï 
78% 
fem."ihre" 
(girl) 
38% 
46% 
72% 
neuter "seine" 
(pig) 
6% 
38% 
11% 
SEXUS/POST 
"ma sc."seine" 
(boy) 
81% 
69% 
83% 
fem."ihre" 
(girl) 
57% 
69% 
89% 
neuter "seine" 
(pig) 
6% 
31% 
33% 
GENUS/PRE 
mase."seine" 
(dice) 
54% 
31% 
39% 
fen."ihre" 
(watering-
can) 
62% 
54% 
72% 
neuter "seine" 
(boat) 
31% 
31% 
5U% 
GENUS/POST 
mase."seine" 
(dice) 
31% 
84% 
78% 
fem."ihre" 
(watering-
can) 
56% 
54% 
78% 
neuter "seine" 
(boat) 
50% 
23% 
44% 
Note that this table includes "pi uri functional usage", i.e. masculine and neuter 
together can attain more than 100%. 
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With respect to the predicted precedence of natural gender before syn-
tactic gender in "specific" pronouns we have at least eight exceptions in 
our data (cf. Table 27). Genus precedes sexus for, firstly, the masculine 
"seine" in group 2/PRE, secondly, the masculine "seine" in group 2/POST, 
thirdly, the feminine "ihre" in group 1/PRE, fourthly, the feminine "ihre" 
in group 2/PRE, fifthly, the neuter "seine" in group 1/PRE, sixthly, the 
neuter "seine" in group 3/PRE, seventhly, the neuter "seine" in group 1/ 
POST, and finally, the neuter "seine" in group 3/POST. Moreover, the 
feminine pronoun "ihre" is mastered equally well by the oldest children in 
sexus/PRE and genus/PRE. 
Pronouns which reflect the predicted preference in sexus before genus 
in "specific" pronouns are more frequent in POST (mase, "seine" in group 1 
and group 3, fem. "ihre" in group 1, group 2, and group 3, and neuter "seine" 
in group 2) than in PRE (mase, "seine" in group 1 and group 3, and neuter 
"seine" in group 2). Thus, with respect to the precedence of natural gender 
before syntactic gender in "specific" pronouns a semantic explanation is not 
supported by the data. 
With respect to the predicted order of masculine before feminine, and 
feminine before neuter within sexus and genus our data show at least six 
exceptions for the precedence of masculine "seine" before feminine "ihre" 
(cf. Table 27). The feminine pronoun "ihre" is mastered better than the 
masculine pronoun "seine" in sexus/PRE by group 2, in sexus/POST by group 3, 
in genus/PRE by group 1, in genus/PRE by group 2, in genus/PRE by group 3, 
and finally, in genus/POST by group 1. Moreover, the masculine "seine" and 
the feminine "ihre" are equally well mastered in sexus/POST by group 2 and 
in genus/POST by group 3. The precedence of masculine over feminine is more 
often correctly predicted for sexus (in the first test of group 1 and group 
3 and in the second test of group 1) than for genus (only in the second test 
of group 2). The feminine pronoun "ihre" precedes, as expected, in all tests 
the neuter pronoun "seine". The frequently observed precedence of the 
feminine "ihre" before the masculine "seine" has to be seen in the light of 
task requirements and identification possibilities (i.e. there was only one 
"seine"-question but two referents could be chosen). It is thus difficult to 
decide on the basis of our data if the prediction that masculine precedes 
feminine is valid or not. However, one prediction which can be checked by 
our data and where the chance for a correct answer is 1/2, is not fully 
valid. The masculine pronoun "seine" should, according to Table 11, come 
before the neuter pronoun "seine". There are at least three exceptions in 
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our data (cf. Table 27). firstly, group 2 choses the neuter "seme" in sexus/ 
PRE more often than the masculine "seine", secondly, group 3 identifies the 
neuter "seine" in genus/PRE more often correctly than the masculine "seine", 
and thirdly, the neuter "seme" is in genus/POST of group 1 more often cor-
rect than the masculine "seine". In genus/PRE, group 2 choses the masculine 
"seme" as often as the neuter "seine". 
In suimary, despite of a few correct predictions for the Precedence of 
sexus before genus with respect to "specific" pronouns in POST and for the 
precedence of feminine before neuter there are numerous exceptions in the 
data. A semantic explanation for the acquisition of gender in pronouns is 
thus not convincing. 
Deictic characteristics 
The last prediction for the gender acquisition is based on deictic 
characteristics (cf. Table 11). Here, two cases can be distinguished, first-
ly, sex-identical pronouns should be acquired first in both sexus and genus, 
and secondly, natural gender should precede syntactic gender. 
When we analyzed our data with respect to the question whether girls 
are more often correct on "ihre' than boys and boys more often correct on 
"seme" than girls we found that boys are in general better on both "seine" 
and "ihre". However, none of the differences in correct identifications of 
"seme" and "ihre" between boys and girls turned out to be significant. Thus, 
we have to reject the prediction that sex-identical pronouns are acquired 
first. 
Our data (cf. Figure 24) show that for all age groups, the genus-scores 
are higher than the sexus-scores in the first test (PRE). This disconfirms 
our deictic expectation that natural gender is acquired before syntactic 
gender, despite of the fact that the situation reverses in the POST tests. 
We will shortly return to this latter finding. 
It is therefore, reasonable to conclude that the gender acquisition in 
possessive pronouns cannot be due to the development of their deictic char-
acteristics. 
Further predictions 
In 3.2 we expected that children are likely to substitute the masculine 
"seme" (and not the neuter "seine") if they err on the feminine "ihre". 
Table 28 in 7.2.1.4 shows us that this is in general not the case for natural 
gender and syntactic gender, with one exception The most frequent mistake 
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for "ihre" is in natural gender/POST the masculine "seine". Thus, a semantic 
feature explanation with respect to children's mistakes and substitutions is 
not very attractive. 
The other prediction which was made relates to both Study A and Study B. 
In 3.2 we said that "sein-e" and "ihr-e" of the gender study (= Study B) 
should be acquired later than "sein" and "ihr" of the "shifting reference" 
study (= Study A). The inspection of our data in Study В (cf. Table 26) and 
in Study A (cf. Figure 2 and Figure 3) shows us that "sein-e" in Study В is, 
contrary to our expectation, earlier acquired than "sein" in Study A. "Ihr-e" 
in Study В and "ihr" in Study A are nearly equally well mastered. However, 
these comparisons are not very conclusive because of differences in task 
requirements and identification possibilities. 
7.2.1.3 Conclusions with Respect to Performance Tests as Related to Predictions 
In 7.2.1.2 we discussed various predictions with respect to our data and 
found that none of our four different points of view (morphophonological 
characteristics, syntactic characteristics, semantic characteristics, and 
deictic characteristics) are valid for an explanation of the results in the 
gender study. All of the four predictions assume (at least with respect to 
"specific" pronouns) a precedence of natural gender over syntactic gender. 
However, this turns out not to be the case, since our results show for all 
three age groups in PRE better performance on syntactic gender. 
What could have facilitated the early acquisition of genus, as opposed 
to what should have been expected from a "Piagetian-cognitive" point of view. 
One possible explanation for the precedence of intralinguistic reference 
before extralinguistic reference (cf. Böhme & Levelt, 1979) could be that 
young children used two intralinguistic cues in their selection of the cor-
rect pronoun: firstly, the suffix "-e" (like in: die Gießkanne) correlates 
strongly with feminine gender in German (cf. e.g. Spitz, 1965; Altmann & 
Raettig, 1973; Werner, 1975), and secondly, the correlation of syllabicity 
and gender. Monosyllabic stems are in German mostly either neuter (das Boot, 
das Schiff*) or masculine; polysyllabic ones are in general associated with 
it 
Diminuitives which were also used (like "das Bötchen" or "das Schiffchen") 
are always neuter (cf. e.g. Spitz, 1965; Jarnatowskaja, 1968). 
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feminine (die Gieß-kan-ne) or masculine gender (der Würfel) (cf. Arndt, 
1970 ). Automatic acquisition could have been promoted by these phonological 
and morphological cues at an early stage. This interpretation seems to find 
support in similar findings, as reported for French (Karmiloff-Smith, 1976, 
1978, 1979b), for Russian (Popova, 1958/1973), and for Swiss-German 
(Schneuwly, 1978a, 1978b, 1979) although two objections could be made. In 
contrast to our assumption, MacWhinney (1977, p. 86) claims: "Thus use of 
phonological cues to gender cannot emerge before the use of overt cues to 
gender." However, in view of ambiguities in the chosen material one can doubt 
the validity of MacWhinney's results. 
Still the question whether morphophonological cues facilitate the 
acquisition of genus in German remains unfortunately unresolved since our 
sample of nouns is much too small for allowing a general conclusion (cf. 
also Karmiloff-Smith, 1979b, p. 235: "In French, for instance, most children 
do seem to acquire the gender distinction by first concentrating on phonolo-
gical procedures. However, in another linguistic environment (e.g. German, 
where word endings are not necessarily good clues to formal gender but to 
semantic cases), different procedures may be used for acquiring gender."). 
Despite of this tempting interpretation, we have some unexplained 
issues in the results of the performance tests in the gender study which 
require a careful further analysis, since some additional factors may be 
involved in children's gender acquisition. 
Arndt (1970, p. 251) writes: "German noun gender may be by no means random-
ly distributed, where morphology rather than semantics is concerned. The 
nonfeminine probably predominates in monosyllables; the nonneuter, in 
dissyllables and polysyllables. 
** 
Among the nouns with "real or inherent semantic gender" MacWhinney chose 
words like "Kind" (child) or "Pferd" (horse). Among the nouns with "phono-
logical endings which served as clear cues for their gender" he chose words 
like der "Hanwner'Vthe (mase.) hamer (counter-evidence: "Mutter'Vmother; 
"Schwester'Vsister; or das Muster/the (neuter) pattern), das "ScheusaT/the 
(neuter) monster^counter-evidence: der Kanal/the (mase.) channel; die Moral/ 
the (fem.) morality, etc.), die "SchweinereT^/the (fern.) piggery (counter-
evidence: der Papagei/the (mase.) parrot), or die "Pfeife'Vthe (fem.) pipe 
(counter-evidence wTnch holds also against our explanation: der Matros^/ 
the (mase.) sailor; der Löwe/the (mase.) lion; der Knabe/theTmasc.) boy, 
etc.). 
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7.2.1.4 Other Influential Factors in the Performance Tests 
Like in Study A, we inspected all data in Study В again in order to find 
out what potential further factors might have been influential in children's 
gender acquisition. It turned out that there are at least three factors 
which are seemingly relevant fora full understanding of children's perform­
ance. 
The first factor is the plurifunctional usage. In Figure 25 we saw that 
only the control group which had awareness before performance showed pluri­
functional usage (and "anaphoric intrusions") but not in sexus/PRE and genus/ 
PRE in the coeval experimental group 3. Figure 26 demonstrates that in POST 
both the control group and the experimental group 3 yield a second referent 
to the "seine"-question, i.e. plurifunctional usage (but only the control 
group displays "anaphoric intrusions"). 
This finding suggests that testing awareness before performance stimu­
lates older children to consider more than one alternative in the following 
performance tasks. This means that older children who do not have recent 
metalinguistic experience use only one reaction possibility in the perform­
ance test whereas older children with metalinguistic experience use more than 
one. 
The second factor is a preference for clear extralinguistic cues in 
sexus. In general children prefer the boy with his male looks and outfit 
over the pig with its unspecified sex when asked for "seine" (cf. Table 27). 
The third factor is the difference in mistakes for "ihre" between sexus 
and genus. This can be seen from Table 28. 
Table Zfl Mistakes f o r t h e F e n l m n e Pronoun " I h r e " in Sexus and Genus 
( A l l Four Groups) 
t e s t i tem given 
to ckUd 
frequency of 
mistakes 
absolute 
frequencies 
of nist^kes 
percentage 
of nlstakes 
out of al l 
mistakes 
per Item 
РЯЕ 
POST 
PRE 
POST 
total 
SEXUS 
•Hire" ( h e r ) 
o b j e c t designated by c h i l d 
boy 
(mase.) 
11 
7 
441 
501 
461 
pig 
(neuter) 
14 
6 
S6Í 
431 
SII 
other 
mistakes 
--
1 
--
71 
31 
GEWS 
•Ihre' (her) 
object designated by child 
dice 
(oasc.) 
6 
г 
32« 
l i t 
21« 
boat 
(neuter) 
13 
15 
68« 
79« 
741 
other 
mistakes 
--
2 
--
11« 
5« 
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From Table 28 we can see that in sexus there is no major preference of 
an "ihre"-mistake for either the boy or the pig. This holds for PRE as well 
as POST. However, in both PRE and POST genus tests, there were more incorrect 
references to the boat (neuter object) than to the dice (masculine object). 
In POST, this tendency is significant (x2 = 9.9, df = 1, ρ < .01). This 
finding argues against a semantic expiation (second ontogenetic principle 
of the SFH (cf. 3.2). 
A possible explanation for this finding can lie in children's colour 
stereotypes. We mentioned earlier (in 7.2.1) that some children considered 
light colours as girls' colours and dark colours as boys' colours. It might 
have been that the light blue of the boat attracted them more in case of 
uncertainty for "ihre" than the black of the dice. 
Let us now summarize the further findings on performance: 
- awareness before performance, i.e. metalinguistic experience, seems to 
enhance plurifunctional usage in older children, 
- children show a preference for clear extralinguistic cues in sexus, and 
- there is a possibility that colour stereotypes influenced children's 
mistakes in the identification of gender pronouns. 
So far for the results of the performance tests in the gender study. 
7.2.2 Awareness Tests 
7.2.2.1 General Results of the Awareness Tests 
Before we relate our awareness results to our theoretical questions, we 
will first present the general results of children's performance and aware­
ness (i.e. of their error detections, changes of the possessive pronoun, 
changes of the predicative adjective, and explanations) in sexus and genus. 
Note that the concerning figures contain both performance and awareness 
scores for comparison. 
Figures 27 and 28 show the performance results and the awareness 
results for the three experimental groups taken together in sexus and genus, 
and for PRE and POST respectively. 
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Fig. 27: Average correct standard performance and awareness (i.e. error detections, changes of possessive pronoun, 
changes of predicative adjective, and explanations) of children at the three aqe levels in sexus and genus (PRE) 
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Fig 28 Average correct standard performance and awareness (i e error detections, changes of possessive pronoun, 
changes of predicative adjective, and explanations) of children at the three age levels in sexus und genus (POST) 
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90--
80--
70--
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50-· 
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Figures 29-31 give the PRE and POST perforaance and awareness data in 
sexus and genus for the three experimental age groups, respectively. 
Fig. 29: Average correct standard performance and awareness (i.e. error detections, changes of possessive 
pronoun, changes of nredicative adjective, and explanations) of the youngest age group in sexus 
and genus (PRE and POST) 
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80-· 
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50- . 
40- • 
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10- · 
о I-
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change of predicative adjective 
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/ 
Л ' 
group 1/PRE group I/POST group 1/PRE group 1/POST 
(х-З.ІІ) (ï=4;4) (x=3;ll) (ï=4;4) 
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Fig. 30: Averaqe correct Standard performance and awareness (i.e. error detections, changes of possessive 
pronoun, changes of predicative adjective, and explanations) of the middle age group in sexus and 
genus (PRE and POST) 
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F1g. 31: Average correct standard performance and awareness (i.e. error detections, changes of possessive 
pronoun, changes of predicative adjective, and explanations) of the oldest age group in sexus 
and genus (PRE and POST) 
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Figure 32, finally, shows the PRE and POST performance and awareness 
data in sexus and genus for the control group 4. 
Fiq. 3? Average correct standard perfomance and awareness ( i e. error detections» channes of possessive 
pronoun, changes of predicative adjective, and exnlanations) of the control group in sexus and 
genus (PRE and POST) 
Î of Ss 
correct 
100 - . 
90 • . 
SO 
70 
60 . . 
50 - • 
40 -
30 -
20 -
10 -
0 
« C W W W W 
П Л Л / ЧЛ 
^ ^ — performance 
— - — error detection 
change of possessive pronoun 
change of predicative adjective 
v w explanation 
group 4/PRE group 4/P0ST 
( ï . 5 ; 5 ) ( ï - 5 ,10 ) 
group 4/PRE group 4/POST 
(«•5;S) ( ϊ ^ Ι Ο ) 
243 
Comments on these figures will follow in later sections. In order to 
study correlations of the four metalinguistic abilities (error detections, 
correct changes of the possessive pronoun, correct changes of the predicative 
adjective, and correct explanations) we had to consider six relationships 
(cf. Table 29). Let us now look at the contingency coefficients С (a measure 
of the extent of association between two sets of attributes) for these 
relationships in sexus and genus, in PRE and POST respectively (note that 
the maximum value which С can attain in a 2x2 table is ν^Τδ = .707). Table 29 
ρ 
lists the different contingency coefficients and the X -values for the 
relationships a., b., c , d., е., and f.: if "C" is underlined we can conclude 
that С is significantly different f"om zero. 
Table 29: Contingency Coefficients for the Associations Anong Metalinguistic 
Abilities (All Four Groups) 
a 
relat ion between 
error detections 
and correct 
changes of the 
poss. pronoun 
b 
relat ion betueen 
error detections 
and correct 
changes of the 
pred. adjective 
с 
relat ion between 
error detections 
and correct еж-
planatlons 
d 
relat ion between 
correct changes 
of the poss. 
pronoun and 
correct changes 
of the pred. 
adjective 
e 
relat ion between 
correct changes 
of the poss. 
pronoun and 
correct екрі. 
f 
relation between 
correct changes 
of the pred. 
adjective and 
correct e i p l . 
SEXUS 
РВЕ 
С . .38 
( · Ζ · 1 ( Μ , d f - l ) 
p < .01 
С - .46 
(Аіб.І, df-l) 
ρ < .001 
С - .58 
(ж2=30.6, df=1) 
ρ < .001 
С - .28 
( x Z - 5 . l . d f - l ) 
ρ < .05 
С = .50 
(ж 2 -17.4, df.1) 
ρ < .001 
С - .45 
( χ Ζ · 1 5 . 2 , d f - l ) 
ρ < .001 
POST 
С - .45 
(ж^=15.6. d f . 1 ) 
ρ < .001 
С = .32 
lx¿'7.Z, d f . l ) 
ρ < .01 
С . .51 
( ж 2 . 2 1 . 0 , df.1) 
ρ < .001 
С - .18 
( χ 2 . 2 . 2 , d f . 1 ) 
С • .55 
(ж^.гб.С, df.1) 
ρ < .001 
С - .15 
( ж г . 1 . 5 , d f - l ) 
1 GENUS 
PRE 
С . .43 
( ж 2 . | Э . 8 , df=l) 
p < .001 
С . .36 
( ж 2 . 9 . 2 , d f - l ) 
ρ < .01 
С - .30 
(ж г =6.0, d f . l ) 
Ρ < .иг 
С - .19 
( ж г . 2 . 4 , d f - l ) 
С = .29 
( ж 2 - 5 . 6 , d f - l ) 
р < .02 
С - .21 
( ж 2 . 2 . 7 , df-1) 
POST 
( ж 2 = 1 4 . 4 . 
d f = 1 ) 
ρ < .COI 
С . .42 
( ж 2 · 1 2 . 8 , 
d f . l ) 
ρ < 001 
С . .17 
( ж г . 1 . 7 . 
df.1) 
С . .25 
( « 2 - 3 . 9 , 
d f . l ) 
р < .05 
С · .09 
( ж 2 · . 5 0 , 
df=t) 
С . .20 
(ж2-2.46 
d f . l ) 
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Table 29 shows that the associations between error detections and correct 
changes of the possessive pronoun and between error detections and correct 
changes of the predicative adjective are relatively strong. This suggests 
that error detections and corrections often go hand in hand. 
In sexus we have also a high correlation between error detections and 
correct explanations, on the one hand, and between correct changes of the 
possessive pronoun and correct explanations on the other hand. 
Associations between correct changes of the possessive pronoun and 
correct changes of the predicative adjective are rather low. This finding 
indicates that children often gave only one kind of correction (either a 
change of the possessive pronoun or a change of the predicative adjective). 
Relatively low correlations were also observed for the relations between 
correct changes of the predicative adjective and correct explanations, with 
the exception of sexus/PRE where we found many children who could neither 
change nor explain correctly. 
Except for associations between, on the one hand, error detections and 
correct changes of the possessive pronoun, and, on the other hand, error 
detections and correct changes of the predicative adjective, correlations in 
genus are lower than correlations in sexus. This holds especially for all 
those associations in which correct explanations are correlated with another 
metalinguistic ability (i.e. with error detections, cf. с in Table 29, 
with correct changes of the possessive pronoun, cf. e in Table 29, and with 
correct changes of the predicative adjective, cf. f in Table 29). For both 
sexus and genus, correct changes of the predicative adjective are in general 
less strongly associated with other metalinguistic abilities (error detec­
tions and correct explanations) than correct changes of the possessive pro­
noun. This finding could be due to children's preferences for changes of the 
possessive pronoun in case of a correction. Thus, children might have noticed 
that E asked for pronouns and not colours (i.e. predicative adjectives). 
Presentation order effects 
Figure 33 displays the performance and awareness data in PRE for the 
oldest experimental group 3 (performance before awareness) and the control 
group 4 (awareness before performance) which was of the same age as the 
children in group 3. 
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Fig. 33: Average correct standard performance and awareness (i.e. error detections, changes of possessive pronoun, 
changes of predicative adjective, and explanations) of the oldest age group and the control group in 
sexus and genus (PRE) 
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Figure 33 exhibits that for both sexus and genus error detections in 
PRE are more frequent in the experimental group 3 (sexus: 83», genus: 78%) 
than in the control group 4 (sexus: 645», genus: 57%). This difference, 
however, is not significant. 
Pronoun changes do not differ in sexus/PRE and genus/PRE between group 
3 and group 4. In sexus/PRE the control children change more often the 
predicative adjective than the children in group 3 (the difference is not 
significant), whereas the "experimental" children in group 3 change the 
predicative adjective in genus/PRE more often than the "control" children 
(the difference between the two groups just misses significance: ρ = .059). 
Explanations in PRE are in both sexus and genus not much different in 
group 3 and group 4. Thus, we did not observe any significant differences 
between group 3 and group 4 in sexus/PRE and genus/PRE with respect to error 
detections, changes of the possessive pronoun, changes of the predicative 
adjective, and explanations. 
Figure 34 depicts the comparison of performance and metalinguistic 
abilities for group 3 and group 4 in POST. 
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Fig. 34: Average correct standard performance and awareness (i.e. error detections, changes of possessive 
pronoun, changes of predicative adjective, and explanations) of the oldest age group and the 
control group in sexus and genus (POST) 
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This comparison shows that there are no major differences in sexus/POST 
and genus/POST with respect to our four metalinguistic abilities, with one 
exception: like in genus/PRE group 3 changes the prediative adjective in 
genus/POST more often than group 4 (however, this difference between the two 
groups also misses significance). 
Thus, there are no significant results with respect to differences of 
metal inguistic abilities between group 3 and group 4 in sexus/PRE, sexus/POST, 
genus/PRE, and genus/POST, i.e. we have no reason to assume strong presenta-
tion order effects for metalinguistic abilities in the gender tests. 
Task order effects 
Half of the children got the natural gender awareness tasks before the 
syntactic gender awareness tasks, and the other half the inverse order 
(syntactic gender awareness tasks before natural gender awareness tasks) 
(cf. 7.1.4). When we analyzed our data with respect to task order effects we 
did not obtain any significant findings. Thus, the position of a metalinguis-
tic gender task does not influence results on error detections, changes of 
the possessive pronoun, changes of the predicative adjective, and explana-
tions. 
7.2.2.2 Awareness Results as Related to Hypotheses 
Section 4 and section 5 were not only devoted to deriving 
hypotheses on the role of linguistic awareness in language acquisition for 
Study A, but also for Study B. In 5. we specified our predictions for both 
studies which were sumnarized in 5.6. 
In H. la we proposed on the basis of Claparède's observations, that 
metalinguistic abilities arise more likely in case of a mismatch between 
sentence content and communicative intent than in case of a correspondence 
between these two. 
The "filler-tasks" Ilia and Illb in sexus and 3a and 3b in genus, i.e. 
the "correct" tasks, function as testing-ground for the Claparede-suggestion 
that awareness for "incorrect" precedes awareness for."correct". 
Let us list them once more (cf. also 7.1.4): 
- filler task Ilia (sexus): "Can I say, "seine" (his) scarf is yellow?", 
- filler task Illb (sexus): "Can I say, "seine" (his) scarf is red?", 
- filler task 3a (genus): "Can I say, "seine" (his) colour is black?" and 
- filler task 3b (genus): "Can I say, "seine" (his) colour is blue?". 
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In general, children accepted these questions, sometimes emphasizing 
that E could say this. However, some children hesitated for a long time and 
some even said that E's utterance was wrong. Most of these "negators" changed 
their opinion during the interviews (i.e. said later that "seine" was correct). 
It is remarkable that in the "a-tasks" (Ilia and 3a) quite a number of 
children (in Ilia: 16% of all children in PRE and POST; in 3a: 12% of all 
children in PRE and POST) said "no" at first and referred to the other 
"seine"-animate or object (i.e., in Ilia "no, because the boy has the red 
scarf" and in 3a "no, because the boat is blue") but noticed later that there 
were two possible referents for "seine". Thus, these children discovered the 
plurifunctionality of "seine" (usually without E's prompts) in the course of 
the interview (children reacted often with surprise; e.g. in 3a: "Nein, weil 
das Boot blau ist ... Oh, doch,wart mal, doch, kannste sagen'VNo, because 
the boat is blue ... Oh, yes, wait a minute, yes, you can say that).* 
We now want to look at children's awareness (defined as children's 
ability to reflect and comment on linguistic structures and functions) for 
the correct "filler"-tasks (cf. Table 30) in order to have a basis for com-
paring awareness for "correct" and awareness for "incorrect". "Error detec-
tions" in Table 30 refer to at least one "no"-answer in the two "correct" 
tasks of sexus, or genus respectively. "Changes of the possessive pronoun" 
refer to at least one pronoun change (e.g. "ihre'Vher or "das seine'Vthe 
(neuter) his. Scores for pronoun changes were also considered if children 
asserted that "seine" was also possible or more appropriate in Illa, lllb, 
3a and 3b). Changes of the predicative adjective refer to at least one colour 
change (nearly always the other referent, for "seine"), and explanations 
refer to at least one correct explanation. 
The discovery of plurifunctionality of "seine" during the awareness inter-
view explains children's plurifunctional usage of "seine" in the performance 
tests after the administration of the awareness tests (cf. 7.2.1.4). 
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Table 30: Children's Awareness in the "Correcf'-Tasks (All Four Groups) 
PRE 
POST 
SEXUS 
error 
detections 
26% 
Зві 
changes 
of the 
poss. 
pronoun 
13« 
10% 
changes of 
the pred. 
adjective 
18% 
2Sl 
explana­
tions 
IK 
31Ï 
GENUS 
error 
detec. 
tions 
23'. 
41Ï 
changes 
of the 
poss. 
pronoun 
TL 
Oï 
changes 
of the 
predic. 
adj. 
15'., 
16; 
expla-
nations 
\ 
г; 
5Í 
Table 30 shows that in both sexus and genus "error detections" in the 
" f i l1er" - tasks become more frequent in the second test than in the f i r s t 
tes t . "Changes of the predicative adjective" are in both sexus and genus 
more frequent than "changes of the possessive pronoun". "Explanations" are 
more often in sexus than in genus. 
For a comparison between awareness for "correct" and awareness for " i n -
correct" we have to give the general awareness scores of the four groups 
in PRC and POST for the " incorrect" tasks (c f . Table 31 , the scores in 
Table 31 can also be derived by averaging chi ldren's scores in F ig. 27, 
Fig. 28, and Fig. 29). 
Table 31 : Children's Awareness in the "Incorrect"-Tasks (All Four Groups) 
PRE 
POST 
SEXUS 
error 
detec-
tions 
511 
70* 
changes 
of the 
poss. 
pronoun 
54% 
67* 
changes of 
the pred. 
adjective 
44% 
46% 
explana-
tions 
41% 
52% 
GENUS 
error 
detec-
tions 
49% 
64% 
changes 
of the 
poss. 
pronoun 
51% 
m. 
changes 
of the 
pred. 
adjective 
36% 
36% 
explana-
tions 
11% 
14% 
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When we compare Table 30 with Table 31 we can see that awareness for 
"incorrect" precedes awareness for "correct" although awareness for "correct" 
is frequently observed. This result suggests that we can partially confirm 
H. la although, apparently, the plurifunctionality of "seine" in the "correct" 
tasks attracted the child's attention and provoked metalinguistic comments. 
Our next hypothesis, H. 1c, relates only to the gender study: 
Нд 1c: Metalinguistic abilities (error detections, corrections, and explana­
tions) can be observed earlier (respectively more often) for natural 
gender where cognitive and linguistic factors coincide than for syn­
tactic gender where only linguistic factors play a role. 
H. 1c, which was also derived from Claparëde's observations, cannot be 
fully confirmed since changes of the possessive pronoun were observed more 
often in genus/POST than in sexus/POST (cf. Table 31). From inspection of 
Table 31 one can see that the differences between natural gender and syntac-
tic gender with respect to error detections and changes of the possessive 
pronoun are relatively small. This finding can also be confirmed by a check 
of the correlations between these two metalinguistic abilities in sexus and 
genus (cf. Table 29). 
However, the intraindividual coherence of the predicative adjective 
between sexus and genus was more loose (cf. also Table 31). Nearly one third 
(in PRE: 31%, in POST: 33%) of all children exhibited differences between 
sexus and genus. Table 31 reveals big differences between sexus and genus 
with respect to explanations. This observation can also be confirmed by 
comparing the levels of explanations in the sexus and the genus tasks: 19 
children gave correct explanations in sexus but not in genus, and only one 
child could explain correctly genus but not sexus. This difference is even 
Note that in the "incorrect" tasks pronoun changes are most frequent (except 
for sexus/PRE where error detections are more frequent) whereas in the "cor-
rect" tasks error detections can be observed more often. Also, changes of 
the possessive pronoun are more frequent than changes of the predicative ad-
jective in the "incorrect" tasks whereas the "correct" tasks display the 
reverse relationship. 
** 
In a control study with 13 adults (only two psycholinguists) we discovered 
that all subjects could explain natural and syntactic gender correctly. (Genus 
was usually not explained by coreferentiality rules but by a one-to-one 
mapping between pronoun and definite article, e.g. "You have to say "ihre" 
(her) because one say "die" (the, fem.) watering-can"). 
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clearer in POST 24 children (39») explained sexus correctly but not genus. 
There was no child in the four groups in the second test who could explain 
genus correctly but not sexus. The differences between sexus and genus expla-
nations are significant in PRE (McNemar -X 14.45, df = 1, ρ < .001) as 
well as in POST (McNemar -X2. 22.04, df = 1, ρ < .001). 
These findings indicate that H. 1c can be definitely confirmed for ex­
planations, probably for changes of the predicative adjective (i.e. reference 
changes), and error detections, but not fully for pronoun corrections. 
Our next hypotheses H.2 and H.3, concern the existence of a unified 
general netalinguistic ability. 
H.2 Metalinguistic abilities (error detections, corrections, and explanations) 
are within a test rather more interdependent than contrasting. 
In Table 29 (in 7.2.2.1) we presented the contingency coefficients for 
the associations among metalinguistic abilities in sexus and genus, in PRE 
and POST respectively. Although some metalinguistic abilities are strongly 
correlated suggesting the existence of a common underlying factor (error 
detections, pronoun corrections, and explanations in sexus, error detections 
and pronoun corrections in genus) we observed that in sexus/POST and genus/ 
PRE changes of the predicative adjective do not much correlate with pronoun 
changes and correct explanations, and that in genus/POST explanations do not 
correlate with other metalinguistic abilities. These findings suggest that 
we have to reject H.2 at least in so far that a "single factor" theory of 
awareness is clearly insufficient. Task-specific factors are surely involved 
as well. The most evident difference of metalinguistic abilities between 
sexus and genus is the difference in explanations whereas error detections 
and pronoun corrections are rather contingent in sexus and genus. It seems 
that explanations for intralinguistic reference require a different kind of 
reflective ability than explanations for extralmguistic reference. 
НдЗ relates to the differential development of different metalinguistic 
abilities with age. 
НдЗ: The cross-sectional and longitudinal development of metalinguistic 
abilities (error detections, corrections, and explanations) with age 
is ordered according to "strain" in reflective ability first are error 
detections, then corrections, and finally explanations. 
НдЗ has to be rejected with respect to the precedence of error detec­
tions. pronoun corrections are sometimes earlier than error detections (cf. 
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Fig. 27, Fig. 28, in Fig. 29 sexus/PRE and genus/PCST, in Fig. 30 genus/PRE, 
in Fig. 31 genus/POST, and in Fig. 32 sexus/PRE and genus/PRE and POST). Al­
though changes of the predicative adjective can be earlier than error detec­
tions (cf. in Fig. 29 sexus/PRE and genus/PRE of the youngest children), 
they are in some tests later than explanations (cf. in Fig. 31 sexus/PRE and 
POST of the oldest children, and in Fig. 32 sexus/POST of the control group. 
However, НдЗ can be confirmed with respect to the precedence of error detec­
tions and pronoun corrections over explanations in both sexus and genus (cf. 
Fig. 27, Fig. 28, and Fig. 32). 
Let us surmiarize our findings with respect to our hypotheses H. la, 
H A 1c, Н д2, and Н д3: 
- H. la: (awareness for incorrect precedes awareness for correct) can be -
at least partially - confirmed although the plurifunctionality of 
"seine" in the "correct" tasks gave rise to metalinguistic comments 
of the child, 
- Нд 1c: (awareness for sexus precedes awareness for genus) can be definitely 
confirmed for explanations, probably for reference changes and error 
detections, but not fully for pronoun corrections, 
- Нд2: (metalinguistic abilities are within a test rather more interdepen­
dent than contrasting) has to be rejected because of clear differ­
ences in explanations between sexus and genus tasks, and 
- НдЗ: (in the development of metalinguistic abilities error detections 
should be first, then corrections, and finally explanations) cannot 
be fully confirmed for the precedence of error detections before 
corrections. However, НдЗ is correct with respect to the precedence 
of error detections and pronoun corrections over explanations. 
Thus, our hypotheses cannot fully explain children's development of 
metalinguistic abilities. We, therefore, will look for other factors under­
lying awareness in the sexus and genus tasks. 
7.2.2.3 Other Influential Factors in the Child's Metalinguistic Abilities 
There are at least seven factors which are not accounted for by our 
predictions but which might be informative with respect to children's meta­
linguistic abilities. 
These factors are: the enhancement of awareness through metalinguistic 
experience, children's striving for internal coherence, the adherence to 
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conversational maxims, children's post-hoc rationalizations in genus, their 
partial awareness of pronoun features, children's preference for sexus, and 
the role of stereotypes in the gender tasks. 
The first factor is the enhancement of awareness through metalinguistic 
experience. This factor can be seen in the enhancement of error detections 
in POST through error detections in PRE (cf. Fig. 27 and Fig. 28 in 7.2.1.1, 
cf. also Figs. 29, 30, and 32) for both sexus and genus tasks of group 1, 
group 2, and control group 4 (however, not of group 3). The enhancement of 
pronoun changes in POST through pronoun changes in PRE becomes apparent in 
Fig. 27 and Fig. 28, also in Figs. 29, 30, 31, and 32, in all tests of all 
four groups, except for the control group in sexus. Except for group 2 in 
sexus and genus there is no enhancement of changes of the predicative adjec­
tive in POST through changes of the predicative adjective in PRE (cf. Fig. 
27 and Fig. 28, cf. also Fig. 30). There is only one clear enhancement of 
explanations in POST over explanations in PRE: in the sexus test of group 2 
(cf. Fig. 27 and Fig. 28, cf. also Fig. 30). This means that the enhancement 
of awareness through metalinguistic experience is stronger for error detec­
tions and pronoun corrections than for reference corrections and explanations. 
This enhancement is not (much) different for sexus and genus. 
Unlike in Study A (cf. 6.2.2.3) we did not observe in Study В an effect 
on the awareness tests from previous experience in the performance tests 
(cf. Fig. 33 and Fig. 34). 
Enhancement of error detections in POST through error detections in PRE 
has not only been observed for the "incorrect" tasks but also for the "cor­
rect" tasks Ilia and Illb in sexus (group 1/PRE: 6%; group 1/POST: З П ; 
group 2/PRE: 23%; group 2/POST: 46%) and for the "correct" tasks 3a and 3b 
in genus (group 1/PRE: 12%; group 1/POST: 25%; group 2/PRE: 8%; group 2/POST: 
46%). But it was not found for older children (group 3 and group 4), or for 
other metalinguistic abilities than error detections. 
Like in Study A (cf. 6.2.2.3) we assume that metalinguistic abilities 
rely on an "awareness"-raising situation: early or late involvement could be 
decisive for the early or late development of metalinguistic abilities. 
The second factor is children's striving for internal coherence of 
linguistic units. Like in Study A, we observed that some children struggled 
for the correct pronoun and that gender pronouns are a problem per se. Let 
us present two transcripts which contain the word innovation "ere" ("er" = 
he, "ihre" = her) of two children. 
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Task IV (natural gender) 
S38 in group 1/POST; 4,7, female 
VI: "Kann ich sagen, ihre Schleife ist 
rof" 
Vp schüttelt den Kopf 
VI: "Warun nicht?" 
Vp. "Weil, weil das Schweinchen 
ist 'n Junge ist." 
VI: "Und dann muß ich sagen7 Wie 
muß ich da sagen bei dem 
Schweinchen?" 
Vp: "Ere, ihre ..." 
VI: "Schleife ist ..." 
Vp: "Gelb." 
VI : "Hmhm. Und wer hat jetzt 
die rote Schleife7" 
Vp: "Lukas." (mannl. Puppe) 
VI: "Hmhm. Kann ich da sagen, 
ihre Schleife ist rot7" 
Vp schüttelt den Kopf 
VI. "Ja? Nee7 Warum nicht7" 
Vp: "Weil das ein Junge ist." 
VI: "Und dann muß ich sagen7" 
Vp: "Ere Schleife ist rot." 
VI: "Das hab ich eben gesagt: 
ihre Schleife ist rot." 
Protokollantin: "Nee, ere!" 
VI: "Ach, ere Schleife7" 
Vp nickt 
E "Can I say, her scarf is 
red7" 
S shakes her head 
E. "Why not7" 
S. "Because, because the piggy 
is a boy is." 
E: "And then I have to say7 How 
do I have to say for the 
piggy7" 
S. "Ere", "ihre" ..." ("er" = 
he, "ihre" = her) 
E. "Scarf is ..." 
S: "Yellow." 
E: "Humhum. And who has now 
the red scarf?" 
S: "Lukas." (male doll) 
E: "Humhum. Can I say there, 
her scarf is red?" 
S shakes her head 
E "Yes? No? Why not?" 
S "Because this is a boy." 
E· "And then I have to say7" 
S: ""Ere" scarf is red." 
E. "I said that: her scarf is 
red." 
Research assistant: No, "ere"'" 
E: "Oh, "ere" scarf?" 
S nods (consents) 
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VI: "Und beim Jungen? Sag ich da: 
"Ere" Schleife oder ihre Schleife?" 
Vp: "Ihre Schleife." 
VI: "Und wo sag ich seine Schleife?" 
Vp: "Beim Lukas." 
VI: "Hmhm. Und wo sag ich ihre 
Schleife?" 
Vp zeigt auf die weibliche Puppe 
E: "And for the boy? Do I say: 
"ere" scarf or her scarf?" 
S: "Her scarf." 
E: "And where do I say his 
scarf" 
S. "For Lukas." 
E: "Humhuffl. And where do I say 
her scarf?" 
S points at the female doll 
It is noteworthy that this girl brought up the same word innovation 
("ere") in the ambiguous task V where the piggy was baptized Petra. The same 
word innovation was also chosen by another child in group 2. 
Task I (natural gender) 
S35 in group 2/POST; 5;2; male 
VI: "So, jetzt mocht' ich von dir 
wissen - guck jetzt mal die drei 
an - kann ich sagen: seine 
Schleife ist grün?" 
Vp: "Nee." 
VI: "Warum nicht?" 
Vp: "Warum* das falsch ist." 
VI: "Warum is 'n das falsch?" 
Vp: "Warum der kein Mann ist." 
VI: "Ja stiimit. (lacht). Und bei 
'nem Mann sagt man? - Seine 
oder ihre Schleife?" 
E: "So, now I want to know from 
you - now look at the three 
- can I say: his scarf is 
green?" 
S: "No." 
E: "Why not?" 
S: "Why this is wrong." 
E: "Why is 't wrong?" 
S: "Why this is no man." 
E: "Yes, true, (laughs). And 
for a man, one says? - His 
or her scarf?" 
The confusion between "warum" (why) and "weil" (because) occurred quite 
frequently in both Study A and Study B, mostly between five and six years. 
2Б7 
Vp: "Er ... ere Schleife." 
VI 
VP 
VI 
"Wie?" 
'Er... ere seine Schleife." 
"Er seine Schleife, (lacht) 
Okay. Und bei 'ner Frau sagt 
man?" 
Vp: "Seine Schleife." 
VI: "Sagt man bei 'ner Frau 'seine 
Schleife' oder 'ihre Schleife'?" 
Vp: "Ihre Schleife." 
VI: "Hmhm. Und jetzt will ich noch 
wissen, kann ich sagen ... - Ach 
so, wie muß ich denn sagen, wenn 
ich nicht sagen kann: seine 
Schleife ist grün? Dann muß 
ich sagen?" 
Vp: "Ihre Schleife." 
VI: "Prima. Und warum?" 
Vp: "Warum das auch 'ne Frau ist." 
VI: "Ja, gut." 
S: ""Er" 
= he) 
"ere" scarf." (er 
"How?" 
""Er"... "ere" his scarf." 
"He his scarf, (laughs) ok. 
And for a woman one says?" 
S: "His scarf." 
E: "Does one say for a woman 
'his scarf' or 'her scarf?" 
"Her scarf." 
"Humhum. And now I still 
want to know, can I say ... 
-Oh yeah, how do I have to 
say then if I cannot say: 
his scarf is green? Then I 
have to say?" 
"Her scarf." 
"Very good. And why?" 
"Why this is also a woman." 
"Yeah, fine." 
We already listed other examples of children's uncertainty with respect 
to the correct pronouns (cf. 7.2). The confusion in finding the correct 
pronoun becomes also evident in the "natural gender conflict" task V (the 
piggy Petra): 
Task V ("natural gender conflict" task) 
S34 in group 2/PRE; 4;9; male 
(...) 
Vp: "Ihre." 
VI: "Warum ihre?" 
...) 
S: "Her." 
E: "Why her?" 
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Vp: "Um das sich besser anhört. 
VI: 
Vp: 
VI: 
Vp: 
VI: 
"Ja? Wieso hört sich das besser 
an?" 
"Von sie, ih, se... sie, ihr 
gehört, deswegen heißt das auch 
richtig seine, ihre Schleife." 
"Wie heißt es denn besser? Seine 
oder ihre Schleife? Das Schweinchen 
heißt Petra." 
"Ihre Schleife." 
"Mein ich dann das Schweinchen 
oder die Petra?" 
Vp: "Das Schweinchen." 
S: "So that sounds better" (the 
incorrect connective "so 
that" expresses more a con-
ditional than a causal re-
lation) 
E: "Yes? Why does it sound 
better?" 
S: "Of she, "ih", "se" ...she, 
her belongs, that's why it 
is called correctly his, her 
scarf." 
E: "How is it better called? 
His or her scarf? The piggy 
is called Petra." 
S: "Her scarf." 
E: "Do I mean then the piggy 
or Petra?" 
S: "The piggy." 
Clearly, the struggle for intralinguistic organization is an important 
factor in both Study A and Study B. 
Our third factor in the development of gender pronouns is the adherence 
to conversational maxims. In 7.2 we gave examples of "arbitrary" explanations, 
like "because one normally says so" or "because one does not lie". Children 
seem even to know that linguistic errors are possible (i.e. they are not 
that unusual) in conversations, like in the examples where a child said that 
"one can sometimes also be mistaken". Apparently, some children in the age 
span studied are already aware of conversational obligations, restrictions, 
and possibilities. 
A fourth factor concerns children's post-hoc rationalizations in genus. 
Some children used natural gender in interpreting genus, like the five-year-
old who invented a whole "dice-family" (for further examples, cf. 7.2). This 
finding confirms Nisbett & DeCamp Wilson's assumption (1977, p. 231) that 
reports on cognitive processes are based on "judgments about the extent to 
which a particular stimulus is a plausible case of a given response", i.e. 
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on post-hoc-rationalizations. 
The fifth factor relates to children's partial awareness of pronoun 
features. When children give sexus explanations in genus they sometimes pre-
serve the feature possessiveness (e.g. "the dice belongs to a boy", "the 
dice has a father", etc.), sometimes not (e.g. "the dice is a boy", "seine" 
(his) colour is a boy's colour"). 
In the syntactic gender task 5 (the boat "Susanne") some children dis-
sociated the boat from "Susanne", i.e. they argued on the basis of the 
female name but did not preserve the gender feature. Let us give an example: 
Task 5 ("syntactic gender conflict" task) 
S26 in group 2/PRE; 4;2; female 
(...) 
Vp: "Ihre Farbe." 
VI: "Warum?" 
Vp: "Weil da die Susanne drin 
fährt." 
VI: "Das Schiff heißt Susanne, da 
fährt nicht die Susanne drin." 
(lacht) 
(...) 
S: "Her" colour." 
E: "Why?" 
S: "Because Susanne crosses 
the sea in it." 
E: "The boat is called Susanne, 
Susanne does not cross the 
sea in it." (laughs) 
It is possible that children master the gender feature without the 
possessiveness feature, and that they master the possessiveness feature 
without the gender feature. 
Our sixth factor is children's preference for sexus in the natural 
gender conflict task V (the piggy Petra) and in the syntactic gender conflict 
task 5 (the boat Susanne). Children preferred "ihre" over "seine" (signifi-
7.7, df = 1, ρ < .01; in task V/POST: 
X 2 = 28.7, df = 1, ρ < .001; and in task 5/POST*: X 2 = 14.75, df = 1, 
cant differences in task V/PRE: X 
ρ < .COI). 
The youngest children and children in group 2 prefer in task 5/PRE "seine" 
This finding corresponds to the precedence of genus (over sexus) in young 
children (cf. 7.2.1.1, Fig. 24). 
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The seventh and last factor relates to the role of stereotypes. Children 
often told us how the objects should look like. The pig, for instance, should 
have - like cows in the Bavarian Alps - "ringing things" ("Schelledinger") 
around its neck (and not a scarf), or that for being a real boat, people 
should sit in the boat. Stereotypes could also affect their ideas with res-
pect to sexus-specific characteristics. The presence or absence of such 
characteristics could then determine children's pronoun choice, like in the 
following example: 
Task V ("natural gender conflict" task = piggy Petra) 
S15 in control group 4/POST; 6;0; male 
(...) 
Vp: "Seine." 
VI : "Warum denn?" 
Vp: "Ich kann das sehen, wenn 
das ein Junge ist." 
VI : "Bei dem kann man das auch 
sehen, hast du gesagt?" 
Vp: "Das hat ja keinen ... kein 
'wo man draus trinken kann', 
kein Milchgefäß." 
(...) 
"His." 
"Why so?" 
"I can see it, if it is a 
boy." 
E: "There you can see it, too, 
you said?" 
S: "This has no (mase. form).. 
no 'where you can drink from' 
no milk container." 
We already mentioned that children's search for extralinguistic cues in 
sexus was frequent, mostly for the pig (cf. 7.2.1). In genus, some children 
looked also for extralinguistic cues-, they had the conception that all light 
colours are girls' colours and that all dark colours are boys's colours (cf. 
also 7.2.1). One child even said that one has to say "seine" (his) for the 
dice, and that the dice is a boy who wears a black suit ("Weil, daß ist ja 
ein Bube und der hat schwarz: der hat 'nen schwarzen Anzug an."). The size 
of the objects played also a role. The relatively big dice was in some cases 
conceived as masculine because of its size ("seine, weil das ja auch so groß 
ist, ist das auch eine* Junge"/his, because it is also so big, it is also a 
Note that the suffix "e" in "Junge", correlates in German with feminine 
gender (cf. 7.2.1.3). 
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(fem.) boy). This factor, children's stereotyping, can be related to our 
fourth factor, their post-hoc rationalizations in interpreting genus. 
7.2.2.4 Sunmary of the Results of the Awareness Tests 
All of our predictions on linguistic awareness could be only partially 
confirmed. 
Claparède's difference hypothesis (it is easier to become aware of 
differences than of similarities) seems to hold with the reservation that 
plurifunctional pronouns attract the child's attention. Moreover, since in 
natural gender cognitive and linguistic factors coincide metalinguistic 
abilities should be observed earlier for sexus than for genus where only 
linguistic factors play a role. This prediction is correct although pronoun 
corrections in genus sometimes precede those in sexus. 
Different metalinguistic abilities do not develop in the same way. The 
most evident difference is the difference of explanations between sexus and 
genus: whereas explanations with respect to extralinguistic reference (sexus) 
correlate with other metalinguistic abilities explanations with respect to 
intralinguistic reference (genus) do not go hand in hand with other meta-
linguistic abilities. 
Clearly, one cannot maintain the notion of a simple unified metalinguis-
tic ability. In the gender study error corrections can precede error detec-
tions but explanations are generally preceded by error corrections and detec-
tions. 
Other influential factors seem to play a role in children's acquisition 
of metalinguistic abilities: the enhancement through metalinguistic experience, 
children's striving for internal coherence, their adherence to conversational 
maxims, their post-hoc rationalizations in genus, their partial awareness of 
pronoun features, their preference for sexus in conflict-tasks, and their 
use of stereotypes in pronoun decisions. The first three factors (the en-
hancement of awareness through metalinguistic experience, children's striving 
for internal coherence, and their adherence to conversational maxims) are 
also apparent in Study A. 
Despite of noticeable parallels between our two studies, our assumptions 
and our results on the development of metalinguistic abilities need further 
theoretical and empirical evaluation. 
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7.2.3 The Relationship between Performance and Awareness 
7.2.3.1 General Results of the Relationship between Performance and Awareness 
In Table 32 an overview is presented of the relationships obtained be­
tween performance and different netalinguistic abilities, i.e. the relations 
a. between correct performance and error detections, 
b. between correct performance and correct pronoun changes, 
с between correct performance and correct reference changes (= changes of 
the predicative adjective), and 
d. between correct performance and correct explanations (cf. Table 32). 
The analyses for these relations are described in 7.2. 
Table 32: Contingency Coefficients for the Associations of Correct Performance 
and Awareness (All Four Groups) 
a 
r e l a t i o n between 
correct perform­
ance and e r r o r 
detections 
Ь 
r e l a t i o n between 
c o r r e c t perform­
ance and correct 
changes of the 
poss. pronoun 
с 
r e l a t i o n between 
correct perform­
ance and correct 
changes of the 
pred. a d j e c t i v e 
d 
r e l a t i o n between 
correct perform­
ance and correct 
explanations 
SEXUS 
PRE 
С = .48 
( x Z . 1 7 . 8 5 . df=1) 
ρ < .001 
С = .52 
( x Z = 2 2 . 3 5 . df=1) 
ρ < .001 
С - .28 
( x Z - 5 . 0 . df=1) 
p < .05 
С = .50 
(χΖ·17.23. df=1) 
ρ < .001 
POST 
С = .35 
( x Z = 8 . 5 . df=1) 
ρ < .01 
С = .31 
( x Z = 6 . 4 3 , df=1) 
p < .02 
С = .15 
(x2=1.39, df=1) 
С = .34 
(xZ=7.72. df=1) 
p < .01 
GENUS 
PRE 
С = .25 
( x Z = 4 . 0 6 . df=1 
ρ < .05 
С = .33 
( x Z = 7 . 5 . df=1) 
p < .01 
С - .15 
(xZ=1.4. df=1) 
С = .01 
(xZ=.0133, 
df=1) 
POST 
С = .14 
( x 2 = 1.16. 
df=1) 
С = .22 
( x Z = 3 . 1 7 , 
df=1) 
С = .32 
(x Z .7.2. 
df=1) 
ρ < .01 
С = .04 
(x2=.12, 
df=1) 
263 
Table 32 shows that correct performance in the sexus task goes hand in 
hand with error detections, changes of the possessive pronoun, and explana-
tions (correct performance and changes of the predicative adjective are only 
associated in sexus/PRE, but not in sexus/POST). In genus we find relatively 
weak associations, except for the correlations of performance with error 
detections and pronoun changes in PRE and the correlation of performance with 
changes of the predicative adjective in POST. The weakest relations are those 
between performance and explanations in genus/PRE and genus/POST. These find-
ings will be discussed in 7.2.3.2. 
Presentation order effects 
Figure 33 and Figure 34 show that there are no major presentation order 
effects with respect to the relation between performance and awareness. 
7.2.3.2 Within-Test Relations between Performance and Awareness as Related 
to Theoretical Expectations 
In 5.6 we formulated three hypotheses with respect to the within-test 
relations between performance and awareness in Study B. 
In the first one (H«4) we expected that awareness can be observed al-
though children do not yet perform correctly. This assumption can be con-
firmed for sexus with respect to error detections, pronoun changes, and 
changes of the predicative adjective (cf. Figure 27 and Figure 28). We even 
observed four children who explained natural gender but could not perform 
correctly. 
H.4 can also be confirmed for genus with respect to error detection and 
pronoun changes (cf. Figure 27 and Figure 28). Moreover, we observed seven 
children who changed the predicative adjective correctly and one child who 
explained genus correctly but could not (yet) perform correctly. However, 
in general children who are aware at an early or late stage are partially 
correct in the performance test as well, i.e. they master at least one pro-
noun (either "ihre" or "seine"). Thus, we conclude that in both sexus and 
genus error detections and corrections are possible without completely cor-
rect performance, but correct explanations are less likely without correct 
performance. 
In general, children who master the awareness tests, show at least par-
tially correct performance. 
In our next hypothesis, H,5, we assumed that performance precedes meta-
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linguistic abilities. For our analysis on the within-test relations betv/een 
performance (= perf) and different metalinguistic abilities (i.e. error 
detections = ed; pronoun changes = pp; reference changes = ref; and explana­
tions = expl) we compared the number of children who perform correctly but 
are not aware (i.e. perf+, ed-; perf+, pp-; perf+, ref-; perf+, expl-) with 
the number of children who cannot perform correctly but are aware (i.e. 
perf-, ed+; perf-, pp+; perf-, ref+; perf-, expl+). This was done for all 
four groups together in PRE and POST, but for sexus and genus separately. 
In general, there are more subjects who can perform correctly but are 
not aware than subjects who cannot perform correctly but are aware. However, 
the within-test relations between performance and error detections, and the 
relation between performance and pronoun changes, do neither in sexus nor in 
genus reveal significant differences. The within-test relations between per­
formance and reference changes and between performance and explanations show 
in sexus and genus significant differences: 
n(perf+, ref-) > n(perf-, ref+) in sexus: X = 12., df = 1, ρ < .001, 
n(perf+, expl-) > n(perf-, expl+) in sexus: X = 10.93, df = 1, ρ < .001, 
n(perf+, ref-) > n(perf-, ref+) in genus: X = 23.12, df = 1, ρ < .001, 
and 
2 
n(perf+, expl-) > n(perf-, expl+) in genus: X = 55.9, df = 1, ρ < .001. 
These results indicate that we cannot reject H.5 although performance 
precedes more clearly reference changes and explanations than error detec­
tions and pronoun corrections. 
In Ндб, our third hypothesis with respect to within-test relations be­
tween performance and awareness, we assumed that it is harder to become aware 
of early acquired pronouns than of later acquired pronouns. Although this 
hypothesis cannot be confirmed with respect to performance and error detec­
tions, pronoun changes, and reference changes in sexus and genus, it is 
fully confirmed with respect to performance and explanations in sexus and 
genus (cf. Fig. 27 and Fig. 28). Genus is earlier correctly used than sexus 
Note that the argimient given in 6.2.3.2 with respect to H.5 ( а Д features 
for correct performance, but only contrasting ones for error detections) 
does not hold anymore. This confirms rather than disconfirms the given ex­
planation. 
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but genus-explanations lag far behind sexus-explanations. It might well be 
that early gender usage is influenced by intralinguistic factors (and not 
conceptual ones) but that gender explanations develop primarily where extra-
linguistic cues are provided. 
This completes the analysis of the within-test relations as far as 
required by the theoretical analyses (cf. section 5). Let us suimarize our 
main findings: 
- error detections and corrections are in both sexus and genus tests possible 
without completely correct performance, but correct explanations are less 
likely without correct performance, 
- performance precedes in general metalinguistic abilities (especially 
reference changes and explanations), and 
- although early gender understanding seems to be influenced by intralinguistic 
factors, gender explanations seem to develop primarily on the basis of 
extralinguistic factors. 
7.2.3.3 Longitudinal Relations between Awareness and Performance 
Let us first repeat our main hypothesis: 
Children who show metalinguistic abilities in the first test but whose 
primary performance is not yet appropriate will improve their primary per-
formance in the second test more than children who are neither aware nor 
perform correctly in the first test. 
In 7.2 we described the data analyses required for a check of our main 
hypothesis in Study B. The procedures are the same as in Study A (cf. 6.2.3.3): 
we dichotomized children's performance scores and awareness scores in PRE 
and compared the absolute performance scores in POST of children with low 
performance and low awareness in PRE (00) with the absolute performance 
scores in POST of children with low performance but high awareness in PRE 
(01). 
In the few cases where a child's performance or awareness score was 
exactly the median for his age group we checked - like in Study A - the 
protocols and transcripts: when very hesitant or inconsistent answers were 
given we decided for a "0"-classification. Since this criterion was still 
insufficient we assigned randomly a "0" or "1" score in all other cases, 
and before the inspection of the performance scores in POST. 
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In 7.2 the final steps of these analyses were described: Four tests 
(error detections, pronoun changes, reference changes, and explanations) for 
each group (and thereafter for all four groups together) were carried out. 
Let us repeat them: 
The first test analyzes differences in means (= M) of performance in 
POST for "00ed"*-children ("00ed" = children with "low perfonnance" and 
"low error detections" in PRE) and "01ed"-children ("01ed" = children with 
"low performance" but "high error detections" in PRE). 
The second test analyzes differences in means (= M) of performance in 
POST for "00 "'"-children ("00 " = children with "low performance" and 
PP PP , — 
"low possessive pronoun corrections" in PRE) and "01 "-children ("01 " = 
children with "low performance" but "high possessive pronoun corrections" in 
PRE). 
The third test analyzes differences in means (= M) of performance in 
POST for "00ref"*-children ("00ref" = children with "low performance" and 
"low reference changes" in PRE) and "01ref"-children ("01ref" = children 
with "low performance" but "high reference changes" in PRE). 
The fourth and last test analyzes differences in means (= M) of perform-
ance in POST of "00 ."'-children ("00eXni" * children with "low performance" 
and "low explanations" in PRE) and "01 ."-children ("01 ," = children 
with "low performance" but "high explanations" in PRE). 
These four tests were applied to each of the groups and to all four 
groups together, for sexus separately and for genus separately. 
For all four tests we applied t-tests after having checked for equal 
variances of the two types of independent observations. 
Let us now look at the results with respect to our main hypothesis, i.e. 
the question whether awareness can be predictive for later performance. 
"ed" stands for "error detection"; "pp" for "possessive £ronoun correction"; 
"ref" for "changes of reference" = "changes of the predicative adjective"; 
"expl" for "explanatiorTT 
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Table 33 Differences In Performance/POSΤ Scores between fcon-Лмаге Children and 
Е а г і у - А м г е Children in Sevus and Genus 
9KPUP 1 
group 2 
group Э 
group A 
a l l four 
enwps 
together 
SEXUS 
e r r o r detections 
significant dif­
ferences between 
• М ^ - .nd -Ol^-
In p«rfonunce/ 
POST 
no ( Ц ^ . 1.5/ 
H 0 1 e a . 2., 
yes (Нщ, -0.75/ 
H ^ . 2 . 2 , 
Ip-e .01/3.47 > 
«(0.95,7) i •1·β»5> 
no W,,,, • 1.75/ 
y.s ( Ц , • 1.3/ 
(p<.00S/<.14> . . 
prone un changes 
stgnlffcant dif­
ferences between 
•00„„" and "01 " 
PP PP 
In perfomance/ 
POST 
no (Hjjjj 1.25/ 
no («„„ . 1.5/ 
no ( Ц 0 • 1.75/ 
С
2
·
1 
no (MJJ - 2.3/ 
yes [И - 1 . 7 / 
PP 
"»'pp' г · 4 , 
(ρ < .05/1.77 > 
І«(О.Ю.»)І- 1 · 7 Μ 
reference changes 
significant dif­
ferences between 
In perforeance/ 
POST 
no « ^ . ,./ 
no (H0 0 . І.ЭЗ/ 
ref 
no ( « m • 1.67/ 
no ( M 0 0 ^ . 2.3/ 
у · ! (И„ · 1.53/ 
M r t f 
H 0 1 r t f . 2.23, 
(p < .025/2.44 > 
1(0.95.26)<· '•™> 
explanations 
significant dif­
ferences between 
•»w ·-
• " ' . e i · ·" 
perfonMnco/POST 
no (%. • 1.25/ 
Ч^Г-' 
^ 'ЧчіГ
 ,
·
: ! 3 / 
no (Η · 1.75/ 
" e i p l 
"οι , -
г
· ' 
"'•«pi 
- ( % . . . ι / 
»·« l"ooeill,- ' · " ' 
"οι ·'•"> 
(ρ < .025/2.25 > 
9nw 1 
gmp 2 
group 3 
gm« 4 
• 1) Грог 
graups 
ugptlar 
Gems 
error œuctiont 
significant differences 
betneen -OO^,· and "Ol^-
perforpance/POST 
no ( H , ^ . .75/ 
* . . • ' • > 
yes (H,, . 1 . / 
(ρ < .005/5.75 > 
¡'(O.gS.S)'· 2 · » , ! ) 
yes («„J . .67/ 
(p< .025/4.19 > 
'
1 (0.95.3)Ι· • ! · 3 5 3 1 
no ( Ц , - 2./ 
"°'Ü" г-5» 
у « ( и ^ • і.г/ 
( p < .005/3.18 > 
'(O.W.ZS)1" 1 ' 6 И , 
pronoun changes 
significant dif­
ferences between 
• V ·»« "»'pp-
In perfomance/ 
POST 
no ( * û 0 - . 8 6 / 
ye. %0 • I.I 
"»С
г
·
1 
(ρ < .05/7.04 > 
''(o.gs.sll' г-1"5' 
yes («„„ . 1./ 
"»С
э
·" 
(ρ < .05/2.53 > 
і«(о.*.з)і- г · 5 5 " 
по (Ищ, • 2.25/ 
у " 'Но '
 м / 
(ρ < .02М.4 > 
reference changes 
significant dif­
ferences between 
•»»ref- ' " ' -"'ref-
In perforasnce/ 
POST 
п. ( Ц ^ . .83/ 
" " . f ' , • , 
no ( Ц , . 1.25/ 
Ό
2
·' 
yes (Γγ0 • .67/ 
(ρ < .05/2.99 > 
'(0.95.3)!· 2.353) 
по (Η,,,, • 2.25/ 
Ό
 2
-
2S) 
"»с;·2·0 
(ρ < .025/2.12 > 
"0.95.29) • ' · " " 
explanations 
significant dif­
ferences between 
••W ·"' 
• 0 1 „ p 1 - in Р.Г-
fon«nce/P05T 
no ^ . M, 
Ч.p,••,· 
Ц,·
4
". 2.5) 
Ί ,
β«ρ1 
(ρ < .01/3.683 > 
¡ ' (o.gs.s)!·2 ·1"5» 
"οι
 Р
 •
 1
· > 
(ρ •< .05/2.53 • 
|«».»л'- г · 3 5 3 ' 
п. (Ч, . 2.1/ 
N ü 1 - ¡ . 2 , , 
У « (Цц • 1.4/ 
" - : : ; ! • 2 • 6 , 
(р < .005/3.36 » 
І'(0.95.29Г- , · 6 ' '» 
* •-• indicates that по child hid "taw perform«:*" In PRE but "high і м т е і Г In PH. 
Rote that when group 1, group 3 and group 4 In seius art tihen together the difference between Ό0*Λ'-children 
and 'Ql^'-chlldron Is also significant with respect to ptrfonnnce/POST (p < .005/3.11 > 1(0,95,17)1 - 1.740). 
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Table 33 shows that in general those children who are aware but cannot 
yet perform correctly in the first test show better performance in the second 
test than children who can neither perform correctly nor are aware in the 
first test. This holds for different kinds of metalinguistic abilities 
(error detections, pronoun changes, reference changes, and explanations) in 
sexus and genus. 
More specifically, it was found that for the sexus task, when all four 
groups are taken together the difference between "00"-children and "01"-
children is significant for error detections (p < .005), for pronoun changes 
(p < .05), for reference changes (p < .025), and for explanations (p < .025). 
The individual age groups all show the same tendency, though significance 
is only reached for group 2 on error detections. 
These results indicate that early awareness (error detections, pronoun 
changes, reference changes, and explanations) may be instrumental or facili-
tative for later performance of natural gender. 
For the genus-task, findings are similar, and even slightly stronger: 
when all four groups are taken together in the genus tests the difference 
between "00"-children and "01"-children is significant for error detections 
(p < .005), for pronoun changes (p < .025), for reference changes (p < .025), 
and for explanations (p < .005). Significant results are also obtained for 
all of these relations in group 3, and all but "reference changes" in group 
2. 
These results suggest that early awareness (error detections, pronoun 
changes, reference changes, and explanations) may be also instrumental or 
facilitative for later perfornance of syntactic gender. 
The results of the sexus and the genus tests seem to confirm our main 
hypothesis: linguistic awareness can function as a feedback mechanism or 
correction device in the gender acquisition of possessive pronouns. 
The main hypothesis is, in both sexus and genus tests, most clearly 
supported for error detections, and for older children (group 2, group 3, 
and group 4). Between the age of four-and-a-half and six years (i.e. in 
group 2 and group 3) early metalinguistic abilities serve more clearly as 
correction device for genus than for sexus performance. The finding that the 
youngest children in genus do not improve their performance from PRE to POST 
as much as older children could be due to the automaticity in early genus 
acquisition. The fact that early corrections (pronoun changes and reference 
changes) do not have an apparent influence on later genus performance in the 
control group can be explained by the observation that the genus performance 
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in PRE is (because of plurifunctional usage which night have been the result 
of the preceding awareness test) already quite good and that it does not 
improve very much in POST (note that the sexus perfomance improves more 
from PRE to POST with respect to "standard" performance, cf. Figure 25 and 
Figure 26). 
In our last hypothesis (H.S) which also concerns longitudinal relations 
between awareness and performance in Study В we expected that early language 
performance is stronger correlated with later language performance than early 
reflective abilities. 
In order to test this hypothesis we used - like in Study A - Kendall's 
partial rank correlation coefficients for partial correlations between aware­
ness in PRE and performance in POST (partialling out the effect of perform­
ance in PRE) and for partial correlations between performance in PRE and 
performance in POST (partialling out the effect of awareness in PRE). This 
was done in four tests (error detections, pronoun changes, reference changes, 
and explanations). In sexus and genus, for each of the four groups and for 
the four groups together we carried out all four tests. 
The analyses were done like in Study A. In a first step we detemined 
three correlations. The first one is the correlation between perfomance in 
POST (= perf;, = y, "x" is based on the number of correct pronouns in POST, 
i.e. fron 0 to 3*) and awareness in PRE (in our first test error detections 
in PRE=y ., in the second test pronoun changes in PRE-y , in our third test 
reference changes in PRE=y ,, and in our fourth test explanations in 
PRE=y ι ; "y" is based on the number of correct error detections, or pronoun 
changes, or reference changes, or explanations in the three error detection 
tasks in sexus, and genus respectively, i.e. from 0 to 3). 
The second one is the correlation between performance in POST (= perf« 
= x) and performance in PRE (= perf. = Z; "Z" is based on the number of cor­
rect pronouns in PRE, i.e. from 0 to 3). The third correlation is between 
awareness in PRE (i.e. in our first test = у ¿ι in our second test = у ; 
τ 
With the inclusion of plurifunctional usage three pronouns could be maximal­
ly correct in either sexus or genus. We ranked our observations on the χ 
variable from 1 to N (N is the number of subjects in a group). Our computa­
tions had to be corrected for ties because some Ss had the same scores. 
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in our third test = У
г е
*; in our fourth test = У
ех
г|-|) a nd performance in PRE 
(= perf, = Z). 
For each group in sexus and genus we had three correlations in each 
test, for error detections T
x v e d> Туе^'
 a n d Ί
χ ζ
»
 f o r
 pronoun changes „„__. 
'
Typpz' a n d τχζ· f o r r e f e r e n c e changes T
x y r e f , T y r e f z , and Γ χ 2, and for ex­
planations Τ
 x
 j, T
v e x
n i
z
»
 a n d T
x z
 '
n o t e t h a t r
x z
 i s t,ie s a m e i n a 1 1 f o u r 
tests). 
In a second step, we determined for the first test (error detections) 
the correlation between performance in POST and error detections in PRE, 
partialling out performance in PRE, (т
Х
 вн
 z
)» ancl the correlation between 
performance in POST and performance in PRE, partialling out error detections 
i n P R E
· ^xz.yed)· 
Similarly, for our second test (pronoun changes) the correlation between 
performance in POST and pronoun changes in PRE, partialling out performance 
in PRE, ( T X V D D z)» was determined as well as the correlation between perform­
ance in POST and performance in PRE, partialling out pronoun changes in PRE, 
(T ). 
xz.ypp' 
For our third test (reference changes) the correlation between perform-
nace in POST and reference changes in PRE, partialling out performance in 
PRE, ( T
x v r
pf ,)» was analyzed as well as the correlation between performance 
in POST and performance in PRE, partialling out reference changes in PRE, 
(τ ) 1
 xz.yref 
Finally, for our fourth test (explanations) the correlation between 
performance in POST and explanations in PRE, partialling out performance in 
PRE, (T
xvex[)i , ) . was determined as well as the correlation between perform­
ance in POST and performance in PRE, partialling out explanations in PRE, 
^xz.yexpl*· 
These eight partial correlations (T
xve(j z as compared to Τ .; 
T
xypp.z a s c o m P a r e d t 0 Txz.ypp; Vef.z a s ¿ o m P a r e d t0 Txz.yref;'xyexpl .z a- c o m P a r e d 
to Τ
 v e x D i ) were analyzed for each of the four groups and for all four 
groups together, in sexus and genus. 
The results are presented in Table 34. 
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Table 34 Partial Correlations between Early Awareness and Later Performance and 
between Early Performance and Later Pertormance 
group 1 
(N•16) 
group 2 
ÏN-13) 
«roup 3 
f f M f l ) 
group 4 
(N-14) 
a l l four 
groups 
together 
(N.61) 
GENUS | 
Імаreness* 
Errar detections 
τ 
•yed г 
p a r t i a l cor­
r e l a t i o n s 
between per-
fomance in 
POST and 
e r r o r detec­
tions m PRE. 
p a r t t a l l l n g 
out p e r f o m -
ance in PRE 
26 
70 
74 
68 
4Θ 
M yed 
p a r t i a l cor­
r e l a t i o n s 
between 
performance 
POST and 
performance 
in PRE, 
p a r t t a l l l n g 
out e r r o r 
detections 
In PRE 
47 
η 
19 
- 65 
02 
Avareness-
'вурр I 
p a r t i a l 
correlations 
between per­
formance in 
POST and 
changes in 
PRE par-
t l a l H n g 
out per 
formaпсе 
in PRE 
3» 
50 
36 
30 
38 
Г
« УРР 
p a r t i a l cor­
r e l a t i o n s 
between 
performance 
In POST and 
performance 
in PRE. par 
t t a l l l n g out 
changes In 
PRE 
37 
27 
06 
- 49 
04 
Reference Changes 
nyref г 
p a r t i a l cor 
r e l a t i o n s 
between 
performance 
in POST and 
r e f e r e n c e 
changes I n 
PRE. par-
t i a l l i n g 
out per­
formance 
in PRE 
41 
31 
64 
10 
19 
12 yr*f 
p a r t i a l cor 
relat ions 
between per 
formane« in 
POST and 
performance 
in PRE, par 
t l a l l l n g out 
reference 
changes In 
PRE 
S3 
24 
16 
-.41 
25 
h r t renest-
1 Eiplanattons 
•yeipl ι 
p a r t i a l 
c o r r e l a t i o n s 
between 
performence 
I n POST and 
e i p l a n a t I o n s 
In PRE, 
p a r t t a l l l n g 
out per­
formance 
In PRE 
02 
. M 
31 
44 
11 
" i t yeipl 
p a r t i a l 
correla 
l ioni 
betwen 
perform 
ance i n 
POST and 
eiplana­
ttons In 
PRE. par-
t l a l l l n g 
out e i -
planjt ions 
In PRE 
53 
33 
36 
- 36 
30 
group 1 
(N 16) 
group г 
(N-13) 
group 3 
ÍN IS) 
group 4 
fPM«> 
a l l four 
groups 
together 
(N 61) 
SEXUS 
Awareness' 
Error detections 
« y e d ï * 
p a r t i a l 
corre lat ions 
between per-
formance in 
POST and 
error detec-
tions In PRE, 
p a r t i a l l ing 
out perform-
ance In PRE 
35 
44 
55 
32 
46 
iz yed 
p a r t i a l 
corre lat ions 
between per 
forma nee in 
P0ST and 
performance 
in PRE, 
p a r t l a l l i n g 
out error 
detections 
In PRE 
Awareness • 
Pronoun Changes 
«ypp г 
p a r t i a l 
c o r r e l a t i o n s 
between per 
formanee in 
POST and 
pronoun 
changes in 
PRE, par 
t i a l l i n g 
out per 
formance 
in PRE 
| 09 
33 
21 
»8 
14 
^ 69 
36 
61 
41 
« ypp 
p a r l l i l 
correlftt ions 
tetmen per 
romance In 
POST and 
performance 
in PRE, ear 
t i a l l i n g out 
pronoun 
changes In 
in P M 
64 
55 
32 
- 33 
16 
• 
| ReFerence Changes 
V e f 2 
p a r t i a l 
c o r r e l a t i o n s 
between per-
f o n w n c e 1n 
POST and 
r e f e r e n c e 
changes In 
PPt. par 
t i a l l i n g out 
perfonwnce 
in PRE 
4g 
26 
46 
- IS 
2І 
Г
« y r e f 
p a r t i a l 
c o r r e l a 
l ions 
between 
perform­
ance In 
POST and 
perform­
ance in 
PRE. par 
t i a l l i n g 
out 
reference 
changes 
In PRE 
49 
20 
12 
M 
34 
E*p1anatlons 
иуекрі l 
p a r t i a l 
t l o n s 
perform­
ance In 
POST and 
e i p l « n a ­
t i o n s In 
PRE, par­
t l a l l i n g 
out per­
formance 
In PRE 
Ü6 
37 
6 
49 
46 
u r e . p l 
р а г П а Г 
tlons 
perform 
ance in 
Post and 
and per­
formance 
in PRE, 
p a r t i a l 
l inn out 
eaplana-
tlons in 
PRE 
50 
10 
37 
28 
to 
Note that tests of the significance
 г
 and
 x t are not possible because the observations are not independent 
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Table 34 indicates that, except for the youngest children in group 1, per-
formance in POST is in general stronger correlated with awareness in PRE 
than with performance in PRE. This holds for sexus as well as for genus. 
Let us first discuss the results for sexus: except for the youngest 
children, performance in POST is stronger positively correlated with error 
detections, pronoun changes, and explanations in PRE than with performance 
in PRE. This can be seen for group 2, group 3, group 4, and all four groups 
together. However, performance in POST is in group 4 and in all four groups 
together stronger correlated with performance in PRE than with reference 
changes in PRE. An explanation for this could be that children often chose 
only one kind of pronoun correction, either a pronoun change or a reference 
change, and reference changes were relatively rare when compared with pronoun 
changes. This holds especially for control group 4 (cf. Figure 32). Perform-
ance in POST is in all four groups together most strongly correlated with 
error detections in PRE. 
In genus, we observe relatively similar results as in sexus, except for 
explanations. Performance in POST is in genus stronger positively correlated 
with error detections and pronoun changes in PRE than with performance in 
PRE in all groups, with one exception: in the youngest group, performance 
in POST is stronger correlated with performance in PRE than with error 
detections in PRE. Although performance in POST is in group 2, group 3, and 
group 4 stronger positively correlated with reference changes in PRE than 
with performance in PRE, performance in POST is in group 1 and in all four 
groups together stronger correlated with performance in PRE than with 
reference changes in PRE. Unlike in sexus, performance in genus/POST, group 
3, and in all four groups taken together, is stronger correlated with per-
formance in PRE than with explanations in PRE (in both sexus and genus tasks 
this finding holds also for the youngest children). Like in sexus, perform-
ance in genus/POST for the four groups together, is most strongly correlated 
with error detections in PRE. 
Thus, we have to reject our hypothesis that early language performance 
is stronger correlated with later language performance than are early 
reflective abilities for our tasks. It seems that in general early awareness 
is more predictive for later performance than is early performance. This 
holds more for older than for younger children, more for error detections, 
pronoun changes, and explanations in sexus than for reference changes in 
sexus, and more for error detections and pronoun changes in genus than for 
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reference changes and explanations in genus. 
A possible reason for the observation that early awareness is less pre­
dictive for later performance than early performance in younger children 
could be that gender is first automatically used without much reflection 
(though not necessarily always correctly). Still, at a later stage awareness 
seems to be instrumental for acquiring additional aspects of gender usage. 
We now want to turn to our last question: is linguistic performance in 
PRE facultative for linguistic awareness in POST? Like in Study A, the 
procedure of our analysis was very similar to the one of our main hypothesis. 
We compared the absolute awareness scores (error detections, pronoun changes, 
reference changes, and explanations) in POST of children with "high perform­
ance" but "low awareness" (low error detections, pronoun changes, reference 
changes, and explanations) in PRE with absolute awareness scores in POST of 
children with "low performance" and "low awareness" in PRE. None of our 
comparisons proved to be significant with one exception: early genus perform­
ance is a predictor for the ability in POST to change pronouns in the genus 
awareness tests (group 1: ρ < .05; group 3: ρ < .025; all four groups to­
gether: ρ < .01). This means that early performance is in general not pre­
dictive for later awareness except for the facilitation of early genus per­
formance for later pronoun corrections in genus. 
Let us sumnarize our findings with respect to the longitudinal relations 
between awareness and performance in the gender study: 
- early linguistic awareness may be "instrumental" or "facilitative" for 
later performance, 
- early awareness seems, in general, to be more predictive for later perform­
ance than early performance, and 
- early performance is in general not predictive for later awareness. 
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8. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The m a m finding of this study is that the child's linguistic awareness 
at one stage of development is predictive for his linguistic performance at 
a later stage. We found that this holds generally for all types of linguistic 
awareness neasured in this study error detections and pronoun corrections 
(Study A and Study B ) , as well as reference changes and explanations (Study 
B). 
The significance of these results is enhanced by the fact that linguis-
tic performance at an early stage is, generally, less predictive for later 
performance in the same tasks, than is linguistic awareness. Moreover, 
linguistic perfomance at an early stage is, in almost all cases, non-
predictive for linguistic awareness at a later stage. 
One cannot, therefore, explain the main result by assigning it to the 
development of a unified underlying linguistic competence which is equally 
well reflected in the child's linguistic awareness and performance. If early 
awareness is a better predictor for later performance on a particular linguis-
tic task, than is early perfonrance on that very same task, there is reason 
to assign a specific instrumental role to linguistic awareness in the child's 
acquisition of linguistic skills (i.e. linguistic awareness is not merely 
an epiphenomenon in language acquisition). Early awareness is, so to say, a 
litmus test for linguistic ingredients which appear overtly only at a later 
stage of development. Or, in other words, awareness tests present us with 
insights into what the child is "working at". By explicit questioning, the 
child may reveal knowledge which is not yet available to him in fully 
"automatized" form. Our performance tasks consisted in finding the correct 
referent for a linguistic expression containing a possessive pronoun. This 
is a perceptual task which, normally, involves no "controlled" or conscious 
processing. There is automatic application of tacit knowledge, no higher level 
problem solving. 
For the age levels and tasks we used in this study, the child may have 
missed the ability to access linguistic information at a fully automatic 
level, even if that information were available to more conscious processing. 
When asked for a referent of a linguistic expression, the child would, 
generally, reply in the "automatic mode", thus often missing access to rel-
evant linguistic information. Only when forced into a conscious or "controlled 
mode" of processing, access to the relevant information would be realized. 
Presence (or absence) of this relevant information, or knowledge, appears to 
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be the best predictor for later automatic processing. 
This, then, provides us with important insight in the way linguistic 
knowledge "enters the system": the stage of automatic access to information 
is, apparently, preceeded by a stage where the information is only conscious-
ly accessible as in a real problem solving situation. This existence of a 
preliminary "conscious" stage strongly resembles the situation in the 
acquisition of some other skills, such as car-driving, writing, or typing. 
Initially, there is a build up of conscious knowledge which can only be 
accessed in a "controlled mode". Only repeated use of such knowledge makes 
it accessible to automatic processing. 
Such a progression of stages is rather surprising for the acquisition 
of linguistic skills, though. It is increasingly apparent that, in terms of 
development, linguistic abilities in the child are more on a par with other 
biologically preprogramed systems, such as locomotion and vision, than with 
non-native skills such as writing, or bike-riding. These preprogrammad 
systems are supposed to develop "automatically", without much conscious 
effort or "controlled processing", though we are not aware of any experimen-
tal tests of these suppositions. 
The question to be answered, therefore, is how generalizable our find-
ings are to other linguistic skills. All tasks in the present study involved 
the comprehension of possessive pronouns. Are they a special class? Could it 
be that our findings will stay limited to the acquisition of lexical items 
with variable reference, such as deictic pronouns, deictic verbs, or kinship 
terms? This is surely possible. In fact, this implies a suggestion for further 
research: apply similar tests to the acquisition of other variable terms as 
well as to non-variable (or rather less variable) reference terms. If any-
thing of the same sort is found there, extensions to other than lexical forms 
of knowledge might be envisaged, so, for instance, knowledge of sentence-
internal anaphoric constraints (cf. Deutsch & Koster, 1982), or phonological 
knowledge (which is, clearly, so much involved in learning to read). A 
particularly important extension would concern knowledge of pragmatic use. 
Still, if similar findings would be obtained in such tests, we see no 
reason to conclude that linguistic skills are, after all, on a par with 
"arbitrary" skills, such as typing or car-driving. Preprogramned biological 
abilities are characterized by the constraints they impose on the end-state 
of the skill. Just as human locomotion varies within very narrow boundaries, 
the scale of possible human languages seems to be highly constrained as well. 
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But the existence of strong biological constraints does not tell us anything 
about the way in which these constraints are realized in the process of 
acquisition. A stage of "controlled processing" might well be involved in 
the child's acquisition of various linguistic skills: the constraints are 
imposed on the set of alternatives the child chooses to consider in this 
conscious processing. 
It is, on the other hand, surely possible that some linguistic skills 
do not proceed through such a stage. In fact, there is evidence in our data 
that the youngest age group acquired aspects of syntactic gender without 
showing the otherwise quite general phenomenon in our data: their initial 
awareness of syntactic gender is non-predictive for their later performance. 
It could be that syntactic, i.e. language-internal, agreement relations 
develop rather more early and at an automatic level than agreement relations 
involving extra-linguistic referents. These, we feel, are the main issues to 
be considered in further research. Over and above these, the present study 
gave occasion to observe various other aspects of linguistic acquisition 
which might warrant further study. 
We found that "linguistic awareness" is not a unified factor in language 
acquisition. This makes it even more necessary than expounded in chapter 
6.2.2,to investigate the interrelationships between different types of meta-
knowledge in child development (research along these lines is reported by 
Yussen & Bird, 1979; as to theoretical positions on the metacognition/meta-
language relationship, cf. Van Kleeck, 1982; Goldman, 1982), and to explore 
the relations of different types of metaknowledge with respect to different 
cognitive abilities in development (as to the relation of metamemory and 
performance, cf. e.g. Waters, 1982). 
Moreover, the present study did not exhaust the different ways awareness 
might arise or function. In chapter 4.2 several causes and functions of 
awareness were mentioned which were not studied in our experiments. So, for 
instance, awareness as a coordination or a superaddition device. Again 
further study might be helpful to disentangle the role of these causes and 
functions in language acquisition. 
Another point in need of further analysis is the question whether older 
children (at the formal-operational stage) show more advanced awareness of 
rules, norms and conventions involving the notion of "intersubjectivity" than 
younger children who mainly exhibit awareness of dyadic interactions. One 
wonders when children attain Selman's level 3, i.e. awareness for mutual 
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perspectives, and when level 4 (multi-dimensional communication), but how 
specifically as measured in linguistic tasks. Is there a "linguistic preced­
ence" for the higher levels of social-cognitive awareness, just as we 
observed for the lower levels in our subjects? Clearly, there is the important 
general issue of the relations between linguistic awareness and social-
cognitive awareness (e.g. of friendship or morality concepts). 
The apparent importance of these and similar issues in the study of 
awareness and consciousness makes one agree with Norman (1979, p. 43) when 
he states: 
"When we come to understand the mechanisms of awareness, then we will 
have made a major step in our understanding of ourselves". 
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SUMMARY 
In this study we are concerned with the enigmatic role of "linguistic 
awareness", the ability to reflect and conment on language structures and 
functions, in language development. 
Two major aims are pursued. A first aim of this work is the investigation 
of children's understanding (performance) and awareness (different metalinguis-
tic abilities) of German possessive pronouns in language development. A second 
aim concerns causes and functions of metalinguistic abilities in language 
acquisition. Failure in communication might be a cause for linguistic aware-
ness to arise, a possible function of linguistic awareness could be prevention 
or repair of such failure. 
The main thesis is that linguistic awareness has an instrumental function 
in the development of primary linguistic skills, and that one should therefore 
expect that linguistic awareness at one stage of development (as apparent 
from error detection, the ability to provide better alternatives, and expla-
nations) has predictive value for the child's primary language skill, es-
pecially in understanding ability, at a next stage of development. 
We set up two studies in which understanding and awareness of German possessive 
pronouns were cross-sectionally and longitudinally tested. The focus of the 
first study, "shifting reference" (Study A), is children's understanding and 
awareness of the speaker/addressee shift, especially in those pronouns which 
change their form according to the point of reference (speaker or addressee). 
The focus of the second study, "natural and syntactic gender" (Study B), is 
children's understanding and awareness of "natural gender" with its extra-
linguistic reference and of "syntactic gender" with its intralinguistic 
reference. Both of these studies have the same experimental design. German 
possessive pronouns serve as our study material. 
This book consists of eight chapters, and begins with the research aims 
and some research requirements (chapter 1). 
Chapter 2 is devoted to the linguistic analysis of those pronouns which 
are used in the experiments of both studies. Various features of pronouns 
are considered: morphophonological, syntactic, semantic, and deictic features. 
Complexity of the different pronouns is analyzed in terms of these character-
istics. 
Chapter 3 derives the general predictions on the order of pronoun 
acquisition with respect to the performance tests. Our predictions are based 
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on differential complexities of morphophonological, syntactic, semantic, and 
deictic features. In 3.4 we give an overview of the predictions for the com­
prehension tests (performance) in Study A, "shifting reference", (cf. Table 10) 
and of the predictions for the comprehension tests (performance) in Study B, 
"natural and syntactic gender", (cf. Table 11). In 3.5 we deal with longitudi­
nal and cross-sectional studies on the acquisition of possessive pronouns 
from the literature with respect to these predictions. 
Chapter 4 contains general assumptions on linguistic awareness. In 4.1 
we are concerned with assumptions on the structure of linguistic awareness, 
and in 4.2 with assumptions on its functions. In 4.3 we review the research 
literature on overt expressions of different metalinguistic abilities. This 
review deals mainly with those metalinguistic abilities which are investigated 
in the present research: error detections, corrections, and explanations. 
In chapter 5 we present general hypotheses on the role of linguistic 
awareness with respect to our studies. Our main hypothesis is that early 
metalinguistic abilities can be predictive for later performance. 
Chapter б is devoted to Study A, "shifting reference". Performance and 
awareness tasks were given to 59 German children at ages 3 to 6. Two sorts of 
data were collected at two different points of time (time interval of five 
months). 
The results of the perfonrance tests show that children's acquisition 
of possessive pronouns is most likely influenced by a combination of semantic 
and deictic (proximal) features. The predictions of the Semantic Feature 
Hypothesis (SFH) and those which are based on the "proximal-nonproximal 
contrast" are clearly more powerful than those based on morphophonological, 
syntactic, and other deictic characteristics. A few additional factors seem 
also to be involved in pronoun acquisition: the child's concentration on the 
dyad of the interlocutors, his preservation of the "gender" feature in the 
speaker pronoun "my" and the addressee pronoun "your", a conflict of pronouns 
which relate to a 3rd person participant and plural pronouns, as well as non­
verbal factors. 
The results of the awareness tests indicate that our predictions on lin­
guistic awareness could be partially confirmed. It seems that children become 
more easily aware if something is different from their own egocentric point 
of view (and not just from an adult's point of view). Different metalinguis­
tic abilities do not develop in the same way. If the quality of pronoun 
corrections is considered, we can see that linguistic judgments (i.e. error 
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detections) precede appropriate corrections. 
Other influential factors seem to be at work in children's metalinguistic 
abilities: the enhancement of linguistic awareness through metalinguistic ex-
perience (this finding argues against postulating one metalinguistic capacity), 
the saliency of dyadic factors, the change from egocentricity in younger 
children to perspective-taking in older children (there is evidence for the 
existence of four partially overlapping but discernible stages in the de-
velopment of children's self-reflections and social cognitions), children's 
striving for intralinguistic coherence, and a growing awareness of Grice's 
cooperative principle. 
As to the relation between early awareness and later performance we could 
confirm the main hypothesis, early linguistic awareness (as apparent from 
error detections and corrections) is predictive for later performance. This 
result supports the view that awareness can be instrumental or facultative 
for the development of primary linguistic skills. We also obtained two further 
interesting results: firstly, early awareness (as apparent from error detec-
tions and corrections) seems to be in general more predictive for later per-
formance than early performance, and secondly, early linguistic performance 
is not predictive for later awareness. 
Chapter 7 deals with Study B, "natural and syntactic gender". Perform-
ance and awareness tasks were given to 61 German children at ages 3 to 6 
(there were different children in Study A and in Study B). Again, two sorts 
of data were collected at two different points of time (a time interval of 
five months). 
The results of the performance tests reveal an unexpected outcome: 
"syntactic gender" with its morphophonological/syntagmatic base and intra-
linguistic reference is earlier acquired than "natural gender" with its 
semantic/cognitive base and extralinguistic reference. Apparently, morpho-
phonological factors seem to be at work in early gender acquisition, i.e. 
the "Piagetian-cognitive" point of view is not supported. Moreover, a couple 
of other factors seem to be influential: firstly, children show plurifunc-
tional usage in the performance tests if awareness tests are given prior to 
the performance tests; secondly, children rely on extralinguistic factors 
in the "natural gender" tasks, and thirdly, mistakes in the "syntactic gender" 
tasks can, in part, be explained by children's stereotypes. 
The results of the awareness tests show that - like in Study A - our 
predictions could be partially confirmed. Children "correct" not only incor-
rect utterances but also correct ones in case of plurifunctional pronouns. 
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Study В exhibits even more clearly than Study A that we should not assume the 
existence of one unified metalinguistic ability (explanations are very dif­
ferent for natural and syntactic gender). Also, it is easier to become aware 
of natural gender with its extralinguistic reference than of syntactic gender 
with its intralinguistic reference although pronoun corrections in syntactic 
gender can precede pronoun corrections in natural gender. 
There are seven other factors underlying awareness in natural and syn­
tactic gender tasks. The first three factors were also found in Study A: the 
enhancement of awareness (error detections and corrections) through metalin­
guistic experience, children's striving for intralinguistic coherence, and 
awareness of the cooperative principle in conversations. The fourth factor 
is the child's post-hoc rationalizing when he uses natural gender for ex­
plaining syntactic gender. The fifth one is the partial awareness of pronoun 
features (e.g. the child masters only the possessiveness feature in the aware­
ness tasks). The sixth one is children's preference for natural gender in 
gender conflict tasks. The seventh and last factor is children's stereotyping 
In their explanations (they say, for instance, "it must be her and not his 
yellow colour - for the yellow watering-can - because light colours are girls' 
colours"). 
As to the relation between early awareness and later performance we can 
show that - like in Study A - early linguistic awareness (as apparent from 
error detections, corrections, and explanations) is predictive for later per­
formance. Two further findings are noteworthy: firstly, early awareness (as 
apparent from error detections, corrections, and explanations) seems to be 
in general more predictive for later performance than early performance for 
older children. Secondly, in general early linguistic performance is not pre­
dictive for later awareness - with one exception: early linguistic perform­
ance relates to later pronoun corrections in syntactic gender. 
Chapter 8 discusses some theoretical implications of our main findings, 
namely: awareness tests present us with insights into what the child is 
"working at". For the age levels and tasks of our study, the child may have 
missed the ability to access linguistic information at a fully automatic 
level, even if that information were available to more conscious processing. 
Presence (or absence) or this relevant information, or knowledge, appears to 
be the best predictor for later automatic processing. Thus, we may assume 
the existence of a preliminary "conscious" stage in the development of auto­
matic pronoun processing. 
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Although our results are the first experimental data suggesting a speci-
fic role for metalinguistic abilities in the acquisition of automatic language 
understanding, the study is necessarily limited in scope and leaves untouched 
a range of important issues. Therefore, chapter 8 nakes also suggestions for 
further research which may stimulate studies with respect to the role of 
awareness in the acquisition of linguistic and other cognitive abilities. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Dit onderzoek betreft de raadselachtige rol van "taalbewustzijn", het 
vermogen om over structuur en functie van taal na te denken en te rapporteren, 
in de taalontwikkeling van kinderen. Het onderzoek heeft twee doelstellingen. 
De eerste is de ontwikkeling in kaart te brengen van het gebruik, met name 
het begrijpen, van bezittelijke voornaamwoorden door Duitse kinderen, alsook 
van hun ontwikkelend taalbewustzijn ten aanzien van die pronomina. De tweede 
doelstelling betreft de oorzaken en functie van metalinguïstische vaardig-
heden in de taalontwikkeling. Falende communicatie kan een oorzaak zijn voor 
het ontstaan van taalreflectie; een nogelijke functie van zulke vaardigheden 
kan gelegen zijn in de preventie of het herstel van zulk falen. De kern van 
dit onderzoek betreft echter de vraag naar de functie van taalbewustzijn in 
de taalontwikkeling. De hoofdstelling is dat taalbewustzijn een instrumentele 
functie heeft in de ontwikkeling van het taalgedrag, en dat derhalve taal-
bewustzijn in een bepaald stadium van ontwikkeling (zoals blijkt uit detectie, 
verbetering en verklaren van linguïstisch falen) predictieve waarde heeft 
voor het taalgebruik, met name het taalverstaan van het kind in een later 
stadium. 
Wij deden twee empirische studies waarin taalverstaan en bewustzijn van be 
zittelijke voornaamwoorden zowel cross-sectioneel (verschillende leeftijds-
groepen) als longitudinaal (herhaald testen van dezelfde kinderen op ver-
schillende leeftijden) werden onderzocht. 
De eerste studie, "referentie-verschuivingen" (Studie A), richt zich op 
het begrijpen en het bewustzijn van de zg. spreker/aangesprokene-verschuiving, 
speciaal voor pronomina zoals "mein' en "dein", die afhankelijk zijn van het 
referentiepunt (spreker of aangesprokene). 
De tweede studie, over "natuurlijk en syntactisch geslacht" (Studie B), 
vergelijkt "natuurlijk geslacht", dat extralinguistische referentie heeft, 
met "syntactisch geslacht" dat intralinguistisch gebonden is. Ook hier wordt 
taaibegrip en taalbewustzijn bepaald bij kinderen. 
De twee studies hebben dezelfde experimentele opzet, en in beide werden 
bezittelijke voornaamwoorden als onderzoeksmateriaal gebruikt. 
Dit boek bestaat uit acht hoofdstukken het begint met een beschrijving 
van de doelstellingen en de aan het onderzoek te stellen eisen (Hoofdstuk 1). 
Hoofdstuk 2 is gewijd aan de linguïstische analyse van de voornaamwoor-
den die in de twee experimentele studies gebruikt worden. Van die voornaam-
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woorden worden morfonologische, syntactische, semantische, en deictische ken-
merken onderzocht. De complexiteit van de verschillende voornaamwoorden wordt 
in termen van die kenmerken geanalyseerd. 
Hoofdstuk 3 leidt een aantal algemene voorspellingen af over de volgorde 
waarin de kinderen die voornaamwoorden leren gebruiken. Die voorspellingen 
zijn gebaseerd op de juist genoemde complexiteit van de linguistische kenmer-
ken. In paragraaf 3.4 wordt een overzicht gegeven van de predicties voor de 
begripstests in Studie A, "referentie-verschuivingen" (vgl. Tabel 10), en 
van die voor de begripstests in Studie B, "natuurlijk en syntactisch geslacht" 
(vgl. Tabel 11). Paragraaf 3.5 geeft een literatuuroverzicht van longitudina-
le en cross-sectionele onderzoeken over de verwerving van bezittelijke voor-
naamwoorden vanuit het gezichtspunt van deze voorspellingen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt een aantal opvattingen over taalbewustzijn. Struc-
tuur en functie van taalbewustzijn komen achtereenvolgens ter sprake in para-
grafen 4.1 en 4.2. Paragraaf 4.3 geeft een literatuuroverzicht van onderzoek 
naar overte expressies van metalinguïstische vaardigheden. Het beperkt zich 
voornamelijk tot vaardigheden die ook in ons onderzoek getest worden: fout-
detectie, - correctie, en - verklaring. 
In hoofdstuk 5 leiden we een aantal hypothesen af over de rol van taal-
bewustzijn met betrekking tot onze empirische studies. De belangrijkste 
hypothese is dat de aanwezigheid van metalinguïstische vaardigheden in een 
bepaalde fase van ontwikkeling voorspellende waarde kan hebben voor het 
correcte taalgebruik in een later stadium. 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt Studie A behandeld, "referentie-verschuivingen". 
Aan 59 Duitse kinderen, variërend van 3 tot 6 jaar, werden begrips- en 
bewustzijnstaken gegeven. Er werden twee soorten data vergaard: cross-sectio-
nele, en longitudinale waarbij dezelfde kinderen na vijf maanden opnieuw 
werden getest. 
De resultaten van de gebruikstests tonen aan dat de verwervingsvolgorde 
van bezittelijke voornaamwoorden hoogst waarschijnlijk wordt bepaald door 
een combinatie van semantische en proximaal-deictische kenmerken. De voor-
spellingen op grond van de "Semantische Kenmerken Hypothese", en op grond 
van het "Proximaal-distaal Contrast" zijn aanzienlijk beter in overeenstem-
ming met de data dan voorspellingen gebaseerd op morfonologische, syntac-
tische en andere deictische kenmerken. Er is ook een aantal additionele 
factoren werkzaam in de verwerving van deze voornaamwoorden: de mate waarin 
het kind zich concentreert op de dyade van spreker en luisteraar; de tendens 
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om het natuurlijk geslacht van "mijn" en van "jouw" te handhaven; een conflict 
tussen pronomina voor derde persoon en meervoud; alsmede enkele niet-verbale 
factoren. 
De resultaten van de bewustzijnstests geven een gedeeltelijke bevestiging 
van de voorspellingen. Het blijkt dat kinderen zich relatief snel bewust wor-
den van dingen die uit egocentrisch oogpunt verschillend zijn (en dus niet 
alleen uit het oogpunt van de volwassen gesprekspartner). Het blijkt verder 
dat verschillende metalinguistische vermogens zich niet gelijknamig ontwikke-
len. Detectie van linguistisch falen gaat bijvoorbeeld in de ontwikkeling 
vooraf aan het kunnen corrigeren van zulk falen. 
Behalve de voorspelde effecten, blijken er ook andere ontwikkelingsver-
schijnselen op te treden: de toename van taalbewustzijn door specifieke 
metalinguistische ervaringen (Dat soort taalbewustzijn blijft echter beperkt 
tot die specifieke ervaringen); de opvallendheid van dyadische factoren, en 
met name de verandering van egocentriciteit in jongere kinderen naar het ver-
mogen om van gezichtspunt te veranderen in oudere kinderen (dit proces ver-
loopt in vier onderscheidbare maar enigszins overlappende fasen); het streven 
van kinderen naar coherentie binnen hun linguistische systeem; het groeien-
de bewustzijn van het coöperatieve principe dat door Grice is beschreven. 
Voor wat betreft de relatie tussen eerder taalbewustzijn en later taal-
gebruik vonden we bevestiging van onze belangrijkste hypothese, namelijk dat 
taalbewustzijn in een vroeg stadium (blijkens foutdetecties en -correcties) 
een goede voorspeller is voor correct taalgebruik vijf maanden later. Het 
ligt voor de hand om aan taalbewustzijn een instrumentele of faciliterende 
functie toe te kennen in de ontwikkeling van het primaire taalgebruik. Dit 
resultaat krijgt extra cachet in het licht van twee andere bevindingen: het 
taalbewustzijn in de eerste test is een betere voorspeller van het taalgebruik 
in de tweede test, vijf maanden later, dan het taalgebruik in de eerste test. 
Bovendien blijkt taalgebruik in de eerste test geen predictieve waarde te 
hebben voor taalbewustzijn in de tweede test. 
Hoofdstuk 7 gaat over Studie B, "natuurlijk en syntactisch geslacht". 
Aan een nieuwe groep van 61 Duitse kinderen van 3 tot 6 jaar werden weer 
begrips- en bewustzijnstaken gegeven. Ook werden weer cross-sectionele en 
longitudinale data verzameld, de laatste over een tijdsspanne van vijf maan-
den. 
De gebruikstests geven een onverwacht resultaat: "syntactisch geslacht" 
met zijn morfonologisch/syntactische basis, en zijn intralinguistische refe-
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rentie wordt vroeger verworven dan "natuurlijk geslacht" met zijn semantisch/ 
cognitieve basis en zijn extralinguistische referentie. Blijkbaar spelen mor-
fonologisch-syntaktische factoren een belangrijke rol in de eerste fase van 
de verwerving van linguistisch geslacht. Dat is in strijd met de Piagetaans-
cognitieve opvattingen over taalverwerving. Voorts speelt er nog een aantal 
andere factoren een rol: ten eerste vertonen kinderen de mogelijkheid het 
voornaamwoord "sein" spontaan een mannelijke zowel als een onzijdige inter-
pretatie te geven ("plurifunctioneel gebruik") wanneer de bewustzijnstests 
aan de gebruikstests vooraf gaan; extralinguistische factoren spelen, ten 
tweede, een rol waar het de interpretatie van natuurlijk geslacht betreft; 
en ten derde zijn de kinderen onderhevig aan stereotype interpretaties die 
zich soms uitdrukken in fouten tegen het syntaktisch geslacht. 
De resultaten van de bewustzijnstests bevestigen, net als in Studie A, 
voor een gedeelte de voorspellingen. Er blijkt nog duidelijker dan in Studie 
A dat er geen sprake is van een uniform metalinguistisch vermogen (zo blijken 
kinderen over het algemeen al vroeg verklaringen te kunnen geven voor de lin-
guistische effecten van natuurlijk geslacht, maar nauwelijks of niet voor die 
van syntaktisch geslacht). Het kunnen verklaren van de relatie tussen natuur-
lijk geslacht en extralinguistische referentie is veel vroeger het geval dan 
het verklaren van de metalinguistische referentie van syntactisch geslacht, 
dit ondanks het feit dat zowel correct gebruik als foutcorrecties voor 
natuurlijk geslacht vroeger zijn kunnen. 
Verder is er nog een zevental factoren die het taalbewustzijn in deze 
experimentele taken blijken te beïnvloeden. De eerste drie ervan kwamen ook 
in Studie A naar voren: het "bewustzijnsverhogend" effect van metalinguis-
tische ervaringen, het streven van het kind naar intralinguistische coherentie, 
en het groeiend bewustzijn van het coöperatieve principe in conversaties. 
De vierde factor is de neiging van het kind "natuurlijke" verklaringen te 
geven voor syntaktisch geslacht. De vijfde factor is het differentiële be-
wustzijn dat het kind vertoont voor sonni ge kenmerken van de voornaamwoorden 
(met name het kenmerk "bezit" wordt goed beheerst in de bewustzijnstaken). 
De zesde factor is de preferentie van het kind voor natuurlijk geslacht 
wanneer syntaktisch en natuurlijk geslacht conflicteren. De zevende, ten-
slotte, is een neiging tot stereotypering bij het geven van verklaringen 
(van bepaalde kleuren wordt bijvoorbeeld gezegd dat die mannelijk of vrouwe-
lijk zijn, hetgeen op zijn beurt het geslacht van het bijbehorende voornaam-
woord bepaalt). 
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De belangrijkste hypothese van Studie В die de relatie tussen vroeg 
taalbewustzijn en later taalgebruik betreft, kon worden bevestigd: vroeg 
taalbewustzijn is een goede predictor voor later correct taalgebruik. Het 
ligt ook hier weer voor de hand te veronderstellen dat taalbewustzijn een 
instrumentele of faciliterende werking heeft. Voorts zijn er weer de twee 
additionele bevindingen, namelijk dat vroeg taalbewustzijn een betere pre­
dictor is voor taalgebruik vijf maanden later dan vroeg taalgebruik, en dat 
vroeg taalgebruik geen predictieve waarde heeft voor later taalbewustzijn. 
Hierop is slechts één uitzondering: er is een verband tussen taalgebruik in 
de eerste test en correcties van foute voornaamwoorden in de tweede test. 
Hoofdstuk 8 bespreekt enkele theoretische implicaties van onze belang-
rijkste resultaten: Bewustzijnstests geven ons inzicht in waar kinderen mee 
"aan het werk zijn" in hun taalontwikkeling. Het vermoeden wordt uitgespro-
ken dat bepaalde vormen van taalkennis beschikbaar kunnen zijn vóórdat die 
kennis volledig geautomatiseerd als vaardigheid functioneert. De toestand 
van deze "voorkennis" blijkt een goede predictor te zijn voor automatische 
verwerkingsmogelijkheden dat het kind in een volgend stadium vertoont. De 
suggestie wordt gedaan dat er een "bewuste" fase vooraf gaat aan de uitein-
delijke en volledig automatische beheersing van de onderzochte voornaam-
woorden. 
Onze resultaten zijn de eerste experimentele gegevens die wijzen op een 
specifieke rol van metalinguistische functies in het verwerven van primaire 
linguistische vaardigheden. Toch is het onderzoek noodzakelijkerwijs van be-
perkte omvang, en het laat een aantal belangrijke vragen onbeantwoord. 
Hoofdstuk 8 wordt derhalve besloten met enkele suggesties voor verder onder-
zoek over de rol van bewuste reflectie in de verwerving van linguistische 
en andere cognitieve vaardigheden. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die vorliegende Arbeit befaßt sich mit der Frage, welche Rolle das 
"Sprachbewußtsein" (d.h. der Fähigkeit über Sprachstrukturen und -funktionen 
zu reflektieren und sie zu kommentieren) in der Sprachentwicklung spielt. 
Zwei Hauptziele werden angestrebt. Ein erstes Ziel dieser Arbeit ist 
die Erforschung kindlichen Verstehens (im folgenden "Performanz" genannt) 
und Bewußtseins (verschiedene metasprachliche Fähigkeiten) deutscher Possessiv-
pronomina in der Sprachentwicklung. Ein zweites Ziel betrifft Ursachen und 
Funktionen von metasprachlichen Fähigkeiten im Spracherwerb. Kommunikative 
Fehler könnten eine Ursache für die Entstehung von Sprachbewußtsein sein. 
Eine mögliche Funktion des Sprachbewußtseins könnte die Verhinderung oder 
Korrektur solcher Fehler sein. 
Die zentrale These lautet: Sprachbewußtsein hat eine nützliche Funktion 
in der Entwicklung primärer Sprachfähigkeiten. Deshalb sollte man erwarten, 
daß Sprachbewußtsein in einem Entwicklungsabschnitt (erkennbar an Fehler-
entdeckungen, der Fähigkeit bessere Alternativen zu liefern und Erklärungen 
abzugeben) die primäre Sprachfähigkeit, besonders die des Verstehens, in 
einem nächsten Entwicklungsabschnitt vorhersagen kann. 
Zwei Untersuchungen wurden konzipiert, in denen Sprachverstehen und 
Sprachbewußtsein deutscher Possessivpronomina mittels Querschnitt- und Läng-
schnittdaten überprüft wurden. Das Hauptaugenmerk der ersten Untersuchung, 
"wechselnde Referenz" (Untersuchung A), wird auf das kindliche Verstehen und 
Bewußtsein des Sprecher/Adressaten-Wechsel s gerichtet, besonders auf solche 
Pronomina, die ihre Form in Abhängigkeit vom Bezugspunkt (Sprecher oder 
Adressat) ändern. (Beispiel: Wenn ein Sprecher "mein Geschenk" sagt, muß der 
Adressat zu demselben Geschenk "dein Geschenk" sagen. Wenn jedoch ein Sprecher 
in bezug auf das Geschenk eines Dritten "sein Geschenk" sagt, so muß auch 
der Adressat "sein Geschenk" sagen.) Das Hauptaugenmerk der zweiten Unter-
suchung, "natürliches und gramatikalisches Geschlecht" (Untersuchung B), 
wird auf das kindliche Verstehen und Bewußtsein des "natürlichen Geschlechts" 
mit seiner außersprachlichen Referenz und des "grammatikalischen Geschlechts" 
mit seiner innersprachlichen Referenz gerichtet. Beide Untersuchungen haben 
dasselbe experimentelle Design. Deutsche Possessivpronomina fungieren als 
Untersuchungsvariablen. 
Das vorliegende Buch enthält acht Kapitel. Es beginnt mit einer Darstel-
lung der Forschungsziele und der allgemeinen Untersuchungsbedingungen (Kapitel 1). 
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Kapitel 2 befaßt sich mit der linguistischen Analyse derjenigen Pronomina, 
die in den Experimenten beider Untersuchungen verwendet werden. Verschiedene 
Merkmale von Pronomina werden betrachtet : morphophonologische, syntaktische, 
semantische und deiktische Merkmale. Die Komplexität verschiedener Pronomina 
wird mit Bezug auf diese Charakteristika analysiert. 
In Kapitel 3 werden allgemeine Voraussagen über die Anordnung des Pro-
nomenerwerbs in den Performanztests abgeleitet. Unsere Vorhersagen basieren 
auf unterschiedlichen Komplexitäten morphophonologischer, syntaktischer, 
semantischer und deiktischer Merkmale. In 3.4 wird ein Oberblick über die 
Vorhersagen für die Verstehenstests (Performanz) in Untersuchung A, "wech-
selnde Referenz" (vgl. Tabelle 10) und über die Vorhersagen für die Verste-
henstests (Performanz) in Untersuchung B, "natürliches und grammatikalisches 
Geschlecht" (vgl. Tabelle 11) gegeben. In 3.5 werden Längschnitt- und Quer-
schnittstudien aus der Literatur zum Erwerb von Possessivpronomina in bezug 
auf unsere Vorhersagen besprochen. 
Kapitel 4 enthält allgemeine theoretische Annahmen über das Sprachbe-
wußtsein. In 4.1 werden Annahmen über die Struktur des Sprachbewußtseins 
diskutiert und in 4.2 Annahmen über seine Funktionen. In 4.3 wird die Litera-
tur zu Forschungen über erkennbare Ausdrucksformen verschiedener metasprach-
licher Fähigkeiten aufgearbeitet. Dieser Literaturüberblick beschränkt sich 
vor allem auf diejenigen metasprachlichen Fähigkeiten, die in unserer 
Forschung untersucht werden: Fehlerentdeckungen, Korrekturen und Erklärungen. 
In Kapitel 5 werden allgemeine Hypothesen über die Rolle des Sprachbe-
wußtseins in Bezug auf unsere Untersuchungen dargelegt. Unsere zentrale 
Hypothese lautet: Frühe metasprachliche Fähigkeiten können spätere Performanz 
vorhersagen. 
Kapitel 6 behandelt Untersuchung A, "wechselnde Referenz". 59 deutschen 
Kindern im Alter von 3 bis 6 Jahren wurden Aufgaben gegeben, die Verstehen 
(Performanz) und Bewußtsein überprüfen. Zweierlei Arten von Daten wurden zu 
zwei verschiedenen Erfassungszeitpunkten (mit einem Zeitintervall von fünf 
Monaten) erhoben. 
Die Ergebnisse der Performanztests zeigen, daß der kindliche Erwerb von 
Possessivpronomina sehr wahrscheinlich durch eine Kombination von semantischen 
und deiktischen (proximalen) Merkmalen beeinflußt wird. Die Voraussagen der 
Semantischen Merkmalshypothese (der "Semantic Feature Hypothesis", "SFH", 
von Eve und Herbert Clark) und die Voraussagen, die auf dem Kontrast von 
Nähe/Feme ("proximal-nonproximal contrast") basieren, haben deutlich 
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stärkere Vorhersagekraft als die Voraussagen, die auf morphophonologisehen, 
syntaktischen und weiteren deiktischen Charakteristika basieren. Darüber-
hinaus scheinen einige zusätzliche Faktoren beim Prononenerwerb eine Rolle 
zu spielen: die Konzentration von Kindern auf die Dyade der Gesprächsteil-
nehmer, ihre Beibehaltung des "Geschlechtsmerkmales" beim Sprecherpronomen 
"mein" und beim Adressatenpronomen "dein", ein Konflikt zwischen Dritt-
personenpronomina und PIuralpronomi na und ebenso nonverbale Faktoren. 
Die Ergebnisse der BewuStseinstests weisen darauf hin, daß unsere Vor-
hersagen über das Sprachbewußtsein zum Teil bestätigt werden konnten. Offen-
sichtlich wird Kinder etwas leichter bewußt, wenn es von ihrem eigenen ego-
zentrischen Standpunkt verschieden ist (und nicht nur von dem Standpunkt 
eines Erwachsenen). Verschiedene metasprachliche Fähigkeiten entwickeln sich 
nicht in derselben Weise. Wenn die Qualität von Pronomenkorrekturen berück-
sichtigt wird, können wir feststellen, daß Sprachurteile (d.h. Fehlerent-
deckungen) angemessenen Korrekturen vorausgehen. 
Andere Faktoren scheinen metasprachliche Fähigkeiten von Kindern zu 
beeinflussen: die Verstärkung des Sprachbewußtseins durch metasprachliche 
Erfahrung (dieses Ergebnis spricht gegen die Annahme einer metasprachlichen 
Fähigkeit), das Herausragen dyadischer Faktoren, der Wechsel vom Egozentris-
mus in jüngeren Kindern zur Perspektivenübernahme in älteren Kindern (unsere 
Daten zeigen vier einander überlappende, aber klar voneinander unterscheid-
bare Phasen in der Entwicklung von Selbstreflexionen und sozialen Kognitio-
nen bei Kindern), das Streben von Kindern nach innersprachlicher Kohärenz 
und ein wachsendes Bewußtsein des Kooperationsprinzips in Konversationen (im 
Sinne des Sprachphilosophen H.P. Grice). 
Hinsichtlich der Beziehung zwischen frühem Bewußtsein und späterer 
Performanz konnten wir die Haupthypothese bestätigen, daß frühes Sprachbe-
wußsein (erkennbar an Fehlerentdeckungen und Korrekturen) spätere Performanz 
vorhersagen kann. Dieses Resultat stützt die Annahme, daß Bewußtsein sich 
nützlich oder fördernd auf die Entwicklung primärer Sprachfähigkeiten aus-
wirken kann. Weiterhin ermittelten wir zwei weitere wichtige Ergebnisse: 
erstens, frühes Bewußtsein (wie es aus Fehlererkennungen und Korrekturen 
ersichtlich ist) scheint im allgemeinen spätere Sprachperformanz besser vor-
herzusagen als frühe Sprachperformanz, und zweitens, frühe Sprachperformanz 
kann späteres Bewußtsein nicht vorhersagen. 
In Kapitel 7 wird Untersuchung B,"natürliches und grammatikalisches 
Geschlecht", dargestellt. 61 deutschen Kindern im Alter von 3 bis 6 Jahren 
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wurden Aufgaben gegeben, die Verstehen (Performanz) und Bewußtsein überprüfen 
(die Kinder in Untersuchung В waren nicht dieselbe wie die in Untersuchung 
A). Wiederum wurden zweierlei Arten von Daten zu zwei verschiedenen Erfas­
sungszeitpunkten (mit einem Zeitintervall von fünf Monaten) erhoben. 
Die Performanztests zeigen überraschende Ergebnisse: Das "gramiatika-
lische Geschlecht" mit seiner morphophonologischen/syntagmatischen Grundlage 
und innersprachlichen Referenz wird früher erworben als das "natürliche 
Geschlecht" mit seiner semantischen/kognitiven Grundlage und außersprachlichen 
Referenz. Offensichtlich sind beim frühen Geschlechtserwerb morphophonolo-
gische Faktoren ausschlaggebend. Dies bedeutet, daß unsere Daten die kogni-
tive Sichtweise der Piaget-Schule nicht stutzen. Darüberhinaus scheinen 
einige weitere Faktoren Einfluß zu haben: erstens, Kinder zeigen plunfunk-
tionellen Gebrauch in der Performanztests, wenn die Bewußtseinstests vor den 
Performanztests gegeben werden-, zweitens, Kinder verlassen sich auf außer-
sprachliche Faktoren in den Aufgaben zum "naturlichen Geschlecht", und 
drittens, Fehler in den Aufgaben zum "granmatikalischen Geschlecht" können 
zum Teil durch Stereotypien von Kindern erklart werden. 
Die Ergebnisse der Bewußtseinstests zeigen, daß - ähnlich wie in Unter-
suchung А - unsere Vorhersagen teilweise bestätigt werden konnten. Kinder 
"korrigieren" nicht nur falsche Aussagen, sondern auch richtige mit pluri-
funktionellen Pronomina. Untersuchung В weist noch deutlicher als Unter­
suchung A darauf hin, daß wir nicht eine einheitliche metasprachliche Fähig-
keit vermuten sollten (Erklärungen für das natürliche und das grarniati ka-
li sehe Geschlecht sind voneinander sehr verschieden). Wir fanden auch, daß 
es leichter ist, sich des naturlichen Geschlechts mit seiner außersprach-
lichen Referenz bewußt zu werden als des "grammatikalischen Geschlechts" mit 
seiner innersprachlichen Referenz, obwohl Pronomenkorrekturen beim granma-
tikal ischen Geschlecht früher als Pronomenkorrekturen beim natürlichen 
Geschlecht auftreten. 
Sieben weitere Faktoren, die dem Bewußtsein in den Aufgaben zum natür-
lichen und granmatikali sehen Geschlecht zu Grunde liegen, konnten gefunden 
werden. Die ersten drei Faktoren wurden auch in Untersuchung A beobachtet: 
die Verstärkung des Bewußtseins (Fehlererkennungen und Korrekturen) durch 
metasprachliche Erfahrung, das Streben von Kindern nach innersprachlicher 
Kohärenz und im Bewußtsein des Kooperationspostulats in Konversationen. Der 
vierte Faktor ist eine Post-hoc-Rationalisierung von Kindern, wenn sie das 
natürliche Geschlecht für die Erklärung des granulati kal i sehen Geschlechts 
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heranziehen. Bei den Altersstufen und Aufgaben unserer Studie könnten Kinder 
sprachliche Informationen auf einem völlig automatischen Niveau verfehlt 
haben, obgleich diese Informationen mehr kontrollierter Informationsverarbei-
tung zugänglich waren. Vorhandensein (oder Fehlen) dieser relevanten Infor-
mationen oder dieses Wissens scheint spätere automatische Verarbeitung am 
besten zu prognostizieren. Wir nehmen deshalb ein "bewußtes" Vorstadium in 
der Entwicklung der automatischen Verarbeitung von Pronomen an. 
Obgleich unsere Resultate die ersten experimentellen Daten sind, die 
beim Erwerb automatischen Sprachverstehens für metasprachliche Fähigkeiten 
eine spezifische Rolle nahelegen, ist diese Studie notwendigerweise hinsicht-
lich ihrer theoretischen Reichweite beschränkt und läßt eine Reihe von wich-
tigen Bereichen unberührt. Deshalb werden in Kapitel 8 auch Vorschläge für 
weitere Forschung formuliert: Untersuchungen sollen angeregt werden, die die 
Rolle des Bewußtseins beim Erwerb sprachlicher und anderer kognitiver 
Fähigkeiten erforschen. 
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STELLINGEN 
1 
Taalbewustzijn is van grotere betekenis voor de verwerving van termen met 
variabele referentie dan voor termen met niet-variabele referentie. 
2 
Zelfreflektie is nodig voor het bereiken van zowel de "conventionele niveaus" 
als de "post-conventionele niveaus" in de morele ontwikkeling. 
Kohlberg, L. Zur kognitiven Entwicklung des Kindes. Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974, en Kohlberg, L. Philosophy of moral development. 
Vol. 1. New York: Harper & Row, 1981, in het bijzonder Kohl berg's stages 
3, 4, 5, en 6. 
3 
Kinderen kunnen nauwkeuriger oordelen geven over de frekwentie van inhouds-
woorden dan over die van functiewoorden. 
4 
Succesvolle TV-series hebben de aandacht van de kijkers gestimuleerd. In 
geval van herhaling worden ze eerder bekeken dan programma-alternatieven die 
alleen maar nieuwe, onbekende dingen aanbieden, omdat de kijkers met de scenes, 
Intriges en akteurs vertrouwd zijn. 
Tannenbaum, P.H. Entertainment as vicarious emotional experience. In: 
P.H. Tannenbaum (ed.) The entertainment functions of television. 
Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1980. 
5 
Oe stadia die Selman onderscheidt in de ontwikkeling van perspektiefnemen 
gelden niet alleen voor interpersonale conmunicatie maar ook voor media-
effecten. 
6 
Micro-electronisehe Informatie- en documentatiesystemen in bibliotheken 
en archieven kunnen de kenniskloof tussen gebruikers met hogere en lagere 
opleidingen vergroten. 
7 
Men kan op theoretische gronden verwachten dat autistische kinderen die 
problemen hebben met persoon-deixis, ook problemen hebben met plaats- en 
tijd-deixis. 
Bertolucci, G. & Albers, R.J. Deictic categories in the language of 
autistic children. Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia, 4, 
1972, 131-144, en Fay, W.H., Schuier, A.L. & Schiefelbusch, R.L. (eds.) 
Emerging language in autistic children. Baltimore: University Park Press, 
1980. 
8 
Scherer's "parasemantische funkties", die niet-verbale comnunicatie relate-
ren aan verbale communicatie (met name "substitutie", "amplificatie", "con-
tradictie" en "modificatie") hebben geen duidelijke theoretische of methodo-
logische status. 
Scherer, K.R. Die Funktionen des nonverbalen Verhaltens im Gespräch. In: 
D. Wegner (ed.) Gesprächsanalysen. Hamburg: Buske, 1978, 275-295. 
9 
Wanneer kleine kinderen gedragsmotieven beoordelen, letten ze meer op non-
verbale dan op verbale indicaties. 
Böhme, К. Nonverbale Коптиni kation. In: H.J. Kagelman & G. Wenninger (eds.) 
Medienpsychologie. Ein Handbuch In Schlüssel begriffen. München: Urban & 
Schwarzenberg, 1982, 127-133. 
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